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USSR Report

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

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19 August 1985

USSR REPORT

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

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U.S., USSR POLICIES CONTRASTED ON WW II VICTORY ANNIVERSARY

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 85 pp 3-16

[Article by Chief Marshal of Artillery V. F. Tolubko: "The Lessons of History and Our Time"]

The 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War is approaching. In today's complicated international situation we keep on turning to historical records, their glorious pages and lessons.

According to Marxist-Leninist teachings, war is an inherent property of imperialism; it is rooted deep in imperialism's aggressive nature and internal contradictions as corroborated by the march of history itself. Over the 20th century alone the insatiable Moloch of war has taken away dozens of millions of human lives. The last world war was no exception—its was also caused by factors inherent in imperialism.

Seeking to redivide the world and establish its domination over it, German imperialism launched two world wars in the first part of the 20th century and both times they ended in Germany's defeat. Twice the German nation was thrown by its rulers into an abyss of national disaster. The Nazi Germany suffered a staggering defeat in World War II when it treacherously attacked a socialist state—the Soviet Union. The Great Patriotic War was a major integral component of the last world war and the Soviet-German front proved to be decisive in it. It was the central theatre of worldwide military operations. The Soviet people and their armed forces selflessly defended their socialist Fatherland and fulfilled their internationalist mission with flying colours. Fascism was defeated.

What is the message of World War II and why its results and lessons are so instructive?

A major lesson of the last war is that it has forcefully demonstrated that imperialist plans for achieving world supremacy, however strong the aggressor might be, are adventurous and have no leg to stand on. These plans proved abortive even at a time when there were no massive anti-imperialist popular movements. Still more unrealistic they appear in our time when the powerful system of socialism is going from strength to strength and the influence of the people on the march of world history becomes ever more pronounced.

The struggle for a just cause always wins the sympathies of progressive-minded forces throughout the world. The Great Patriotic War was a just war of liberation and the Soviet Union's participation in it aroused the sympathies and gained the support of broad popular masses in other countries. The Hitlerites' plans to isolate the Soviet Union exploded. The Soviet Union was not alone. On the contrary, a powerful anti-fascist coalition formed around it and was led by it. History has shown that any attacks of the aggressive forces of imperialism against the national interests of other countries, their attempts to destroy world civilization and impose their dominance over humanity arouse indignation

and resolute resistance by peace-loving peoples. Postwar developments have proved once again that such attempts are rebuffed with increasing vigour.

Another important lesson of the last world war demonstrates the invincibility of socialism, and its tremendous economic, social, political and spiritual advantages. Before attacking the Soviet Union Nazi Germany invaded several capitalist countries. None of them could withstand the fascists' offensive. They were conquered one after another within a matter of several months, weeks or even days, but the powerful, well armed and experienced fascist army failed to defeat the Soviet Union.

The decisive economic advantages of socialism enabled the Soviet Union to outstrip Hitler Germany in the manufacture of all types of military hardware. At the initial stages of the war our country lost its vital economic areas which accounted for 45 per cent of its population, 47 per cent of the arable land, two-thirds of coal production, more than 50 per cent of steel output, and an overwhelming share of military equipment, arms and munitions production. But using the benefits characteristic of the socialist system and relying on the industrial facilities that had been built in the eastern part of the country during the Five-Year-Plan periods preceding the war, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government succeeded in rapidly retooling the economy to meet wartime requirements. Within six months 1,523 industrial enterprises, mainly in defense, and more than 10 million workers were evacuated to the eastern areas of the country. In fact, a whole industrial power was moved over thousands of miles. Every record was broken in reconstructing the evacuated plants, building new ones and putting them into operation. Truly heroic efforts of working people made it possible to put some of the evacuated plants back into operation after 3-4 weeks and in 3-4 months some of them exceeded prewar production levels. By mid-1942, the economic switch-over to a war footing had been on the whole completed and by 1943, the end of the first period of the war, a smooth-functioning defence-oriented economy was increasingly meeting the needs at the front. In the long run, despite extremely difficult conditions the Soviet Union had, over the course of the war, produced 1.5-2 times more military hardware than Germany and its satellites.

Our agriculture also met the challenges posed by the war. In 1941-1944 the Soviet Union's grain harvest exceeded the level achieved by Russia during World War I more than three-fold.

Soviet military science also proved superior to the notorious "Prussian military school" on the giant battlefields of the last war. The Germans were outgeneralled and outmanoeuvred by the Soviet army. Most operations of the Soviet armed forces, justly recognized as the summit in the art of warfare, were original and daring, well-calculated, planned, and far-sighted; they were distinguished for tactical and strategical mobility and resolution and for flexible and firm control of the troops.

On the other hand, the war proved that the general strategic concepts of the German military leadership were scientifically untenable as they were based on the adventurous policies of the Nazis who had unleashed an unjust, anti-popular, predatory war.

The struggle of the Soviet people against Hitler's Germany was a competition not only in the economic and military fields. It was also a battle between two antagonistic ideologies—the ideology of socialism, the most humanitarian in history, and that of fascism, the most inhuman ideology which is based on nationalism and racial hatred and is the most reactionary and dangerous variety of bourgeois ideology. It reflected German monopolistic capital's ambition for world supremacy.

The imperialist and aggressive ideology of German fascism was counterposed by Marxist-Leninist, socialist ideology which reflects the basic interests of the working class, of all working men, an ideology of equality, friendship of nations, and proletarian internationalism.

In the war years Marxist-Leninist ideology, a powerful spiritual weapon of the Soviet people, triumphed over the misanthropic, savage ideology of fascism. It was the victory of progress over reaction, of humanism over barbarism. It was new striking proof that socialist ideology is the most advanced, progressive and effective of all ideologies. In times of great hardships the ideological staunchness and convictions of the Soviet people were opened up for all to see, as were their patriotism and faith in the triumph of communism. They spared neither energy nor their lives to defend their socialist country and communist ideals, to fulfil their patriotic and internationalist duty to the end. The vast spiritual potential of our people enabled Soviet soldiers to excel the nazis in staunchness and courage. Lenin's prophetic words, "A nation in which the majority of the workers and peasants realise, feel and see that they are fighting for their own Soviet power, for the rule of the working people, for the cause whose victory will ensure them and their children all the benefits of culture, of all that has been created by human labour—such a nation can never be vanquished,"¹ came true.

The next lesson to be learnt from the last world war is that in the era of the transition from capitalism to socialism and communism the imperialists' military ventures on a world scale inevitably backfire against themselves, against the aggressor country, and against the capitalist system as a whole.

World War I resulted in the Russia's withdrawal from the system of capitalism and the formation of the world's first socialist state of workers and peasants. Imperialism's positions had been significantly weakened. World War II added to the general crisis of capitalism: a world socialist system was formed and is now making steady and continuous headway; the colonial system of imperialism collapsed. As a result, the sphere of imperialist domination of the world has been essentially narrowed. Imperialism has bogged down still deeper in internal and international contradictions, paroxysms and conflicts.

A question therefore arises whether those who are to blame for instigating the world wars have learnt their lessons of history and made appropriate conclusions thereof. The postwar developments and the present international situation belie the positive answer.

As before imperialism continues to be the main cause of the escalating danger of war. The only change to take place in the imperialist camp after World War II has been a realignment of forces with US imperialism stepping in to serve as the major stronghold of world reaction. It has inherited the imperial ambitions of the "Third Reich", become an international gendarme and an enemy of peace, freedom, democracy and socialism. "Recent years", pointed out Konstantin Chernenko, in his speech at the Kuybishev electoral district in Moscow on March 2, 1984, "have been marked by much more active policies of the aggressive forces of US imperialism, the policies of outright militarism and claims for world supremacy". Historical experience confirms Lenin's assessment of imperialism, his conclusion that "world domination is, to put it briefly, the substance of imperialist policy, of which imperialist war is the continuation."²

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 319.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 35.

Imperialist wars cause huge, ever increasing material losses. The damage inflicted on the young Soviet Republic by the civil war and the Entente powers' intervention reached approximately 50,000 million gold roubles. In the last war the German fascists burnt down and destroyed 1,710 Soviet cities and townships, over 70,000 villages and hamlets, more than 6 million houses. Over 25 million Soviet people were rendered homeless. The Hitlerites burnt down and demolished about 32,000 industrial enterprises, 4,100 railway stations, 40,000 hospitals and 84,000 schools.

World War I cost humanity (in 1913 comparable prices, including expenditures on post-war rehabilitation) \$280,000 million, whereas World War II ran up to \$3.3 trillion. The military spending of all countries over the period of 1945-1975 comprised (in the same prices) \$5.65 trillion, i. e., one and a half times more than the cost of the two world wars.³

The toll of human lives taken by imperialist wars increases in geometrical progression. As compared to the 18th century, the average annual casualties in the 19th century wars increased by 41 per cent. In the 20th century the figure skyrocketed to 1,070 per cent. Russia lost 8 million people as the result of the civil war and foreign intervention. The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 against fascist Germany took a toll of 20 million of human lives in the Soviet Union.

Contemporary imperialism's aggressive policies mirror a series of new modern trends.

Contemporary US-led imperialism not only increases the danger of a new world war; it adds a new monstrous dimension to its fatal consequences. In the past imperialism threatened mankind with wars and the enslavement of individual countries and regions; today it threatens mankind with a nuclear holocaust and the destruction of human civilization. This is a new sinister quality in the escalation of the danger of war.

The evolution of anti-communism in the capitalist countries has reached the extremes. Modern anti-Sovietism has assumed the form of a "crusade" against communism, against the USSR and other socialist nations. This "crusade" was announced by President Reagan in 1982 and it is not just a slogan, but a real foreign policy programme of action followed by the USA and the NATO countries.

The USA and NATO's new strategic concepts also testify to the increased aggressiveness of the contemporary imperialists' policy. The strategy of "direct confrontation" between the USA and the USSR on global and regional levels in the 1980s has come to replace the strategic concepts of "massive retaliation" (the 1950s), "flexible response" (the 1960s) and "realistic intimidation" (the 1970s). The US strategy of the 1980s is especially aggressive and dangerous for peace because it promotes the acceleration of preparations for the US military machine for "local", global or even star wars. A focal point running through all the above concepts, is a first, pre-emptive nuclear strike against the USSR.

The US Administration has turned down repeated Soviet proposals to follow the example of the Soviet Union which pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. NATO top brass formulated new doctrines based on military use of the latest scientific and technological achievements.

In the late seventies and the early eighties US aggressive circles backed up by their NATO allies came up with an initiative to break the strategic balance and achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union and the socialist community countries. With this in mind, the Reagan Ad-

³ See O. E. Vlasievich, *The Economic Burden of Imperialism*, Moscow, 1980, p. 137 (in Russian).

ministration announced in 1981 that its strategic programme for the 1980s would envisage the development and deployment of new weapons systems based on the latest military scientific and technological achievements. The cost of the programme for 1982-1987 alone is estimated by the White House at \$222,000 million. The programme provides for the production of 100 new "MX" inter-continental missiles by 1986. The US also intends in the near future to commission new atomic submarines of the "Ohio" type equipped with nuclear missiles and to supply its armed forces, as of 1986, with new strategic B-1 bombers carrying cruise missiles. All these are first strike (or the so-called "disarming") weapons.

General-purpose forces are also being streamlined and updated. Simultaneously, work is underway to develop fundamentally new types of weaponry, including space armaments, as well as other means of mass annihilation—chemical, biological and laser beam weapons. Recently, the White House has made public a special Presidential decree which is meant to set up a special commission on problems pertaining to chemical weapons. There is every reason to believe that the activity of that commission will be connected with the further modernisation of US chemical armaments.

To act free in the arms buildup, US and NATO leaders shirk straightforward negotiations on stopping and limiting the arms race. The US Administration has brought to a deadlock talks on these important issues. Their refusal to discuss them in a constructive spirit is explained by an alleged disparity between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, by the military superiority of the Soviet Union over the USA. But this is just an excuse for justifying the arms race and war preparations.

In their efforts to escalate the danger of war US imperialists seek to extend their military presence in various parts of the globe. Today the USA boasts of 2,500 military bases and installations on the territory of 114 countries. Europe alone permanently hosts 0.5 million GIs, 8,000 units of nuclear munition, and 3,000 nuclear delivery systems; over 3,000 units of nuclear munition are deployed in the Far East and Southeast Asia, mostly near the Soviet and other socialist community countries' borders.

In December 1979 the governments of the NATO countries approved a dangerous decision which threw open Europe's doors to new US medium-range missiles. In November 1983 they started to put the decision into effect. Over 100 "Pershings" and cruise missiles aimed at the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are already deployed in Western Europe.⁴

In addition to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans where it has numerous military bases the USA seeks to build up its military presence in the Indian Ocean. The Pentagon is in a hurry to set up a network of military bases in the Middle East declared a zone of US vital interests.

In recent years the USA and its NATO allies have been stepping up massive military exercises involving hundreds of thousands of men and a lot of hardware. Many of these are conducted near the Soviet and other socialist community countries' borders, thus creating a special danger of provoking a military conflict.

The USA puts a lot of pressure on European, Asian and Latin American countries to have them join the anti-Soviet front. It does everything it can to revive Japanese militarism and incorporate it in the NATO military and political machine. The USA bends over backwards to encourage revanchist forces in Japan and to fan the nationalistic sentiment of certain social groups in this country apropos "northern territories".

⁴ See *Pravda*, Dec. 12, 1984.

Of late the White House has been paying special attention to Asia. Under the hackneyed pretext of "Soviet military threat" the Pentagon continues to build up its military muscle in the Far East, the Pacific, and the Indian Oceans, seeking to intimidate the peoples of this region with the "communist menace". An active desire to turn the developments in Asia in favour of US imperialist interests and to convert the continent into another anti-socialist, anti-peace and anti-progress front can easily be traced in the foreign-policy and military activities of the present US Administration. This dangerous approach to the problems of the region is not accidental. President Reagan's adventurous policy is staked on brute force and vain plans to turn back the wheel of history.

Since the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia in 1917 which, as Lenin put it, awakened Asia, the peoples of this continent, today accounting for more than three-fifths of the world population, have scored important successes in their struggle for national and social liberation. The changes here can be seen with the naked eye. The ill-famed colonial system has collapsed. The oppressed nations have won political independence and have defended it from imperialist direct attempts to reimpose slavery. They won the right to choose their own way of life. The peoples of Mongolia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, China and three Indochinese countries have opted for socialism.

The new positive changes throughout Asia were not to the liking of the imperialists. The military circles of the USA, Japan and other Washington-oriented governments and countries in Asia and the Pacific area have built up a military machine spearheaded against the Soviet Union and other progressive forces of the region. According to Western press, the US overseas contingent in the Far East is second to that stationed in Europe, with approximately 0.5 million officers and men. The USA has over 300 military installations here and its 7th fleet, equipped with nuclear weapons, roams the waters of the region.

Examples of brazen US behaviour from positions of strength in various regions, including Asia, are numerous: the dirty war in Vietnam; military aid to Afghan dushmans; seizure of Grenada; deliveries of arms, munitions and military advisers to the military junta in El Salvador; attempts to stifle freedom in Nicaragua through the use of mercenaries; comprehensive military support to Israeli aggressive actions in Lebanon and against Syria; assistance in building up South African military potential; and participation of US and South African mercenaries in armed raids against Angola. All of this has disgraced US imperialism.

The most reactionary US circles resort to more severe policies toward the Soviet Union and other socialist nations, including various economic, political and cultural "sanctions" against Poland and the USSR. Ideological pressure on the Soviet Union and other countries of socialist community has been stepped up. The imperialists have launched a large-scale "psychological war" which is another dangerous variety of aggression infringing on the sovereignty of these countries.

The aim of the "psychological war" is to demoralise the socialist society from within. Intensive work is underway in all countries to brainwash public opinion, camouflage the aggressive nature of the imperialist powers' policies and give a secret, evil twist to the peaceful policies of the socialist countries. Imperialist propaganda seeks to instill the population in Western countries with fear of communism, get people accustomed to the idea of an inevitable war with the socialist countries and make them willingly accept any aggressive foreign policy venture. The ideological expansion of imperialism is an expression of its aggressive strategy stemming from the deepening general crisis of capitalism.

The situation warrants that every effort be mobilized against the reactionary imperialist forces for peace and security of nations; that the defence capability of all socialist countries be enhanced, as well as the combat preparedness of their armed forces as a decisive factor in curbing the aggressor.

The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee on the 40th anniversary of V-Day points out that "it is necessary to fight against a war before it has started. Historical experience carries the following message: concerted, coordinated and vigorous actions of all peace-loving forces against the aggressive ventures of imperialism are needed to uphold peace. It is necessary to enhance the vigilance of the peoples, to protect and multiply the gains of socialism".

Like all nations of the socialist community the Soviet Union has a concrete programme of action—the Peace Programme. The CPSU and the Soviet government steadfastly carry out the mandate of their people; they do everything in their power to justify the hopes of mankind for a lasting peace, for a peaceful sky over the earth. The Soviet Union has never been seeking military supremacy. It wants our planet to be free of nuclear weapons and is prepared to limit or ban any kinds of armaments on the basis of a mutual agreement. The peace initiatives and proposals which the Soviet Union has put forward encompass a wide range of political and military measures to this effect.

The problem of war and peace, of preserving peace and preventing a nuclear catastrophe has become central in our time. Along with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries waging a consistent and resolute struggle against the nuclear war, the international working class and its vanguard—the communist parties, as well as the national liberation movements have offered strong resistance to the warmongers. The anti-war movement has been joined by many peace-loving nonaligned nations of Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. A vigorous anti-war campaign is being led by the World Peace Movement which embraces the broadest sections of population all over the globe.

Lenin once said: "We promise the workers and peasants to do everything for peace. And this we shall do". Ever since the Soviet state emerged our Party has been sparing no effort to fulfil this promise. International practices irrefutably prove that the world socialist system has been producing decisive effects on historical developments. Every day brings fresh evidence that the socialist community countries act as generators of international peace initiatives. "As for the CPSU and the Soviet State", emphasised Konstantin Chernenko in his speech in the Kremlin on November 7, 1984, "We together with the fraternal parties and in unity with the countries of the socialist community did and will do all in our power to improve the political climate on our planet and to avert the military threat hanging over mankind".

Indeed, the Soviet Union has come out with concrete initiatives with regard to every problem, every field of importance related to present-day international security which reflect its real aspiration and work for peace. Soviet proposals are aimed, in the first place, against the use and for the ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons. It is obvious that the relations between all nuclear states ought to be based on certain rules. Taking into consideration the disastrous implications of any nuclear conflict the most important of these rules is that these states should regard the prevention of a nuclear war as the major goal of their foreign policy. It is also expedient that propaganda of a nuclear war—both global and "limited"—be abolished and states, following the example of the Soviet Union, undertake not to use nuclear weapons first. Other obligations of a similar nature ensue from the rules suggested by the Soviet Union.

Supported by the entire world community, the Soviet Union stands up against the militarisation of outer space, for its exclusively peaceful uses. This is a most urgent task because if we do not block the nuclear weapons from being deployed in outer space today it will be too late to do it tomorrow.

In defiance of world public opinion, Washington is going ahead with its plans of developing nuclear systems for star wars and whipping up the arms race as a whole through employing new, up-dated types of submarines, bombers and missiles. The US Administration claims that it seeks to negotiate disarmament with the Soviet Union, but these negotiations, according to Washington, can only be effective provided the USA is stronger than the USSR. The desire to achieve military superiority and honest businesslike negotiations on problems related to the sides' national security are incompatible, pointed out Konstantin Chernenko in a message to American readers in his book *Soviet-US Relations: Articles and Speeches* recently published in the USA. He stated that attempts to achieve military superiority are groundless, dangerous and cannot but complicate our relations. And, on the contrary, when both sides were willing to adhere to principles of equality and equal security and reached mutually acceptable agreements thereupon, including those on arms limitation, relations between the two countries also changed for the better.

It is as clear as day that despite the ideological and social differences between the Soviet Union and the USA there is no other reasonable alternative but to live and coexist peacefully on the same planet.

This is also true of other countries. Hence, a collective proposal of the socialist countries to conclude a Treaty on the Non-Use of Military Force between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the NATO Member-Countries, the logical reaction of the peaceful Leninist policies to the groundless imperialist rhetoric about the alleged threat of Soviet attack.

In our troubled times, people pin their hopes on the Soviet Union, a loyal and devoted advocate of peace, arms limitation and reduction, because it is always ready and willing to conduct substantial and sincere negotiations to achieve agreements that would not infringe on anybody's interests and would be conducive to a better political climate in the world.

Aspirations of the people of good will are in harmony with the foreign policies of the Soviet Union and other socialist community countries. True to the principles of the Leninist peaceful foreign policy, the Soviet Union has never claimed a special role in any region, including Asia. In recent years it has made a series of new constructive political and military proposals, many of them bearing directly on various parts of the Asian region from the Middle to the Far East. They include, for example, the well-known Initiative of the 26th CPSU Congress to start negotiations between parties concerned on confidence building measures in the Far East to prevent new armed conflicts.

The countries of this region welcomed the March 1982 declaration of the Soviet Union to the effect that it was prepared to negotiate a mutually-agreed limiting of operations of the confronting blocs' navies. Specifically, it was proposed to limit the patrolling areas of missile-carrying submarines. The Prague meeting (early 1983) of the Warsaw Treaty countries' Political Consultative Committee proposed to conclude a treaty on the non-use of force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO member-states, and also to refuse from extending the sphere of influence of both blocs to other regions of the world, including Asia.

Having made public its desire to achieve security in Asia through collective efforts of the countries of the region, the Soviet Union appro-

ves other countries' constructive initiatives aimed at improving the situation in this region. Among them, specifically, is the proposal of the Mongolian People's Republic to draft and sign a convention on non-aggression and non-use of force among the countries of Asian and the Pacific area, the initiatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea designed to ease tension in Korea and the Far East, and the constructive proposals of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea welcomed the world over to turn Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability. Many useful ideas have been suggested by the nonaligned nations as well.

In short, these are all prerequisites to start an active, conscientious search to improve the situation in Asia without wasting time. The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community are ready to display good will. Now it's the other side's turn.

The Communist Party and the Government of the Soviet Union are consistently upholding the principles of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and seeking the negotiated settlement of all international disputes. War cannot and must not be used as a means to settle international disputes. This peaceful Leninist policy of the Soviet leadership was expressly reaffirmed by the 26th CPSU Congress and the subsequent plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. As a great socialist power, the Soviet Union is fully aware of its responsibility for the maintenance and strengthening of peace. It is ready for peaceful, mutually profitable cooperation with all countries of the world.

But the Soviet people have learnt from their own experience how adventurous imperialism is: they know all too well that to defend peace and socialist gains and to check imperialist aggressors they must be strong and increasingly improve their armed forces which vigilantly guard common interests together with the armies of the fraternal Warsaw Treaty member countries.

Against the background of aggressive imperialist plans and the aggravated situation, the Soviet Union and other socialist nations have to maintain their defence capability at a necessary level and combine their peace-loving policies with enhanced readiness to repulse any aggression. This obliges us to devote most serious attention to strengthening the country's defenses.

The dialectics of history show that only that military force acts in favour of peace which is directed against the aggressive aspirations of imperialism. The harmonious unity of justice and force embodied in the army of a socialist type meets the humanitarian ideals of our time. In a class society the army was used exclusively as a tool of war; under socialism, the army, for the first time ever, has become a tool for preventing war, a powerful means of checking aggressive plans and saving peace on earth.

The strength of the Soviet Armed Forces lies in their indissoluble unity with the Soviet people. Such unbreakable unity of interests and aims, will and action as the Soviet Union maintains in relationships between classes, social groups, nationalities and races, and monolithic unity such as underlies the relationship between the Soviet Armed Forces and the Soviet people is unprecedented in history. There is no doubt that in the context of the arms race unleashed by imperialists our Armed Forces will be supplied with everything they need to safely withstand the attempts of the imperialist forces at achieving military superiority.

The forthcoming 40th anniversary of V-Day will be celebrated in many countries of the world. Summing up in connection with this memorable date their achievements in the past four decades the peoples of Europe can point to the main result—they have succeeded in saving and strengthening peace in a difficult struggle. Over this period they have learnt not only to co-exist, but also to cooperate for the benefit of their countries, and this is regarded as the most valuable achievement of the postwar period.

This is why the peoples are so alarmed by the continuing international tension. The ongoing deployment of US medium-range nuclear missiles in some West European NATO countries and the revanchists' attempts to revise the postwar borders in Europe not only worsen the political situation; they involve Europe in a new, especially dangerous round of the arms race.

The Soviet Union acts on the assumption that it is still possible to bring about a turn for the better in the international situation. It has proposed a large number of measures to protect peace and save the planet from a nuclear catastrophe. They were discussed during Konstantin Chernenko's recent talks with Austrian Federal Chancellor F. Sinowatz, British Labour leader Neil Kinnock and in his interviews with the *Washington Post*, NBC and CNN.

The Soviet Union stands for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons all over the world; at the same time it is ready to accept half-way measures leading to this objective, such as the reduction of nuclear armaments, the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world and other similar steps. As for Europe, the Soviet Union would like to see it completely free of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons, this being attained of course, on the basis of the observance of the principles of equality and equal security for the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries.

The Soviet Union's position on disarmament and other problems related to the maintenance of peace in Europe is fully supported by the USSR's allies and friends as confirmed by the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' Committee which met in Berlin on December 3-4, 1984 for its regular session to discuss the situation in Europe against the background of the general international situation. In reviewing the results of this meeting the CPSU Politburo emphasized that they once again pointed to the energetic efforts of the allied socialist nations to remove the threat of a nuclear war and to find, by way of negotiations, solutions for stopping the arms race and reducing armaments, and for a return to detente, cooperation and peaceful coexistence in international relations.

The Foreign Ministers' meeting in Berlin deemed it most urgent that the following specific and effective measures be adopted to overcome the nuclear confrontation: to freeze nuclear armaments both qualitatively and quantitatively; to sign a treaty completely and universally banning nuclear weapons tests; and to undertake not to use these weapons first by all nuclear states which have not as yet done so.

The Warsaw Pact countries, the Berlin meeting pointed out, attach great significance to the Soviet-American agreement to start negotiations on the whole set of problems relating to the non-militarisation of outer space and the reduction of strategic and medium-range nuclear armaments. Urging the USA to hold such talks the Soviet Union proceeded from the special responsibility which rested with the two most powerful nuclear nations for the maintenance of world peace. The Soviet Union, replied Konstantin Chernenko to the message of the 4th Congress "International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War" is prepared for the most radical solutions that would make for an advance towards

the end of the arms race, the banning and, ultimately, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Is the USA prepared to act similarly? During his election campaign, President Reagan spoke more than once of his serious intentions to reach mutually acceptable agreements with the Soviet Union. Now, having been re-elected for another four-year term, he has every opportunity to back up his assurances with concrete deeds. We will not have to wait long to see how earnest the new US Administration's intentions are.

The Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War proved the viability and the invincibility of the world's first socialist state. It heralded the triumph of the new social and state system born of the October Revolution, the socialist economy, Marxist-Leninist ideology, the moral and political unity of Soviet society, and the unbreakable friendship of Soviet peoples. The main architect of this victory was the Soviet people whose heroism was unprecedented in history.

The army and the navy were conspicuously gallant and intrepid during the war. Soviet military strategy and tactics proved to be superior. Soviet officers and political workers educated by the Communist Party demonstrated exceptional skills in planning and conducting the military operations against the enemy in the West and the East.

The contribution made by Soviet workers, collective farmers and intelligentsia to the victory cannot be overestimated. Their selfless labour combined with the exploits of the military to make the victory. The front and the rear were one while the war raged on.

Our victories in the Great Patriotic War were inspired and organised by the Leninist Communist Party, the leading and directing force of Soviet society. The Party had demonstrated its strength and staunchness in following the great ideals of communism. It formulated a clear-cut programme of defeating the fascist invaders and militarists, rallied the peoples of the Soviet Union and led the struggle against the enemy to the victorious end. The heroism of our people in the last war was and still is highly appreciated and admired in the Soviet Union and by all of progressive mankind. The victory of the Soviet people and its armed forces in the Great Patriotic War is of great international significance. It opened the way to freedom, independence, socialism and progress to many countries. It has been and continues to produce a great effect on the international situation all over the world creating favourable conditions for the rising national liberation movement and for the struggle against the reactionary and aggressive forces, revanchists and neo-fascists. Neither the passage of time, nor bourgeois falsifications can erase from the peoples' memory the decisive role the Soviet Union played in the defeat of Hitler Germany and militaristic Japan.

An important contribution to the common victory over the enemy was made by the peoples and armies of the anti-Hitler coalition. It has been proved in practice that countries with different social systems can effectively cooperate politically and militarily.

It must be pointed out that the imperialist forces seek in every possible way to falsify the records of World War II, ignoring historical lessons. The key events of the last war and the role of the Soviet Union in defeating the German fascist armies are viciously distorted. For example, an American military historian W. Kerr tries to prove that the Eastern Front was not at all decisive and that the battle of Stalingrad was not so important for the outcome of the war.⁵

⁵ W. Kerr, *The Secret of Stalingrad*, New York, 1961, p. 239.

Immediately after the victory of the Soviet Union in the Far East, almost all the Western political and military leaders, especially, those in the USA and Great Britain, openly admitted the decisive contribution of the Soviet armed forces to Japan's defeat. At that time the world press was full of articles and comments extolling Soviet operations in the Far East. Harry Truman and C. Atlee had many nice words to say about the Soviet Union in their messages. General D. MacArthur and Admiral Ch. Nimitz who were in charge of US military operations in the Pacific announced in those days that the Soviet entry into the war against Japan sped up its defeat.⁶ General C. Chennault's (commander of US Air Force in China) comment in an interview to a *New York Times* correspondent is also noteworthy. He said that the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan had been a decisive factor in the quick termination of the war in the Pacific which would have been the case anyway even if the A-bombs had not been dropped. The fast blow delivered by the Red Army against Japan completed the encirclement and put Japan on its knees.

Later, especially in the years of the cold war things began to be reassessed. Imperialist ideologues sought to deny the decisive role of the Soviet Union in the war, to belittle its huge contribution to the defeat of the fascist Axis and to ascribe all these accomplishments to the USA, picturing it as the main contributor to the victory. Positive assessments of the Soviet Union's role in the war by Roosevelt, Marshal and some American wartime historians (D. Vernadski, F. Dulles, etc.) disappeared from the pages of the bourgeois press. The true facts concerning the decisive role of the USSR in World War II were either suppressed or denied. For instance, American historian G. Smith claims peremptorily that Roosevelt and his advisers "have over-estimated Russia and its contribution to the war", that the armed struggle was "led" by the USA which "drove Hitler from the West..., defeated Japan in the Pacific... armed the UK, Russia and China... and set up the great coalition."⁷ It is obvious that these propositions are just impudent lies.

It is appropriate in this context to remind those Westerners who today believe in abovesaid lies, of words by E. Stettinius, then US Secretary of State. He said that the Americans should not forget that in 1942 they were on the brink of a catastrophe. Had the Soviet Union failed to hold its front the Germans would have had an opportunity to capture Great Britain. They would have also been able to conquer Africa and then to establish a bridgehead in Latin America. President Roosevelt was always aware of this impending threat⁸. I can only add to this that the Japanese military, in the person of Admiral Yamamoto who was then in command of the united Japanese Navy, happily visualized the marines' successful landing on the US coast and the signing of an act of surrender in Washington. Contemporary Western historians either conceal such facts and declarations from the public or distort them.

Falsifying reality, Western statesmen and reactionary historians claim that there was no need to ask the Soviet Union to enter into war in the Far East. They argue that it neither affected the progress of the war in the Far East nor accelerated the end of World War II because the Soviet Union's military presence in the Far East was very shortlived. But this reasoning is absurd and does not go in line with historical truth.

First of all, in the summer of 1945 US intelligence experts themselves arrived at the conclusion that neither a blockade, nor shelling alone

⁶ See *Pravda*, Aug. 10, 1945.

⁷ *Big Lies About the War*, Moscow, 1971, p. 94 (in Russian).

⁸ E. Stettinius, *Roosevelt and Russians*, L., 1950 p. 16.

could ensure the unconditional surrender of Japan and that Soviet interference was desirable, if not necessary, for the success of the invasion strategy.⁹ Soviet combat operations in the Far East undertaken to defeat the Kwantung Army lasted actually almost a month and not six days as reported by prejudiced Western sources.¹⁰

Biased assertions designed to belittle the Soviet contribution to the defeat of the Japanese army were also used in the draft peace treaty with Japan drawn up by the US State Department in 1951. Specifically, it said that the Soviet Union had been at war with Japan "only 6 days". True, it did not take long to smash the Kwantung army, but, as mentioned above, the actual stubborn fighting (causing many casualties) went on for about a month because the Kwantung army offered resistance for a long time, despite the Emperor's declaration of surrender.¹¹

Western press continues to maintain frequently that the outcome of the war with Japan was decided by the A-bombs which the USA dropped on Japan. For instance, the compilers of the American *Encyclopedia of Military History* assert that it was the two A-bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (a justified action in their view) that made Japan accept unconditional surrender.¹² This action has gone down in history as an atrocious infamy of US imperialism which used atomic weapons against the civilians of thickly populated Japanese cities.

It is absolutely clear that the atomic bombardment was not a military necessity. It had far-reaching political goals meant for the postwar period. In fact, this was an atomic blackmail of the Soviet Union, the first "hot point" of the notorious cold war against the USSR. Later, Winston Churchill admitted that "it would have been a mistake to assume that Japan's lot was decided by an atomic bomb." Admiral Legui, chief military adviser of the US President wrote, that the use of this barbarous weapon in Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided no substantial aid to the US war effort against Japan.¹³ Japan accepted unconditional surrender only after the Soviet armed forces had dealt quick smashing blows to the Kwantung army, the Japanese militarists' backbone.

The victory of the Soviet armed forces in the Far East was a blow not only against Japanese militarism, but also against all international reactionary forces. Its historical role in strengthening the positions of the democratic forces throughout the world and specifically, in the liberated countries of East and Southeast Asia cannot be underestimated. From the outset of the Manchurian operation and, even more so, upon its successful termination very favourable conditions were created for a vigorous growth of the national liberation movement in China, Korea and Southeast Asian countries.

There are still sufficiently influential people in the West who are psychologically prepared for any crazy venture. It is they who artificially breed hatred for the Soviet people and want to get the world accustomed to the prospect of star wars.

Hopefully, this year of the 40th anniversary of Victory over fascism, memorable for all progressives in the world, will see an optimistic turn of events. A good omen is the visit to Great Britain of a Soviet delegation led by Mikhail Gorbachev, Member of the Political Bureau, CC CPSU, Secretary of the CC CPSU, and Chairman of the Soviet of the

⁹ *Foreign Affairs*, Jan. 1957, p. 342.

¹⁰ See *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945. A Short Course of History*, Moscow, 1970, p. 553.

¹¹ *Pravda*, June 11, 1951.

¹² R. E. Dupuy and T. N. Dupuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3000 B. C. to the Present*, New York, 1970.

¹³ *History of the CPSU*, Vol. 5, book 1, Moscow, 1970, p. 627.

Union Foreign Relations Committee under the USSR Supreme Soviet. Opinions now being voiced in UK in favour of mutually beneficial cooperation inspire hopes for a better international situation. The recent conference on a nuclear-free Europe in Athens where peace supporters from Europe, the USA and Canada had a fruitful exchange of views also adds to these hopes. The Soviet peace champions made a remarkable contribution to the discussion of international issues at this conference.

A meeting between Member of the Politburo CC CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Andrei Gromyko and US Secretary of State George Shultz, held on January 7-8, 1985 in Geneva according to the previously reached agreement was a step toward solving the task of eliminating the threat of war which can destroy mankind. During the meeting the sides discussed the subject and goals of the forthcoming Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space armaments. The USSR and USA agreed to begin negotiations on March 12, 1985.

People of good will are full of hope that the year 1985, a year of the 40th anniversary of the V-Day, will revive the spirit of detente and international cooperation, that it will be a year of solidarity of working people, of reason prevailing over the madness of the policy of nuclear and space wars.

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THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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[Article by A. N. Zhelokhovtsev]

Over forty years have elapsed since imperialism unleashed the Second World War, but people do not forget these dramatic events in the history of mankind. Interest in the history of the Second World War has grown in recent years as the aggressive imperialist policy conducted by the US on the world scene has put the whole world under the threat of nuclear war: this explains the desire to turn to the past in search of historical lessons and bitter experience, for in those years imperialism, embodied by its most aggressive forces—nazi Germany, militarist Japan and fascist Italy—found itself strong enough to impose a war unprecedented in its destructiveness upon the peoples of the world.

A great deal has been done in the USSR to shed objective light on the history of the Second World War and its causes. Work on these problems is based first of all on the study of historical documents, both Soviet and foreign, including captured archival materials. This work began right after VE-Day and is still being carried on. Soviet scholars have published copious literature on the subject.¹

Relying on a wealth of documentary material, Soviet historians have collectively written fundamental works on the Second World War.²

Ever since they began their research, Soviet scholars have attached a great deal of importance to criticism of falsifications of the history of the Second World War, presented by bourgeois historiography. In its time the publication of the book *Falsifiers of History* (Moscow, 1948) was of great political significance in this respect. The sharp polemical battles waged with bourgeois historians by Soviet scholars in creative cooperation with scholars from other socialist countries and representatives of progressive schools in capitalist countries have an important place in a special collection of articles published by the Institute of World History.³

The history of the Second World War is being studied in other countries too. Important archival documents have been published by governmental agencies in Britain, the United States, and West Germany. There have appeared monographs on the subject by bourgeois historians. A history of the war in the Pacific has been written in Japan.

It comes as no surprise that historians in the PRC, having resumed their research after a decade of the "cultural revolution" (1966-1976), with its pernicious effect on science, have turned their attention to the events of the Second World War. The subjects they have chosen for their

¹ See *Documents and Materials of the Eve of the Second World War*, Moscow, 1948; *The USSR in the Struggle for Peace on the Eve of the Second World War*, Moscow, 1971; *Documents of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Vol. 16, Moscow, 1970; Vol. 17, 1977; *Documents on the History of the Munich Deal, 1937-1939*, Moscow, 1979; *Documents and Materials of the Eve of the Second World War, 1937-1939*. In two volumes, Moscow, 1981. (All the above in Russian).

² See *A History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945*. In six volumes, Moscow, 1959-1965; *A History of Soviet Diplomacy*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1965; Vol. 4, 1975; *A History of the USSR Foreign Policy, 1917-1980*. In two volumes, Moscow, 1980; *A History of the Second World War, 1939-1945*. In 12 volumes, Moscow, 1973-1981; *The Second World War. A Concise History*, Moscow, 1984 (All in Russian).

³ *The Causes of the Second World War*, Moscow, 1982 (in Russian).

research and the directions they are taking in it, reflect specific interest of Chinese society in regard its recent past, as well as in the PRC's present-day international standing. The interest, the Chinese academic community is displaying in the problems of the Second World War, is quite understandable if only because China was one of the first countries engulfed by the World War, a country on whose territory military operations took place. The Chinese people have experienced the hardships and horrors of war in full measure.

There is no denying that China was a victim of imperialist aggression in the Second World War. In spite of the equivocal position taken by the reactionary Guomindang government which at first pursued a policy of non-resistance and then began to display capitulationist hesitations and waged the war rather passively, Chinese resistance to the aggressor nevertheless made a definite contribution to the common victory over fascism and Japanese militarism.

Unlike other countries, the PRC has not yet published a fundamental work on the history of the Second World War. However, the interests of Chinese policy demand that these questions be worked out. Therefore it is no surprise that a special academic society for the study of the Second World War has been set up in the PRC. This society holds regular thematic conferences and is planning to bring out a large volume of collected essays on the history of the Second World War. In the years since 1980 members of the society have published seven books on this subject.

Judging by the publications which have appeared, including the scholarly works, Chinese historians have not yet reached a consensus on many important questions, and an agreement is being worked out through polemical exchanges. In the PRC attention is primarily focused on the role of the Chinese front in the Second World War, and other related questions including how the war began.

The themes of the Second World War history have been under close scrutiny by the Chinese academic public since 1978 when the June 5th issue of the newspaper *Guangming ribao* published an article by historians Wang Zhende and Hou Chengde entitled "On the Beginning of the Second World War".

The Chinese authors hold that studies of World War II usually have a Eurocentrist bias and they put forward their own thesis: "The Second World War began on July 7, 1937, with the invasion of China proper by Japanese imperialism". To support this thesis the authors offer the following arguments: 1) unlike other early hotbeds of war, the Chinese front remained in existence until the very end of World War II in 1945; 2) from the very beginning this front was an integral element of the world war and not just of China's war with Japan; 3) throughout the Second World War there was a close strategic connection between the Chinese front and other fronts. "In March 1939," say the authors of the newspaper article, "Stalin pointed out that the Second Imperialist World War had already begun and said: 'Japan's war with China is in its second year now' (*Problems of Leninism*, p. 659)." However, this reference is cited inaccurately. On March 10, 1939, in his report at the 18th Party Congress, Joseph Stalin said that "the new imperialist war has already entered its second year", and even called it "a second imperialist war", but he did not consider it a world war then. It is clearly stated in the report. "A characteristic feature of the new imperialist war is that it has not yet become a general, world war".⁴

The argument advanced by these historians that the Chinese front existed from July 7, 1937 until the end of the Second World War in 1945

⁴ *The 18th Congress of the CPSU(B)*, Shorthand record, Moscow, 1939, pp. 9, 10, 12 (in Russian)

is historically correct, but their assessment of it as a front in World War II is not justified because it is subjected to changes due to external factors, and this is not taken by Chinese historians into account. In the end the Chinese front did become a front in the Second World War, not the main front, of course, but one of the important ones. However, it did not acquire this significance when it first came into being. The thesis that from the outset the war was not just a war between China and Japan is both arguable and vulnerable. Here the question to be considered first of all is the role and place of the USSR in the course of the Japanese-Chinese war.

It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union rendered assistance in a wide range of forms to the people and government of China in that war. For a long time, practically until the summer of 1941, Soviet aid was the most substantial and actually the only foreign aid that China received in its struggle against the superior might of Japan's war machine.⁵ Soviet volunteer pilots took a direct part in military operations on the Japan-China front.⁶ At that time (1938) military conflicts flared up between the USSR and Japan on the Soviet border in the area of Lake Khasan and in 1939 Japanese militarism suffered a defeat on the Mongolian border along the Ialbyn-gol River. These military events helped lower the level of activity by Japanese land forces on the Chinese front.

The reference by Chinese historians to Stalin's 1939 pronouncement with respect to the Second World War, which ended in 1945, seems somewhat misapplied because in 1939 it was simply impossible to make a definitive judgement on the war as a whole. Here they are apparently pursuing the aim of using any argument to exaggerate the role of the Chinese front in the Second World War. The legitimate and understandable wish of the Chinese scholars to determine their country's place in world history, and in the history of the Second World War in particular, has in this case led them away from solid historical ground. A revision was begun of the generally recognised date that marks the beginning of the Second World War.

The aforementioned article in *Guangming ribao* aimed to refute the accepted date of September 1, 1939 as the beginning of the Second World War. The authors categorically reject and present arguments to call in question the following points: 1) prior to Hitler's invasion of Poland the chief powers—Britain, France and the US did not participate in the war and therefore it was not "global"; 2) it was the declaration of war by Britain and France on Germany that marked the "official beginning" of the Second World War; 3) up until Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, it was an "imperialist war".

In the opinion of Wang Zhende and Hou Chengde the present, generally accepted interpretation of the Second World War, "serves the interests of the two superpowers", and they support their argument by pointing out that in both the USSR and the US historians recognise September 1, 1939 as the beginning of the Second World War.

The bombastic criticism by the Chinese historians of the fact that Soviet and US historians recognise one date as that which marks the beginning of the Second World War, springs from openly political motives. Moreover, their argumentation is rather shaky. For example, among the chief powers, without which the war cannot, apparently, be called "world", they include the US, although the US entered the war not in 1939 but on December 7, 1941, and American scholars call it a world war even before the US became directly involved. In addition, the demand by the Chinese

⁵ See *The USSR's Leninist Policy Towards China*, Moscow, 1968, pp. 95-120 (in Russian).

⁶ See *In the Sky of China, 1937-1940. Reminiscences by Soviet Volunteer Pilots*, Moscow, 1960 (in Russian).

historians that the Second World War be viewed as a war of liberation from the very beginning simplifies the complex nature of the Second World War's first stage.

In his last work the Soviet Academician Ye. Zhukov wrote: "The Second World War began within the framework of the capitalist system. The war in its initial phase had an unjust imperialist character not only with regard to the aggressive fascist bloc, but also in the case of the Anglo-French coalition. But to view the Second World War in that phase as imperialist on both sides is to ignore the fact that from the very beginning the resistance of the popular masses in those countries subjected to fascist aggression was liberational in nature. The fact must be taken into account that the states belonging to the aggressive fascist bloc unleashed war with the aim of conquering the whole world and establishing the predatory 'new order,' thus posing the utmost danger. Therefore for the peoples of Poland, Yugoslavia and a number of other states that were victims of fascist aggression, the war was by its nature a just struggle for freedom and national independence from the very beginning."⁷

The article in *Guangming ribao* was directed against the two superpowers merely in form; in content it only criticised the concept of Soviet historians. In the same year, 1978, the Soviet press refuted the main points of that article.⁸

The arguments put forward in *Guangming ribao* on June 5, 1978 have not become generally accepted in China either. Noteworthy in this respect is the article "The Second World War" which appears in the Chinese encyclopedic dictionary *Cihai*, an official reference work in the PRC. The article retains the views that were passionately criticised by the Chinese historians in 1978 in the daily press. In particular, the dictionary says, "The world war, unprecedented in its scale, was unleashed by the fascist states of Germany, Italy and Japan... Japan, after seizing the northeastern part of our country in 1931, began an aggressive war against China in 1937... The aggressive actions of the fascist states met the resistance of the Chinese people and the peoples of other countries subjected to aggression and suppression, and aggravated contradictions among the imperialist powers. On September 1, 1939, the German army invaded Poland, on September 3 Britain and France declared war on Germany and the world war commenced".⁹

Cihai calls the seizure of northeastern China by Japan the fascist states' first aggressive act but not the beginning of the Second World War. What is more, it states that the war unleashed by Japan against China in 1937 was not a world war either; it was Japanese aggression against China. Finally, the beginning of the Second World War is directly linked with the aggravation of contradictions among imperialist powers. All of this is completely at odds with the views presented by Wang Zhende and Hou Chengde.

It is particularly odious that the date September 3, 1939 is given in the encyclopedia as the beginning of the Second World War. Although, it is only two days off the generally accepted date, this difference is of considerable significance because it has some bearing on the assessment of Germany's role in unleashing the war.

⁷ Ye. M. Zhukov, "The Origin of the Second World War". In *The Causes of the Second World War*, Moscow, 1982, p. 13.

⁸ See M. Podklyuchnikov, "Falsifiers", *Pravda*, July 8, 1978; M. Yakovlev, "Falsifiers from Peking", *Pravda*, July 16, 1978; V. Borisov, "A Futile Attempt: Peking Falsifies the History of the Second World War", *Izvestia*, July 19, 1978; P. Zhilin, "One More Venture into History: How Peking Has Falsified Generally Known Facts", *Pravda*, August 8, 1978; B. Sapozhnikov, "Peking Falsifiers of History", *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Aug. 4, 1978.

⁹ *Cihai*, Shanghai, 1980, pp. 18, 81.

In a formal way, Germany's attack on Poland was not the beginning of the world war but a local act of aggression. Military operations actually became worldwide in scope after the involvement of the European colonial powers—Britain and France—which Hitler did not attack on September 1, 1939 and even hoped to come to terms with them, as evidenced by the very fact of the "strange war" on the Western front in late 1939 and early 1940. Thus the official declaration of the Second World War occurred on September 3, but, as has been repeatedly and convincingly shown in historical literature, it is unacceptable to ignore the substance of the matter, i. e., the responsibility Nazi Germany bears for unleashing the Second World War. By attacking Poland, Hitler wanted war, foresaw that it could turn into a world war and consciously took that risk. Formalism must have no place in such matters, particularly in such a respectable encyclopedic dictionary as *Cihai*.

Chinese historiography traditionally looks for historical parallels, that can be useful to China's policies. These parallels are sought out not only in Chinese history, but in geographically distant regions as well. It can be recalled that Sun Yatsen, working for China's national reunification, was interested in Bismarck's reunification of Germany and his policy towards German social democracy at that time. Mao Zedong in Yanan during the war was greatly interested in the events in... Greece. He viewed the suppression of the Greek democratic national liberation movement by British troops... as a dangerous example of what could happen in China after the war with Japan ended.¹⁰ Such a "parallelism" has been extended in China in recent years to some events in the Second World War. This subject is used not only for academic but for political purposes either. For example, the message of the article by Cheng Renqiang entitled "The German-Polish War of 1939: an Example of Sudden Attack by Imperialism"¹¹ is that an aggressive imperialist state, seeking expansion and the solution of domestic problems at the expense of foreign policy, can, like Nazi Germany, perpetrate a sudden act of aggression against a neighbouring state. Is this not a hint that a similar threat is posed to the PRC?

Further use of the subject of the Second World War for present-day political needs is made in Bao Yicheng's article "A Discourse on the Causes of the Second World War. What Kind of Imperialism Is the Most Dangerous Source of War".¹²

The purpose of Bao Yicheng's article is to justify China's rapprochement with imperialist countries by arguments from "historical experience". The article is crammed with statistical material and appears to be an example of serious scholarly research, but its conclusions clearly serve the needs of present-day Chinese politics. The author tries to prove that there are two kinds of imperialism: "belligerent" and "nonbelligerent", thereby consciously attempting to revise Lenin's definition of imperialism. "The experience of the First and Second World Wars proves," writes Bao Yicheng, "that although all imperialist states are predatory by nature and any kind of imperialism dislikes peace, the most dangerous is the kind which is relatively weak in terms of its finances and economy, the kind that has saved little or has lost its savings".¹³ Later the Chinese historian elaborates, "The history of the Second World War shows that imperialism which has originated relatively recently is the most dangerous hot-

¹⁰ P. P. Vladimirov, *Special Region of China 1942-1945*, Moscow, 1973, p. 401 (in Russian).

¹¹ *Lishi yanjiu*, No. 2, 1978.

¹² *Ibid.*, No. 4, 1980.

¹³ *Ibid.*, No. 4, p. 171.

bed of war¹⁴... The war was rooted in the crisis of the Axis powers, not in the world economic crisis".¹⁵

The reasons for the Second World War are defined by the author quite precisely: "The struggle for Europe and world domination". And on this basis he formulates the conclusion required by Peking's present-day political course of rapprochement with imperialist countries. "It would clearly be wrong to say that all imperialist powers are always ready to launch a world war; in fact it is only those who are out to get Europe and world domination that pose a threat".¹⁶ Thus a historical criterion for dividing imperialist powers into "bad" and "good", was "discovered": the "bad" ones are always ready to start a world war, while "good" ones are not. In this way Bao Yicheng's article presents historical facts in accordance with the demands of pro-imperialist policy and gives it a kind of "substantiation", which radically differs from Lenin's teaching on the nature of imperialism.

Historical studies, like Bao Yicheng's article, have been used in the Chinese press to promote major political and propaganda actions, including openly anti-Soviet in nature. Such is the article which appeared in the September 1, 1979 issue of *Renmin ribao* on the 40th anniversary of the beginning of the Second World War. *Pravda* answered this article by saying, "Peking's propaganda has ascribed aggressive plans to a country that sacrificed 20 million lives to defeat fascism. An attempt has been made to present the Soviet Union as a virtual accomplice in unleashing this war, to put part of the blame for this world conflict on the USSR."¹⁷

It can be surmised that it is the political significance of this theme that brought about the creation of the Chinese society for the study of the Second World War in 1980.¹⁸ The society was set up after the Second Symposium on the History of the Second World War which took place in Kunming in June 1980. The main subject under discussion was "The Beginning and Place of the War of Resistance to Japan in the History of the World Anti-Fascist War".¹⁹ Discussion revealed several different points of view.

According to the first point of view, shared by the majority of participants in the symposium, the Second World War began in 1939. Those in favour of this date note the change in political situation in Europe after the Munich deal. In the majority opinion, the "subjective conditions" in Germany and Japan had grown ripe for unleashing a world war in 1939. The war resulted directly from the policy of appeasement conducted by the Western powers, and there are three possible reasons for this policy: 1) a form of struggle between Britain and France for world domination; 2) the anti-Soviet and anti-communist orientation of British and French policies; 3) sacrificing small countries for the selfish interests of Britain and France.

Supporters of this viewpoint hold that "the Chinese front appeared on September 18, 1931" and was always connected with the European theatre, while on July 7, 1937 war spread throughout China, but it was "a war limited to the Asian theatre" until the start of war in Europe, and not a world war at all.

All the participants in the symposium were unanimous in their opinion that, "China is one of the countries that were the first to enter the Second World War, fought in it the longest and suffered the greatest losses."²⁰

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

¹⁶ *Lishi yanjiu*, No. 4, p. 183.

¹⁷ "Peking's Double Standard", *Pravda*, Sept. 26, 1979.

¹⁸ *Shijie lishi*, 1981, No. 1, p. 14.

¹⁹ *Xinhua yuebao wenzhaiban*, No. 9, 1980, pp. 91-93.

²⁰ *Xinhua yuebao wenzhaiban*, 1980, No. 9, p. 92.

According to the second point of view, July 7, 1937 is not the beginning of war in the Chinese theatre but the beginning of the Second World War: the Chinese front, it is maintained, has always been part of the world anti-fascist front, while the connection between the Chinese and European theatres of military operations was mutual. Thus, the war in Europe inspired Japanese aggression, while the war in China postponed the beginning of war in the Pacific until December 1941. The Chinese front is said to have saved the USSR from a war on two fronts and gave it four years of peace in the Far East. While the beginning of the war in the Pacific made the Chinese front of primary strategic importance.

All of the participants in the Kunming symposium agreed that the Chinese people were the Allies' main instrument in Asia for defeating Japanese fascism. It was also pointed out that the Soviet-Japanese treaty on neutrality had an adverse effect on the Chinese theatre of military operations.

Those in favour of the second point of view have clearly taken a nationalist stand and are trying to exaggerate the role the Chinese front played in the Second World War, and in the Asian theatre in particular. According to Soviet historian B. G. Sapozhnikov the Chinese front was, in all probability, not of primary strategic importance for Japanese militarism, judging by the fact that it was closed down until offensive operations were resumed in 1944, an event which was facilitated by the Guomindang government's passive conduct of the war. In 1942-1943, Japanese militarism pursued its strategic objectives on the Chinese front through a "peaceful offensive" against the Guomindang government of Chiang Kaishek in Chongqing so as to induce Guomindang to peace and alliance with Japan through common actions against the Chinese communists.²¹

Neither is there enough substance in the assertion by PRC historians that the Chinese front postponed the Pacific war until December 1941. As a matter of fact, the existence of that front did not prevent the war in the Pacific. The concrete date it was begun was determined by the progress of Hitler's aggression in Europe and in particular, by the capitulation of France in 1940 and the time it took Japan to prepare a springboard in Indochina for the offensive in Southeast Asia. As early as July 1940 a contingent of Japanese troops landed in Haiphong.²² The treaty on mutual defence of December 9, 1941, put all of French Indochina under Japanese control.²³

It is also an extreme exaggeration to assert that the Chinese front "saved the USSR from a war on two fronts" and gave it four years of peace in the Far East. We must remind in this connection of the fact that the existing Chinese front did not prevent the Japanese from carrying out provocations in the area of Lake Khasan in 1938 and the Halhyn-gol River in 1939. It was the crushing defeat on the Halhyn-gol delivered by Soviet-Mongolian troops that secured the USSR five years of peace in the Far East. "For the majority of Japanese generals the lesson was so clear that war plans against the USSR immediately lost all feasibility. Soviet troops, fighting in new surroundings, far away from their bases, without any lines of communication, nevertheless utterly defeated the best Japanese units. This caused a change in the strategy of Japanese militarism", notes Soviet historian I. V. Mozheiko who has studied the history of Japanese aggression in the countries of Southeast Asia in detail.²⁴

²¹ B. G. Sapozhnikov, *China in the Flames of War (1931-1950)*, Moscow, 1977, p. 218.

²² I. V. Mozheiko, *Western Wind—Clear Feather. Southeast Asia in the Second World War*, Moscow, 1984, p. 29.

²³ Viet Nam: *A Historical Sketch*, S. I. s. a., p. 236.

²⁴ I. V. Mozheiko, *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

The assertions by Chinese historians that the Soviet-Japanese treaty of neutrality had "an adverse effect" on the Chinese front also suffers from nationalist shortsightedness. The Chinese historians ignore such important facts as non-observance by Japan of the treaty of neutrality and preparations to openly violate it. They write nothing of the fact that Japan decided against declaring war on the USSR not because of the treaty of neutrality, but because of developments on the other fronts of the war, especially on the Soviet-German front, unfavourable as they were for the aggressive fascist bloc. Besides, in spite of the treaty of neutrality, the Soviet Union kept a major contingent of Soviet troops in the Far East, which were badly needed on the western front at that time. It seems that in this question Chinese historians have been influenced by Japanese bourgeois historiography.

The treaty of neutrality between the USSR and Japan served to foster a certain amount of distrust between the two main aggressors—nazi Germany and militarist Japan. It also enabled the USSR to concentrate its great military efforts in the West, achieve victory there, and then, in August 1945, defeat the Kwantung army in northeastern China—the shock land force of Japanese militarism. In the final analysis, the above treaty served all the allied powers, including China, well. Regrets over the treaty were voiced first and foremost by the Guomindang men who dreamed of involving the USSR in the war against Japan so as to enjoy the benefits of the victories of others. In reality, as has been repeatedly noted by Soviet historians, "getting ready for the war in the Pacific, Japan decided in late 1938 to allocate not more than a fourth of its military budget to operations in China. The Japanese command also planned to speed up its preparations at the expense of intensive exploitation of the resources of Manchuria and the occupied regions of China. Beginning in the summer of 1939, the Japanese army ceased offensive operations in China."²⁵

By beating off Japanese aggression against the Mongolian People's Republic the USSR was able to increase its aid to China. "The biggest deliveries of Soviet weaponry, including tanks, aircraft, ammunition, and other supplies were made in 1939 and the first half of 1941."²⁶ Later Soviet aid to China was sharply cut back, not because of the Soviet-Japanese treaty of neutrality (April 1941) but because of Germany's perfidious attack on the USSR.

In August 1982, the society for the study of the Second World War held its 3rd annual conference in Peking to discuss "The Causes of France's Defeat in 1940."²⁷ The audience heard 9 reports and a number of speeches. The Chinese historians rejected in word the views of the French capitulationists Pétain, Weygand and Gamelin who asserted that "the roots of defeat are in self-indulgence" or that "sybaritism overpowered the spirit of sacrifice". Foreign views on the question were summed up at the conference as follows: "the French military and political leadership" were of the opinion that France was militarily inferior to Germany in 1940 and did not receive enough support (political or material) from its allies, Britain and the United States. The opinion of a British historian was that the greatest contribution to Hitler's success was made by the French General Staff because French military theory was backward as was its weaponry, while the military command was ineffective.

The Soviet point of view was interpreted at the conference as laying stress on political causes, above all on the class causes that resulted in the national treason by the French big bourgeoisie, and only subsequently were purely military causes mentioned.

²⁵ *The Contemporary History of China 1917-1970*, Moscow, 1972, p. 186.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

²⁷ *Shijie lishi*, 1982, No. 6, pp. 74-77, 80.

The opinion of the French historians who spoke of "a complex combination of various factors" was singled out.

Most of the participants expressed a similar viewpoint: the defeat was brought about by both internal and external causes; it was the effect of different factors: political, military, economic, social, ideological and diplomatic.²⁰ Special attention was paid to France's military backwardness in 1940, noting not only its technical inadequacy but also its inept use of the available weapons, tanks in particular; the strategy of passive defence, the conservatism of military thought, poor control over troops, ineptitude in conducting modern combat, etc.

More insight was demonstrated by historian Ruan Yinan, who explained French military setbacks by political factors: the backwardness and reactionary nature of France's ruling classes, their degradation. Chen Zhengfei's conclusion was even more incisive: "From the Munich deal to the 'strange war', from the dissolution of the Communist Party to the persecution of progressive figures, to the aid to Finland an anti-Soviet movement was swelling which embodied France's reactionary policy".²¹ Historian Li Hua made the following comment on anti-Sovietism which characterised the French ruling circles at the time: "Those were politically blind people who tried to direct disaster to the East by magic incantations."²² Among the causes of France's defeat historian Zhou Xifeng mentioned the existence of a powerful pro-fascist and capitulationist grouping. According to Dai Chengjun, "The ideological fortitude of the broad popular masses, of soldiers and officers, and their will to win are the key to success in war, but in France in 1940 the people and the army were disgusted by war and feared it—therein lie the social and psychological causes of the French debacle".²³

At the same time the conference in Peking heard opinions quite in keeping with the views of French capitulationists. For example, Dai Chengjun and Yu Qun asserted that pacifism in France "poisoned the army and people". Is this much different from accusations of self-indulgence and sybaritism which were rejected in word by the Chinese historians?

Criticism was also directed at the Communist Party of France and the Comintern for allegedly misinterpreting the nature of the war and regarding it as "an unjust, reactionary, imperialist war", having failed to perceive its complex nature and the just struggle of oppressed peoples against the aggressors. Echoing French reactionary authors, Dai Chengjun said, "The French Communist Party, carrying out the directives of the Comintern, called the war imperialistic and demanded its immediate cessation. This was a wrong position which led to ideological chaos in the minds of the people and Party members while undermining the will of the army and the people." These attacks on the French Communist Party and the Comintern reflect a hostile attitude towards the activities of the Comintern.²⁴

Outwardly the discussion at the conference aimed at bringing the position of Chinese historians and the interpretation of events in France itself closer together; in any case, a concordance of views was declared, while the views of Soviet historians on this subject were greatly simplified. Still interest in the subject, somewhat unusual for a conference in China, was chiefly aroused by historical analogies and political parallels that have taken root in Chinese life. France's defeat in 1940 was used to

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

²¹ *Shijie lishi*, 1982, No. 6, p. 76.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 77.

²³ *Ibidem*.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 77. See also *Comintern and the East: The Struggle for Leninist Strategy and Tactics in the National Liberation Movement*, Moscow, 1969, p. 186 (in Russian).

show what a high price can be paid for rejecting the policy of "modernisation", this being not a historical but an extremely topical, political question for the PRC.

In 1982, an article by Ou Zhengwen entitled "The Beginning of the Second World War Should Be Seen in the Events of September 18", was published, first by a provincial journal³³ and then, having probably attracted some attention, in the central press.³⁴ Ou Zhengwen had gathered the following dates for the beginning of the Second World War from historians in various countries: 1) September 1 (or 3), 1939; 2) 1935 (the Italian invasion of Ethiopia); 3) July 7, 1937 (the Japanese invasion of China proper); 4) December 8, 1941 (the attack on Pearl Harbor); 5) September 18, 1931. He writes that discussion at the Chinese society for the study of the Second World War showed that the majority consider July 7, 1937 to mark the beginning of World War II. But Ou Zhengwen takes exception to this referring to the Japanese historian Akira Fujiwara who in his work *A History of Modern Japan (Nihon kindai shi)* states that the Japan-China war began on September 18, 1931. On the basis of this, Ou Zhengwen declares, "The war began with Japanese aggression and ended with Japanese capitulation".³⁵ He puts forward his own chronology of the war: September 18, 1931—the Second World War begins; September 1, 1939—expansion of the war; June 22, 1941—further expansion of the war; December 1941—only now does the war become truly global. He writes, "The events of September 18, 1931, marked the beginning of the Second World War, which one of the three fascist states, . . . Japan, started by launching aggression against China. This was also the beginning of the Chinese people's armed resistance to Japanese aggression. In the world struggle against fascism the Chinese people were the first to start an armed struggle against the Japanese aggressors and that was an epoch-making event in the struggle of the peoples of the world against fascism, which started in 1922...

"...After the events of September 18, 1931, the Chinese people, led by the Communist Party of China, conducted a protracted anti-Japanese guerrilla war in the northeastern part of the country. It became an integral part of the Chinese people's war of national liberation. The Party led the Chinese people in a national war against the aggressor, which began on September 18, 1931. Initially this war was waged in the northeast, but it never ended...

"...The Chinese front was formed before any other and it was in existence the longest. The events of September 18 marked the beginning of Japan's armed aggression against China and meant the emergence of one of the Second World War's hotbeds—the Far Eastern".³⁶

Thus, Ou Zhengwen declares the appearance of the Far Eastern hotbed of the Second World War to be the beginning of the war itself. The emergence on September 18, 1931 of a hotbed of military conflict, which subsequently became part of the World War II general military actions is not disputed by anyone. But to mistake a hotbed of war for such a universal and broad phenomenon as a world war is only possible in case of a very formal approach to the events in question or if there is a wish to exaggerate their importance.

Ou Zhengwen is guilty on both counts. "The Sino-Japanese war exerted a great influence on the development and course of the Second World War. It was not a local war",³⁷ the Chinese historian asserts, although in the period from 1937 to 1939 the war remained local in scope and only later—

³³ *Hengan shida xuebao*, 1982, No. 4.

³⁴ *Xinhua wenzhai*, 1982, No. 11.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

³⁶ *Xinhua wenzhai*, 1982, No. 11, pp. 78-79.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

finally and indisputably in December 1941—did it become one of the fronts of the Second World War.

Ou Zhengwen ends his discourse with the following words: "The Second World War ended with Japan's unconditional capitulation, so to date the beginning of the war from the moment of Japan's aggression corresponds not only to the historical facts but to the logic of history as well".³⁸ This demonstrates nothing but a formal approach to historical events.

Even though a great deal of attention was paid to Ou Zhengwen's article in the PRC, his opinion did not become predominant. In November 1983, a special scientific conference was held in Shanghai, entitled "On the Causes and Beginning of the Second World War", at which different opinions were once again voiced.³⁹ It is noteworthy that the conference heard a report by historian Yu Xintian about Soviet research into the subject.

At the conference it was said that the main cause of the war was the world economic crisis of capitalism (Zhang Ziping) and that the Second World War began as an imperialist war (Zhu Guisheng). They were contradicted by another participant, Xie Youzhi, who still maintained that the main cause was the contradiction between fascism and peoples and insisted that "from the very beginning it was an anti-fascist war of liberation".⁴⁰

Some ideas expressed at the conference radically differed from those previously propounded by Chinese historians. Thus, the majority came to the conclusion that the difference between World War II and World War I is that the former grew out of local wars. Alongside this well-founded and serious approach, attempts were made again to exaggerate the importance of Chinese resistance and the Chinese front in the Second World War. "China's anti-Japanese war of resistance prevented Japan's movement either to the south or the north. The Munich of the Far East was frustrated by the Communist Party of China", asserted Wang Side. "The Chinese war of resistance postponed the beginning of war in the Pacific and prevented Japan from attacking the USSR".⁴¹ But the fact remains that Japan did unleash a war in the Pacific and the Japanese army occupied countries in Southeast Asia, while its attacks on the USSR as has already been pointed out took the form of military conflicts in 1938 and 1939.

Much more to the point were Wang Side's comments on the role of the Chinese front in the 1940s: "After the defeat and capitulation of France, the USSR needed all its forces to repulse the German threat, while the US set Europe as its first priority; the fulfilment of its strategic plans depended on China's ability to hold Japan. Stalin sent Chuikov as an adviser to Chiang Kaishek".⁴²

In effect, even after France's capitulation and until the beginning of nazi aggression against our country, the USSR continued to render assistance to China in terms of weapons, materials, and advisers. And Stalin really did set Chuikov the task of strategically holding Japan before Chuikov departed for China: "Your task, Comrade Chuikov, the task of all our people in China is to bind the hands of the Japanese aggressor. Only when the hands of the Japanese aggressor are bound, shall we be able to avoid a war on two fronts, if the German aggressors attack our country..."⁴³

³⁸ *Ibidem*.

³⁹ *Shijie lianli*, 1984, No. 1, pp. 82-84.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

⁴² *Ibidem*.

⁴³ V. I. Chuikov. *Mission in China. Notes by a Military Adviser*, Moscow, 1981, p. 58 (in Russian).

In his concluding remarks at the Peking conference historian Zhu Tingguang called on the participants "to use the results of Soviet and Western research selectively" and set the task of writing a work on the beginning of the Second World War from a "Chinese point of view".⁴⁵

The 1980s saw the publication of the first books on the Second World War by Chinese historians. Most are of a compilatory nature. However, one must keep in mind that their authors did not have access to documents from Chinese archives. Seven such works have been published and two of them are available to us at present. One is a book entitled *A History of the Second World War*, written by a large group of authors. It has already gone through two printings, one in 1982 and the other in 1983.⁴⁶ This book was reviewed in detail in the Soviet scholarly press, where criticism was leveled at the points the authors had borrowed from the bourgeois scholars, as well as at the tendency to overestimate the role of the Chinese front in the Second World War.⁴⁷ In scale the Chinese book cannot compare to the 12-volume Soviet *History of the Second World War* the last volume of which was published in 1982. Functionally the Chinese volume can be compared to historical essays that have repeatedly been published in the USSR.⁴⁷

In his preface to the book Liu Simu, a prominent Chinese historian, makes the following admission: "It is sad that in the past our historians did not do systematic and in-depth research either into the history of the Second World War, or even into the history of resistance to Japan, so that until now only booklets have been issued on the subject. As yet no special work written by Chinese authors on the history of the Second World War has been published".⁴⁸

Another work available to us is a historical essay written by Cai Zuming.⁴⁹ In both works the presentation of events begins with Japan's occupation of China's three northeastern provinces on September 18, 1931, but the beginning of the war is given as September 1, 1939—the day Germany attacked Poland. In the opinion of these Chinese authors, "the majority of the works on the history of the Second World War do not pay enough attention to the war of resistance waged by China against Japan".⁵⁰ This is probably true as, by their own admission, Chinese historians did not work on this question. Their argumentation that the Chinese was the main front in the Asian theatre of military operations is not convincing. As Yu. Shchebenkov has justly pointed out, "the armed struggle in China was in the main of a local nature. It is a fact that during the entire war Chinese troops did not carry out a single strategic operation".⁵¹ The Chinese authors' biased belittling of the role of the USSR and Soviet armed forces in the war also diminishes the scientific value of their work, as Yu. Shchebenkov noted in his review.

With all the differences of opinion and interpretation as regards the history of the Second World War, Chinese historians demonstrate a tendency to overestimate China's role in the war, which in a number of cases

⁴⁵ *Shijie lishi*, 1984, No. 1, p. 84.

⁴⁶ Zhu Guisheng, Wang Zhende et al., *A History of the Second World War*, Peking, 1982, 734 pp. (in Chinese).

⁴⁷ Yu. Shchebenkov, "For a Correct Presentation of the Events of the Second World War", *Military-Historical Journal*, 1983, No. 12, pp. 64-70 (in Russian).

⁴⁸ *The Second World War 1939-1945, Military-Historical Essay*, Moscow, 1958, 930 pp.; G. A. Deborin, *The Second World War, Military-Political Essay*, Moscow, 1958, 430 pp.; *The Second World War, A Short History*, Moscow, 1980, 530 pp.

⁴⁹ *Dierci shijie dazhan shi*, Peking, 1983, p. 2.

⁵⁰ Cai Zuming, *Dierci shijie dazhan shi jianbian* (An Essay of the History of the Second World War), Peking, 1983, 200 pp. (in Chinese).

⁵¹ *Dierci shijie dazhan shi*, p. 3.

⁵² Yu. Shchebenkov, *Op. cit.*, 1983, No. 12, p. 68, *A History of the Second World War 1939-1945*, Vol. 12, p. 427.

brings them closer to and sometimes even coincides with the Guomindang interpretation of the Second World War (for example, the idea of the decisive role of the Chinese front in Asia). The Chinese scholars also readily rely on works by Japanese historians. Some Chinese historians are also prone to emphasise the role played by the United States in the war because, according to them, only US involvement made the war a really global one.

Until quite recently, for over 20 years Chinese historiography practically kept silent about the role the USSR played in the defeat of fascism, and in the defeat of Japanese militarism in particular. The tendency to belittle the USSR's role is also seen in the special emphasis which is placed on the "adverse effect" the 1941 Japanese-Soviet non-aggression pact had on the Chinese theatre of military operations. In spite of historical truth, what is constantly underscored is not Soviet aid to China in the War of Resistance to Japan, which was real, but Chinese aid to the USSR of a political nature ("four years of peace in the Far East", saving the USSR from fighting on two fronts). The nationalistic tone which the treatment of this subject takes in Chinese historiography cannot be overlooked.

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VIETNAM CP LAUDED ON 55TH ANNIVERSARY

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[Article by A. S. Volodin: "A Staunch Detachment of the International Communist Movement (On the 55th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Vietnam)"]

On February 3, 1985 the fraternal Vietnamese people celebrated the 55th anniversary of the creation of its militant Marxist-Leninist vanguard—the Communist Party of Vietnam. This anniversary saw the CPV armed with historical experience; it has great accomplishments to its credit and is full of creative plans. It enjoys tremendous prestige among the Vietnamese working people. The merits of the CPV, a party of patriots and internationalists, a party of revolutionary action, are recognised throughout the world. The Communist Party of Vietnam has asserted itself as the political and ideological leader of the working class, and of the country's working people as a whole during a long and difficult struggle. Its road to victories was not an easy one, and is of much theoretical and practical interest.

Numerous armed uprisings began to occur throughout the territory of the country in the middle of the 19th century, when the French colonialists seized Vietnam. But these uprisings were crushed because the rebels had neither a unified leadership nor a clear-cut programme of action, and their methods of struggle were outdated. The Vietnamese national-liberation movement was in a state of crisis until the Vietnamese working class entered the political arena and assumed guidance of the revolution.

The Great October Socialist Revolution exerted a tremendous influence on the national-liberation struggle in Vietnam. It demonstrated that the Vietnamese proletariat could fulfil its historic mission only if it created an independent revolutionary party that would firmly and consistently adhere to Marxist-Leninist theory.

The creation of such a party was preceded by a period of preparation lasting many years during which the Vietnamese revolutionaries mastered the Marxist-Leninist world outlook. This was not an easy process as socialist traditions did not then exist in Vietnamese society. In addition, it was isolated from the main centres of the international revolutionary movement. But Marxist organisations began to appear in Vietnam in the 1920s. They established ties with the workers' movement, conducted anti-feudal and anti-imperialist propaganda. Ho Chi Minh, an outstanding revolutionary and the first Vietnamese communist, played an enormous role in the dissemination of Marxism-Leninism in Vietnam. He began

working to create a revolutionary Marxist organisation in the mid-1920s. In 1925 he formed the Society of Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth in which Communists constituted the guiding nucleus.¹ The years that followed the establishment of the Society witnessed the vigorous development of its organisational base and of the mass organisations guided by it: the worker, peasant and student leagues. The Society succeeded in establishing ties with the Comintern and the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, France and China.² Independent communist organisations were formed in 1929 in all three parts of the country.³ But there was an urgent need to unify the Communists in a single party as quickly as possible. The need for unity of action was noted also by the Comintern. Mindful of this, the Executive Committee of the Comintern sent a letter on October 27, 1929 to Vietnamese Communist organisations in which it said that "the absence of a single Communist party at a time when there is an upsurge in the movement of the worker and peasant masses is fraught with great danger for the future revolution in Indochina".⁴

On February 3, 1930 separate Marxist groups attended a party unity conference under Ho Chi Minh's chairmanship and formed the Communist Party of Vietnam.⁵ A plenary meeting of the Party's Central Committee held in October 1930 decided to rename it the Communist Party of Indochina (CPIC). On April 11, 1931 the Executive Committee of the Comintern recognised the Communist Party of Indochina as an independent organisation affiliated with the Comintern.

The forming of the Communist Party of Indochina was a historic turning point in the Vietnamese people's liberation struggle which heralded the assertion of the guiding role played by the working class in the revolution as well as the end of the national-liberation movement's ideological and organisational crisis. For the first time ever the leadership of this struggle was assumed by a political party reliably armed with scientific theory, which clearly realised the aims and tasks of the struggle, was closely connected with the broadest popular masses, possessed an arsenal of methods and means which would lead them to victory, while being in a militant alliance with the international revolutionary movement.

From the very first days of its existence the CPIC guided itself by the Leninist provision that "with the aid of the proletariat of the advanced countries, backward countries can go over to the Soviet system and, through certain stages of development, to communism, without having to pass through the capitalist stage", and clearly indicated that at the initial stage the Vietnamese⁶ revolution should overthrow the power of imperialists and feudal lords, win national independence, form a worker and peasant government, create a worker and peasant army and hand land over to those who till it. The task of the following stage was to advance to socialism bypassing the stage of capitalist development. The close alliance of the working class and the peasantry was declared the main motive force of the revolution.⁷

¹ See *A Militant Vanguard of the Vietnamese People. History of the Communist Party of Vietnam*, Moscow, 1981, p. 23.

² See Nguyen Khanh Toan, *The Great October Revolution and Vietnam*, Moscow, 1979, p. 37.

³ During French colonial rule Vietnam was divided into three parts with different political regimes and systems of administration (Cochin china, Tonkin and Annam).

⁴ *Party Documents (1930-1945)*, Vol. 1, Hanoi, 1977, p. 10 (in Vietnamese).

⁵ See *Militant Vanguard of the Vietnamese People*, p. 28.

⁶ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 244.

⁷ See *History of the Communist Party of Vietnam (1930-1945)*, Vol. 1, Hanoi, 1978, pp. 39-41 (in Vietnamese).

The party's first General Secretary Tran Phu played an important role in drawing up the party's programme of action formulated in the form of political theses.

A mere fifteen years passed between the creation of the Party in 1930 and the victory of the August 1945 Revolution as a result of which the Vietnamese people under the leadership of the CPIC put an end to the almost 100 years of colonial domination and the millennium-long oppressive feudal monarchy. During this brief period the CPIC succeeded in staging three "rehearsals" of the revolution. Creatively applying Marxist-Leninist theory in practice it worked out and tested in the flames of revolutionary battles the strategy and tactics of the proletariat's class struggle.

The first "rehearsal" was the mighty revolutionary uprising of 1930-1931 during which the guiding role of the working class and the Communist Party of Indochina was asserted. During these years workers and peasants called for independence, freedom, pay raises, reduction of the work day, support for the Soviet Union and the national-liberation movements of the peoples of the world and opposition to imperialist war.

The class battles fought in Nghean and Hatinh provinces were especially fierce and the colonial feudal administration there was liquidated in the course of the uprising. The workers and peasants took the administration of all aspects of political and social life into their hands at the local level and performed the functions of popular power according to the Soviet model. The Soviets resolutely suppressed counterrevolutionary activity. Taxes introduced by the colonialists and feudal lords were abolished. Public land was divided among the peasants. All sorts of requisitions were eliminated, rent was reduced and a movement for the eradication of illiteracy was started.⁸

The French colonialists resorted to ruthless terror in order to suppress the revolutionary movement and destroy the Communist Party of Indochina. Tens of thousands of party members and patriots were arrested, thrown into prison, sentenced to hard labour or killed. Almost all the members of the CPIC Central Committee were arrested and many of them lost their lives. The first General Secretary of the CPIC Central Committee Tran Phu perished in September 1931. He was 27 at the time. The colonialists succeeded in smashing almost all of the CPIC cells. Beyond the terror campaign the colonialists tried to deceive and bribe the masses. It was then that various petty-bourgeois theories began to be circulated and Vietnamese Trotskyites and nationalists stepped up their activities.

But the CPIC soon succeeded in restoring its organisations and establishing firm ties with the masses. Revolutionaries organised political studies in prison, and the process of summing up the experience which had been gained during this period of revolutionary activity began. Intensive ideological struggle was conducted.

The CPIC Steering Committee Abroad was set up in 1934. It did much to unify party organisations, train leaders and create the necessary conditions for convening the party's first congress which was held in March 1935. It was attended by delegates representing party organisations in Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. The Congress outlined the top-priority tasks: to strengthen the Party, draw the broad popular masses to its side, and struggle against the preparations being made for imperialist war. It played an important role in preparing the party for a new upsurge in revolutionary activity.⁹

⁸ See *Thirty Years of Struggle by the Party and Working Class of Vietnam*, Hanoi, 1960, pp. 34-42.

⁹ See *The Militant Vanguard of the Vietnamese People*, p. 41.

In conditions of the certain easing of the political situation in Indochina in the wake of the creation of a Popular Front government in France the CPIC, relying on the decisions of the 7th Congress of the Comintern (July 1935), proclaimed that it was forming a Democratic Front. This front united all the democratic and progressive forces opposed to the French colonialists and local reactionaries. It came out in support of democratic freedoms and improving the life of the population, while opposing fascist aggression.

During the years which marked an upsurge in revolutionary activity (1936-1939) the party mastered the art of conducting political work with the urban and rural masses. The numerous publications put out by the Party were extensively used for this purpose. The propaganda of Marxism-Leninism, of the Party's main goals was also conducted through the trade union, youth, women's and other organisations that functioned under its guidance. As a result of pressure exerted by the popular movement many political prisoners were freed, among them Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong. Along with overt methods the Party also made extensive use of underground forms of struggle, thus enabling it to protect its nucleus from acts of repression.

The CPIC strove to establish contacts with petty-bourgeois political parties and with democratic elements among the bourgeois intelligentsia in order to organise joint actions. It sternly criticised manifestations of "leftist" deviation which took the form of sectarianism, narrow-mindedness and an inability to use legal and semi-legal forms of struggle. At the same time manifestations of rightist deviation such as intoxication with individual instances of success and disregard for need to strengthen the alliance of workers and peasants were also criticized. The CPIC Central Committee waged a persistent struggle against the Trotskyites exposing them as the accomplices of fascists.¹⁰

The upsurge in revolutionary activity from 1936 to 1939 enabled the CPIC to rouse millions of working people in town and countryside, strengthen the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, train a large number of party cadres and close party ranks. In those years the party did much to raise the level of education and political awareness among its members.

The Party's ties with the international communist movement had grown in strength. Comrade Le Hong Phong, who headed the CPIC delegation at the 7th Comintern Congress, was elected alternate member of the Comintern's Executive Committee. Comrade Ho Chi Minh, who was at the time enrolled in the International Leninist School in Moscow and was engaged in research, attended the Congress as a guest.

The Second World War broke out and with it came a time of great trial for the party. After France had been defeated Japan seized Indochina. The colonial authorities outlawed the CPIC and began to disband the legal and semi-legal organisations formed by the communists. Thousands of patriots, among them most of the party's leaders, were thrown behind bars and sentenced to hard labour. The opportunities open to the party for legal work were exhausted. The democratic freedoms won during the upsurge in revolutionary activity were eliminated.

But this drastic turn for the worse did not catch the Party off guard and it instructed its organisations to go underground in good time. When determining the party's tasks during this new stage the CPIC Central Committee noted that from now on the revolution's main task would be to overthrow the rule of imperialists and achieve the country's national liberation.

¹⁰ See *Brief History of the Vietnam Workers' Party*, Moscow, 1971, pp. 24-25.

The masses launched a determined struggle against the dual oppression of the Japanese occupiers and the French colonialists. In September 1940 there was uprising in Bacson. An uprising in Nam Ky began in November 1940, followed by uprisings in Te Rang and Doluong in 1941. These uprisings were suppressed but the intensity of the struggle was not reduced.

The Party decided to form the League of Struggle for the Independence of Vietnam uniting in its ranks all those fighting for the freedom of Vietnam regardless of which class they belonged to, their social status or creed. A decision was made to set up armed forces and step up activities to prepare the ground for an uprising with the aim of seizing power and extending it throughout the country. Liberation detachments were formed everywhere and the Liberation Army of Vietnam came into being in 1944.

The victories scored by the Soviet Union in the struggle against Nazi fascism facilitated the growth of the Vietnamese people's liberation movement. The CPIC set the task of preparing for an uprising against the Japanese invaders who eliminated the French colonial administration in March 1945 thus becoming Indochina's sole master.

The Soviet Union's rout of fascist Germany and its subsequent entry into the war against militaristic Japan, which by its nature was a mission of liberation in respect of the peoples of Asia, had a positive influence on the Vietnamese people's liberation struggle.

The decision to start a national armed uprising was made at a party conference held in Tan Trao on August 13-15, 1945. Several days later the National Congress of People's Representatives was convened. It gave its support to this decision, elected a National Liberation Committee, headed by Ho Chi Minh, and invested it with the powers of a provisional government. The Congress' decision stated that "the Soviet Union, having made a tremendous contribution to the cause of routing fascism in Europe, declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945... The Japanese regime in our country is crumbling". The Congress appealed to the people and revolutionary organisations to seize power, create the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and arm the people".¹¹

The uprising in Hanoi was victorious on August 19, in Hue on August 23, and in Saigon on August 25. The revolution spread throughout the country sweeping away the hated puppet feudal monarchy and its Japanese and French patrons. At a meeting attended by half a million people in Hanoi on September 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh, speaking on behalf of the Provisional Government, read out Declaration of Independence. He proclaimed the creation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the first state of workers and peasants in Southeast Asia. Vietnam acquired the statehood that had been wrested from it by the colonialists and won political independence. The Vietnamese people "became truly free and independent".¹²

Between September 1945 and December 1946 the Party guided the struggle to defend and strengthen the revolutionary regime and to restore the national economy. It mobilised the working people in order to repulse the aggression of the colonialists who hoped to restore the old order with the help of the local feudal and bourgeois upper crust. It was at this time that the struggle to increase production and to cope with the terrible famine that had spread throughout the country was begun. Land that once belonged to French colonialists and traitors was divided upon

¹¹ See *Let Us Smash the Fetters. Documents of the August 1945 Revolution in Vietnam*, Moscow, 1960, pp. 70-71.

¹² Ho Chi Minh, *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Moscow, 1959, p. 165.

a temporary basis, rent was cut by 25 per cent and a law on the 8-hour work day was adopted. General elections were held early in 1946. The National Assembly adopted the state's first Constitution. A literacy campaign was launched throughout the country.

These democratic reforms were carried out in terribly difficult times. North Vietnam was invaded by an army of 200,000 Chiang Kaishek men. With the help of the British imperialists the French colonialists seized Saigon on September 23, 1945 and launched combat operations throughout South Vietnam.

The CPIC and the DRV government made a tremendous effort to stave off the foreign aggression by political means. But the colonialists marched further and further along the road of military provocation and outright armed aggression. Therefore, the Central Committee of the Communist Party adopted a resolution entitled "On the War of Resistance by the Entire People" on December 22, 1946. The party urged the population to wage a "nationwide, comprehensive and protracted war of resistance" in order to uphold the gains of the August Revolution.¹³

Thus began the Vietnamese people's lengthy war of resistance to the French colonialists (1946-1954). During the war the Vietnamese People's Army and the partisan detachments had the support of the whole people and dealt blows to the French expeditionary corps which was equipped with American-made weapons. Along with armed resistance the Vietnamese patriots, headed by the Communist party, conducted vigorous political and diplomatic activity. The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union¹⁴ and other socialist countries in 1950 became an important factor facilitating the Vietnamese people's successful struggle and considerably strengthening the young republic's international status. The large-scale movement in France which called for an end to the "dirty war" also helped weaken the position of French colonialism in Indochina.

The 2nd Party's Congress held in February 1951 played a tremendous role in mobilising the masses to the struggle against the imperialist aggression. It worked out a programme of struggle against the colonialists stipulating that the task of the revolution was to bring the war of resistance to a victorious end, achieve independence, unite the nation, liquidate feudal and semi-feudal survivals, hand the land over to those who till it, develop the system of people's democracy and create the fundamentals of socialism while bypassing the stage of capitalist development. The Congress adopted a resolution legalising the party and renamed it the Vietnam Workers' Party. A decision was also made to organise separate revolutionary parties in Laos and Kampuchea that would be capable of meeting the specific demands of each country.¹⁵

The agrarian reform initiated by the WPV Central Committee (November 1953) was of prime importance in mobilising the overwhelming majority of the population—the peasants—to anti-imperialist struggle. Upon receiving land, millions of peasants joined the ranks of the resistance.

In the winter of 1953-1954 the armed forces of liberation launched a strategic offensive that ended in the victorious Battle of Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954. 112,000 enemy soldiers were killed or wounded.¹⁶ The rout of the French Expeditionary Corps by the Vietnamese People's

¹³ See *Brief History of the Vietnam Workers' Party*, p. 52.

¹⁴ See *Soviet Union-Vietnam. 30 Years of Relations. 1950-1980. Documents and Materials*, Moscow, 1982, p. 8.

¹⁵ See *Documents of the 2nd Party Congress*, Hanoi, 1965, pp. 39, 90, 95, 118 (in Vietnamese).

¹⁶ See *Militant Vanguard of the Vietnamese People*, p. 97.

Army at Dien Bien Phu paved the way for the DRV's success at the Geneva Conference on Indochina. The Geneva Accords were signed on July 20, 1954 which recognised the right of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea to "independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity".

The end of the war and the conclusion of the Geneva Accords in 1954 were an important victory for the VWP, the Vietnamese people, and all those who opposed imperialism. Given the new situation in the country the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the VWP Central Committee (July 1954) stressed the need to press for peace and strengthen it, to complete the country's unification, gain independence and implement democracy throughout the country.¹⁷

The agrarian reform was completed in the north of the country after the restoration of peace thus achieving the goal set by the party immediately after its formation. The task of restoring a national economy was in the main completed in the DRV by 1957. On the whole the volume of industrial and agricultural production reached the 1939 level. The state of people's democracy asserted itself and exercised the dictatorship of the proletariat. A three-year plan for transforming and developing the economy was successfully fulfilled between 1958 and 1960. North Vietnam made a step forward towards the socialist transformation of society and in 1959 new, socialist constitution was adopted.

The 3rd VWP Congress was held in September 1960. This marked the first time a congress of Vietnamese Communists had been held legally. In the years following the August revolution party membership had grown from 5,000 to almost 500,000. By 1960 party organisations had been set up throughout the country.¹⁸ The Congress worked out the party's general line at the new stage which faced it. The Congress noted that the general task of the Vietnamese revolution was to "strengthen the unity of the entire people, resolutely to struggle for the preservation of peace, accelerate socialist transformations in North Vietnam, activate the national people's democratic revolution in South Vietnam, unite the country on the basis of independence and democracy, create a peace-loving, united, independent, democratic and prosperous Vietnam..."¹⁹ The Congress endorsed the guidelines of the first five-year plan (1961-1965), discussed questions of party building, approved changes in Party Rules and elected the Party's guiding bodies. Ho Chi Minh was elected Chairman of the VWP Central Committee and Le Duan was elected First Secretary.

By 1965 the DRV had considerable achievements to its credit. The socialist sector had won key positions in production and distribution. More than a thousand state enterprises had been set up or rebuilt. Socialist industrialisation was begun. The foundations of heavy industry were laid and several new industries had been created. Illiteracy had been stamped out, a system of universal secondary education had been introduced and the training of engineers, technicians and skilled workers had been organised.

As for the southern part of the country, the patriotic forces there, headed by Communists, were conducting a vigorous struggle for liberation from the anti-popular Saigon regime that was being propped up by American bayonets and for the reunification of the country. The struggle for the homeland's reunification became the single national task of the Vietnamese revolution. Vietnam's revolutionary, democratic forces view-

¹⁷ See Ho Chi Minh, *Selected Works*, Hanoi, 1973, p. 191.

¹⁸ See *3rd Congress of the Workers' Party of Vietnam*, Moscow, 1961, p. 133.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

ed the reunification of the country as the sole basis on which further rapid national and social progress could be made.

Directed by Communists, the struggle for the country's unification was conducted in all spheres: military, political, ideological, economic and social. In the struggle for the country's freedom, independence and unity the Vietnamese people foiled American plans for waging a "special war" and then, beginning in 1964 and 1965, a "local" war against the South Vietnamese patriots and bombings of the DRV. In this struggle the Vietnamese people had the all-round and effective assistance of the CPSU and other fraternal Communist and Workers' parties, on its side as well as the active support of the national-liberation and peace movements.

An agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam was signed in Paris on January 27, 1973. It was the result of the flexible and consistent course taken by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG RSV), which was proclaimed by the patriotic forces in the south in 1969, and the unflagging support this course received from the USSR, other socialist countries, and progressive forces around the world. A decisive step was thereby made along the road to the total restoration of peace and the reunification of Vietnam.

In the north of the country the Vietnamese people began to heal the wounds war had inflicted. At the same time the VWP and the government of the DRV, in close cooperation with the PRG RSV, vigorously pressed for the fulfilment of the 1973 Paris Agreement. This was especially important since even though the United States had withdrawn its troops from South Vietnam it did not stop deliveries of arms and ammunition to the Saigon puppet regime and pushed it both to expand military operations against the liberated areas and actually to reject a political solution to the country's problems. In these conditions the liberation forces were compelled to fight back.

Saigon, the remaining bulwark of neocolonialism on Vietnamese soil, was liberated on April 30, 1975 as a result of a general offensive by the armed forces of liberation and a popular uprising. Speaking on the importance and sources of the people's victory in this protracted and bloody war the General Secretary of the Party Central Committee Le Duan said that, "our victory is a victory of the revolutionary path and methods of revolutionary action, of the correct and creative course of revolutionary war pursued by our Party, which holds high the banner of the national-democratic revolution and the banner of the socialist revolution, which merged the forces of national independence with the might of socialism, mobilised the forces of the entire people and, by combining them with international forces throughout the world today, created an integrated force to rout and defeat the US imperialists".²⁰

The victory of 1975 put an end forever to over a century of colonial domination on Vietnamese soil. It shattered the strategic plans of imperialism and hegemonism. As a result of this victory the necessary preconditions were created for the reunification of Vietnam as a state and the forming of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1976. A new epoch began in the life of the Vietnamese people, the epoch of building socialism throughout the country.

Basing their decisions on the situation which resulted from the Vietnamese people's victory, the 4th Party Congress (1976) defined the general course of the socialist revolution in Vietnam during its new stage: "Firmly to adhere to the dictatorship of the proletariat, to develop the working people's right to be the master and simultaneously to carry

²⁰ Le Duan, *Selected Articles and Speeches (1975-1981)*, Moscow, 1981.

out three revolutions in the sphere of production relations, in the sphere of science and technology and in the sphere of ideology and culture, the scientific and technological revolution being the most crucial of the three, to accelerate socialist industrialisation which is the key task during the entire period of transition to socialism; to create a regime of socialist collective economic management, large-scale socialist production, a new culture, to form a new, socialist man; to eliminate the exploitation of man by man, poverty and backwardness; steadily to raise vigilance, constantly to strengthen the country's defences, to preserve political security and public order; successfully to build a peaceful, independent and united socialist Vietnamese homeland; to make an active contribution to the struggle of the world's peoples for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism."²¹ The 4th Congress also decided to rename the party the Communist Party of Vietnam.

The 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (March 1982) made an important contribution to the further development of the strategy and tactics to be used in building socialism in the SRV. The Congress clearly defined the outlines of the Party's social and economic policy at the initial stage of socialist industrialisation. It noted that in the 1980s the party and people would concentrate their efforts on the accelerating the development of agriculture, this being viewed as the top-priority task today; on the comprehensive development of the production of basic goods as well as on the creation of a number of heavy industries without which the country's further industrial progress is inconceivable.

The Congress directed the party to carry out socialist reforms in the southern provinces, taking measures to strengthen the country's single economic complex, launching the social and economic integration of the North and the South whose development had proceeded in opposite directions over the course of several decades.

The Communist Party of Vietnam takes the specific conditions under which the country has to build the new society into consideration. Vietnam is building socialism while bypassing the stage of capitalist development. One of the problems with which it must cope is its underdeveloped productive forces. Thus, in 1975 the bulk of the national product was produced in agriculture primarily by small-commodity peasant households. The low initial level of the material base is also illustrated by the following fact: the per capita national income in 1975 was a mere \$135.²² Neither should one forget the devastating consequences of American aggression in Vietnam. The new society is being built in an unfavourable international situation, and it constantly faces armed provocations and threats by hegemonism and imperialism. This compels the SRV to divert considerable resources to maintain its own defences and those of its allies Laos and Kampuchea at the proper level. Attempts by the extreme imperialist circles, first and foremost in the United States, to subject the SRV to an economic blockade, to create a sort of a "cordon" around socialist Vietnam should also be taken into account.

In analysing the situation in the country at its 5th Congress the Communist Party of Vietnam frankly stated that beyond causes of an objective nature stable and confident economic development was retarded by subjective causes as well, including errors and miscalculations in managing and planning the economy, a shortage of experienced cadres and the inability of a number of functionaries to switch from wartime methods of administration to economic methods of management quickly enough.

Almost ten years have passed since the full liberation of Vietnam. Great successes have been achieved in healing the wounds inflicted by

²¹ *The 4th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam*, Moscow, 1977, p. 49.

²² See A. S. Voronin, *Vietnam Today*, Moscow, 1979, p. 11.

war and in creating the foundations of the new society during this period. War-ravaged agricultural and industrial enterprises have been rebuilt and the transportation network is being restored. Millions of people have received housing and jobs.

The accomplishments made in the main branch of the economy—agriculture—are especially impressive. Despite extremely unfavourable weather conditions some 18 million tons of food were produced in 1984. As a result, the population's food needs are now primarily satisfied by domestic production. Considerable changes are taking place in industry. The average annual increment of industrial output during the current five-year-plan period (1981-1985) equalled 11 per cent. There was a growth in the output of electricity, cement, machinery, chemical fertilizers, fabrics and paper.²³

The situation as it concerns capital building is improving. Greater resources are now being concentrated on decisive projects in key industries. The Hoabinh, Phalai and Trian hydroelectric and thermal power stations are now under construction. The extraction of Vietnamese oil has been started on the continental shelf in the south of the country. New moorages have been built in the sea ports of Haiphong, Hongai and Campha. Traffic has been resumed on the trans-Vietnamese railway linking Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.

Much is being done to strengthen the state and cooperative sectors of the economy, this being especially important in the case of southern Vietnam. In 1984 more than 50 per cent of the peasants owning approximately 50 per cent of all the land under cultivation formed production teams, mutual assistance labour groups or farm cooperatives.

Economic management is being perfected. A system of labour remuneration based on the end result of work done by a team or an individual is being introduced in agriculture. A policy of developing the independence and initiative of enterprises and local authorities is being pursued in industry; limits on using material incentives have been expanded; socialist cost-accounting is being strengthened; measures are being taken to remove disproportions in the economy; a policy of restricting and scaling down the activity of the free market, of ensuring social justice in the distribution of income among various segments of the population is being pursued.

The CPV has made a tremendous effort to arm its cadres and all members of the Party with the necessary knowledge in the field of management. Questions concerning management are regularly discussed at plenary meetings of the CPV Central Committee. They were also taken up at the Sixth and Seventh Plenary Meetings of the CPV CC in July 1984. The need to further strengthen the state sector of the economy and extend socialist reforms was stressed at the meeting.²⁴

The republic has made impressive achievements in the field of science and technology. 83 research organisations and 21 design institutes have been set up. 300,000 people have received a higher education while more than half a million received a specialised secondary education. There are more than 4,000 candidates and doctors of science in the country.²⁵

The organisational role of the CPV and the leadership it provides, the determined work of Party bodies, Party functionaries, and all Communists who mobilise the efforts of the working class, the cooperative-farm peasantry and the people's intelligentsia to the attainment of the tasks set

²³ See *World Marxist Review*, 1984, No. 10.

²⁴ See *Pravda*, July 19, 1984.

²⁵ See A. S. Yermolayev, "The Scientific and Technical Cooperation of the USSR and the SRV", *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 1, 1985.

by the 5th CPV Congress all this is clearly seen in the country's labour victories which in terms of their importance are on a par with the people's feat of arms.

The CPV's guiding role was formalised in Article 4 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which was adopted in December 1980. This recognises the great services of the party of the working class in solving the tasks of socialist revolution and the building of socialism. The Constitution stresses that the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat created in the SRV can fulfil its historic mission only if the working class and the entire people is led by a party that undeviatingly follows the Marxist-Leninist road.²⁶

Today the Party has more than 1.8 million Communists in its ranks. They work in more than 35,000 primary organisations. In fact, primary party organisations have been formed at virtually all industrial enterprises, work shops, educational establishments, and social and cultural institutions in the North of the country. The influence Party organisations exert on production and social life in the South of Vietnam is growing with every year as well. After the 5th Congress the Party carried out extensive measures designed to strengthen primary organisations as well as party leadership, at the district level, because success in the implementation of the Party's decisions depends to a large degree on their work.

The Party shows particular concern for improving the qualitative composition of its ranks. Special attention is being given to drawing the best representatives of the working class, the cooperative farm peasantry, soldiers from the Vietnamese People's Army and the socialist scientists, technicians and workers of culture into the Party. More than 84 per cent of the CPV's new members are from the Ho Chi Minh Young Communist League. About a half of the new members of the CPV have a secondary or specialised secondary education, while 6 per cent are graduates of institutions of higher learning.²⁷

Exacting demands are also made of the moral and political makeup of Communists. Absolute loyalty to the revolutionary cause, total support for the Party's line, a high level of political awareness, modesty, honesty, unselfishness, and an ability to place the interests of society and the collective above personal interests—these are criteria formulated in the CPV Rules.

Recently, the CPV gave its members the first membership cards ever to be issued in the Party's history. This campaign made the Party more united while facilitating the organisational strengthening of its ranks and the enhancement of ideological level of Communists. The professional competence, political and moral qualities of every Communist were subjected to a thorough analysis in the course of this campaign that was started in 1980. One characteristic of this campaign was that opinions on every Communist were expressed not only by members of his Party organisation but also by non-party representatives of the collective in which he worked. During the campaign the Party resolutely freed itself of those who had failed to pass the test of high responsibility imposed by membership in the Party. The Party's prestige among the working people and its ties with working people grew and were strengthened as a result of this campaign.

In the ideological field the CPV sees its main tasks in arming Communists with the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, cultivating in them will-power and the resolve to overcome all difficulties, and ensuring that

²⁶ See *Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam*, Moscow, 1982, p. 19.

²⁷ See *Pravda*, March 24, 1983.

they acquire the knowledge necessary to fulfil successfully the tasks of building socialism and defending the homeland. As was stressed at the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the CPV Central Committee (1983) which studied the party's pressing tasks in the field of organisational and ideological work, every Communist must not only have a thorough understanding of the Party's policies but also be a dedicated, active fighter for their realisation. The Plenary Meeting demanded that political and educational work in the Party be intensified, that criticism and self-criticism be promoted, that party discipline be observed and that the principles of democratic centralism be strictly adhered to.²⁸

A ramified system of party schools has been created to promote the ideological education of Communists. The classics of Marxism-Leninism are put out in large printings. The full collection of Lenin's works has been published in the SRV. The full collection of Ho Chi Minh's works is being prepared for the press, while collections of articles and speeches by Le Duan and other CPV leaders as well as by CPSU leaders are regularly published. A collection of works by Konstantin Chernenko, was published in Hanoi in November 1984.

Theoretical work in the party is being much more actively conducted. The quality of research in the field of social sciences has grown. Researchers are concentrating on the laws governing the period of transition to socialism, as well as on the CPV's economic strategy, party construction and economic development at the present stage.

The growth of the party's influence on all aspects of the country's life is also enhanced by the large amount of work being conducted by the CPV with public organisations through the Fatherland Front. In essence this work amounts to tapping the wells of the people's creativity and drawing the masses into the process of elaborating proposals, making decisions and implementing the party's policy.

Working on the basis of the Political Programme adopted in 1977 the Front has become an active assistant to the CPV in solving the tasks facing the country. Along with the CPV the Front now includes the Vietnam Federation of Trade Unions, the Ho Chi Minh Young Communist League, the Vietnam Union of Women and other public and professional organisations, as well as the Socialist and Democratic parties of Vietnam.

The Communist Party of Vietnam has never separated itself from the international communist movement of which it considers itself to be an integral part. By its selfless struggle in the interests of working people, to strengthen the unity of the international communist and workers' movement and the greater solidarity of the countries, belonging to the socialist community, on the immutable basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism the Communist Party of Vietnam has earned an impressive reputation among the Communists of the world, and among all those fighting against imperialism and for peace, democracy and socialism.

The CPV is developing multi-faceted cooperation with the CPSU and the Soviet Union. "Solidarity and multi-faceted cooperation with the Soviet Union", it was stated by the Fifth CPV Congress, "have been and remain the cornerstone of the foreign policy of our party and state." The spirited solidarity and comprehensiveness which characterise Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation are a guarantee that the Vietnamese people will successfully defend their homeland, build socialism, and strengthen socialism's status in the Indochinese peninsula.²⁹

²⁸ See *Vietnam News*, 1983, No. 8, p. 1 (in Russian).

²⁹ See *5th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam*, Moscow, 1983, p. 96.

The Communist Party of Vietnam has every right to be proud of its achievements. At every stage of its history it has successfully played the role of the leader of the working masses, the inspirer and organiser of all their victories. It profoundly and precisely expressed the people's aspirations and skillfully translated the demands of the masses into the political language of revolutionary action. Its work has always been distinguished by its loyalty to the great teaching of Marxism-Leninism, and its ability to implement a revolutionary strategy based on principle despite every obstacle, placed in its path, while utilising flexible tactics and great diversity of form in the process. In the eyes of Soviet people and all friends of the fraternal Vietnamese people the CPV is a staunch detachment of the international communist movement, a striking and inspiring example of selfless service to the people's cause. "We," the message of greetings of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the CPV on the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the formation of the CPV, pointed out in part, "express firm confidence that the Vietnamese people, guided by the militant vanguard—the Communist Party, its Central Committee led by General Secretary Le Duan, will win fresh successes in building strong and prosperous socialist Vietnam, in the struggle for consolidating international positions of socialism, forces of peace and progress."³⁰

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USSR-JAPAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 60TH ANNIVERSARY MARKED

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[Article by N. N. Nikolayev and V. N. Arsenyev: "The 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the USSR and Japan"]

The year of 1985 marks 60 years since diplomatic relations were established between the Soviet Union and Japan. On February 26, 1925, the Convention on the Basic Principles of Relations Between the USSR and Japan went into effect, inaugurating the history of Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations. The Convention recorded the two countries' desire to live in peace and friendship and their commitment to develop relations on the basis of the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs and to refrain from direct or indirect hostility against each other.

Sixty years is a long period, during which Soviet-Japanese relations had both ups and downs and at times seriously worsened through no fault of the Soviet side. Nevertheless the experience accumulated during that period gives grounds to conclude that whenever normal relations were maintained between the two countries this fully accorded with the interests of the Soviet and the Japanese people and with the task of conserving peace and security in the Far East. The history of Soviet-Japanese relations also shows that for these relations to develop fruitfully it is imperative to follow consistently the policy of genuine goodneighbourliness and mutually advantageous cooperation.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan was of great international importance and was a major gain of the Soviet Union's Leninist foreign policy, a policy designed to promote relations of a new type—diverse peaceful cooperation between states with different social systems. The signing of the Soviet-Japanese Convention of 1925 and the subsequent establishment of diplomatic and consular relations consummated an important stage in Soviet efforts towards normalising relations with the leading capitalist countries.

The more far-sighted Japanese politicians of the 1920s realised that the Soviet state, which had already established relations with many capitalist countries, was stable and should not be ignored. Furthermore, Tokyo's ruling quarters believed that normal relations with the USSR could help them strengthen their international position and overcome the incipient isolation of Japan on the world scene, which became manifest particularly at the Washington conference of 1921-1922. As for the country's businessmen, they were aware of the direct advantages of broader trade and economic contacts with the USSR.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan opened prospects for the development of contacts between the two countries in the most diverse areas. Mutually advantageous trade burgeoned, initial cultural contacts were made, and so on.

But the Japanese reactionary and militarist forces stubbornly opposed goodneighbourly relations in a bid to unleash armed conflicts

against the USSR within the framework of their aggressive policy. The "anti-Comintern pact" concluded between Japan and Nazi Germany in 1936 and ensuing military alliance ("the tripartite pact") with Germany and fascist Italy were symptomatic of the Japanese ruling elite's dangerous aspirations connected with preparations for war against the Soviet Union. Manifestations of this aggressive policy were invariably rebuffed, as attested by the events at Lake Khasan (1938) and in the region of the Halhyn-gol River (1939).

It is noteworthy that in the complicated international situation of those years the Soviet government did its utmost to maintain a certain level for the development of relations with Japan and to use favourable prospects for it, which opened after the bilateral Convention had gone into effect. This was obstructed by the Japanese reactionaries who stepped up their expansionist policy and eventually plunged the Japanese people into the abyss of the Second World War, in which Japan suffered defeat.

In violation of the Neutrality Pact concluded between the USSR and Japan in 1941 the Japanese brass persisted in its provocative activities at Soviet borders, bent on availing itself of an opportunity to attack the USSR, depending on the course of military operations at the Soviet-German front. Japan concentrated the Kwantung army, the biggest grouping of its land forces, close to Soviet territory, regularly blocked Soviet navigation in the Pacific and supplied the Nazi military command with secret information about the USSR. In this connection the Soviet government denounced the Neutrality Pact with Japan in April 1945, having stressed that the document had been rendered void under the circumstances.

Seeking to put an end to the war, to lessen the number of victims and to restore universal peace as soon as possible, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan on August 9, 1945. The Soviet Army launched an offensive against the Kwantung army in Manchuria and dealt it a crushing blow. In August 1945, Japan announced its unconditional surrender.

The routing of Japanese militarism was part of the great victory and meant the end of the Second World War. The defeat of militarist Japan brought liberation to the peoples who had been enslaved by it, boosted the national liberation movement in Asia, speeded up the victory of the Chinese revolution and dealt a great blow to imperialism and its colonial system.

However, for a most dangerous seat of aggression to be eliminated forever in the Far East, it was necessary to consolidate the military-political victory over Japanese militarism by implementing extensive measures to demilitarise and democratise Japan. The USSR insisted on a set of measures that would uproot Japanese militarism and ensure the country's transformation into an independent, peace-loving state. The Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, envisaged that after the end of the war Japan would be granted complete national independence, form its own democratic institutions and develop a peaceful economy and national culture.

While striving hard to ensure Japan's peaceful, democratic development, the Soviet Union also wanted to restore normal diplomatic relations with Japan as soon as possible.

Despite its intentions, however, it took more than 11 years to normalise Soviet-Japanese relations. This was a period of virtually no contacts, commercial, cultural or other relations between the two countries. The reasons for that situation should be sought in the opposition mounted by certain elements in Japan and outside it, determined to preclude the normalisation of these relations and the easing of tensions in Asia. The

US attempts to "legalise" its military presence in that country by ensnaring it in a network of military bases also played a negative role in this.

In the mid-1950s, the movement for the normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union emerged as a formidable force. The country's progressive public actively supported the efforts of the Japanese government and above all Prime Minister I. Hatoyama, who realised the importance of good relations with their Far Eastern neighbour—the Soviet Union. As a result, despite the opposition of some influential opponents of the normalisation of relations, a sober-minded attitude to the USSR and the awareness of the need to take into account the interests of the two neighbouring nations, interests which objectively required that normal contacts between the USSR and Japan be established prevailed in the Japanese government.

As a result of the bilateral talks held in Moscow, the Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration was signed on October 19, 1956 which ended the state of war between the two countries and restored diplomatic and consular relations. The Soviet Union and Japan declared that in their relations they would be guided by the principles formalised in the UN Charter, and in particular, would settle their disputes by peaceful means. The Declaration also recorded the two sides' agreement to enter negotiations in the shortest possible period in order to conclude treaties or agreements to lay a firm foundation for Soviet-Japanese relations in the fields of trade, navigation and so on.

In the period that followed the two sides did a good deal to develop further Soviet-Japanese relations. They succeeded in laying a certain groundwork of treaties and agreements designed not only to regulate relations and contacts in individual areas but also to stimulate their further development. Among those documents were the 1957 Trade Treaty, agreements such as on fishing and direct air and sea communications, the Consular Convention and an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation.

The two countries have maintained fruitful and effective political contacts, including at a high level, since the Joint Declaration was signed. In October 1973, the Japanese Prime Minister came to the Soviet Union on an official visit. Beginning with 1966 the two countries' foreign ministers have been exchanging visits, during which a wide range of problems of bilateral relations as well as important international problems were discussed. The Soviet and the Japanese foreign ministers also began to hold regular meetings during the UN General Assembly sessions in New York.

Parliamentary contacts are also a good example of developing business ties, which facilitate the solution of political and other problems and promote mutual understanding between our nations. Official parliamentary delegations exchanged visits in 1964, 1970, 1975 and 1978. Reciprocal visits were made by the chairmen of the USSR Supreme Soviet Chambers and those of the Japanese Diet; the foreign relations commissions, too, exchanged delegations.

Beginning with 1979, there have been regular bilateral consultations on the level of deputy foreign ministers as well as other useful contacts between representatives of the two countries' foreign ministries.

Maintaining a political dialogue with Japan, the Soviet Union invariably demonstrates its constructive approach to developing relations with that country. The Soviet side always viewed and continues to view goodwill, realism and the taking into account of each other's interests and positions as a reliable basis for progress in mutual relations. Soviet-Japanese contacts have demonstrated that precisely such an approach has yielded tangible positive results in diverse fields.

For example, Soviet-Japanese trade and economic relations have been developing quite actively for a long period. From 1957 to 1983 bilateral trade grew almost 200-fold, reaching 3,004,000 million roubles in 1983. By the way, trade between the two countries is indeed mutually advantageous. Commodity flows between the USSR and Japan graphically illustrate the mutually complementary aspects of their economies. The Soviet Union's major export items are timber, textile raw materials, petroleum and petro-products, solid fuel and so on; beginning in the late 1970s this country expanded export of manufactures, including machines and equipment, to Japan. The Soviet Union imports from Japan primarily machines and equipment, including complete plant for enterprises of the chemical, oil-refining, textile and other industries as well as some other types of equipment.

Of paramount importance to the development of trade and economic ties between the two countries are the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation committees set up in 1965. The committees' efforts are all the more significant since prospects have opened for the two sides' interaction in developing the natural resources of Siberia and the Far East. Two General Agreements on timber were signed in 1968 and 1974, envisaging Japanese supplies of equipment, machines, materials and other commodities to the USSR to develop the timber resources of the Far East; a General Agreement on cooperation in building the port of Vostochny in the Wrangel Bay was signed in 1970; and a General Agreement on Soviet supplies of chips and pulp log lengths of deciduous trees to Japan upon receiving from it the corresponding equipment, machines and materials was signed in 1971. All these agreements have been implemented. Among the agreements signed and now being put into effect are a General Agreement on supplying Japan with coking coal from the Yuzhno-Yakutsk deposit upon receiving the necessary equipment, machines, materials and so on from Japan (signed in 1974), a General Agreement on cooperation in prospecting for and developing oil and gas deposits on the Sakhalin shelf (1975) and the third General Agreement on cooperation in developing Far Eastern timber resources (1981).

It would be a mistake to claim that Japan or the Soviet Union might be unilaterally interested in these projects. The undertakings are mutually advantageous and both nations equally stand to gain from their implementation. Representatives of Japanese business repeatedly have had a chance to see this, too.

It should be said that visits made by large delegations of Japan's leading businessmen to the USSR have greatly contributed to the development of Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation. For instance, in 1976 the Soviet Union was visited by a delegation of a leading Japanese business organisation — the Federation of Economic Organisations — headed by T. Doko, then chairman. In February 1983, another representative delegation of the Japanese business community headed by S. Nagano visited the Soviet Union. The meetings and talks held during those visits focussed on specific areas of prospective large-scale economic cooperation.

Fishing is traditionally a key area of Soviet-Japanese relations. As two major fishing powers, the USSR and Japan engage in large-scale fishing in the same areas of the World Ocean and coastal waters. Relations between them are regulated in this sphere by a number of agreements, including those signed quite recently, such as the Agreement between the Soviet and the Japanese government on mutual relations in the field of fishing along each other's coast (signed on December 7, 1984). The two sides maintain fairly close and active contacts in fishing

and hold consultations between the corresponding Soviet and Japanese ministers.

Taking into consideration the interests of the Japanese fishermen on the Island of Hokkaido and in the north of Honshu, the Soviet Union favourably responds every year to the Japanese request for the right to sea kale trade in some regions of Soviet territorial waters by the Island of Signalny and also to the extraction of some other seafood in Soviet maritime regions, including by organising joint expeditions with some Japanese companies.

Cultural exchanges and contacts in the field of science, sports, etc., have an active role to play in promoting mutual understanding between the Soviet and the Japanese people and expanding their knowledge of each other. Konstantin Chernenko said: "The Soviet people are familiar with the works of the creative genius of the Japanese people. And we know that the Japanese have profound interest in Russian and Soviet culture. After all interest in each other's culture and awareness of the intellectual heritage of every nation is a direct path to its heart and mind."¹

Indeed the postwar years saw many positive changes in what the Japanese know of the Soviet Union and the life of the Soviet people. Russian and Soviet literature, arts, theatre, ballet and so on are well understood and highly appreciated in Japan. Great interest is evoked by tours by Soviet ballet companies, first and foremost, the Bolshoi Ballet, the Kirov Opera and Ballet Company, the Kiev Company and others. Our circus companies and amateur performers tour Japan with invariable success. Another important aspect of cultural exchanges is the organisation of exhibitions of works of art from Soviet museum collections in Japanese picture galleries much to the delight of the Japanese public.

Japanese art and culture enjoy great esteem in the Soviet Union. The Soviet people are familiar with the works of celebrated Japanese writers Y. Kawabata, R. Akutagawa and many others, pieces of traditional Japanese *ukyo-e* engraving, Japanese national theatre companies and the art of *ikebana*. Perhaps, hardly any other country in the world publishes as many books about Japan and its culture and translations from Japanese classical and modern literature as the USSR does. After a rather prolonged interruption the practice of holding Soviet and Japanese film festivals through government organisations has been resumed.

The two countries maintain cultural contacts on the basis of an agreement reached by the Soviet and the Japanese government on concrete problems of cultural exchanges as well as through Japanese public and private organisations.

Contacts between Soviet and Japanese public organisations contribute greatly to the development of ties between the two nations. The Union of Soviet Friendship Societies and the Soviet-Japanese Friendship Society and, on the Japanese side, some influential organisations advocating friendship with the USSR all play an important role in this. Round-table conferences of representatives of the two countries' public have become a fruitful form of cooperation in establishing truly good-neighbourly relations between the USSR and Japan and in promoting an atmosphere of trust.

The Soviet and the Japanese people can rightfully be proud of achievements in the relations between the two countries in the postwar years. It seemed as though these positive experiences could not leave any

¹ *Pravda*, Aug. 25, 1984.

grounds to doubt the need to further develop mutual ties along the lines of goodneighbourliness, trust and mutual advantage.

But in the late 1970s and the early 1980s Soviet-Japanese relations cooled considerably; as it were, they stagnated in many fields and were even reversed in some areas.

Since the end of the war the USSR has not taken a single step to curtail links with Japan, restricting contacts or lowering the level of relations. Soviet state policy, designed to establish truly goodneighbourly relations between the two countries, is never subject to circumstantial changes and is based on a principled approach. This has been recorded in the resolutions of the CPSU Congresses and reiterated repeatedly in speeches made by Soviet leaders, the Soviet side developed its relations with Japan, working consistently and unswervingly to implement that policy.

The Japanese government adopted a different stand in the early 1980s. It unilaterally restricted political contacts with the Soviet Union, including contacts at the government level, introduced restrictions on signing new mutually advantageous contracts in the commerce and on granting new bank credits to the USSR, and adopted a policy of actually curtailing in other fields, among them in science and technology. These measures were taken under heavy pressure from the United States, which demanded that Japan should follow it in pursuing the policy of "stringent sanctions" against the Soviet Union.

It is absolutely clear that these measures ran counter to the interests of Japan itself, in particular those of its businessmen, who lost many profitable commissions from Soviet foreign trade organisations. As a result, instead of ranking second among the capitalist trade partners of the USSR, Japan ranked only fifth. There was a tendency to a slump in the turnover of goods; it dwindled by more than 18 per cent in 1983, as compared with 1982.

Simultaneously Japan stepped up its campaign of unlawful territorial claims against the USSR in a bid to make the further development of relations dependent on some "concessions" from the Soviet Union. Anti-USSR campaigns were mounted against the backdrop of an actively exploited myth of a "Soviet military threat" used by some Japanese quarters to justify steps taken to build up Japan's military potential. A dangerous shift was also made in Japanese policy in international affairs, first and foremost, in the context of Tokyo's close involvement in Washington's adventurist strategy. Taking concrete measures to strengthen its military alliance with the US, Tokyo did not conceal that it viewed the USSR as the main potential enemy. Naturally, that state of affairs considerably aggravated relations between the USSR and Japan because, as Nikolai Tikhonov, Member of the Politburo CC CPSU, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, said in an interview given to a *Yomiuri* correspondent, "the Japanese government, not without encouragement from the other side of the Pacific, deliberately pursued the policy, I would say, of dismantling the entire system of Soviet-Japanese relations..."² It goes without saying that such policy met with a rebuff from the Soviet side.

Many people in Japan, especially in the past few years, have become aware of the danger of following that policy. They understand that the country's geography, characteristics of the postwar development of its economy, other factors, and in a word, Japan's very national interests call for a stable policy in relations with all countries, including its close neighbour—the Soviet Union. In this connection Andrei Gromyko, Mem-

² *Pravda*, Jan 2, 1984.

ber of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Soviet Foreign Minister, in his address to Japanese readers published by *Asahi* on January 1, 1985, said that any positive shifts in the political mood of the Japanese leadership, especially if they are accompanied by practical deeds, "would be duly appraised by us and meet with the corresponding response, as the Soviet leadership has repeatedly stated".³ The Japanese side should look more realistically at the state of affairs and prevent earlier accomplishments in the development of mutual ties from being rendered void.

Today Japanese officials, including those occupying high ranks in the government, speak out ever more frequently in favour of better relations with the Soviet Union, stressing the importance of maintaining normal relations with the USSR. During meetings with Soviet officials which have become frequent of late representatives of the Japanese government speak about the desire to break the impasse in relations and make them more productive.

In September 1984, Andrei Gromyko met with Japanese foreign minister S. Abe in New York during the 29th UN General Assembly, and in November 1984, Nikolai Tikhonov, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU CC, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers had a talk with Japanese Prime Minister Y. Nakasone in Delhi. During these talks the Japanese officials assured their Soviet counterparts of their desire to improve relations with the USSR and develop cooperation with it. Soviet-Japanese exchanges of parliamentary delegations, which Tokyo had deliberately blocked previously, have now been resumed. In October-November 1984, a representative delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet headed by Dinmukhamed Kunayev, Member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU CC, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan visited Japan. A number of delegations of the Japanese most prominent politicians visited Moscow. The 4th Round Table conference of representatives of the Soviet and the Japanese public was held in October 1984 and discussed various aspects of bilateral relations. The 9th joint conference of the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation committees took place in Tokyo in December 1984; at this conference the two countries' delegations reported the successful implementation of some existing cooperation agreements and made preparations for further talks.

Needless to say, such positive changes can only be welcomed. The Soviet Union maintains a clearcut stand on the question of expanding the Soviet-Japanese dialogue and contacts. It advocates dialogue that would deepen mutual understanding and catalyse the development of bilateral contacts. The Soviet leaders declared in no uncertain terms that if Tokyo were to opt for peace and goodneighbourliness, the USSR would be a reliable partner in developing extensive mutual contacts in the political, economic and other fields.

The Soviet approach to Japan and the clear, constructive programme of developing Soviet-Japanese relations have been expounded in Konstantin Chernenko's address to the readers of the book of his speeches and articles published recently in Japan.

Speaking at an official ceremony for the presentation of Konstantin Chernenko's book to Japanese readers, M. Akagi, a leading Japanese politician, chairman of the Japanese-Soviet Friendship Society and member of the Diet, stressed that "the appearance of Konstantin Chernenko's book, which contains concrete proposals to improve Japanese-Soviet re-

³ *Pravda*, Jan. 2, 1985.

lations, inspires broad sections of the Japanese people advocating the establishment of friendship and goodneighbourliness between the two neighbouring countries. The establishment of truly friendly ties between our two countries ... is of vital importance for the cause of peace in Asia and throughout the world."⁴

The Soviet Union has approached Japan with a number of constructive and far-reaching political initiatives. The USSR is known to have proposed that a treaty on goodneighbourliness and cooperation be concluded between the two countries in areas ripe for a contractual foundation. This, in its turn, would be an important step towards greater mutual trust and a favourable atmosphere for further talks on a peace treaty. The Soviet leaders have also repeatedly proposed that confidence-building measures for the Far East should be worked out jointly with Japan and other interested states. The realisation of that initiative would, on the one hand, help stabilise the situation in the region and, on the other, improve the climate in Soviet-Japanese relations. Besides, the Soviet Union has suggested that Japan and the USSR should exchange opinions on concluding a bilateral agreement on guarantees designed to formalise, in a corresponding legal document, the Soviet pledge not to use nuclear weapons against Japan. The Japanese side could, in its turn, reiterate its pledge to observe strictly and consistently its non-nuclear status. Such an agreement coupled with other constructive steps would, beyond doubt, help eliminate mutual distrust, if there were any in bilateral relations, and would set an example that would open up new opportunities for easing tensions in the Far East.

Tremendous opportunities exist for the development of Soviet-Japanese trade and economic contacts. Bearing in mind the fact that the forthcoming five-year period and the subsequent years are to witness the development of rich regions adjacent to the Baikal-Amur Mainline, the Soviet Union is ready to consider specifically Japan's participation in realising our large-scale plans. It is only natural that the task of putting bilateral relations in this field on a firm and stable basis is especially relevant, as it would be in the interests of both countries and would facilitate the quest for new, promising patterns of business cooperation between them. That is why the Soviet side has recently repeated its proposal that an agreement on the principles of economic cooperation be signed between the Soviet and Japanese governments and its long-term programme be worked out.

There are also great opportunities for expanding Soviet-Japanese cultural exchanges. For example, the Soviet proposal to conclude an inter-governmental agreement on cultural cooperation that would stabilise such relations is still in effect. Other areas of cooperation also have much to offer in this respect but remain, so far, underexploited.

The task is to use the existing potential, to make active efforts to normalise Soviet-Japanese relations and to steer them towards genuine goodneighbourliness on a firm and stable basis. It is especially important to adopt a constructive and realistic approach to each other supported by a sound understanding of the vital interests of the two neighbouring states.

"Geography willed it," Konstantin Chernenko mentioned in his address to the Japanese readers of the collection of his speeches and articles, "that the USSR and Japan be close neighbours. Our coasts are washed by the same Pacific Ocean. But relations between our countries can hardly be called pacific."

"History cannot be re-written. The need to establish truly goodneighbourly, lively relations between the USSR and Japan is especially felt

⁴ *Pravda*, Sept. 5, 1984.

in our nuclear age when all of us live in one interrelated and fragile world. This is necessary for the sake of the vital interests of the Soviet and the Japanese peoples, for the sake of peace in Asia and throughout the world."⁵

There is no denying, of course, that the Soviet and the Japanese sides may have different opinions and arrive at different conclusions. But if attention is concentrated on what can unite the two sides and on problems inviting effective interaction, positive results will soon be there. It is, first and foremost, a matter of our common concern for the destinies of peace in the Far East and of the need to pool efforts in the struggle against the threat of war and for the bright future of this and coming generations, and for the restoration and further development of detente.

"We are ready," Konstantin Chernenko emphasised, "to cooperate honestly and constructively with all those genuinely wishing to see world affairs progress towards stronger peace and security, detente and trust rather than towards new stages of the nuclear arms race."⁶ The Soviet Union uses the same approach to Japan, with which it wants to maintain goodneighbourly relations to the benefit of the two nations and for the sake of a stable peace in Asia and on our planet as a whole.

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5. PRAVDA, 25 August 1984.

6. Ibid., 6 December 1984.

JAPAN-CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONS ASSESSED

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[Article by M. I. Krupyanko, candidate of economic sciences: "Japan's Economic Ties with China"]

Japan's economic policy towards China is determined, on the one hand, by the private interests of certain groups of its business community striving for expansion of trade relations with Chinese partners under conditions of chronic instability in the world capitalist market, and, on the other hand, by the general class interests of Japanese monopolistic capital trying to undermine the unity of the world socialist system and to completely sever the PRC from this system. The Japanese ruling circles' readiness to broaden economic links with China thus indicates a desire to gain a firm footing in the Chinese market and use trade and economic levers for influencing PRC policy. Already now, for example, for the sake of good relations with Tokyo, the Chinese leaders say that there is no militarisation in Japan and that it is time to discuss the idea of China's alliance with Japan, the US and Western Europe against the USSR. This concept, put forward by Deng Xiaoping during his visit to Washington early in 1979, determined Peking's practical actions on the world scene for several subsequent years.

The experience of trade and economic relations between Japan and China in the 1970s and the early 1980s has shown that attempts to integrate China in the economic system of the West can be carried out through trade in modern machinery, through the transfer of scientific know-how and technology, through credit cooperation and capital investment. Whereas in the 1970s ordinary trade was given preference, by the beginning of the 1980s ever greater significance began to be attached to credit cooperation, scientific and technological links and investments both in the mining and processing branches of Chinese industry. It stands to reason that such a course could be realised only under conditions of the "open door" policy actively pursued by the Chinese leadership; this implies an expansion of credit-financial and scientific-technological "assistance" from the West. As Zhao Ziyang pointed out during his visit to the US in January 1984: "China has opened its doors and will never shut them".¹

CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF JAPAN'S CREDIT POLICY

In all phases of the development of Japanese-Chinese economic relations credit policy has been the basis of Japan's economic strategy. The character and main directions of this policy were closely connected with the state of political relations between the two countries. Before bilateral relations had been normalised, the Japanese government banned to use state funds to finance trade between Japan and China. Whereas other Western powers, delivering finished industrial products to the Chinese market in the 1960s, widely practiced various forms of middle-term crediting, including the use of state funds, the Japanese government did not find it necessary to resort to credits by the state Export-Import Bank (EIB) in trade with China. Such a position arose, above all, from the complicated relationship in the Japan-US-Taiwan triangle.

Only in December 1972, for the first time since the normalisation of Japanese-Chinese relations, did Japan's government officially approve the

¹ Washington Post, Jan 13, 1984.

use of state credits for the export of complete sets of equipment. That marked the beginning of a qualitatively new phase of Japan's strategy with respect to China, with a wide use of the mechanism of credit in trade and economic ties between the two countries. Thus Japan sought to increase China's credit dependence and exploit it as an important tool for pressurising the Chinese government in questions of foreign and domestic policy. This course was also designed to strengthen the PRC's ties with the capitalist market of loan capital and to completely sever China from credit cooperation with the socialist countries, which successfully developed back in the 1950s. Finally, Japan's monopolistic circles counted on profiting from state assistance in their competition in the Chinese market with US and West European monopolies.

Japan's credit policy towards China often runs into problems due to China's inconsistency in borrowing funds from external sources. The point is that in the 1970s and the early 1980s China adopted a course of inviting massive financial assistance from abroad in accordance with the "open door" policy. At that time some top leaders in Peking believed that it was expedient to acquire large quantities of industrial equipment in the capitalist countries necessary for China's economic modernisation on borrowed money in order to speedily use it in production before the end of this century and then pay back creditors. In order to raise the interest of potential capitalist creditors in granting China huge credits and bolster confidence in it as a trade partner, Peking tried to pose as a strong power, capable of holding a substantial number of Soviet divisions in the Far East. Developed capitalist countries, and first of all Japan, then showed their readiness to grant credits to China to the tune of over \$30,000 million. However, later on the Chinese leaders had to admit that such a course could lead the country to financial dependence on capitalist countries since most Western credits are offered at high interest rates. Besides, Peking realised that in exchange for financial assistance the West expects major political concession from China. So, at present, China is determined to rely mainly on its internal resources, using foreign, including Japanese, credits only cautiously and as a subsidiary.

Mindful of China's zig-zags in its policy on loans and credits, Japan's strategy in bilateral economic relations is applied mainly in two ways: by varying conditions on granting credit and by restricting cooperation in the development of Chinese exports. The latest experience of Japanese-Chinese credit contacts shows that Tokyo, along with granting credits on relatively tough terms (the average repayment deadline not exceeding 7 years and an annual interest rate on all kinds of credit—6-8 per cent), also offers credit on favourable terms. Thus, during his visit to Peking in March 1984, the Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone announced, in particular, the granting to China of a favourable loan of 470,000 million yen (about \$2,000 million) at 3 per cent interest rate to be repaid within 30 years.²

The Japanese government's line of limiting cooperation in the development of the PRC's export basis is especially noteworthy since the difficulties of the Chinese economy, stemming from its growing foreign debt, are compounded by the country's limited export potential. The latter is linked with the increasing demand for fuel and raw materials by China's own economy as it modernises and with the slow expansion of production in the extraction industries. Besides, the present tendency for stabilisation and even reduction of prices on the world market for the main kinds of China's raw materials exports (oil, coal, non-ferrous ores) leads to a reduced volume of foreign currency revenues.

² In *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 5, 1984.

in Tokyo's assessment these main directions of credit-monetary policy with respect to China must directly and indirectly enhance the latter's dependence on the developed capitalist countries, Japan included. In this context the Japanese government also takes into consideration such an objective factor as the low effectiveness of foreign credits in the RPC economy. According to Wang Bingqian, the PRC Minister of Finance, by the beginning of the 1980s, of the \$10,200 million of credits granted to China, the latter had used only 2,200 million, i. e., about 20 per cent.³ The intensive use of foreign credits is bogged down by the overall problems of China's economy. As stressed by Zhao Ziyang at the Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress in May 1984, the Chinese economy is still characterised by low production efficiency, imbalance, and an "irrational" pricing system, as a result of which "the state bears a heavy burden of subsidies, while the centre experiences quite serious financial difficulties".⁴

Thus, the main distinction of Japan's credit policy vis-à-vis the PRC at present and in perspective is the Japanese ruling circles' aspiration to bind China fast to the Japanese market of loan capital and enhance the role of the "credit lever" in influencing the Chinese leadership.

POLICY IN TECHNICAL COOPERATION

Japan's technical cooperation with China is a very important element of its active economic strategy. At the present juncture it constitutes a link within the whole complex of economic measures vis-à-vis China, including credit-monetary cooperation, trade, and investments by Japanese capital in the development of a number of Chinese industries. Without wide-scale and diverse technical assistance from capitalist countries (while refusing to cooperate in this sphere with socialist countries) China can hardly count on the effective use of the purchased industrial plant and obtained foreign credits, i. e., on the successful implementation of the modernisation programme.

Almost throughout the 1970s, technical cooperation between the two countries proceeded on a non-governmental basis through unofficial, private channels. China's partners in Japan were private firms, separate enterprises, scientific establishments and organisations. But in the late 1970s, as the Chinese leadership was revising its policy in regard to scientific and technical exchanges with developed capitalist countries, Japan managed to bring into play powerful governmental financial and scientific organisations. In 1979, intergovernmental agreement was signed on scientific and technical cooperation between Japan and the PRC. It enabled the Japanese government, in addition to measures carried out under agreements with private firms, to use its scientific and technical arsenal to promote ties with China in the sphere of science and technology. Even wider prospects opened for Japan in this respect after China was officially granted the status of a "developing nation" in 1980. The inclusion of China in the group of developing countries made it possible to extend to it all those credit and technical privileges usually granted by Japan within the framework of "development aid" to other countries.

In its policy of technical cooperation with China, Japan seeks not so much to increase the rate and amount of profit, as is the case in its relations with the majority of developing countries, but rather to bind China economically even closer and to strengthen the positions of monopoly capital on the Chinese market.

³ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 13, 1980.

⁴ *Renmin ribao*, June 2, 1984.

The Japanese ruling circles, using China's bad need for foreign technology and know-how in their own interests, are expecting at the same time to reap maximum political advantages. Japanese specialists in China seek the widest possible contacts with local engineers, technicians and scientists. Attempts are being made to influence the working out of concrete research programmes and, on a wider scale, to modify the shaping of the country's economic policy. Tokyo also seeks to distinguish the huge technical assistance given China by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the 1950s from the aid Japan renders China today.

By its policy of technical cooperation with China Japan pursues ideological objectives as well. The point is that technical cooperation, as a rule, means something more than transfer of know-how and experience of the donor-country to the recipient. It also influences the outlook of a great number of technical specialists in the given recipient country. Japan's ruling circles find it important to penetrate the ideological sphere by transferring technological know-how and influence the minds of broad sections of Chinese technical intelligentsia. In this case Japan pursues an important objective of ideological expansion in China, since the transfer of technical know-how is accompanied not only by the transfer of elements of the productive forces but of elements of new relations of production as well. Japan seeks to introduce some elements of capitalist organisation of production to Chinese enterprises in order to increase China's scientific and technical dependence on the West. Cooperation with China today is supposed to create a more favourable climate for investment of Japanese capital as regards the economic, social and political aspects. The transfer of technical know-how thus serves as a kind of "lubricant" for a deeper penetration into the Chinese market over the long term. Japan's efforts are directed above all at creating a sufficient number of specialists trained at capitalist enterprises in a number of highly productive branches, as well as at creating capacious markets, and developing infrastructure. In the final count the attainment of these conditions is the aim of technical cooperation which is an objective necessity for China. Without it the process of modernisation would proceed very slowly and economic relations with industrially developed countries would be difficult.

Japan sees the low efficiency of programmes of technical cooperation with China and tries to expand, to a certain degree, the latter's possibilities of using new machinery and technology. This is a prerequisite for the continued growth of orders from the PRC. Japan also renders assistance to China in the mining industry, thus solving the task of "aiding development" through import. In fact, Japan grants to China financial aid and technical consultations in developing its natural resources and improving the mining industry with the aim to limit the growth of China's export potential.

Technical cooperation with the PRC also serves purely pragmatic aims. The Japanese are actively using every chance provided by the Chinese government to gather accurate information about China, its economic potential, foreign trade policy, etc. As is known, the Chinese authorities give the right to separate enterprises and agricultural units, educational and scientific institutions to establish technical links with private Japanese firms, organisations, scientific and educational establishments. These enterprises and institutions are allowed to buy, depending on the size of their own budgets and foreign currency funds, the necessary technology, equipment, licenses, patents, documentation, as well as to invite to China foreign specialists, lecturers, and to expand the so-called "fraternal relations" between separate collectives and private firms abroad.

Thus, it is apparent that Japan intends, through wider scientific and technical contacts with China, to strengthen its own commercial position in that country, to increase exports of finished goods, and to be able to influence the development of various branches of China's economy. Tokyo is banking on technical cooperation as an important tool of political pressure on China. Expanding the framework of technical exchanges, Japan is establishing closer contacts with Chinese specialists and scientists. It must be stressed that in its relations with China, Japan, on the whole, does not minimize the transfer of know-how, as is the case with other socialist countries. On the contrary, Japan maximizes the framework of technical cooperation with Peking.

JAPAN'S INVESTMENT-ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY IN CHINA: A PROMISING TREND

In the early 1980s, Japan's ruling circles watched with alarm the incipient decline in Japan-China trade relations, which threatened to be of a protracted nature. The press and special studies with increasing frequency expressed the views that Japanese-Chinese relations were undergoing a period of restructuring to be accompanied with a slump. Thus in May 1982, the weekly *Japan Economic Journal* noted that economic ties between Japan and China had entered a phase of protracted downward curve and were experiencing great difficulties in their development.⁵ At the same time it was pointed out that as distinct from the 1970s, when the main problems were engendered by political instability in China and its zig-zag policy vis-à-vis the West, in the 1980s the dynamics and character of Japanese-Chinese relations are mainly determined by economic factors. The latter include, in our opinion, primarily the fact that Japan's exports to China invariably exceeded its imports from that country (by over \$4,000 million in 1975-1980 alone). This hampered the steady growth of China's purchases of finished industrial products in the Japanese market and compelled China to periodically limit its imports from Japan in order to cut the trade imbalance. With this in mind, in the early 1980s, Japan substantially increased its purchases in China.

Japanese firms' business activities in China in the 1970s and the early 1980s were fraught with great economic risk which limited to a certain degree their number and the scope of their operations. At the beginning of the 1980s, the leading Japanese universal trade corporations, such as *Mitsui* and *Mitsubishi* (the main counterparts of the Chinese foreign trade organisations) were forced on this account to cut back the number of their subsidiaries in China.

Japan's ruling circles, realistically assessing the perspectives for Japan-China trade in the 1980s, have begun more actively to use new forms of economic exchange, such as mixed enterprises, wider cooperation in production, and the participation of Japanese capital in the development of China's natural resources. For Japan investment in the Chinese economy is a method to realise its own strategic plans with regard to the PRC, rather than a means to deeply involve in the international division of labour. This is not to say, however, that Japanese monopolies do not care about purely economic objectives.

Japan's monopolistic circles consider export of capital to China to be a means for boosting commodity exports, and above all the export of investment commodities. Export of capital to China can increase the export of complete sets of equipment, materials, technology, i. e., all those items which are part and parcel of active trade and economic relations

⁵ *Japan Economic Journal*, May 4, 1982.

between the two countries. It must be stressed that in contrast with many other countries that are rather cautious in inviting Japanese capital, the Chinese authorities do not put obstacles in the way of Japanese investors. Moreover, they bend over backward to please them.

Japanese entrepreneurs also pin certain hopes on the possibility of exporting their products, manufactured in China, to the not easily accessible markets of the US and Western Europe. The point is that already at the Second UNCTAD Conference in New Delhi in 1968 the developed capitalist countries, under the pressure of developing nations, agreed to allow them easier exports to their domestic markets. With the introduction of the system of preferential tariffs, the American and West European markets have become much more accessible for developing countries. Japanese entrepreneurs jumped at this opportunity and expanded the output of finished goods at mixed enterprises in developing countries so as to increase the export of formally non-Japanese products, which are, however, the end result of Japanese capital. At the beginning of the 1980s, Japanese investors just began to create mixed production in China and therefore could not count on selling competitive products on the US and West European markets in sufficient quantities. However, with the growing scale of Japan's investment-entrepreneurial activity in China the flow of such products can noticeably increase.

Japanese investors also show much interest in depositing capital in various kinds of combined Japanese-Chinese raw materials projects. An important stimulus here is the so-called "multiplication effect" of invested capital which results from the fact that Japanese companies have the possibility of simultaneous participation in different sides of the project: in construction, in building transport facilities, creating the industrial infrastructure, service facilities, etc. From experience in other countries, Japanese investors know that often investments in the mining industry ensure them a lot of business links, enabling them to build "bridges" to other industries in the recipient country. Taking into account China's great interest in inviting Japanese capital into the mining industry, part of the products of which is oriented to export, Japanese exporters of capital are expecting a stable market in this sphere of the Chinese economy too. A stimulus for the Japanese investors is provided by the upward tendency of the yen against the dollar, as a result of which it is more profitable for Japan, than for the US, to export capital to China in the form of industrial plant, materials, and payment for manpower. So it is important for Japanese investors to beat their rivals from other capitalist countries in gaining a firm foothold in the Chinese market.

Also of some importance for the Japanese investors is economising on wages paid at Chinese enterprises, which are still much lower than in other countries where Japanese capital is used.

At the same time Japanese investment in the PRC is supposed to achieve not only economic goals. Propaganda objectives are, perhaps, of even greater significance. Japan's ruling circles are actively trying to demonstrate to the wide Chinese public, including workers, technicians, and engineers, the advantages of working at enterprises where Japanese capital has been applied as compared with state-owned factories and plants. Japan is thus trying to change the mentality of Chinese workers, particularly young ones, with respect to working conditions at capitalist enterprises with their exploitation and system of payment. The Japanese investors are out to accustom Chinese workers to the idea that mixed enterprises and those included into the system of production cooperation with Japanese companies, can and must exist in China and that they are virtually the beacons of advanced experience and the scientific organisation of labour. It is these enterprises that must speed up the process of modernisation in China.

An important political aspect of Japanese investment in China can also be seen in the "service" rendered by Japan to the US in using the Chinese factor in Washington's global anti-Soviet strategy. Japanese capital in the PRC enables the Japanese government to view China as a kind of a "proving ground" in Asia for working out new and improving old methods of political and economic expansion in socialist countries. The fact that China is compelled to make concessions to Japan, in particular in providing more favourable terms for exporting capital, proves that economic policy is effective on this score.

In the late 1970s, in an interview with the journal *Keidanren geppo*, I. Inayama, President of the Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren), pointed out that "for Japan ordinary trade was the most desirable kind of economic ties with any country, including China. However, relations with the latter must take into account not only economic but also political aspects. Therefore, in order to promote political stability in the region and throughout the world, Japan must, aside from ordinary trade, provide economic aid to China by exporting capital there. Of course, Japan cannot develop China's economy instead of China, but Japan will always take into account to what extent its economic aid promotes peace and stability in Asia and all over the world".⁶

An analysis of Japan's economic policy towards China during the 1970s and the early 1980s shows that it is based above all on political, rather than commercial, considerations. Tokyo's official circles proceed from the view that the development of trade, credit cooperation, scientific and technical links, as well as the export of capital, all actively involve China in the orbit of Western economic and political influence, bind it to the capitalist market and inevitably foist political obligations on the Chinese government which are advantageous to the capitalist countries. At a press-conference held by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone after his talks with Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the CC CPC, in Tokyo in November 1983, it was directly stated that "the preservation and development of stable relations of peace and friendship between Japan and China on the eve of the 21st century, notwithstanding their different social systems, are of much importance not only for the two countries but for peace and prosperity around the world. The year 1978 saw the signing of a treaty of peace and friendship which laid down the main principles of relations between our countries. The talks just held have confirmed our loyalty to these principles. We note with regret the relentless growth of tension in the international situation in recent years. We are particularly concerned over regional conflicts and the Soviet Union's build-up of its military potential. If these tendencies get stronger, they will inevitably pose a serious threat to peace. I find it significant that Japan and China, from their positions, will call the countries concerned to exert efforts in favour of peace and in the interests of promoting stability in Asia and all over the world. Striving to consolidate Japanese-Chinese relations of friendship and cooperation so that they can be handed down to our children and grandchildren in the 21st century, we find it desirable to set up a Japanese-Chinese friendship committee of the 21st century".⁷ Propaganda rhetoric aside, it can be noted that the Japanese Prime Minister unequivocally underscored the coincidence in the long term of both countries' policies towards the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

During Nakasone's visit to Peking in March 1984, further steps were taken to expand economic contacts between Japan and China. At that time, as has already been noted, the Japanese Premier announced the

⁶ *Keidanren geppo*, 1979, No. 6, pp. 41-42.

⁷ *Asahi*, Nov. 25, 1983.

granting to China of long-term loans to the tune of about \$2,000 million.⁸ In late October, it was made known in Peking that Japan's Export-Import Bank was granting China another loan of \$2,400 million to be used for the working of China's oilfields and coal deposits. The Chinese leadership's desire to use in the future too Japan's financial and technical "aid" is testimony of certain successes of the economic policy of the Japanese ruling circles.

In all probability the main trends of Tokyo's economic policy with respect to the PRC in the 1980s will be: firstly, attempts to increase China's dependence in the sphere of finances through more extensive crediting and varying conditions for granting credit.

Secondly, Japan will continue to exploit such a factor as the low efficiency of imported industrial plant, delivered on contract by Japanese companies and installed at Chinese enterprises where it is serviced by local workers and technicians. This, Tokyo hopes, will create a greater need for Japanese specialists at these enterprises at all stages of the production process. The best possibilities in this respect can be provided by enterprises maintaining cooperation ties with Japanese firms, as well as by mixed enterprises.

Thirdly, the Japanese side plans to hold under certain control the development of the PRC's exports, resorting with this aim in view to purposeful credits and deliveries of complex equipment. Granting China additional money, Japan will simultaneously give Chinese exporters the possibility to realise a part of their goods on Japan's domestic market, thus strengthening the trade and economic ties between China and Japan.

In the 1980s, economic relations between the two countries are marked by new trends and features which demand serious study. Their scientific analysis is necessary not only to provide practical activity with the objective and full picture of the economic policy of a capitalist country, in this case Japan, in relation to a socialist country, China, but also to help neutralise the possible undesirable consequences of this policy for the Soviet Union.

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ASEAN POLICIES SEEN HINDERING CREATION OF ASIAN PEACE ZONE

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[Article by A. P. Vasyugov and I. S. Galichev: "ASEAN's Approach to Creating a Zone of Peace in Southeast Asia: Illusions and Reality"]

Since the end of World War II the attention of the world public has been constantly focussed on Southeast Asia. There are few points on the globe where, due to US imperialism, the flames of war which poisoned the international political atmosphere have burst forth so often in recent years, or where dangerous hotbeds of tension have sprung up with such frequency. The triumph of the peoples of Indochina over US aggression eliminated a dangerous seat of war in Southeast Asia and gave all the countries in the region an opportunity fundamentally to restructure their relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence, and to channel the efforts of the peoples of those countries towards solving the urgent tasks of socio-economic development.

The defeat of imperialism and its puppets together with the victory won by the forces of peace and socialism in Indochina brought about serious changes in the alignment of forces in the region: the aggressive block SEATO was disbanded, US military bases in Thailand were eliminated, and diplomatic relations between the countries of Indochina and the members of ASEAN were established. All these changes made ASEAN¹ leaders reconsider how the Southeast Asian political situation might develop and considerably revise their policies with an eye to adapting them to the reality.

Under these conditions, the proposal on turning Southeast Asia into a region of peaceful cooperation and a zone of peace, stability and good-neighbourliness has been put on the political agenda by the very course of events. Are there any similarities between the positions of the Indochina states and the members of ASEAN on this issue? What prevents the states of Southeast Asia from making their desire to see the region peaceful and secure a reality?

The answers to these questions can be found not only in the specifics of the current political situation in Southeast Asia, but also in its history. The situation in the region also cannot be viewed without taking into account the links between events there and the deep-seated processes determining the current global situation.

TWO CONCEPTS, TWO "ZONES" — TWO APPROACHES

Different schemes for "neutralising" Southeast Asia and ensuring a "peaceful settlement" there were set forth prior to 1975. However, the necessary prerequisites for implementing such proposals came into existence only after the defeat of US imperialism in Southeast Asia and the elimination of pro-imperialist puppet regimes in Indochina.

¹ ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Initially it included Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. In January 1984, it was joined by Brunei when the latter gained its independence.

The plan for setting up a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality" (ZOPFAN) set forth by Malaysia in 1968, a year after ASEAN was formed, holds a special place among the various plans for the "pacification" of Southeast Asia. The "neutralisation" of Southeast Asia which embraces the ASEAN states, Indochinese countries and Burma, was the principal aim of the Malaysian proposal which subsequently became the key to Kuala Lumpur's foreign policy. The plan envisaged guarantees from the three great powers: the US, USSR and PRC.

In 1971, this plan or, to be more precise, its concept, was approved at a conference of ASEAN Foreign Ministers (The Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971). With an eye to implementing the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, ASEAN set up an ad hoc committee which elaborated the fundamental principles of the "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality". These principles were approved in April 1973 at a conference of ASEAN Foreign Ministers held in Thailand. The states within the "zone" were strictly to abide by the provisions of the UN Charter, the Bandung Conference, the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 on the creation of ASEAN, and the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971. The countries in the "zone" undertook to build relations with all countries, including those within the "zone" and those beyond it, on the basis of mutual respect for national specific features, independence, sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity. They also pledged to refrain both from being drawn into conflicts between the powers beyond the "zone", and from concluding agreements incompatible with the principles of the "zone". The creation of foreign military bases on the territory of states belonging to the "zone" was declared inadmissible. The use, storage, manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons or their components within the limits of the "zone" was also banned.

Was the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration a propaganda gesture on the part of ASEAN or did it express the sincere aspiration of those who were then the leaders of the Association? It is probably impossible to give a definite answer to this question. One can think it a pity that the principles of the Declaration remained only on paper. It should be pointed out that, in spite of ASEAN's adherence to the concept of a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality", an adherence which, until recently, was reiterated more than once, the members of ASEAN have never had a single approach to this problem and therefore they are not ready for business-like negotiations. Each ASEAN country has had its own opinion on how Southeast Asia could be turned into a "zone of peace" and on what prospects that will have. Within each country various political leaders have different understandings and interpretations of the problems of setting up such a "zone".

Malaysia has been the most consistent vehicle of the abovementioned interpretation of the "zone" although it has not always been sufficiently active in promoting it. In the main, Indonesia shares Malaysia's stand. Singapore is skeptical of the "zone of peace" concept. For a relatively long time now it has held that the "balance of superpower presence" constitutes the best method for preserving peace and avoiding conflicts in Southeast Asia. However, as soon as socialism began strengthening its positions in the region, particularly after the Pol Pot regime had been toppled, Singapore set about advocating the need for a broader US presence in Southeast Asia (and for a PRC presence to a somewhat lesser extent) to avert "the threat of spreading Soviet influence". Thailand is also in the right flank of ASEAN on this issue. The ruling elite of that country is banking on military cooperation with the US and closer relations with China to guarantee Thailand's security. The Philippines, too, is staking on the US to a considerable degree. US military bases are still situated on the territory of that country. During the Philippine-US

talks held in Honolulu in August 1980, Ferdinand Marcos stated that the transformation of Southeast Asia into a "zone of peace and neutrality" should be viewed as an event which would not be occurring in the near future. In general, Brunei supported the ZOPFAN idea although it has not explained its position in great detail.

As for the countries of Indochina, they demonstrate a different approach to the problems of strengthening peace and stability in the region.

Vietnam's peaceable proposals were set forth in an interview given to VIA by Nguyen Dui Trinh, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on July 5, 1976, three days after the proclamation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. These proposals represent a peace programme of sorts for Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese spokesman put forward four principles on the basis of which Vietnam was going to build relations with the other states in the region. They were founded on the Pancha shila principles, the ten principles of the Bandung Conference (1955), and the generally recognised standards of international law recorded in the UN Charter. Moreover, the ASEAN countries' stand was also taken into account.

In 1981, the Foreign Minister of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Ph. Sipaseuth, speaking on behalf of the three Indochinese states, presented the UN General Assembly with a policy-making statement on the principles underlying relations between the countries of Indochina and the ASEAN states. The principles included respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries in the region, non-aggression, non-interference, equality, mutual benefit; settlement of all controversial issues by peaceful means exclusively without the threat or use of force, the right to individual and collective defence in accordance with the UN Charter; development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation among all the states of Southeast Asia in economic, technical, scientific, cultural and other spheres; respect for the sovereignty the littoral countries of the region possess over their territorial waters, economic zone and shelf area. It was stressed that countries outside Southeast Asia should respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states in the region, which, in turn, should not give their territories to any country within or without Southeast Asia for use as a springboard for aggression and direct or indirect interference in the affairs of other countries.

Clearly, there are no fundamental differences between the principles set forth in the zone of peace proposals made by the two groups of states. It was precisely for this reason that the foreign ministers of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea meeting in the summer of 1983 expressed their readiness to use the proposal made by the ASEAN countries on setting up a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality as the basis for discussion between the countries of Indochina and ASEAN on turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability.

Thus, the matter came to hinge on the question, of whether ASEAN countries adhere to their own declarations and translate them into political reality.

"THE KAMPUCHEAN FACTOR"

The policy pursued by Pol Pot's "Democratic Kampuchea" was a factor which seriously complicated and destabilised the situation not only in Indochina, but in the whole region as well and caused tension in relations between the Southeast Asian states after the liberation of South Vietnam and reunification of that country, the victory of the people's democratic revolution in Laos and the overthrow of the Lon Nol regime in Kampuchea. It is common knowledge that the Pol Pot men had a pathological hatred of Vietnam, and before the fall of Saigon, staged incessant attacks and provocations on the border between the two count-

ries, which later turned into a real war. By the end of 1976, the situation on the border between "Democratic Kampuchea" and Laos had also deteriorated sharply. In addition, the Pnompenh authorities staged numerous provocations on the border with Thailand. The Pol Pot gangs attacked Thai villages in the area along the border, seized cattle, burnt crops, and murdered peaceful Thai peasants. Pol Pot's men were not only seeking to create a strip of "scorched land" in the border area, but they were also striving to "regain" the provinces of Eastern Thailand (Surin, Barisarak, Sisaket) which had once belonged to the Cambodian Empire. Thus, Pol Pot's Kampuchea became a source of constant tension in the region and a threat to the security of its neighbours.

The Kampuchean problem acted as a brake on the natural development of relations between Vietnam and ASEAN countries long before the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime.

When contradictions between socialist Vietnam and Kampuchea had become aggravated, the position of the "Five" proved to be far from neutral. Well aware of who directed the policies of "Democratic Kampuchea", ASEAN thought that the conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam would provide the Association with room to manoeuvre and it tried to use the contradictions for its own purposes. The potential weakening of Vietnam as a result of the pressure brought to bear on it from the southwest and the north was quite to ASEAN's liking. The reactionary wing of the Association expressed cynical satisfaction over the existence of the "Kampuchean buffer" between the "Five" and Vietnam. A contradiction emerged between the words of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on promoting peace, stability and neutrality in the region and the deeds of ASEAN.

The long awaited overthrow of the Pol Pot regime, which was brought about by the patriotic forces of Kampuchea with the help of Vietnamese volunteers, not only put an end to a gloomy period in the history of the Vietnamese-Kampuchean relations, but eliminated a hotbed of tension and war in Southeast Asia, and became a prerequisite for establishing genuine peace, stability and goodneighbourliness in the region. From the very first days of its existence, the People's Republic of Kampuchea stated that it was ready to adhere to the principles of peaceful coexistence and goodneighbourliness in its relations with all its neighbours.

However, right after the overthrow of the Pol Pot clique and the formation of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, ASEAN states displayed a deeply hostile attitude towards the changes occurring in that country. The Association regarded the overthrow of the anti-popular regime in Pnompenh and the coming to power of the national-patriotic forces in Kampuchea as an "intensification of the communist menace" and began to consolidate ASEAN along anti-Vietnamese and anti-socialist lines.

ASEAN started bringing pressure to bear on Vietnam in a variety of ways in a bid to make it withdraw the contingents of Vietnamese volunteers from Kampuchea, an act which would inevitably lead to the restoration of the brutal Pol Pot regime. The ASEAN states refused to recognise the People's Republic of Kampuchea and declared their unconditional support for the non-existent "Democratic Kampuchea". Their relations with the SRV were frozen in all spheres. To increase the pressure on the SRV they enlisted the "American factor" (Thailand and the Philippines secured from the US a reiteration of its commitments under the Manila Treaty of 1954 which, as is well known, was the "embryo" of SEATO). Attempts were also made to use China as a counterweight to Vietnam. ASEAN states looked with satisfaction upon China's acts of aggression against Vietnam, which, according to the ASEAN states, were taken in response to the introduction of Vietnamese units to Kampuchea.

The withdrawal of those units has been made one of ASEAN's primary foreign policy goals. According to ASEAN strategists, the pull-out of the

Vietnamese contingents would create a "vacuum of force" in Kampuchea which would be filled by some "neutral" government "independent of Vietnam", which "naturally" would be favourably disposed towards the Association. In other words, this is nothing but an overt act of interference in the internal affairs of the PRK and an attempt to establish a government in sovereign Kampuchea, which would be to the liking of ASEAN's ruling circles.

Moreover, a blind eye is deliberately turned to the obvious fact that the restoration of the Pol Pot regime (no matter under which cover) is a threat to the security of the peoples in the whole region, including the ASEAN countries. It should be also borne in mind that the Pol Pot regime was responsible for immense human and material losses and actually created armed conflicts along all of Kampuchea's borders with its neighbours, including Thailand.

If one assumes that the ASEAN countries really want peace and security for the region, the tough policy they pursue in regard to the countries of Indochina is unproductive because, as a result of this policy, the ASEAN states are increasingly being drawn into the military orbit of the US which has been plotting to turn the Association into a military grouping opposed to socialism.

ASEAN'S MILITARISATION

After the PRK was formed, the militarisation of the ASEAN states which created the prerequisites for converting the Association into a political-military and later into military-political alliance (whether its members want it or not) has become an important part of ASEAN's activities.

During the past decade the intensification of military cooperation among the members of ASEAN was carried out along the following lines: information was exchanged on military actions and programmes in order to coordinate them;² the exchange of intelligence information was improved and new channels for transmitting data were set up; armaments were standardised; joint military operations were carried out against rebel and separatist movements in border areas (including the revival in 1981 of the ANZUK agreement on the defence of Malaysia and Singapore by Britain, Australia and New Zealand); the joint training of military personnel and regular joint military exercises were carried out involving all types of armed forces on a bilateral or multilateral basis with the participation of members of the organisation or with the armed forces of the US, Britain and Australia. After 1979 these efforts were intensified.

The question of turning ASEAN into a military bloc has not yet been removed from the agenda. The Thai military are most active in this respect. When visiting the US early in 1979 the Prime Minister of Thailand declared that the ASEAN states might hold consultations on the expediency of converting the Association into a military bloc. In 1980, Bangkok made an attempt to persuade its allies in ASEAN to hold negotiations on setting up a new regional "security system" which would replace SEATO in some respects.

The attempts the ASEAN military have made to obtain ultra modern weapons have caused grave concern among the public of the Southeast Asian countries. A question arises in Southeast Asia and beyond it: why is this being done? Do the members of ASEAN really need to have

² In 1981, a special group was formed at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta to study recommendations for the Association's military-political leadership which would plan the further strengthening and development of the national armed forces in the common interests of the organisation.

AWACS, purchased by Singapore, to "keep tabs" on territories which are more than 800 kilometres away from the borders of the ASEAN countries? Do they really need F-16 fighters capable of delivering nuclear warheads to targets situated some 1,000 kilometres away (such as Hanoi and Haiphong among other places)? It should be borne in mind that AWACS are flown by American crews and the information they obtain is processed by US intelligence officers. US military personnel are also needed to keep Thailand's F-16s repaired and ready for combat. This only warrants the conclusion that ASEAN's military buildup merely converts its members into an appendage of the US war machine.

The Pentagon has been nurturing far-reaching plans as far as South-east Asia is concerned. The question of stationing additional nuclear warheads, cruise missiles and chemical weapons there is "under study". It seems that the accelerated formation of ASEAN's military structure, the schemes for turning the Association into a military-political bloc and the inclusion of ASEAN states in the US strategy are at loggerheads with the national interests of those states, to say nothing of the fact that such steps diametrically oppose the aims of "peace and neutrality".

THE RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE AND THE ASEAN POSITION

ASEAN's tough stand which was reflected in the pressure it brought to bear on Vietnam and in its demand for the "immediate and unconditional" withdrawal of the Vietnamese volunteers from Kampuchea as a *sine qua non* for the resumption of dialogue between the two groups of countries failed to withstand the test of time. The Association had to agree to the resumption of contacts between the Foreign Ministry of Vietnam, on the one hand, and those of the ASEAN states, on the other. Although, as a result of this dialogue, tension in the region has somewhat subsided and a step has been made towards overcoming mutual alienation, mistrust and apprehensions, it nonetheless, failed thus far to bring about a radical improvement in the situation in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN countries still refuse to recognise the real state of things, i.e., the existence in the region of two groups of states belonging to different socio-economic systems. The changes in the stand taken by the members of ASEAN are either purely cosmetic (for example, harsh and insulting words concerning the action of Vietnam are no longer used) or represent an attempt to wrest an obviously unacceptable concession from the Indochinese countries "in return" for some invented concession from the ASEAN countries.

As far as the "Kampuchean settlement" is concerned, ASEAN's policy is still based on the demand that the Vietnamese volunteers be withdrawn from Kampuchea and that "free elections under the UN supervision" be held there. In this, however, the legitimate right of the Kampuchean people to self-determination is ignored. The Kampucheans made their choice during the elections when they gave their votes to the representatives of the popular government. Their attitude towards Pol Pot's thugs is quite clear: those butchers will never be allowed to return to Kampuchea.

The coordinated stand of the PRK and the SRV on the withdrawal of the Vietnamese military personnel is quite clear: the volunteers will be withdrawn when the external threat to Kampuchea's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity is removed. The threat being reduced, Kampuchea and Vietnam, on the basis of a mutual agreement, will carry out a partial withdrawal of the Vietnamese volunteers. Some troops have already been pulled out of Kampuchea in four stages (the most recent pullout occurred in late June 1984).

If ASEAN leaders really care about the withdrawal of the Vietnamese units which they call a "threat to Thailand" and an obstacle to the "im-

plementation of the right of the Khmer people to self-determination", they should have to eradicate the situation which brought the Vietnamese contingents into the People's Republic of Kampuchea, by putting an end to the border war against Kampuchea, and disarming the gangs of Khmer reactionaries which have their bases in Thailand, are armed by external powers and instructed by foreign specialists. Thus, when dealing with the question of the "withdrawal of Vietnamese troops" which, the Association has declared, will play a key role in normalising its relations with the countries of Indochina, ASEAN exploits the problem which has been created at least with its active participation and connivance.

The same can be said of the "Kampuchean refugees" problem. Kampuchea has repeatedly expressed its readiness to take back from Thailand thousands of people driven away by the Pol Pot men or those who left the country earlier because of the Pol Pot genocide. Bangkok would like to continue to exploit the "refugees" problem, the desired result of its policy, or even to "export" the complicated and explosive set of problems which it has created through its own policy, to its neighbour, Kampuchea. The implementation of the ASEAN proposal on the establishment of "liberated areas" in Kampuchea along its border with Thailand would actually be tantamount to the creation of the Palestine-type situation, when part of the Khmer people would live on the territory of their own country as "refugees".

The following should be said about the reasons behind ASEAN's tough stand on the "Kampuchean problem" and its persistent striving to bring this problem into the forefront of world politics. The process of the turning of the Association into a single regional economic organisation, to say nothing of the integration of the economies of the "Six", is far from complete. As a matter of fact, ASEAN emerged as an internationally recognised political organisation with a certain emphasis on military cooperation in 1979.³ Events in Kampuchea were used by the ruling circles in the ASEAN countries to consolidate the membership on an anti-communist and anti-Vietnamese basis. Moreover, by exploiting the "Kampuchean problem", the ASEAN countries facilitated their cooperation with the West, and enhanced, in a certain sense, ASEAN's prestige in the capitalist world as a unified organisation.

It is no secret that there is no unity within the Association with regard to the crucial issues in its relations with the countries of Indochina, as well as the role and place of third powers in the region. Meanwhile, the ruling elite in Thailand and the right-wing military circles in that country, seeking to present it as an outpost and bulwark of the "free world" against "Vietnamese expansion" in the region, actively utilise the ASEAN "solidarity". Political observers rightfully note that the Thai generals also make use of this invented external threat to buttress their role in the political life of the country.⁴

In striving to display a broader and well thought-of approach to relations with the countries of Indochina, Indonesia, the biggest country in the region, takes a stand which differs from that of other ASEAN countries. Indonesian politicians are apprehensive about the actions of Bangkok which is ready to use any enemies of the Indochinese peoples to pursue its anti-Vietnamese line, thereby becoming an instrument of a policy which is alien to regional interests.

³ Prior to 1979, the annual meetings of ASEAN ministers were reduced to unproductive discussions of ZOPFAN and "the five joint economic projects", not very successful attempts to find new commodities for the list of trade preferences, and political juggling in an attempt to avoid potentially explosive questions related to Eastern Timor, Sabah, and the activities of Muslim rebels in the Philippines and Thailand.

⁴ See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 10, 1984.

In recent years Indonesia has increasingly become the leader of ASEAN. The statesmen of that country who possess vast experience in dealing with representatives of different groups of states exhibit substantial realism, a sense of responsibility for peace in the region, and political far-sightedness. As compared with the other ASEAN countries, Indonesia is also marked by a somewhat greater degree of independence from the US and the latter's allies in Asia and Western Europe.

Indonesia and Thailand hold different views on the key question of how peace and security will be maintained in the region in the future and of who actually poses a threat to peace, stability and cooperation in Southeast Asia. In the opinion of Indonesian political leaders, this threat is posed by the PRC, which does not belong to the region, rather than by an imaginary Vietnamese "regional hegemonism". Malaysia holds a similar opinion. Hussein Onn, a former Prime Minister and Malaysia's most outstanding politician, has said recently that it is China which poses a threat to the countries of Southeast Asia.⁶

Unlike Thailand, Indonesia maintains that the introduction of the Vietnamese units to Kampuchea was not an act of "annexation" or "expansion" but was a matter of "national survival" and that "in fact, Vietnam is unable to attack the other Southeast Asian countries."⁶ According to political observers, the sober trends in the Indonesian leadership's approach to Southeast Asian problems developed in 1984. Early last year Beni Murdani, Commander-in-Chief of Indonesia's armed forces, made a trip to Vietnam. Upon his return home Murdani stated: "Judging from the impressions of my four-day visit and consultations with the Vietnamese leaders I came to the conclusion that Vietnam has common goals with ASEAN". "Bringing the Vietnamese troops into Kampuchea was motivated by considerations of national survival and the needs to secure the country... Vietnam has no territorial ambitions".⁷

Some ASEAN countries (Thailand first and foremost) met these words from Jakarta with alarm. Efforts were made to "unite" the ranks on the basis of anti-Vietnamese sentiments. As a result of conferences of ASEAN foreign ministers held in May and July, 1984, the "Six" reaffirmed their policy of supporting the "democratic coalition" headed by Sihanouk and demanded the withdrawal of Vietnamese units from Kampuchea.

Recent developments demonstrate however that there is a trend among sober-minded political leaders in ASEAN towards conducting constructive dialogue with the states of Indochina. Realising that the "ASEAN common line has not worked" and that efforts to continue bringing pressure to bear on Vietnam have only intensified rifts between the countries in the Association, i. e., adversely affected the unity of the group, Jakarta took the initiative to improving bilateral relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam late in 1982. Since that time it has succeeded in winning official support for its policy from other ASEAN countries.

Jakarta considered the Indochinese proposal that Pol Pot's men be removed from the "coalition" to be a key issue, a decisive step forward, and an important new component in the stand of the Indochinese countries opening up new vistas for bringing the concepts of the two groups closer together, reaching practical mutual understanding and even mutual activities. This is of great importance for the ASEAN countries which should also have no interest in seeing the Pol Pot regime restored. *Indonesia Times* wrote on April 24, 1984 that "the liquidation of the Polpotian gangs is a *sine qua non* for the Cambodian settlement". This political settlement as such deserves a most serious scrutiny.

⁶ See *New Straits Times*, May 30, 1984.

⁶ See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 29, 1984.

⁷ See *Indonesia Times*, March 14, 1984.

The awareness of the fact that the crisis situation in Southeast Asia act like a magnet on hegemonic and imperialistic powers, which pose as ASEAN "defenders" while in actual fact make use of conflicts in the region to fight for the "spheres of influence" and recarve those "spheres", was the chief reason why Indonesia modified its stand and realistically-minded political figures and groups in the ASEAN states began to speak out.

One important factor is worthy of note. Today the problem of "external influence" is widely discussed in the Association. It is indicative that ASEAN favours preservation of US military bases in the region, saying that this issue cannot be a subject for negotiation with the countries of Indochina. Some ASEAN states openly advocate the preservation and considerable expansion of China's presence, and a bigger role for the latter in solving the problems faced by the region. On the other hand it is said that the Soviet "presence" in Southeast Asia plays a destabilising role.

Some people in the ASEAN countries, as if guided by good intentions, uphold the idea of "removing the influence of the PRC and the USSR from the region". For example, the "Kuantana formula" set forth in the township of Kuantana at a Malaysia-Indonesia summit meeting declares the desire to "convince the PRC to relax its pressure on Vietnam thus removing the pretext for the Soviet presence in the region".

In this connection it would not be inappropriate to point out that the Soviet Union is the only great power which has never committed an act of aggression against the countries in the region. The USSR has supported resolutely and consistently the struggle waged by the peoples of that region for national independence and sovereignty. This is well known in Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. The role the USSR played in defeating Japanese militarism which brought so much suffering to the peoples of the region has not been forgotten in the ASEAN countries.

Many statesmen in ASEAN realise that the thesis on the danger of a "Soviet presence" and "the Soviet menace" has been made up. According to scholars of international affairs who represented the ASEAN states at a conference on the security problems faced by the countries of Asia and the Pacific, which was held in San Diego, California, in 1984, no "Soviet threat" is actually felt in the region. The Prime Minister of Malaysia and Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, Datuk Mahathir bin Mohamad, said that the "threat to the ASEAN countries is posed by China, not by the Soviet Union".⁸ The USSR has never sought to oust any power from the region. It has never made its assistance to the SRV dependent on the latter's relations with third countries. The policy pursued by the Soviet Union in that part of the world, as in the international arena at large, is aimed at creating an alliance with the forces of socialism, progress and national liberation, supporting the struggle of newly-free countries against imperialist and hegemonic policies of *diktat* and oppression. Clearly, the USSR wants Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea to have peaceful neighbours so that the resources so badly needed for national restoration and socialist construction will not be diverted by the confrontation with any external threat. The Soviet Union believes that this is equally in the interests of the socio-economic development of the ASEAN countries and of economic construction in China.

Let us note that it is not the USSR that has declared Southeast Asia to be within the sphere of its "vital interests", "historical zone of influence" and so on. The specific intentions of some powers to further militarise the ASEAN states, make them more dependent and lay the foundation for an ever greater strengthening of the positions held in

⁸ *Pusanon*, July 13, 1984

the region by those powers can be clearly seen behind the conjectures about the "Soviet presence" in Southeast Asia, which are voiced by different sources. Thailand has already been used by Peking as a base of operations against the Indochinese peoples. Observers openly speak of the unofficial strategic alliance between Thailand and China.⁹

One cannot ignore the US military presence in the region. There have long been a number of big US air force and naval bases in Southeast Asia. While some people in the ASEAN countries may believe that these bases play a positive role in guaranteeing the "security" of the Association, the countries of Indochina hold their own opinion on the matter, regarding the bases as a direct threat to them. This point of view has broad support in the world. During his recent visit to Indonesia, India's Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao noted: "The security of ones cannot be based on the lack of security for the others."¹⁰

Opposition to the presence of US military bases in the region has invariably been an important element in the regional policies of the Indochinese countries, beginning with Nguyen Dui Trinh's four points (1976). In speaking out in support of an equitable dialogue between the countries of ASEAN and Indochina, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have every right to raise the question of equal security for the two groups of countries.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS THE BEHEST OF THE TIMES

An analysis of ASEAN's stand on regional detente and the creation of a zone of peace in Southeast Asia leads us to the conclusion that real opportunities exist for turning the region into a zone of peace and stability. As for the struggle to roll socialism back in Southeast Asia and reverse the historic processes there, it is doomed. The establishment of the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations between the two groups of states—Indochina and ASEAN—is the only alternative to kindling the fires of conflict in Southeast Asia.

Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have met ASEAN half way. Even a brief list of proposals made by the Indochinese states to the ASEAN countries includes the signing of bilateral or multilateral treaties of non-aggression between the three countries of Indochina, on the one hand, and Thailand, on the other (including the principle of the non-use of force and the renunciation of granting the signatories' territories to third countries to be used by the latter as a base for aggression against another country or countries); the proposal to discuss the prospects for setting up a zone of peace and stability in Southeast Asia (the ASEAN states rejected it); the proposal to create a demilitarised zone on the Thai-Kampuchean border or—if Thailand is not prepared to take that step—a "zone of security" on both sides of the Kampuchean-Thai border, as a result of which there would be no Vietnamese troops on the Kampuchean side and no Pol Pot gangs or armed detachments of the Khmer reactionaries in Thailand; the proposal to hold consultations on the situation in the South China Sea; Kampuchea's proposal to take back, on an organised and streamlined basis, the refugees now staying in Thailand. Clearly, it is the countries of Indochina that have displayed initiative in the quest for peace by looking for ways comprehensively to improve relations with ASEAN, by striving to relax tensions and create an atmosphere of trust, and improving relations on peripheral problems if the members of ASEAN are not prepared to work together with the Indochi-

⁹ *Asia Pacific Community*, No. 24, Spring 1984

¹⁰ *Hindustan Times*, June 5, 1984

nese countries to find a solution to the key issues in the region at this time

How can the situation in that region be improved, and the current deadlock resulting from the unrealistic and unconstructive stand by the ASEAN states be overcome? How can the members of that organisation finally be put on the road leading to peace and cooperation in Southeast Asia?

It seems that the "Six" are becoming increasingly aware that there is little hope that a new "international conference on Kampuchea" overtly directed against the countries of Indochina will be successful. The world community displays less and less interest in this idea, and the international status of the PRK is gaining ground. However, under formal pretexts, ASEAN has rejected the proposal put forward by Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea that a regional conference be held,¹¹ although it is unable to present a realistic and reasonable alternative to this proposal.

Given this situation it would be more natural to continue the dialogue between the two groups of countries. It then would enable ASEAN and the Indochinese countries to specify the conceptual foundations of the approach taken by the two groups to the structure, parameters and mechanism of any future system for maintaining peace and stability in the region and subsequently to reduce the differences between the two conceptual foundations. At the same time it would eliminate distrust, prejudice and hostility, while working out some intermediate, temporary or palliative partial solutions to crucial issues. Also included among the possible subjects for discussion are confidence-building measures, the distribution of information on the situation in the states of the region to the public in these groups of countries, exchanges of people and ideas, scientific conferences, the specification of the stands taken by both sides concerning the division of the continental shelf and economic zones, and other international issues, the development of the resources of the Mekong River, mineral and other natural riches, etc.

There is nothing keeping the ASEAN and Indochina from settling the Southeast Asian problems according to the "Helsinki model", when two groups of states negotiate bilateral relations by means of dialogue (each group formulating a single stand for negotiations with the other side), elaborate a "code of behaviour" of sorts, and implement the principles of peaceful coexistence as applicable to the region in question. The countries of Indochina have long since declared and reaffirmed through their action their readiness for such a dialogue. However, these efforts have not evoked any response from ASEAN.

The Association is pursuing a tough and non-constructive policy on the form any dialogue should take with states of Indochina. While the countries of Indochina are ready for a dialogue of the states concerned in any combination, ASEAN, on the insistence of Thailand and Singapore, made it a *sine qua non* that representatives of the so-called coalition government, which includes Pol Pot men, be "full-fledged" participants at the talks.

At present the dialogue along the official lines is carried out in the form of relatively regular meetings of foreign ministers. It is Vietnam and Laos that have displayed the initiative in holding them. Another form of dialogue between the two groups is the "dialogue of communication", i. e., information is exchanged on the meetings of the Indochinese

¹¹ The Indochinese states propose to hold a conference (modelled after the Geneva conferences or the Paris Conference on Vietnam in 1973) in which all of the ten countries of Southeast Asia, the UN Secretary-General, and spokesmen for the country coordinating the non-aligned movement and the great powers will participate. They are assumed to confirm the recognition of the decisions adopted by the conference and work out guarantees for their implementation.

foreign ministers and the conferences of ASEAN foreign ministers, which are held twice a year. Rather promising are the ties between formally non-governmental organisations. This form of a dialogue has developed of late.

Late in January 1984, a delegation from the Commission on Foreign Affairs of the lower chamber of the Thai parliament headed by a prominent political leader, former Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanand, paid a friendly visit to Hanoi. The delegation was received by the leaders of the SRV, and detailed talks were held on a wide range of questions concerning bilateral relations between the commissions of parliament and SRV ministries and departments. Upon the completion of the talks, Chomanand expressed "great satisfaction" with their results and said that the talks were held in a "warm and friendly atmosphere". The visit by the Thai delegation facilitated the trend towards dialogue and detente in the region.

Of great interest was the February 1984 International Scientific Seminar on Southeast Asia held in Hanoi under the auspices of the Hanoi Institute of International Relations and the Jakarta Centre for Strategic Research. The participants in the seminar were unanimous in their opinion that the differences between the stands taken by ASEAN and Indochina, far from being an obstacle to negotiations and discussions, make such a dialogue topical and necessary. The principles advanced at the Bandung Conference, the decisions made at the conference of nonaligned countries in New Delhi, the proposals presented by the Indochinese states, and the formula set forth by ASEAN on setting up a "zone of peace" in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971, were cited as the basis for solving the problems facing Southeast Asia.

In a report prepared for the seminar by Jusuf Wanandi, head of the Indonesian Centre for Strategic Research and a member of the GOLKAR¹² Commission on Foreign Affairs, it was stressed that there existed a real basis for constructive dialogue on a whole range of specific problems. Wanandi expressed the opinion that the countries in the region should not bring pressure to bear on one another, instead they should be strong and independent enough to settle conflicts themselves. As a result, there would no longer be any need to seek "protection" from the great powers. However, this would not keep the great powers from maintaining a "normal" presence in the region.

The Indonesian participants in the seminar outlined the following course for establishing a zone of peace in Southeast Asia: initial negotiations would be conducted between Vietnam, Laos and the ASEAN states; subsequently an international settlement would be made in which some states such as the USSR, China, and Japan would participate. At a certain stage some "Kampuchean factions" might take part in the negotiations in accordance with an agreement between both sides. Clearly, this programme coincides in the main with the proposals made by the Indochinese countries (regional consultations—regional conference—confirmation and guarantees by the great powers). The seminar papers testify to the fact that the Hanoi discussion was attended by people who, on the whole, held similar views.

There is no need to convince anyone that Soviet policy in this region of the world is totally honest and devoid of any ambiguity. Unlike other great powers, the Soviet Union is not responsible for the problems that have arisen in Southeast Asia. The US, on the other hand, is expanding its military-political presence there. Instead of promoting realistic and peaceful tendencies in the countries of the region, Washington is

¹² GOLKAR (Association of Functional Groups)—an organisation analogous to a ruling party or a bloc of ruling parties in Indonesia.

going out of its way to earn political capital by supporting those who want to prevent a political settlement from being reached in the region. US activities are aimed at raising military spending by the ASEAN states to record levels, providing them with new offensive weapons, pushing ASEAN to strengthen its military ties, standardising weaponry based on US military hardware and, finally, turning the "Six" into a military bloc associated with the US and its allies. Of course, the US has no intention of abandoning its military bases in Southeast Asia.

The USSR has emphasised more than once that it favours a lasting peace and the security of nations, including the Southeast Asia. Konstantin Chernenko said that the "Soviet Union supports the constructive programme developed by Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea which would help turn Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability, and start a dialogue between the countries of Indochina and the ASEAN states"¹³. The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that it would welcome any efforts the Southeast Asian countries might make towards creating a peaceful, stable and secure life in the region and that it is ready, if need be, to take part in discussions of this problem and in forging any possible guarantees of its solution, together with other great powers. The Soviet Union is in favour of initiating the discussion as soon as possible and of its touching upon the broadest range of issues of concern to the states in the region, possibly including the creation of a "nuclear-free zone" in Southeast Asia, an idea the ASEAN states themselves have proposed. The USSR favours an open and honest dialogue.

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LEGAL ASPECTS OF CHINA'S 'OPEN DOOR' POLICY DISCUSSED

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[Article by Ye. G. Pashchenko, candidate of historical sciences: "The Legal Aspects of China's 'Open-Door' Policy"]

The drafting and adoption of legislative acts regulating the inflow and use of various forms of foreign entrepreneur capital in China's economy has become an important trend in the law-making process which was resumed in the late 1970s, when China started implementing an "open-door" policy in foreign economic relations and expanding economic and technical exchanges with foreign countries. The long-term nature of the "open-door" policy¹ was reflected in the 1982 Chinese Constitution. Article 18 states that the PRC "allows foreign enterprises and other foreign economic organisations or individuals to invest" in keeping with China's laws "their capital in China and maintain various forms of economic cooperation with Chinese enterprises or other Chinese economic organisations". The same article stipulates that the "legitimate rights and interests" of foreign investors shall be safeguarded by Chinese legislation.

The "open-door" policy legislation is characterised by consistency and determination. As a rule, all pertinent acts become operative upon their publication. By the end of 1983, more than 50 relevant acts, regulations and decrees which had been adopted by central and local bodies of authority and administration beginning in the summer of 1979 were in force.

The Law on the Exploitation of Joint Enterprises Based on Chinese and Foreign Capital adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in July 1979, was the first step in elaborating "open-door" policy legislation.² The Law showed that at that time the Chinese government intended to bring foreign capital into the country primarily in the rather complex form of joint ventures, which enabled them to make comprehensive use of foreign investments, technology, know-how and management techniques. Simultaneously, this form of joint venture guaranteed that such enterprises would be run profitably and rationally as foreign partners would share in the profits and losses. Such ventures are lucrative for China because of their "feasibility", i. e., major capital investments can be avoided by using available material values and resources.

It also became clear at this time that the implementation of the "open-door" policy would be largely empirical. This was borne out by the fact that the Law on Joint Enterprises was very brief (comprising as few as 15 articles) and was worded in language unusual for such legal documents. It was, in fact, a programmatic document defining a general institutional framework for the ongoing process of enlisting foreign capital and setting forth the basic method of operation for such enterprises in China. True, Li Xiannian, the then Deputy Premier of the State Council

¹ Zhao Ziyang, Premier of the State Council, emphasised during his talks with the former US Secretary of the Treasury, Donald Regan, that the "open-door" policy will not only be a long-term policy, but "even more open" one (*Renmin ribao*, March 21, 1984).

² See *Renmin ribao*, July 9, 1979. In Soviet literature such enterprises are also called "mixed".

and now PRC's Chairman, acknowledged some time later that the new law was "far from being perfect" because China had no experience in setting up joint enterprises.³ But this view was largely rooted in the imperfection of China's legal system as such. To this day those branches of law—civil, administrative, economic, labour, and patent⁴—which must regulate, directly or otherwise, the use of foreign investments, have not been sufficiently elaborated.

As a fundamental act, the Law on Joint Enterprises contained rules defining the goals and principles involved in establishing such ventures, their general rights and organisational structure.

The Law established a permissive procedure for setting up enterprises involving foreign capital. A specially established Committee for Control over Foreign Investments became the organisation sanctioning this practice. (Following the reorganisation of the system of administrative bodies within the PRC State Council and, specifically, the establishment of a Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties and Foreign Trade, the 22nd Session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress, held in March 1983, adopted a resolution relegating the functions of the Committee for Control over Foreign Investments to the newly created Ministry.) Chinese and foreign companies, enterprises and other economic organisations as well as foreign citizens were allowed to take part in joint ventures. Joint enterprises were set up within the framework of China's judicial system and fell under Chinese jurisdiction (the Law stipulated that in carrying through their operations they had to "strictly adhere" to relevant Chinese laws and regulations). According to the Law, such enterprises take the form of joint-stock companies with limited responsibility. Yet this provision has been "suspended in the air" because China has no law or legal institution regulating the activities of such companies.

In accordance with the generally accepted principles of legislation concerning joint enterprises, their property comprised the partners' capital, equipment (there was a special provision which stated that foreign machinery and equipment should conform to the world standard), production facilities, industrial property rights, and know-how. The Chinese side was granted the right to consider the use of land plots as part of its investment. The pertinent legislation also stipulated that each partner should receive profits, sustain losses and run a risk proportionally to the share of its participation.

In contrast to other countries using foreign capital, whose legislation stipulates that the share of foreign participation should not, as a rule, exceed 50 per cent, according to Chinese Law the minimum share of foreign participation is 25 per cent, whereas the upper limit is not specified at all. It follows then that, theoretically, the Law permits enterprises funded entirely by foreign capital to be established, though such cases require special legislation. The absence of the upper limit for foreign participation also signifies that the Law was designed to attract the maximum volume of foreign investments. During his talks with the Japanese Minister of Justice, Yo. Furui, Deng Xiaoping offered the following explanation: "If the share of foreign capital is limited to 49 per cent, China will have to provide the remaining 51 per cent. Insofar as we do not have surplus funds, the limit has been waived."⁵ Generally speaking, it follows from the Law that joint ventures whose property is a combination of Chinese state property and foreign private property, have acquired a

³ See *Renmin ribao*, July 18, 1982.

⁴ The PRC's Patent Law adopted at the Fourth Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress in March 1984 takes effect on April 1, 1985.

⁵ *Economisuto*, No. 3, 1979, p. 6.

state-capitalist nature, though the current PRC Constitution does not provide for a state-capitalist sector in China's economy.

The Law defines a broad legal personality of joint enterprises, including the right to participate independently in the economic turnover. This means that such ventures are legal persons (although this term is not included in the text of the Law) under the aegis of China's judicial system. Their operation is governed by a basic provision according to which all production plans are to be reported to competent bodies and fulfilled by way of concluding economic agreements. To put it differently, the Law was intended to ensure that joint enterprises would operate within the framework of a centrally-planned system and under the control of the relevant Chinese administrative bodies.

In regards to the organisational structure of joint enterprises, the Law envisaged setting up boards of directors comprised of representatives of the two parties, their composition and membership being agreed upon by the parties in each specific case. To ensure that the Chinese side would maintain administrative control over the activities of joint enterprises the Law stipulated that irrespective of size of the foreign partner's share in an enterprise the board should be chaired by a citizen of the PRC.

One of the major objectives of the Law on Joint Enterprises was to provide terms sufficiently advantageous to attract foreign investors. To this end joint enterprises "at an advanced technological level" could be partially or completely freed of the obligation to pay income tax during the initial two or three years of successful operation, foreign partners' profits could be transferred abroad (after the necessary taxes were paid) without any restrictions, and in the event they reinvested their profits in China part of the taxes paid could be reimbursed. To ensure foreign-currency earnings, joint enterprises were encouraged to export their products. They were given the right to set up branches outside China, to have their own foreign-currency accounts in the Bank of China, and to purchase, if necessary, raw and manufactured materials abroad.

Yet many important problems involved in establishing and running joint-stock enterprises were bypassed by the Law. Specifically, the branches of the economy where the participation of foreign capital was to be allowed were not enumerated; neither were the methods to be employed in evaluating the emergent property of such enterprises specified; questions concerning the regulation of the rights of industrial ownership and the transfer of technology were left unaddressed; the mechanism regulating the relationship between joint enterprises and the planned economy and their liquidation procedure was only vaguely explained. The Law left unexplained which taxation brackets these enterprises were in, a crucial question for foreign investors. These deficiencies, it seems, did not stem from the carelessness of those who had drafted the Law. Indeed, many countries have developed a sufficiently comprehensive legislation concerning the use of foreign capital. Given this, the inadequate wording of the Law is explained by China's wish to back up its new course with legislation based on practical results, rather than by lack of experience. At the same time, this meant that at the initial stage of the "open-door" policy many issues, including some very important ones, involved in setting up and running joint-stock enterprises, would be settled by way of negotiation between the parties concerned and formalised in contracts for establishing such ventures. According to reports in the foreign press, a foreigner wishing to set up a joint enterprise in China, soon found that instead of law he should abide by during negotiations, the talks themselves provide a means for drafting the relevant law.⁶

⁶ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 30, 1980, p. 79.

Following the adoption of the Law on Joint Enterprises, it took one year to take further steps towards producing legislation for the policies which were aimed at drawing financial and economic assistance from the capitalist world. In July 1980, the PRC State Council adopted two acts: Regulations Governing the Registration of Joint Enterprises and Regulations Governing Labour at Joint Enterprises.⁷

The first statute transferred all matters pertaining to foreign investments to both the PRC's Chief Directorate of the Industrial and Trade Administration, and to local administrative bodies which handle industrial and trade matters on the level of provinces, central cities and autonomous regions. To ensure state control over enterprises with foreign financial backing, the statute gave a list of documents required for registration, which would provide basic data concerning the enterprises in question and the nature of their activities. Local administrative bodies were granted the right to register enterprises subject to subsequent approval by the Chief Directorate of the Industrial and Trade Administration.

The second statute, which also elaborated the provisions of the 1979 Law, granted the administration of joint enterprises a number of benefits which state-sector enterprises did not possess. These included the right to attract skilled labour to the joint enterprise by offering higher wages and adequate liberty in dealing with matters such as employment, dismissals and labour quotas. The statute implied that labour agreements concluded between the administration and the trade union set up at a particular enterprise, might to a large degree serve as a regulator for labour conditions in individual cases. At the same time the statute was aimed at making enterprises the centres for training skilled workers and administrative personnel.

Having thus taken the initial steps in elaborating "open-door" policy legislation, the Chinese leaders set about establishing a legal basis which would ensure real profits from the activities of foreign capital. The next series of legislative acts to be adopted was aimed at developing a tax system to be applied to joint enterprises. The first step in this direction was the Law on Taxing the Income of Joint Enterprises, which played a key role in the policy of "cooperation" with foreign capital and its passage was closely observed abroad. The law, adopted in September 1980 at the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress,⁸ showed that the Chinese leaders had remained loyal to their promise to create conditions favourable for foreign enterprise in China.

To bring the finances of joint ventures under the control of Chinese tax collecting bodies, the Law established an income tax rate equalling 30 per cent of the net profit received by a venture both in China and abroad. Together with the additional 10 per cent local tax, the general income tax level was 33 per cent irrespective of the overall profit. Foreign observers agreed that this level was lower than the normal level of taxes imposed on enterprises in developed capitalist countries.

The Law also provided for a three-year "tax credit" designed to attract foreign capital to the Chinese economy over a lengthy period. Enterprises set up to operate for ten and more years could be exempt from taxes during the first year of receiving profit, while during the second and third such years taxes could be reduced by half. Special tax allowances were provided for joint enterprises operating in China's economically backward regions or in low-profit branches of the economy, such as agriculture and forestry. To attract foreign capital the Law also provided for the reimbursement of 40 per cent of the taxes paid by foreign investors in the event they reinvested their income in China over a period of more

⁷ In *China's Foreign Economic Legislation*, Vol. 1, Beijing, 1982, pp. 13-26.

⁸ See *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 16, 1980.

than five years. In contrast to international practice, foreign partners were also granted the right to transfer their profits abroad at an extremely low tax rate. The Chinese press emphasised that this tax rate was sufficiently advantageous and promised new advantages in future.⁹

The Law did not apply, however, to joint ventures in the field of oil and gas production or the use of other natural resources.

The Law on Personal Income Tax adopted at the same session of the National People's Congress, has become a component of the newly developed tax system.¹⁰ From a formal juridical point of view, the Law applies to all Chinese citizens. If we consider, however, when it was adopted, the rates of taxation (annual incomes lower than 800 yuan were not taxed) and the provisions for taxing persons residing in China not less than one year and earning incomes in China or abroad, it becomes clear that it was not the incomes of ordinary working people which were the object of regulation by this Law, but rather those of foreign investors, the staff of joint enterprises, as well as those representatives of the bourgeoisie still existent in the country.

To finalise the elaboration of a relatively comprehensive tax system whose creation was a result of the "open-door" policy, the PRC State Council adopted two sets of regulations on the application of the above tax laws. In December 1980 these regulations interpreted a number of provisions and definitions used in the wording of the laws, specified the methods for calculating income tax and set forth the procedure for paying taxes. From that time on, Chinese legislation on the use of foreign investments was characterised by a specific feature: following the adoption of a law, by-laws were adopted on its basis to specify the sphere of its application and to regulate its administration.

Even before foreign capital began to flow into China in the form of mixed enterprises, use was also made of other forms of cooperation with foreign entrepreneur capital, which were less sophisticated than joint enterprises. This is the way China attracts the bulk of direct foreign investment to its economy today. Such forms include contracts concluded between Chinese enterprises and foreign firms allowing the latter to manufacture in China, on the basis of foreign production methods and technology, export-oriented manufactured goods or their components, semi-processed goods, etc. These forms of attracting foreign capital, know-how and technology are most frequently used in labour-intensive and technology-deficient branches of industry. The flexible forms of "cooperation" with foreign businessmen, such as goods-payback trade, joint or "cooperative" production and processing "on trust", are widespread because foreign partners regard them preferable for several reasons: there is no need to engage in complex and at times protracted negotiations where current legislation must be considered (as is the case when joint enterprises are set up); contracts are short-term; it is always possible to go out of business if the situation becomes unfavourable. Chinese participation involves, as a rule, providing manpower, production facilities and raw materials, whereas the foreign partner provides technology, know-how, parts and capital. The product is mainly exported to foreign markets. A joint enterprise as such is not set up; the partners divide their profits in accordance with the agreement they reached. Upon the termination of the contract foreign technology and know-how are transferred, for a fee, to the Chinese side. In other words, Chinese enterprises are being reconstructed in this way.

Despite the obvious need for general legislation on such forms of industrial and trade cooperation with foreign entrepreneurs, the Chinese

⁹ In *Beijing Review*, 1982, No. 17, p. 20.

¹⁰ See *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 16, 1980.

side had, as before, preferred to provide legal grounds for obtaining profits from such cooperation. In December 1981, the 4th Session of the Fifth National People's Congress adopted another law, i. e., on taxing foreign enterprise revenues.¹¹ The Law applied to foreign companies investing their capital in the Chinese economy on the basis of individual contracts similar to those mentioned above. The level of taxation stipulated by the law could not be regarded as extremely high. It varied between 20 and 40 per cent depending on the revenues received on a progressive scale from 250,000 to 1,000,000 yuan. At the same time, local authorities were granted the right to lower the level of the 10-per cent local surtax or to waive it in the event a particular enterprise was small-scale or low-profit. As regards further benefits, a number of measures were outlined similar to the "tax credit" established earlier by the Law on Joint-Enterprise Income Tax.

In 1982, China began implementing plans for a goal-oriented use of foreign investments to develop its energy and raw-material resources. In doing so, it was emphasised that oil was one of the principal energy resources and raw materials which was both needed by China and in constant demand on the world market. With this in view, the development and exploitation of oilfields on China's continental shelf has become a special area in the elaboration of "open-door" policy legislation.¹² In January 1982, the Standing Bureau of the State Council adopted Regulations Governing the Joint Development of Sea Oil Resources with Foreign Companies.¹³

Having reaffirmed that all oil resources on China's continental shelf are state property, the law allowed foreign companies to join China in developing the Chinese oilfields under the control of Chinese authorities. China's Ministry of Oil Industry became the body responsible for the elaboration and realisation of an oil resources development programme. All the drilling and pumping was entrusted to the Chinese General Company for the Development of Sea Oil Resources (established after this set of regulations took effect) which was given exclusive rights in this area. These regulations were also intended to enable the Chinese side to invest in the development of oilfields, whose lucrativeness has been proved. For this reason this set of regulations permitted foreign companies to drill for oil in an allocated sea region by their own means and at their own risk. Only after a commercially feasible oilfield or gas deposit has been found is it to be developed by the joint capital of the foreign partner and the Chinese General Company (or its subsidiary). This gives birth to a "cooperative" enterprise established on a contractual basis. When the contract expires, the Chinese side receives an oil producing enterprise; it takes over the property rights in relation to all the property produced or imported by the foreign partner. The cost of the foreign partner's property is reimbursed during the oil production process.

By inviting foreign capital into the national economy, China intends to achieve two basic objectives: that is to raise industry's technological level, and to obtain a source of foreign currency. Experience shows that the Chinese leaders intend to achieve this in two ways. Joint and large-scale capital-intensive enterprises of the "cooperative" type (established, in part, for oil production) will be given a predominant role in solving the first task (although these enterprises, too, are intended to provide budget revenues). The use of foreign capital in this rather complex form of enterprise implies the operation of such ventures over a considerable

¹¹ See *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 17, 1981.

¹² See *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 11, 1982.

¹³ China is now actively engaged in negotiations with a number of foreign companies which seek to assist in the development of coal deposits.

period and massive foreign investments. All this requires meticulously elaborated legislation on "cooperation" with foreign firms, and the establishment of legal institutions which thus far do not exist in China. But in dealing with these problems the Chinese government has preferred not to make haste, taking, as has been noted earlier, mostly empirical measures.

In order to satisfy the country's foreign currency needs as fully and as quickly as possible, China began establishing special enclaves on Chinese territory—special economic zones similar to free-trade or export zones—in 1980. They are a major component of the "open-door" policy.

The first and most comprehensive act defining the conditions which were to prevail in such zones thus far was the Regulations for Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province, adopted in August 1980 by the Guangdong Provincial People's Congress.¹⁴ Its analysis shows that in contrast to most countries having such zones, control over their everyday activities in China is exercised by provincial, rather than central bodies.

The regulations provided for the establishment of a supreme administrative body—the Committee for Administration of Special Economic Zones, with its main office in Shenzhen. On behalf of the People's Congress of Guangdong Province, the Committee "exercises unified administration over all special zones". It was granted the exclusive right to consider and approve projects which use foreign capital in various forms. The Committee's terms of reference include the development and implementation of special zone development programmes, the coordination of "working relations" between various organisations within such zones which were set up for the benefit of foreign companies, and the maintenance of law and order.

In order maximally to liberalise the terms under which foreign capital operates in China, for the first time since the declaration of the "open-door" policy the government allowed both joint enterprises and those fully financed by foreign capital, which are virtually private capitalist enterprises to be established in the special zones. The Regulations also granted special tax rebates: revenues were taxed at 15 per cent (lower than in Xiang Gang); enterprises in the special zones were allowed to import all necessary equipment, spare parts, raw materials, means of transportation, etc., duty-free.

The zones enjoy special status also because the output of their enterprises is to be exported. In order to sell these products on the domestic market the enterprise must not only obtain a special permit from the Committee for Administration of Special Economic Zones, but also to pay customs duties. In other words, the zones are not part of the planned economy. They play the role of "states within a state", which is augmented by the stipulation that "investors may administer their enterprises independently". Zhao Ziyang, Premier of the State Council, reaffirmed this when he said: "Government bodies [in these zones] shall in no way interfere in enterprise management and shall accord such enterprises complete freedom for the development of production."¹⁵ The Chinese press explained the meaning of this directive, noting that if the planned regulation of production in the zones becomes excessive, this will hamper the inflow of foreign capital. At the same time the press reported that there

¹⁴ See *Zhongguo renmin jingji shidian* (1981), Beijing, 1981, Section II, pp. 147-148. Although these regulations which embodied an important government policy took effect following their approval at the 11th Session of the National People's Congress Standing Committee the same month they were not published in the central press and did not acquire the legal force of a national law in accordance with the 1978 PRC Constitution then in force.

¹⁵ *Ta Kung Pao* (Weekly Supplement), Aug. 20-26, 1981, No. 789, p. 1.

might be close ties between business activities in the zones and the markets of Xiang Gang and Aomen.¹⁶ In other words, in order to obtain foreign currency the Chinese authorities have made the special zones appendages of the capitalist economy. It is most significant that a huge poster proclaiming "Time Is Money" has been put up at the entry to Xiang Gang from Shenzhen.¹⁷

The power to regulate life in the special zones was transferred to local authorities, this is a characteristic feature of their status. Legal norms expanding or specifying the initial set of Regulations were drafted by standing committees of provincial people's congresses. In November 1981, four interim provisions were adopted concerning entry into and exit from special zones, the system of labour and wages, the registration of business activities, and land tenure (the latter applying to the Shenzhen zone exclusively). The right of the Guangdong administration to adopt such acts had its legal basis in the Resolution of the 21st Session of the National People's Congress Standing Committee of 26 November 1981, which empowered the people's congresses of Guangdong and Fujian Provinces and their standing committees to work out independently all regulations pertaining to any economic problems arising in the special economic zones under their jurisdiction.¹⁸

In keeping with these four interim provisions, the procedures governing travel between the zones, Xiang Gang (Hong Kong) and Aomen (Macao) were simplified; in contrast to enterprises outside the special economic zones, foreign enterprises in such zones were given greater latitude in defining the terms for hiring personnel and the form of wages; land in the special zones was rented and remained state property.¹⁹

The characteristic features of special economic zones enable us to conclude that they are now also regions where Peking conducts experiments aimed not only at earning foreign currency, but also at trying out ways of reforming the economic mechanism (including giving enterprises more independence) on a national scale in order to modernise China's economy. It seems, however, that the special economic zones are regarded by the Chinese leadership as a development which will later play an important role in implementing the Chinese political strategy of re-uniting the country. This pertains primarily to Xiang Gang (Hong Kong).

The empirical approach the Chinese authorities take to "open-door" policy legislation (which is demonstrated by the fact that relevant legal norms take effect stage by stage), has in recent years been acquiring an ever more pronounced pragmatic character.

In the spring of 1983, the Chinese press began publishing articles which laid the groundwork for the further liberalisation of the policy of utilising foreign capital and offered corresponding promises.²⁰

The Resolution of the 2nd Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress of September 2, 1983 concerning

¹⁶ In *Beijing Review*, 1981, No. 50, p. 15.

¹⁷ See *Renmin ribao*, May 6, 1983. Chinese economists define the essence of the special zones economy as state capitalism, when the socialist state holds key positions, yet allows some elements of capitalism, including private ownership and market regulation to exist (*Jingji yanjiu*, 1983, No. 2, p. 28).

¹⁸ In *China's Foreign Economic Legislation*, Vol. 1, pp. 207-244.

¹⁹ Less than a year after the four interim provisions had taken effect, new benefits were announced in the leading special economic zone of Shenzhen. These included a provision that in certain cases enterprises might be exempted from paying the single industrial-trade tax; taxes on revenues might be reduced by 15-20 per cent for the duration of three years for "relatively large enterprises"; land rent for such enterprises might be reduced by 20-40 per cent; moreover the new rent would be calculated on the basis of the minimal rent established earlier, i. e. 10 yuan for one square metre a year (*China Business Review*, 1982, No. 6, p. 4).

²⁰ See *Renmin ribao*, April 9, 1983. *Beijing Review*, 1983, No. 19, p. 7. *China Daily*, May 12, 1983.

changes in the Law on Joint Enterprise Income Tax was a practical step toward substantially extending the benefits accorded foreign entrepreneurs.²¹

In keeping with the Resolution, the "tax credit" for such enterprises was extended from three to five years. From now on, joint enterprises established to operate for ten or more years may be exempted from paying taxes on revenues during the first two years of profitable operation and pay half of it on the third, fourth and fifth years.

The Regulations on the Application of the 1979 Law on Joint Enterprises (the only legislative act whose content has not been disclosed in by-laws), adopted by China's State Council on September 20, 1983, was a milestone in the history of drafting legislation for the policy of utilizing foreign capital.²² Chinese officials considered this set of regulations to be a "new stage in the development of trade and the policy of investments in China."²³

Considering the great size of this document (118 articles grouped in 16 chapters) and the wide range of its provisions based, as a rule, on other stipulations empirically reached and reflected in specific contracts on joint enterprises concluded from 1979 on, this act may be regarded as a relatively comprehensive legal document which is to play the role of the Chinese investment code of sorts. At the same time the adoption of this document has amply shown that in the preceding period the "open-door" policy was largely in its probationary stage.

Developing the original 1979 Law, the regulations were primarily aimed at providing legislation for the interaction mechanism between joint enterprises and the system of planned economy, ensuring simultaneously sufficiently broad autonomy for their operations. Significantly, the regulations made further concessions to foreign capital by giving foreign investors additional privileges.

This set of regulations represented the first attempt to define the legal status of joint enterprises as legal persons. It further elaborated their status as companies with limited liability (provided for by earlier legislation) and established that enterprise partners' responsibility is limited by the volume of their investment, while the enterprise itself is responsible for its debts by all of its property.

The original law was further elaborated in another respect. The regulations allowed enterprises with foreign participation to be established in some of the leading branches of the Chinese economy, such as power engineering, chemistry, metallurgy, engineering, instrument manufacturing, sea-bed oil production, electronics (including the production of computers and means of communication), various branches of the light industry, tourism and services.

By regulating the mechanism of interaction between joint enterprises and the planned economy, this set of regulations did not merely reaffirm their economic independence. Mindful of the fears earlier expressed by foreign investors that it would be impossible to carry on business activities in China independently, the regulations also forbade planning and administrative bodies at all levels to give instructions to such enterprises concerning their production programmes. Pursuing the line of providing legal grounds for the privileged position of joint ventures vis-à-vis state enterprises, the new act made it binding upon departments responsible for these enterprises to ensure the fulfilment of their plans by giving them certain advantages in terms of material supplies. When defining chan-

²¹ See *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 3, 1983.

²² See *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gouyuan gongbao* (The Bulletin of the State Council of the PRC), 1983, No. 21, pp. 969-987.

²³ *China Daily*, Sept. 27, 1983.

nels through which joint enterprises would acquire raw and manufactured materials, they are given access to resources distributed in a planned manner. The privileged position of joint enterprises is also clearly seen in the fact that the new act obliged the people's governments of provinces, autonomous regions and central cities to help maintain the foreign currency balances of such enterprises at the expense of their reserves, if necessary. In case this is impossible to do, the matter is to be settled by its inclusion in the state plan.

Significantly, the privileges granted earlier to enterprises within the special economic zones are now being given to joint ventures outside such zones. For example the regulations allow the bulk of materials and equipment needed by enterprises for production to be imported duty-free. In addition, the single industrial and trade tax on the goods enterprises produce for export may be cancelled during the initial period of their operation in case difficulties arise.

Guided by the desire to obtain from joint enterprises products in short supply or those which have to be imported and taking into consideration foreign companies' aspiration to consolidate their position on China's domestic market, these regulations, for the first time ever, definitely give joint enterprises an opportunity to sell such products "chiefly" on the domestic market for hard currency. In other words, the former export orientation of such enterprises' production activities has been reconsidered. Joint enterprises are put on an equal footing with state enterprises as regards prices for raw and manufactured materials purchased in China and the maintenance costs of support services. Prices for products to be sold on the domestic market are fixed according to their quality.

At the same time, the regulations granted benefits to foreign personnel working at mixed ventures. After paying their personal income tax, they are now entitled to transfer all their remaining earnings abroad, and not half (as was the case before).

By acquiring an increasingly comprehensive legislation, the "open-door" policy is gaining momentum. Its forms, methods and scale are expanding in the context of eased control and coordinating effect on the part of central authorities.

Local governments are given ever increasing powers as regards the attraction of foreign capital. All Chinese provinces have been granted the right to approve investment projects valued at up to \$3 million. As regards Guangdong and Fujian, including the special economic zones, all projects irrespective of the scale of foreign investments involved may be authorised at a provincial level.²⁴

In April 1984, China made another important step in "opening its doors to the world". The authorities allowed so-called regions of economic and technical development to be set up in 14 ports, with foreign capital. These regions were accorded advantages similar to those in the special economic zones. The regions differ from the special zones in that emphasis there is made on the establishment of high-technology industrial enterprises and joint ventures backed by foreign capital, and on the modernisation of Chinese enterprises with foreign assistance. As a result, the 14 port-cities have been given broad powers to approve projects involving foreign participation. Tianjin and Shanghai can authorise projects valued at \$30 million; Dalian and Guangzhou, up to \$10 million; and the rest, up to \$5 million. Characteristically, these rights apply to projects which are outside the state planning system in terms of supplies and prices.²⁵

²⁴ In *China Business Review*, 1983, No. 5, p. 20

²⁵ In *Beijing Review*, 1984, No. 50, p. 16

In line with the general policy of expanding benefits for high-technology and large-investment enterprises, in November 1984 the PRC State Council adopted an interim provision according to which joint and foreign enterprises in the special economic zones and coastal cities are exempted from paying taxes (depending on their nature) during the initial two years of operation, while during the subsequent three years they may pay taxes totalling no more than 10 per cent of their profits.²⁶

Seeking to create an even more favourable "investment climate" for foreign capital, China, as a recipient country, has in recent years taken the path of assuming international legal obligations in relation to other countries. By the end of 1984, the Chinese government had signed seven agreements to promote and protect foreign investments (with Sweden, Romania, West Germany, France, Belgium, Finland, and Norway) and is negotiating similar agreements with Japan, the United States, Switzerland, Austria, Holland, and Italy.²⁷

The drafting of "open-door" policy legislation remains a central issue in China. According to reports in the Chinese press, work is underway to draft laws on enterprises fully financed by foreign investments, on contracts with foreign entrepreneurs, and a series of acts regulating the use of investments in the form of "cooperative" enterprises, goods-payback trade, etc.

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26. RENMIN RIBAO, 18 November 1984.

27. JINGJI RIBAO, 30 October 1984.

CHRONOLOGY, CURRENT STATUS OF KOREA UNIFICATION TALKS NOTED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 85 pp 84-94

[Article by V. I. Andreyev, candidate of economic sciences, and V. I. Osipov, candidate of juridical sciences: "The Problem of a Settlement in Korea Today"]

The question of normalising the situation in the Korean peninsula is one of the problems in world politics that demands to be solved. The military and political situation in Korea is becoming one of the most explosive in the world at a time when international tension has been heightened through the fault of the most aggressive forces of imperialism headed by the United States. The situation in Korea during the postwar years can best be described as a dangerous balancing between a cold war and a very real armed conflict. It was in Korea that imperialism made its first attempt to change the alignment of forces which took shape as a result of the Second World War by force of arms when it attacked the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1950. It was there that imperialism suffered a jarring defeat, the result of the socialist countries' collective efforts and the Korean people's heroic struggle.

Korea's division into the North and the South is one of the unsolved questions left over from the Second World War. It is a result of the expansionist imperialist policy followed by the United States and the flouting by US of its allied commitments.

The Korean people is demonstrating a growing desire to bring about the peaceful unification of the country. But this is paralleled by mounting interference in its internal affairs on the part of imperialist states and by steadily increasing efforts to shore up the anti-popular regime in Seoul, thereby to perpetuate the "two Koreas" situation. Washington has included the Korean peninsula in the sphere of its "vital interests" and is increasing its military presence in South Korea. It is vigorously using the American troops stationed there to undermine peace and security and whip up tension in the Far East and Asia. The provocation organised by the US secret service, involving the use of a South Korean aircraft that intruded deep into the USSR's air space for espionage purposes, is an example of the Pentagon's aggressive designs in the Far East.

Ever more persistent attempts have been made in recent years to create a new military-political formation—a tripartite military alliance involving the United States, Japan and South Korea. President Reagan's visit to Tokyo and Seoul in November 1983 and his demonstration of the "diplomacy of strength" create an extremely dangerous seat of tension in the Korean peninsula and in the Far East as a whole. The thesis in Reagan's and Chun Doo Hwan's joint statement that "the security of the Republic of Korea [South Korea.—*Author*] is vital to the security of the United States"¹ reveals Washington's intention to draw other countries, first and foremost South Korea, into its militaristic plans for Asia and the Pacific.

The 6th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, held in October 1980, stressed that the confrontation in the Korean peninsula between considerable contingents of armed forces from the North and the South

¹ *Korea Herald*, Nov. 15, 1983.

and the presence of American troops in South Korea perpetuate the tense situation there. The Congress also noted that the elimination of the military confrontation between the two parts of Korea was the most important precondition for their peaceful unification.²

It should be recalled that today, when various parts of the world are becoming ever more closely bound together any local conflict could easily become global. For this reason the Korean problem transcends national boundaries and is an important issue in the struggle for peace throughout the world.

The international importance of the Korean question, however, is not restricted to its military aspect. It is, as always has been, a problem concerning the confrontation of two diametrically opposed socio-political systems and two distinct foreign policies. The only realistic way of solving it is to remove all interference by imperialism in the affairs of the Korean people and to achieve a peaceful democratic unification of Korea.

The movement for the unification of Korea is one of the primary concerns of the Workers' Party of Korea and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Throughout the years of its existence the DPRK has made more than 200 concrete proposals to the South Korean authorities on ways of achieving a peaceful, democratic solution of the Korean question.³

For a long time the DPRK's initiatives went unanswered. And it was only in the early 1970s that the first official contacts on Korean land between the North and the South were arranged—first between the national branches of the Red Cross Society to solve humanitarian issues and then at the governmental level.⁴ These contacts were primarily the result of the general shift towards détente internationally which came about through the tireless efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. They were also aided by the growing support given by the world public and by the world socialist community to the Korean people's just desire to live as one family.

The first meeting between representatives of the North and South Korean branches of the Red Cross was held on August 20, 1971 in Panmunjom, a small settlement near the demarcation line which divides the country along the 38th parallel. Exactly one month later, on September 20, preliminary talks on the agenda and procedural questions of the main talks were begun in the meeting hall of the Commission of Neutral States for Observance of the Armistice in Korea. Welcoming the commencement of contacts Kim Il Sung noted: "The entire people of North and South Korea... unanimously want these talks to become an important starting point in the drive to destroy the barrier between the North and the South, and attain the peaceful unification of our homeland".⁵

The preliminary talks lasted for almost a year and were conducted quite vigorously, there being a total of 38 sessions on the working level, including 25 plenary sessions and 13 held behind closed doors. It was only at the 20th session on June 16, 1972, when contacts between the two governments had already been initiated that the sides agreed on

² See Kim Il Sung, *Report of the WPK CC to the 6th Party Congress*, Pyongyang, 1960, pp. 81-82.

³ See *DPRK's Proposals on the Unification of the Country*, Pyongyang, 1982, p. 1.

⁴ In 1963 representatives of the Olympic Committees of the DPRK and South Korea met in Hong Kong and Lausanne to discuss forming a single Korean team to perform at the Tokyo Olympics.

⁵ *Rodong Shinmoon*, Jan. 1, 1972.

the agenda for the main talks between the North and South Korean branches of the Red Cross. The agreement reached was based on a proposal made by the DPRK representatives. It included the following items:

- that searches for separated relatives be conducted and information on their whereabouts be provided;
- visits by relatives living in the North and South and the creation of the conditions necessary for their meetings;
- free correspondence between separated relatives;
- reunification of relatives who freely state desire;
- other humanitarian issues.⁶

Seven rounds of the main talks between Red Cross representatives were held and the first item of the agenda was discussed. But by the middle of 1973 the talks became deadlocked because South Korean side refused to solve matters constructively, from positions of genuine humanism.⁷

Talks on the governmental level between North and South Korea were opened without public announcement and held in Pyongyang from May 2 to 5 and in Seoul from May 29 to June 1, 1972.⁸ They resulted in the signing of a Joint Statement by North and South Korea, by plenipotentiary representatives of the two governments and were published simultaneously in Pyongyang and Seoul on July 4, 1972.

This document is important because in it the sides recorded their common approach to the problem of unifying the country, which has become known as the "three principles of the homeland's unification"; they also agreed to carry out a number of practical measures. In accordance with the Joint Statement the country's unification should be achieved, first, independently, without foreign interference, second, by peaceful means, and, third, on the basis of "national consolidation".⁹

When suggesting the principle of the country's independent peaceful unification without foreign interference the DPRK government had in mind the elimination of imperialist interference, of American imperialism first and foremost in the Korean people's affairs and the withdrawal of American troops from the territory of South Korea.¹⁰

The principle of "national consolidation" means that broad sections of the public both in the North and in the South should participate in the dialogue and, accordingly, that a democratisation of South Korean society, including freedom of political activity for all parties and public organisations in the South and the discontinuation by the Seoul authorities of their policy of anti-communism must occur. "How can national consolidation be achieved", Kim Il Sung queried, "if one does not cooperate with Communists and comes out against Communists?"¹¹ The DPRK government also includes in this principle the understanding that when conducting a dialogue and striving for unification the sides should not impose their socio-political systems on one another. It has stated its readiness to permit any South Korean political party to engage in political activity in the DPRK if the same right is granted to North Korea's

⁶ See *Modern History of Korea*, Pyongyang, 1979, pp. 622-623.

⁷ In July 1983 the South Korean Red Cross proposed that talks with the DPRK Red Cross be resumed on the question of separated relatives. In reply the Central Committee of the DPRK Red Cross published a statement on July 24 in which it condemned the South Korean Red Cross as a "political toy" in the hands of the Seoul authorities and offered it as a preliminary condition to admit its crimes in connection with the torpedoing of the talks between national branches of the Red Cross in the 1970s and apologise to the nation for this. *Rodong Shinmoon*, July 25, 1983.

⁸ See *The DPRK's Proposals on the Unification of the Country*, p. 105.

⁹ See *Rodong Shinmoon*, July 4, 1972.

¹⁰ See Kim Il Sung, *On the Independent Peaceful Unification of the Homeland*, Pyongyang, 1980, p. 76.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 77-78.

political parties in the South. National consolidation also implies wide-ranging cooperation between the North and the South in all fields of politics, economy, culture and military matters.¹²

In their Joint Statement of July 4, 1972 the sides also agreed to "stop mutual slander and armed provocations against each other", to take vigorous measures to prevent sudden military clashes, to promote greater understanding and exchanges of every kind between the North and the South, to open a direct telephone line between Pyongyang and Seoul. In order to implement all the practical issues and to carry out the above-mentioned accords a decision was made to form in the future the Coordinating Committee of the North and the South. Its co-chairmen were also appointed: for the DPRK—Kim Yong Chue, head of a department in the WPK Central Committee, and South Korea—Lee Hu Rak, Director of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency.¹³

At their third meeting, which was held in Seoul from November 30 to December 1, 1972 the co-chairmen reached a formal agreement on the establishment of the Coordinating Committee of the North and the South and the commencement of its activity. Included in the Committee's functions were the discussion, solution and supervision of the realisation of the following questions:

- attainment of the country's peaceful unification on the basis of agreed-upon principles;
- implementation of extensive exchanges between political parties, public organisations and individuals in the North and the South;
- implementation of economic, cultural and social exchanges; pooling of efforts in solving economic matters;
- easing of tension in relations between the North and the South, preventing military clashes and reducing the level of military confrontation;
- coordination of the foreign policy activities of the North and the South.

In accordance with the agreement five sub-committees were to have been formed under the Coordinating Committee: political, military, diplomatic, economic and cultural.¹⁴

There is no doubt that fulfilment of both the Red Cross and Coordinating Committee agreements would have presented genuine prospects for gradually easing tension in the Korean peninsula, for the development of mutual trust and this in the long run could have facilitated the eventual attainment of a peaceful unification of the country.

The DPRK realised, however, that these contacts were of a limited nature both in terms of the questions that were discussed and the number of persons who discussed them. They knew that they alone could not solve all the problems that had accumulated during the long years of the country's division and eliminate mistrust between the North and the South. That is why after the signing of the Joint Statement the DPRK government proposed that a joint conference of the political parties and public organisations of North and South Korea or a conference of representatives of the North and South Korean authorities, as well as a joint meeting of deputies of the Supreme People's Assembly of the

¹² See Kim Il Sung, *On the Independent Practical Unification of the Homeland*, pp. 123-124. Besides the Workers' Party of Korea, which is the guiding and organising force of the Korean people, there are two other parties in the DPRK: the Social Democratic Party (prior to 1991—the Democratic Party) and the Chonggyo-Chonuduhn Religious party. These two parties do not have local organisations and fully support the WPK's activities.

¹³ *Rodong Shinmun*, July 4, 1972.

¹⁴ See *A Modern History of Korea*, pp. 517-518.

DPRK and the South Korean parliament be held.¹⁵ The DPRK carried out a number of practical measures in accordance with the agreement reached with South Korea. The country's mass media stopped presenting materials critical of the South Korean regime. Another real demonstration of the DPRK's sincere desire to ease military tension in the Korean peninsula was its absolute and relative reduction of spending on defence by more than a third in 1972—from 1,959.83 million won in 1971 to 1,256.06 million won, or from 31.1 per cent of total state budget expenditures to 17 per cent. Subsequently this spending did not exceed the 1972 level in terms of percentage of the total budget, though it did grow somewhat in terms of absolute figures.

After three meetings of the Coordinating Committee, held in Seoul and Pyongyang alternately, it became clear that on the instigation of the United States the South Korean side was trying to use the dialogue between the North and South to secure unilateral advantages by eroding the socialist system in the DPRK. At his first press conference on the day the Joint Statement of the North and South was published the Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency Lee Hu Rak, who signed it for the South Korean side, stated that "from today on, we are moving from confrontation without dialogue to a new era of confrontation with dialogue".¹⁶ As time passed this South Korean approach to contacts with the DPRK became even more obvious. "The South Korean side", note DPRK scholars, "paid only lip service to the 'full opening of doors' while in reality it proposed only limited measures in the fields of economics and culture, insisted on the creation of only two subcommittees under the Coordinating Committee, obstructed the adoption of measures to end military confrontation, the creation of the political, military and diplomatic subcommittees and the convocation of a political conference between the North and the South".¹⁷

By the middle of June 1973 the work of the Coordinating Committee was at an impasse. Contacts between the deputies co-chairmen of the Coordinating Committee were resumed again in December 1973 but they, too, were discontinued after the 10th meeting held on March 14, 1975 through the fault of the South Korean authorities.

The facts show that the Seoul authorities needed the dialogue with the DPRK and certain initiatives displayed in this direction not to make a genuine attempt at the negotiating table towards reaching a mutually acceptable decision on the country's future but only to divert the attention of the democratic Korean public and world public opinion from South Korea's further militarisation and the military build-up conducted within the framework of the "Nixon doctrine" with the aim of raising the level of confrontation with the DPRK and "rolling back communism" from the Korean peninsula. Seoul's attitude towards the dialogue with Pyongyang was noted by American researchers as well. South Korea feigned an interest in the issue of unification in order to win time to strengthen its position, wrote the American political scientist R. Clough.¹⁸

The intention of both the South Korean ruling circles and imperialism to perpetuate the country's division clearly manifested itself in the so-called special statement made by the then "president" of the Seoul regime Park Chung Hee on the morning of June 23, 1973 after first clearing it with the US Administration and the Japanese government. Park

¹⁵ See Kim Il Sung, *On the Independent Peaceful Unification of the Homeland*, pp. 11-12.

¹⁶ *Asian Survey*, November 1980, vol. XX, No. 11, p. 1113.

¹⁷ *Modern History of Korea*, p. 620.

¹⁸ R. Clough, *Deterrence and Defence in Korea: The Role of US Forces*, Washington, 1976, p. 28.

Chung Hee proposed that North and South Korea join the United Nations separately. This would legitimise and formalise the "two Koreas" situation, as Park himself admitted. For precisely this reason on the evening of the same day the DPRK government emphatically rejected the idea of having the two Korean states separately join the United Nations and offered new proposals on unification consisting of five points. These were:

- to end military confrontation and ease tension between the North and the South;
- to make multifaceted cooperation and exchanges between the North and the South a reality;
- to convene a Great National Assembly which would bring together representatives of all sections of the population as well as representatives of political parties and public organisations from the North and South;
- to form a confederation of the North and the South under a single state name;
- to join the United Nations under a single state name.¹⁹

In combination with the three principles contained in the Joint Statement of the North and the South these five-point proposals continue to serve as the basis of the DPRK government's consistent policy towards the country's peaceful democratic unification.

We have already investigated the content of the "three principles of unification". Now let us look into the "five point proposal".

As has been repeatedly stressed by the DPRK government bringing military confrontation to an end and easing tensions in the Korean peninsula is one of the key questions which must be addressed if the unification of the country is to be brought about. "The possession by both the North and the South of considerable armed forces and their military confrontation are serious factors threatening the existence of peace in our country. They are also a source of misunderstandings and mistrust," stressed Kim Il Sung.²⁰ There is no doubt that the elimination of this factor would facilitate the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust in Korea and thereby facilitate the implementation of other measures along the road to the country's unification. To this end the DPRK proposed that the South Korean government stop building up armaments and encouraging the arms race, withdraw all foreign, American troops first and foremost, from the territory of South Korea (there are no foreign troops on the territory of the DPRK), reduce the armed forces of the North and the South to 100,000 men or less, limit arms, stop the importation of arms, and conclude a peace agreement between the interested parties, i. e., between the DPRK and the US, to replace the existing shaky armistice agreement.

It has been proposed that wide-ranging cooperation between the DPRK and South Korea be initiated in the fields of politics, military matters, diplomacy, economics and culture. Its purpose is to prevent the total economic, political and cultural enslavement of South Korea by the United States and other imperialist countries, to organise the joint exploitation of natural resources, to resume the traditional economic exchange between North and South Korea, to unify the language, and to facilitate the development of the national arts. Backing up its proposals with concrete initiatives the DPRK offered the South Korean authorities to form a single Korean team for participation in the 22nd Summer Olympic Games in Moscow. The Seoul regime not only rejected this

¹⁹ See Kim Il Sung, *On the Independent Peaceful Unification of the Homeland*, pp. 19-20.

²⁰ Kim Il Sung, *On the Independent Peaceful Unification of the Homeland*, pp. 20-21.

suggestion but took the line laid down by its American masters and joined them in the so-called boycott of those Games.

Proceeding from their past experience in conducting dialogue with the South the DPRK believes that talks on the unification of Korea cannot be conducted solely by representatives of the authorities of both parts of Korea. It is quite clear that the South Korean authorities do not represent the interests of all the classes and political strata of that society. For this reason broad sections of the public in the South and the North should take part in these talks. For this reason it is proposed that a Great National Assembly be convened.

The purpose of forming a confederation of the North and the South is to create a unified Korean state. It would represent the first step towards the final unification of Korea, and continue as long as the different socio-political systems in the DPRK and South Korea exist.

The DPRK has proposed a concrete programme for Korea's peaceful, democratic unification. At the same time it never considered this proposal to be the only one possible and expressed its readiness to compromise and to cooperate in a business-like manner with the South Korean authorities in working out mutually acceptable ways of unifying the country²¹. These considerations also motivated other initiatives taken by the DPRK government in recent years to resume the dialogue with South Korea.

A statement of the Central Committee of the United Democratic Fatherland Front was adopted on January 23, 1979 at a joint meeting of the DPRK's political parties and public organisations, convened by the Central Committee of the United Democratic Fatherland Front on the suggestion of the Workers' Party of Korea. Addressed to various sections of South Korea's population, to Koreans living abroad, to South Korean political parties and public organisations, and to the South Korean authorities, this statement proposed that a number of measures be adopted "to accelerate the country's unification".²²

First, the North and the South should return to the ideals and principles of the Joint Statement of July 4, 1972. To this end it was suggested that the two sides officially confirm their adherence to these ideals and principles at an agreed-upon date. Second, mutual propaganda attacks should stop. Third, all actions hostile and threatening to the other side, involving the use of armed forces, should stop immediately and unconditionally. The build-up of armed forces, military operations, the construction of military installations and the holding of military exercises should stop in areas adjoining the military line of demarcation. Fourth, a national conference attended by representatives of all the political parties and public organisations in the North and the South, including the Chairman of the ruling Democratic Republican Party of South Korea, as well as representatives of compatriot organisations (in Japan, the USA, the FRG and other countries) should be convened to discuss questions of comprehensive cooperation and exchanges in politics, the economy, defence, culture, the free dom for the political parties of the North and South to engage in political activity throughout the entire territory of the Korean peninsula. With the aim of preparing for this conference and solving other questions of unification it was proposed that a preparatory committee of national unification be formed which would include not only representatives of the authorities but also of all political parties and public organisations in the DPRK and South Korea, as well as representatives of compatriot organisations.²³

²¹ See Kim Il Sung, *On the Independent Peaceful Unification of the Homeland*, p. 97.

²² *Redong Shinmoon*, Jan. 24, 1979.

²³ See *Redong Shinmoon*, Feb. 6, 1979.

The DPRK government repeatedly brought its proposals to the attention of the South Korean authorities and stressed that then, when the South Korean ruling circles were in a political crisis due to the murder of the compromised dictator Park Chung Hee it was more important than ever to join in a search for a rational way of peacefully reunifying the country. Although the Seoul authorities published a statement on January 26, 1979 positively assessing the proposal made by the Central Committee of the United Democratic Fatherland Front,²⁴ they did not do anything to put it into practice. The South Koreans simply did not send their delegates to the fourth meeting of representatives of the North and the South in Panmunjom, thus torpedoing a new round of contacts.

In January 1980 the DPRK came up with a new initiative intended to bring about a resumption of the dialogue between North and South. Vice-President of the DPRK, Chairman of the Committee on the Peaceful Unification of the Homeland Kim Il proposed to the leaders of the ruling and opposition parties in the South, while the Premier of the DPRK's Administrative Council Li Jong Ok proposed to the Prime Minister of South Korea that a consultative conference and multilateral talks be held between political and public organisations from both parts of Korea. They also voiced their interest in seeing a meeting of the prime ministers.

The South Korean Prime Minister gave his consent to this and nine working conferences between representatives of both sides were held in Panmunjom from February 6 to June 24, 1980 to thrash out the terms of the forthcoming meeting of premiers (location, who was to participate and the agenda). The North Korean side displayed a constructive attitude, a high sense of responsibility, and proposed that the meetings be held not in third countries but on Korean territory. The DPRK also asked that the scope of questions for discussion not be restricted to a narrow agenda, as Seoul insisted. Soon, however, these conferences were discontinued and the aims set before them were not attained. While conducting talks with the DPRK, the military authorities headed by Chun Doo Hwan, which replaced the brief period of civilian rule after the murder of Park Chung Hee, launched a campaign of terror against democratic leaders and the people that was without precedent even in South Korea. It used force to suppress an uprising in May 1980 by the residents of Kwangju who demanded the restoration of democracy in the country. Under these circumstances the DPRK was compelled to cease contacts with the South Korean regime.

As to Kim Il's message, neither party nor public leaders in South Korea had a chance to reply to the proposals contained in it because they were arrested by Chun Doo Hwan. These and other actions taken by Seoul's ruling circles were deliberate actions intended to worsen the atmosphere and complicate intra-Korean dialogue.

The 6th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, which was held in October 1980, gave a great deal of attention to the problem of a political settlement in the Korean peninsula. In furtherance of earlier proposals while taking the actual situation in and around the Korean peninsula into account the Congress once again proposed that a confederation of the DPRK and South Korea be created as a step on the road to normalising the situation in Korea and creating the preconditions necessary for a peaceful, democratic solution of the Korean problem without interference by imperialist forces.

The supreme forum of the Korean Communists proposed to the United States that talks be held on the question of replacing the 1953

²⁴ See *Rodong Shinmun*, Jan. 28, 1979.

Korean armistice agreement with a peace treaty, and this became an integral part of its programme for finding a political solution to the situation in the Korean peninsula. The first such proposal to the United States, the main participant in the aggression against the DPRK which occurred between 1950 and 1953, was contained in a message from the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK to the US Congress in March 1974. Washington, however, has yet to send an answer.²¹ The Congress also demanded that American troops be speedily withdrawn from South Korea, stressing that such a step on the part of the United States would be in keeping with the interests not only of the Korean people but also of the peoples of other countries, including the United States, and contribute to the cause of ensuring peace in the world.

The new initiatives of the Workers' Party of Korea, which were directed at bringing about peaceful, democratic unification of the country in the speediest manner possible received wide support from the Korean public. The conference attended by representatives of the Workers' Party of Korea, the Democratic Party, the Chondogyo-Chonuduhn Party, the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Homeland and other DPRK public organisations, held in Pyongyang on November 11, 1980, sent a letter to the population of South Korea and Koreans living abroad, urging them to facilitate the implementation of the proposals concerning the country's unification approved by the 6th WPK Congress.²² It was noted in the letter that these proposals had the unanimous support of the Korean people and were positively assessed by the international public. The participants in the conference also proposed that a consultative conference to be attended by representatives of North and South Korean political parties, public organisations and also of Koreans living abroad be convened to solve questions concerning the implementation of the DPRK's proposals in practice. In November-December 1980 this letter was sent to 1,336 South Korean political and public figures and to 870 Koreans living in other countries.

In the 1980s the DPRK's main efforts towards resolving the situation in Korea are concentrated on the holding of a broad campaign inside the country and abroad to garner support for the idea of creating a confederation of the North and the South and isolating the present rulers of South Korea who have the blood of the Kwanju patriots on their hands. At the same time, the heightening of tensions in the world and in the Far East in particular during that period which were the result of the aggressive intrigues of imperialist forces and the hurried creation of the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul militaristic alliance, necessitated certain adjustments in the WPK's policies on the Korean settlement. These adjustments did not alter the essence of this policy but only served to somewhat change the proposals on ways of achieving the tasks set by the previous Congress.

At their joint meeting on January 10, 1984 the Central People's Committee and the Standing Council of the Supreme People's Assembly studied the question "On New Measures for the Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Question" and proposed that talks be held between the DPRK, the USA and South Korea.²³

It is a well-known fact that the idea of holding tripartite talks (in which the U.S., South Korea and the DPRK would participate equally) on securing a lasting peace in Korea was initially expressed by Washington way back in 1979. When addressing the South Korean parliament during his visit to Seoul in November 1983 President Reagan sta-

²¹ See *Modern History of Korea*, pp. 832-834.

²² See *Pyongyang Shinhun*, Nov. 12, 1980.

²³ See *Pyongyang Shinhun*, Jan. 15, 1984.

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USSR Report

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

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19 August 1985

USSR REPORT

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

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U.S., USSR POLICIES CONTRASTED ON WW II VICTORY ANNIVERSARY

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[Article by Chief Marshal of Artillery V. F. Tolubko: "The Lessons of History and Our Time"]

The 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War is approaching. In today's complicated international situation we keep on turning to historical records, their glorious pages and lessons.

According to Marxist-Leninist teachings, war is an inherent property of imperialism; it is rooted deep in imperialism's aggressive nature and internal contradictions as corroborated by the march of history itself. Over the 20th century alone the insatiable Moloch of war has taken away dozens of millions of human lives. The last world war was no exception—its was also caused by factors inherent in imperialism.

Seeking to redivide the world and establish its domination over it, German imperialism launched two world wars in the first part of the 20th century and both times they ended in Germany's defeat. Twice the German nation was thrown by its rulers into an abyss of national disaster. The Nazi Germany suffered a staggering defeat in World War II when it treacherously attacked a socialist state—the Soviet Union. The Great Patriotic War was a major integral component of the last world war and the Soviet-German front proved to be decisive in it. It was the central theatre of worldwide military operations. The Soviet people and their armed forces selflessly defended their socialist Fatherland and fulfilled their internationalist mission with flying colours. Fascism was defeated.

What is the message of World War II and why its results and lessons are so instructive?

A major lesson of the last war is that it has forcefully demonstrated that imperialist plans for achieving world supremacy, however strong the aggressor might be, are adventurous and have no leg to stand on. These plans proved abortive even at a time when there were no massive anti-imperialist popular movements. Still more unrealistic they appear in our time when the powerful system of socialism is going from strength to strength and the influence of the people on the march of world history becomes ever more pronounced.

The struggle for a just cause always wins the sympathies of progressive-minded forces throughout the world. The Great Patriotic War was a just war of liberation and the Soviet Union's participation in it aroused the sympathies and gained the support of broad popular masses in other countries. The Hitlerites' plans to isolate the Soviet Union exploded. The Soviet Union was not alone. On the contrary, a powerful anti-fascist coalition formed around it and was led by it. History has shown that any attacks of the aggressive forces of imperialism against the national interests of other countries, their attempts to destroy world civilization and impose their dominance over humanity arouse indignation

and resolute resistance by peace-loving peoples. Postwar developments have proved once again that such attempts are rebuffed with increasing vigour.

Another important lesson of the last world war demonstrates the invincibility of socialism, and its tremendous economic, social, political and spiritual advantages. Before attacking the Soviet Union Nazi Germany invaded several capitalist countries. None of them could withstand the fascists' offensive. They were conquered one after another within a matter of several months, weeks or even days, but the powerful, well armed and experienced fascist army failed to defeat the Soviet Union.

The decisive economic advantages of socialism enabled the Soviet Union to outstrip Hitler Germany in the manufacture of all types of military hardware. At the initial stages of the war our country lost its vital economic areas which accounted for 45 per cent of its population, 47 per cent of the arable land, two-thirds of coal production, more than 50 per cent of steel output, and an overwhelming share of military equipment, arms and munitions production. But using the benefits characteristic of the socialist system and relying on the industrial facilities that had been built in the eastern part of the country during the Five-Year-Plan periods preceding the war, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government succeeded in rapidly retooling the economy to meet wartime requirements. Within six months 1,523 industrial enterprises, mainly in defense, and more than 10 million workers were evacuated to the eastern areas of the country. In fact, a whole industrial power was moved over thousands of miles. Every record was broken in reconstructing the evacuated plants, building new ones and putting them into operation. Truly heroic efforts of working people made it possible to put some of the evacuated plants back into operation after 3-4 weeks and in 3-4 months some of them exceeded prewar production levels. By mid-1942, the economic switch-over to a war footing had been on the whole completed and by 1943, the end of the first period of the war, a smooth-functioning defence-oriented economy was increasingly meeting the needs at the front. In the long run, despite extremely difficult conditions the Soviet Union had, over the course of the war, produced 1.5-2 times more military hardware than Germany and its satellites.

Our agriculture also met the challenges posed by the war. In 1941-1944 the Soviet Union's grain harvest exceeded the level achieved by Russia during World War I more than three-fold.

Soviet military science also proved superior to the notorious "Prussian military school" on the giant battlefields of the last war. The Germans were outgeneralled and outmanoeuvred by the Soviet army. Most operations of the Soviet armed forces, justly recognized as the summit in the art of warfare, were original and daring, well-calculated, planned, and far-sighted; they were distinguished for tactical and strategical mobility and resolution and for flexible and firm control of the troops.

On the other hand, the war proved that the general strategic concepts of the German military leadership were scientifically untenable as they were based on the adventurous policies of the Nazis who had unleashed an unjust, anti-popular, predatory war.

The struggle of the Soviet people against Hitler's Germany was a competition not only in the economic and military fields. It was also a battle between two antagonistic ideologies—the ideology of socialism, the most humanitarian in history, and that of fascism, the most inhuman ideology which is based on nationalism and racial hatred and is the most reactionary and dangerous variety of bourgeois ideology. It reflected German monopolistic capital's ambition for world supremacy.

The imperialist and aggressive ideology of German fascism was counterposed by Marxist-Leninist, socialist ideology which reflects the basic interests of the working class, of all working men, an ideology of equality, friendship of nations, and proletarian internationalism.

In the war years Marxist-Leninist ideology, a powerful spiritual weapon of the Soviet people, triumphed over the misanthropic, savage ideology of fascism. It was the victory of progress over reaction, of humanism over barbarism. It was new striking proof that socialist ideology is the most advanced, progressive and effective of all ideologies. In times of great hardships the ideological staunchness and convictions of the Soviet people were opened up for all to see, as were their patriotism and faith in the triumph of communism. They spared neither energy nor their lives to defend their socialist country and communist ideals, to fulfil their patriotic and internationalist duty to the end. The vast spiritual potential of our people enabled Soviet soldiers to excel the nazis in staunchness and courage. Lenin's prophetic words, "A nation in which the majority of the workers and peasants realise, feel and see that they are fighting for their own Soviet power, for the rule of the working people, for the cause whose victory will ensure them and their children all the benefits of culture, of all that has been created by human labour—such a nation can never be vanquished,"¹ came true.

The next lesson to be learnt from the last world war is that in the era of the transition from capitalism to socialism and communism the imperialists' military ventures on a world scale inevitably backfire against themselves, against the aggressor country, and against the capitalist system as a whole.

World War I resulted in the Russia's withdrawal from the system of capitalism and the formation of the world's first socialist state of workers and peasants. Imperialism's positions had been significantly weakened. World War II added to the general crisis of capitalism: a world socialist system was formed and is now making steady and continuous headway; the colonial system of imperialism collapsed. As a result, the sphere of imperialist domination of the world has been essentially narrowed. Imperialism has bogged down still deeper in internal and international contradictions, paroxysms and conflicts.

A question therefore arises whether those who are to blame for instigating the world wars have learnt their lessons of history and made appropriate conclusions thereof. The postwar developments and the present international situation belie the positive answer.

As before imperialism continues to be the main cause of the escalating danger of war. The only change to take place in the imperialist camp after World War II has been a realignment of forces with US imperialism stepping in to serve as the major stronghold of world reaction. It has inherited the imperial ambitions of the "Third Reich", become an international gendarme and an enemy of peace, freedom, democracy and socialism. "Recent years", pointed out Konstantin Chernenko, in his speech at the Kuybishev electoral district in Moscow on March 2, 1984, "have been marked by much more active policies of the aggressive forces of US imperialism, the policies of outright militarism and claims for world supremacy". Historical experience confirms Lenin's assessment of imperialism, his conclusion that "world domination is, to put it briefly, the substance of imperialist policy, of which imperialist war is the continuation."²

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 319.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 35.

Imperialist wars cause huge, ever increasing material losses. The damage inflicted on the young Soviet Republic by the civil war and the Entente powers' intervention reached approximately 50,000 million gold roubles. In the last war the German fascists burnt down and destroyed 1,710 Soviet cities and townships, over 70,000 villages and hamlets, more than 6 million houses. Over 25 million Soviet people were rendered homeless. The Hitlerites burnt down and demolished about 32,000 industrial enterprises, 4,100 railway stations, 40,000 hospitals and 84,000 schools.

World War I cost humanity (in 1913 comparable prices, including expenditures on post-war rehabilitation) \$280,000 million, whereas World War II ran up to \$3.3 trillion. The military spending of all countries over the period of 1945-1975 comprised (in the same prices) \$5.65 trillion, i. e., one and a half times more than the cost of the two world wars.³

The toll of human lives taken by imperialist wars increases in geometrical progression. As compared to the 18th century, the average annual casualties in the 19th century wars increased by 41 per cent. In the 20th century the figure skyrocketed to 1,070 per cent. Russia lost 8 million people as the result of the civil war and foreign intervention. The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 against fascist Germany took a toll of 20 million of human lives in the Soviet Union.

Contemporary imperialism's aggressive policies mirror a series of new modern trends.

Contemporary US-led imperialism not only increases the danger of a new world war; it adds a new monstrous dimension to its fatal consequences. In the past imperialism threatened mankind with wars and the enslavement of individual countries and regions; today it threatens mankind with a nuclear holocaust and the destruction of human civilization. This is a new sinister quality in the escalation of the danger of war.

The evolution of anti-communism in the capitalist countries has reached the extremes. Modern anti-Sovietism has assumed the form of a "crusade" against communism, against the USSR and other socialist nations. This "crusade" was announced by President Reagan in 1982 and it is not just a slogan, but a real foreign policy programme of action followed by the USA and the NATO countries.

The USA and NATO's new strategic concepts also testify to the increased aggressiveness of the contemporary imperialists' policy. The strategy of "direct confrontation" between the USA and the USSR on global and regional levels in the 1980s has come to replace the strategic concepts of "massive retaliation" (the 1950s), "flexible response" (the 1960s) and "realistic intimidation" (the 1970s). The US strategy of the 1980s is especially aggressive and dangerous for peace because it promotes the acceleration of preparations for the US military machine for "local", global or even star wars. A focal point running through all the above concepts, is a first, pre-emptive nuclear strike against the USSR.

The US Administration has turned down repeated Soviet proposals to follow the example of the Soviet Union which pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. NATO top brass formulated new doctrines based on military use of the latest scientific and technological achievements.

In the late seventies and the early eighties US aggressive circles backed up by their NATO allies came up with an initiative to break the strategic balance and achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union and the socialist community countries. With this in mind, the Reagan Ad-

³ See O. E. Vlasievich, *The Economic Burden of Imperialism*, Moscow, 1980, p. 137 (in Russian).

ministration announced in 1981 that its strategic programme for the 1980s would envisage the development and deployment of new weapons systems based on the latest military scientific and technological achievements. The cost of the programme for 1982-1987 alone is estimated by the White House at \$222,000 million. The programme provides for the production of 100 new "MX" inter-continental missiles by 1986. The US also intends in the near future to commission new atomic submarines of the "Ohio" type equipped with nuclear missiles and to supply its armed forces, as of 1986, with new strategic B-1 bombers carrying cruise missiles. All these are first strike (or the so-called "disarming") weapons.

General-purpose forces are also being streamlined and updated. Simultaneously, work is underway to develop fundamentally new types of weaponry, including space armaments, as well as other means of mass annihilation—chemical, biological and laser beam weapons. Recently, the White House has made public a special Presidential decree which is meant to set up a special commission on problems pertaining to chemical weapons. There is every reason to believe that the activity of that commission will be connected with the further modernisation of US chemical armaments.

To act free in the arms buildup, US and NATO leaders shirk straightforward negotiations on stopping and limiting the arms race. The US Administration has brought to a deadlock talks on these important issues. Their refusal to discuss them in a constructive spirit is explained by an alleged disparity between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, by the military superiority of the Soviet Union over the USA. But this is just an excuse for justifying the arms race and war preparations.

In their efforts to escalate the danger of war US imperialists seek to extend their military presence in various parts of the globe. Today the USA boasts of 2,500 military bases and installations on the territory of 114 countries. Europe alone permanently hosts 0.5 million GIs, 8,000 units of nuclear munition, and 3,000 nuclear delivery systems; over 3,000 units of nuclear munition are deployed in the Far East and Southeast Asia, mostly near the Soviet and other socialist community countries' borders.

In December 1979 the governments of the NATO countries approved a dangerous decision which threw open Europe's doors to new US medium-range missiles. In November 1983 they started to put the decision into effect. Over 100 "Pershings" and cruise missiles aimed at the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are already deployed in Western Europe.⁴

In addition to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans where it has numerous military bases the USA seeks to build up its military presence in the Indian Ocean. The Pentagon is in a hurry to set up a network of military bases in the Middle East declared a zone of US vital interests.

In recent years the USA and its NATO allies have been stepping up massive military exercises involving hundreds of thousands of men and a lot of hardware. Many of these are conducted near the Soviet and other socialist community countries' borders, thus creating a special danger of provoking a military conflict.

The USA puts a lot of pressure on European, Asian and Latin American countries to have them join the anti-Soviet front. It does everything it can to revive Japanese militarism and incorporate it in the NATO military and political machine. The USA bends over backwards to encourage revanchist forces in Japan and to fan the nationalistic sentiment of certain social groups in this country apropos "northern territories".

⁴ See *Pravda*, Dec. 12, 1984.

Of late the White House has been paying special attention to Asia. Under the hackneyed pretext of "Soviet military threat" the Pentagon continues to build up its military muscle in the Far East, the Pacific, and the Indian Oceans, seeking to intimidate the peoples of this region with the "communist menace". An active desire to turn the developments in Asia in favour of US imperialist interests and to convert the continent into another anti-socialist, anti-peace and anti-progress front can easily be traced in the foreign-policy and military activities of the present US Administration. This dangerous approach to the problems of the region is not accidental. President Reagan's adventurous policy is staked on brute force and vain plans to turn back the wheel of history.

Since the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia in 1917 which, as Lenin put it, awakened Asia, the peoples of this continent, today accounting for more than three-fifths of the world population, have scored important successes in their struggle for national and social liberation. The changes here can be seen with the naked eye. The ill-famed colonial system has collapsed. The oppressed nations have won political independence and have defended it from imperialist direct attempts to reimpose slavery. They won the right to choose their own way of life. The peoples of Mongolia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, China and three Indochinese countries have opted for socialism.

The new positive changes throughout Asia were not to the liking of the imperialists. The military circles of the USA, Japan and other Washington-oriented governments and countries in Asia and the Pacific area have built up a military machine spearheaded against the Soviet Union and other progressive forces of the region. According to Western press, the US overseas contingent in the Far East is second to that stationed in Europe, with approximately 0.5 million officers and men. The USA has over 300 military installations here and its 7th fleet, equipped with nuclear weapons, roams the waters of the region.

Examples of brazen US behaviour from positions of strength in various regions, including Asia, are numerous: the dirty war in Vietnam; military aid to Afghan dushmans; seizure of Grenada; deliveries of arms, munitions and military advisers to the military junta in El Salvador; attempts to stifle freedom in Nicaragua through the use of mercenaries; comprehensive military support to Israeli aggressive actions in Lebanon and against Syria; assistance in building up South African military potential; and participation of US and South African mercenaries in armed raids against Angola. All of this has disgraced US imperialism.

The most reactionary US circles resort to more severe policies toward the Soviet Union and other socialist nations, including various economic, political and cultural "sanctions" against Poland and the USSR. Ideological pressure on the Soviet Union and other countries of socialist community has been stepped up. The imperialists have launched a large-scale "psychological war" which is another dangerous variety of aggression infringing on the sovereignty of these countries.

The aim of the "psychological war" is to demoralise the socialist society from within. Intensive work is underway in all countries to brainwash public opinion, camouflage the aggressive nature of the imperialist powers' policies and give a secret, evil twist to the peaceful policies of the socialist countries. Imperialist propaganda seeks to instill the population in Western countries with fear of communism, get people accustomed to the idea of an inevitable war with the socialist countries and make them willingly accept any aggressive foreign policy venture. The ideological expansion of imperialism is an expression of its aggressive strategy stemming from the deepening general crisis of capitalism.

The situation warrants that every effort be mobilized against the reactionary imperialist forces for peace and security of nations; that the defence capability of all socialist countries be enhanced, as well as the combat preparedness of their armed forces as a decisive factor in curbing the aggressor.

The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee on the 40th anniversary of V-Day points out that "It is necessary to fight against a war before it has started. Historical experience carries the following message: concerted, coordinated and vigorous actions of all peace-loving forces against the aggressive ventures of imperialism are needed to uphold peace. It is necessary to enhance the vigilance of the peoples, to protect and multiply the gains of socialism".

Like all nations of the socialist community the Soviet Union has a concrete programme of action—the Peace Programme. The CPSU and the Soviet government steadfastly carry out the mandate of their people; they do everything in their power to justify the hopes of mankind for a lasting peace, for a peaceful sky over the earth. The Soviet Union has never been seeking military supremacy. It wants our planet to be free of nuclear weapons and is prepared to limit or ban any kinds of armaments on the basis of a mutual agreement. The peace initiatives and proposals which the Soviet Union has put forward encompass a wide range of political and military measures to this effect.

The problem of war and peace, of preserving peace and preventing a nuclear catastrophe has become central in our time. Along with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries waging a consistent and resolute struggle against the nuclear war, the international working class and its vanguard—the communist parties, as well as the national liberation movements have offered strong resistance to the warmongers. The anti-war movement has been joined by many peace-loving nonaligned nations of Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. A vigorous anti-war campaign is being led by the World Peace Movement which embraces the broadest sections of population all over the globe.

Lenin once said: "We promise the workers and peasants to do everything for peace. And this we shall do". Ever since the Soviet state emerged our Party has been sparing no effort to fulfil this promise. International practices irrefutably prove that the world socialist system has been producing decisive effects on historical developments. Every day brings fresh evidence that the socialist community countries act as generators of international peace initiatives. "As for the CPSU and the Soviet State", emphasised Konstantin Chernenko in his speech in the Kremlin on November 7, 1984, "We together with the fraternal parties and in unity with the countries of the socialist community did and will do all in our power to improve the political climate on our planet and to avert the military threat hanging over mankind".

Indeed, the Soviet Union has come out with concrete initiatives with regard to every problem, every field of importance related to present-day international security which reflect its real aspiration and work for peace. Soviet proposals are aimed, in the first place, against the use and for the ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons. It is obvious that the relations between all nuclear states ought to be based on certain rules. Taking into consideration the disastrous implications of any nuclear conflict the most important of these rules is that these states should regard the prevention of a nuclear war as the major goal of their foreign policy. It is also expedient that propaganda of a nuclear war—both global and "limited"—be abolished and states, following the example of the Soviet Union, undertake not to use nuclear weapons first. Other obligations of a similar nature ensue from the rules suggested by the Soviet Union.

Supported by the entire world community, the Soviet Union stands up against the militarisation of outer space, for its exclusively peaceful uses. This is a most urgent task because if we do not block the nuclear weapons from being deployed in outer space today it will be too late to do it tomorrow.

In defiance of world public opinion, Washington is going ahead with its plans of developing nuclear systems for star wars and whipping up the arms race as a whole through employing new, up-dated types of submarines, bombers and missiles. The US Administration claims that it seeks to negotiate disarmament with the Soviet Union, but these negotiations, according to Washington, can only be effective provided the USA is stronger than the USSR. The desire to achieve military superiority and honest businesslike negotiations on problems related to the sides' national security are incompatible, pointed out Konstantin Chernenko in a message to American readers in his book *Soviet-US Relations: Articles and Speeches* recently published in the USA. He stated that attempts to achieve military superiority are groundless, dangerous and cannot but complicate our relations. And, on the contrary, when both sides were willing to adhere to principles of equality and equal security and reached mutually acceptable agreements thereupon, including those on arms limitation, relations between the two countries also changed for the better.

It is as clear as day that despite the ideological and social differences between the Soviet Union and the USA there is no other reasonable alternative but to live and coexist peacefully on the same planet.

This is also true of other countries. Hence, a collective proposal of the socialist countries to conclude a Treaty on the Non-Use of Military Force between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the NATO Member-Countries, the logical reaction of the peaceful Leninist policies to the groundless imperialist rhetoric about the alleged threat of Soviet attack.

In our troubled times, people pin their hopes on the Soviet Union, a loyal and devoted advocate of peace, arms limitation and reduction, because it is always ready and willing to conduct substantial and sincere negotiations to achieve agreements that would not infringe on anybody's interests and would be conducive to a better political climate in the world.

Aspirations of the people of good will are in harmony with the foreign policies of the Soviet Union and other socialist community countries. True to the principles of the Leninist peaceful foreign policy, the Soviet Union has never claimed a special role in any region, including Asia. In recent years it has made a series of new constructive political and military proposals, many of them bearing directly on various parts of the Asian region from the Middle to the Far East. They include, for example, the well-known initiative of the 26th CPSU Congress to start negotiations between parties concerned on confidence building measures in the Far East to prevent new armed conflicts.

The countries of this region welcomed the March 1982 declaration of the Soviet Union to the effect that it was prepared to negotiate a mutually-agreed limiting of operations of the confronting blocs' navies. Specifically, it was proposed to limit the patrolling areas of missile-carrying submarines. The Prague meeting (early 1983) of the Warsaw Treaty countries' Political Consultative Committee proposed to conclude a treaty on the non-use of force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO member-states, and also to refuse from extending the sphere of influence of both blocs to other regions of the world, including Asia.

Having made public its desire to achieve security in Asia through collective efforts of the countries of the region, the Soviet Union appro-

ves other countries' constructive initiatives aimed at improving the situation in this region. Among them, specifically, is the proposal of the Mongolian People's Republic to draft and sign a convention on non-aggression and non-use of force among the countries of Asian and the Pacific area, the initiatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea designed to ease tension in Korea and the Far East, and the constructive proposals of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea welcomed the world over to turn Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability. Many useful ideas have been suggested by the nonaligned nations as well.

In short, these are all prerequisites to start an active, conscientious search to improve the situation in Asia without wasting time. The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community are ready to display good will. Now it's the other side's turn.

The Communist Party and the Government of the Soviet Union are consistently upholding the principles of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and seeking the negotiated settlement of all international disputes. War cannot and must not be used as a means to settle international disputes. This peaceful Leninist policy of the Soviet leadership was expressly reaffirmed by the 26th CPSU Congress and the subsequent plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. As a great socialist power, the Soviet Union is fully aware of its responsibility for the maintenance and strengthening of peace. It is ready for peaceful, mutually profitable cooperation with all countries of the world.

But the Soviet people have learnt from their own experience how adventurous imperialism is: they know all too well that to defend peace and socialist gains and to check imperialist aggressors they must be strong and increasingly improve their armed forces which vigilantly guard common interests together with the armies of the fraternal Warsaw Treaty member countries.

Against the background of aggressive imperialist plans and the aggravated situation, the Soviet Union and other socialist nations have to maintain their defence capability at a necessary level and combine their peace-loving policies with enhanced readiness to repulse any aggression. This obliges us to devote most serious attention to strengthening the country's defenses.

The dialectics of history show that only that military force acts in favour of peace which is directed against the aggressive aspirations of imperialism. The harmonious unity of justice and force embodied in the army of a socialist type meets the humanitarian ideals of our time. In a class society the army was used exclusively as a tool of war; under socialism, the army, for the first time ever, has become a tool for preventing war, a powerful means of checking aggressive plans and saving peace on earth.

The strength of the Soviet Armed Forces lies in their indissoluble unity with the Soviet people. Such unbreakable unity of interests and aims, will and action as the Soviet Union maintains in relationships between classes, social groups, nationalities and races, and monolithic unity such as underlies the relationship between the Soviet Armed Forces and the Soviet people is unprecedented in history. There is no doubt that in the context of the arms race unleashed by imperialists our Armed Forces will be supplied with everything they need to safely withstand the attempts of the Imperialist forces at achieving military superiority.

The forthcoming 40th anniversary of V-Day will be celebrated in many countries of the world. Summing up in connection with this memorable date their achievements in the past four decades the peoples of Europe can point to the main result—they have succeeded in saving and strengthening peace in a difficult struggle. Over this period they have learnt not only to co-exist, but also to cooperate for the benefit of their countries, and this is regarded as the most valuable achievement of the postwar period.

This is why the peoples are so alarmed by the continuing international tension. The ongoing deployment of US medium-range nuclear missiles in some West European NATO countries and the revanchists' attempts to revise the postwar borders in Europe not only worsen the political situation; they involve Europe in a new, especially dangerous round of the arms race.

The Soviet Union acts on the assumption that it is still possible to bring about a turn for the better in the international situation. It has proposed a large number of measures to protect peace and save the planet from a nuclear catastrophe. They were discussed during Konstantin Chernenko's recent talks with Austrian Federal Chancellor F. Sinowatz, British Labour leader Neil Kinnock and in his interviews with the *Washington Post*, NBC and CNN.

The Soviet Union stands for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons all over the world; at the same time it is ready to accept half-way measures leading to this objective, such as the reduction of nuclear armaments, the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world and other similar steps. As for Europe, the Soviet Union would like to see it completely free of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons, this being attained of course, on the basis of the observance of the principles of equality and equal security for the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries.

The Soviet Union's position on disarmament and other problems related to the maintenance of peace in Europe is fully supported by the USSR's allies and friends as confirmed by the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' Committee which met in Berlin on December 3-4, 1984 for its regular session to discuss the situation in Europe against the background of the general international situation. In reviewing the results of this meeting the CPSU Politburo emphasized that they once again pointed to the energetic efforts of the allied socialist nations to remove the threat of a nuclear war and to find, by way of negotiations, solutions for stopping the arms race and reducing armaments, and for a return to detente, cooperation and peaceful coexistence in international relations.

The Foreign Ministers' meeting in Berlin deemed it most urgent that the following specific and effective measures be adopted to overcome the nuclear confrontation: to freeze nuclear armaments both qualitatively and quantitatively; to sign a treaty completely and universally banning nuclear weapons tests; and to undertake not to use these weapons first by all nuclear states which have not as yet done so.

The Warsaw Pact countries, the Berlin meeting pointed out, attach great significance to the Soviet-American agreement to start negotiations on the whole set of problems relating to the non-militarisation of outer space and the reduction of strategic and medium-range nuclear armaments. Urging the USA to hold such talks the Soviet Union proceeded from the special responsibility which rested with the two most powerful nuclear nations for the maintenance of world peace. The Soviet Union, replied Konstantin Chernenko to the message of the 4th Congress "International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War" is prepared for the most radical solutions that would make for an advance towards

the end of the arms race, the banning and, ultimately, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Is the USA prepared to act similarly? During his election campaign, President Reagan spoke more than once of his serious intentions to reach mutually acceptable agreements with the Soviet Union. Now, having been re-elected for another four-year term, he has every opportunity to back up his assurances with concrete deeds. We will not have to wait long to see how earnest the new US Administration's intentions are.

The Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War proved the viability and the invincibility of the world's first socialist state. It heralded the triumph of the new social and state system born of the October Revolution, the socialist economy, Marxist-Leninist ideology, the moral and political unity of Soviet society, and the unbreakable friendship of Soviet peoples. The main architect of this victory was the Soviet people whose heroism was unprecedented in history.

The army and the navy were conspicuously gallant and intrepid during the war. Soviet military strategy and tactics proved to be superior. Soviet officers and political workers educated by the Communist Party demonstrated exceptional skills in planning and conducting the military operations against the enemy in the West and the East.

The contribution made by Soviet workers, collective farmers and intelligentsia to the victory cannot be overestimated. Their selfless labour combined with the exploits of the military to make the victory. The front and the rear were one while the war raged on.

Our victories in the Great Patriotic War were inspired and organised by the Leninist Communist Party, the leading and directing force of Soviet society. The Party had demonstrated its strength and staunchness in following the great ideals of communism. It formulated a clear-cut programme of defeating the fascist invaders and militarists, rallied the peoples of the Soviet Union and led the struggle against the enemy to the victorious end. The heroism of our people in the last war was and still is highly appreciated and admired in the Soviet Union and by all of progressive mankind. The victory of the Soviet people and its armed forces in the Great Patriotic War is of great international significance. It opened the way to freedom, independence, socialism and progress to many countries. It has been and continues to produce a great effect on the international situation all over the world creating favourable conditions for the rising national liberation movement and for the struggle against the reactionary and aggressive forces, revanchists and neo-fascists. Neither the passage of time, nor bourgeois falsifications can erase from the peoples' memory the decisive role the Soviet Union played in the defeat of Hitler Germany and militaristic Japan.

An important contribution to the common victory over the enemy was made by the peoples and armies of the anti-Hitler coalition. It has been proved in practice that countries with different social systems can effectively cooperate politically and militarily.

It must be pointed out that the imperialist forces seek in every possible way to falsify the records of World War II, ignoring historical lessons. The key events of the last war and the role of the Soviet Union in defeating the German fascist armies are viciously distorted. For example, an American military historian W. Kerr tries to prove that the Eastern Front was not at all decisive and that the battle of Stalingrad was not so important for the outcome of the war.⁵

⁵ W. Kerr, *The Secret of Stalingrad*, New York, 1961, p. 239.

Immediately after the victory of the Soviet Union in the Far East, almost all the Western political and military leaders, especially, those in the USA and Great Britain, openly admitted the decisive contribution of the Soviet armed forces to Japan's defeat. At that time the world press was full of articles and comments extolling Soviet operations in the Far East. Harry Truman and C. Atlee had many nice words to say about the Soviet Union in their messages. General D. MacArthur and Admiral Ch. Nimitz who were in charge of US military operations in the Pacific announced in those days that the Soviet entry into the war against Japan sped up its defeat.⁶ General C. Chennault's (commander of US Air Force in China) comment in an interview to a *New York Times* correspondent is also noteworthy. He said that the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan had been a decisive factor in the quick termination of the war in the Pacific which would have been the case anyway even if the A-bombs had not been dropped. The fast blow delivered by the Red Army against Japan completed the encirclement and put Japan on its knees.

Later, especially in the years of the cold war things began to be reassessed. Imperialist ideologues sought to deny the decisive role of the Soviet Union in the war, to belittle its huge contribution to the defeat of the fascist Axis and to ascribe all these accomplishments to the USA, picturing it as the main contributor to the victory. Positive assessments of the Soviet Union's role in the war by Roosevelt, Marshal and some American wartime historians (D. Vernadski, F. Dulles, etc.) disappeared from the pages of the bourgeois press. The true facts concerning the decisive role of the USSR in World War II were either suppressed or denied. For instance, American historian G. Smith claims peremptorily that Roosevelt and his advisers "have over-estimated Russia and its contribution to the war", that the armed struggle was "led" by the USA which "drove Hitler from the West..., defeated Japan in the Pacific... armed the UK, Russia and China... and set up the great coalition."⁷ It is obvious that these propositions are just impudent lies.

It is appropriate in this context to remind those Westerners who today believe in abovesaid lies, of words by E. Stettinius, then US Secretary of State. He said that the Americans should not forget that in 1942 they were on the brink of a catastrophe. Had the Soviet Union failed to hold its front the Germans would have had an opportunity to capture Great Britain. They would have also been able to conquer Africa and then to establish a bridgehead in Latin America. President Roosevelt was always aware of this impending threat⁸. I can only add to this that the Japanese military, in the person of Admiral Yamamoto who was then in command of the united Japanese Navy, happily visualized the marines' successful landing on the US coast and the signing of an act of surrender in Washington. Contemporary Western historians either conceal such facts and declarations from the public or distort them.

Falsifying reality, Western statesmen and reactionary historians claim that there was no need to ask the Soviet Union to enter into war in the Far East. They argue that it neither affected the progress of the war in the Far East nor accelerated the end of World War II because the Soviet Union's military presence in the Far East was very shortlived. But this reasoning is absurd and does not go in line with historical truth.

First of all, in the summer of 1945 US intelligence experts themselves arrived at the conclusion that neither a blockade, nor shelling alone

⁶ See *Pravda*, Aug. 10, 1945

⁷ *Big Lies About the War*, Moscow, 1971, p. 94 (in Russian)

⁸ E. Stettinius, *Roosevelt and Russians* L., 1950 p. 16

could ensure the unconditional surrender of Japan and that Soviet interference was desirable, if not necessary, for the success of the invasion strategy.⁹ Soviet combat operations in the Far East undertaken to defeat the Kwantung Army lasted actually almost a month and not six days as reported by prejudiced Western sources.¹⁰

Biased assertions designed to belittle the Soviet contribution to the defeat of the Japanese army were also used in the draft peace treaty with Japan drawn up by the US State Department in 1951. Specifically, it said that the Soviet Union had been at war with Japan "only 6 days". True, it did not take long to smash the Kwantung army, but, as mentioned above, the actual stubborn fighting (causing many casualties) went on for about a month because the Kwantung army offered resistance for a long time, despite the Emperor's declaration of surrender.¹¹

Western press continues to maintain frequently that the outcome of the war with Japan was decided by the A-bombs which the USA dropped on Japan. For instance, the compilers of the American *Encyclopedia of Military History* assert that it was the two A-bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (a justified action in their view) that made Japan accept unconditional surrender.¹² This action has gone down in history as an atrocious infamy of US imperialism which used atomic weapons against the civilians of thickly populated Japanese cities.

It is absolutely clear that the atomic bombardment was not a military necessity. It had far-reaching political goals meant for the postwar period. In fact, this was an atomic blackmail of the Soviet Union, the first "hot point" of the notorious cold war against the USSR. Later, Winston Churchill admitted that "it would have been a mistake to assume that Japan's lot was decided by an atomic bomb." Admiral Legui, chief military adviser of the US President wrote, that the use of this barbarous weapon in Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided no substantial aid to the US war effort against Japan.¹³ Japan accepted unconditional surrender only after the Soviet armed forces had dealt quick smashing blows to the Kwantung army, the Japanese militarists' backbone.

The victory of the Soviet armed forces in the Far East was a blow not only against Japanese militarism, but also against all international reactionary forces. Its historical role in strengthening the positions of the democratic forces throughout the world and specifically, in the liberated countries of East and Southeast Asia cannot be underestimated. From the outset of the Manchurian operation and, even more so, upon its successful termination very favourable conditions were created for a vigorous growth of the national liberation movement in China, Korea and Southeast Asian countries.

There are still sufficiently influential people in the West who are psychologically prepared for any crazy venture. It is they who artificially breed hatred for the Soviet people and want to get the world accustomed to the prospect of star wars.

Hopefully, this year of the 40th anniversary of Victory over fascism, memorable for all progressives in the world, will see an optimistic turn of events. A good omen is the visit to Great Britain of a Soviet delegation led by Mikhail Gorbachev, Member of the Political Bureau, CC CPSU, Secretary of the CC CPSU, and Chairman of the Soviet of the

⁹ *Foreign Affairs*, Jan. 1957, p. 342.

¹⁰ See *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945. A Short Course of History*, Moscow, 1970, p. 553.

¹¹ *Pravda*, June 11, 1951.

¹² R. E. Dupuy and T. N. Dupuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3000 B. C. to the Present*, New York, 1970.

¹³ *History of the CPSU*, Vol. 5, book 1, Moscow, 1970, p. 627.

Union Foreign Relations Committee under the USSR Supreme Soviet. Opinions now being voiced in UK in favour of mutually beneficial cooperation inspire hopes for a better international situation. The recent conference on a nuclear-free Europe in Athens where peace supporters from Europe, the USA and Canada had a fruitful exchange of views also adds to these hopes. The Soviet peace champions made a remarkable contribution to the discussion of international issues at this conference.

A meeting between Member of the Politburo CC CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Andrei Gromyko and US Secretary of State George Shultz, held on January 7-8, 1985 in Geneva according to the previously reached agreement was a step toward solving the task of eliminating the threat of war which can destroy mankind. During the meeting the sides discussed the subject and goals of the forthcoming Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space armaments. The USSR and USA agreed to begin negotiations on March 12, 1985.

People of good will are full of hope that the year 1985, a year of the 40th anniversary of the V-Day, will revive the spirit of detente and international cooperation, that it will be a year of solidarity of working people, of reason prevailing over the madness of the policy of nuclear and space wars.

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THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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[Article by A. N. Zhelokhovtsev]

Over forty years have elapsed since imperialism unleashed the Second World War, but people do not forget these dramatic events in the history of mankind. Interest in the history of the Second World War has grown in recent years as the aggressive imperialist policy conducted by the US on the world scene has put the whole world under the threat of nuclear war: this explains the desire to turn to the past in search of historical lessons and bitter experience, for in those years imperialism, embodied by its most aggressive forces—nazi Germany, militarist Japan and fascist Italy—found itself strong enough to impose a war unprecedented in its destructiveness upon the peoples of the world.

A great deal has been done in the USSR to shed objective light on the history of the Second World War and its causes. Work on these problems is based first of all on the study of historical documents, both Soviet and foreign, including captured archival materials. This work began right after VE-Day and is still being carried on. Soviet scholars have published copious literature on the subject.¹

Relying on a wealth of documentary material, Soviet historians have collectively written fundamental works on the Second World War.²

Ever since they began their research, Soviet scholars have attached a great deal of importance to criticism of falsifications of the history of the Second World War, presented by bourgeois historiography. In its time the publication of the book *Falsifiers of History* (Moscow, 1948) was of great political significance in this respect. The sharp polemical battles waged with bourgeois historians by Soviet scholars in creative cooperation with scholars from other socialist countries and representatives of progressive schools in capitalist countries have an important place in a special collection of articles published by the Institute of World History.³

The history of the Second World War is being studied in other countries too. Important archival documents have been published by governmental agencies in Britain, the United States, and West Germany. There have appeared monographs on the subject by bourgeois historians. A history of the war in the Pacific has been written in Japan.

It comes as no surprise that historians in the PRC, having resumed their research after a decade of the "cultural revolution" (1966-1976), with its pernicious effect on science, have turned their attention to the events of the Second World War. The subjects they have chosen for their

¹ See *Documents and Materials of the Eve of the Second World War*, Moscow, 1948; *The USSR in the Struggle for Peace on the Eve of the Second World War*, Moscow, 1971; *Documents of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Vol. 16, Moscow, 1970; Vol. 17, 1977; *Documents on the History of the Munich Deal, 1937-1939*, Moscow, 1979; *Documents and Materials of the Eve of the Second World War, 1937-1939*. In two volumes, Moscow, 1981. (All the above in Russian).

² See *A History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945*. In six volumes, Moscow, 1959-1965; *A History of Soviet Diplomacy*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1965; Vol. 4, 1975; *A History of the USSR Foreign Policy, 1917-1980*. In two volumes, Moscow, 1980; *A History of the Second World War, 1939-1945*. In 12 volumes, Moscow, 1973-1981; *The Second World War. A Concise History*, Moscow, 1984 (All in Russian).

³ *The Causes of the Second World War*, Moscow, 1982 (in Russian).

research and the directions they are taking in it, reflect specific interest of Chinese society in regard its recent past, as well as in the PRC's present-day international standing. The interest, the Chinese academic community is displaying in the problems of the Second World War, is quite understandable if only because China was one of the first countries engulfed by the World War, a country on whose territory military operations took place. The Chinese people have experienced the hardships and horrors of war in full measure.

There is no denying that China was a victim of imperialist aggression in the Second World War. In spite of the equivocal position taken by the reactionary Guomindang government which at first pursued a policy of non-resistance and then began to display capitulationist hesitations and waged the war rather passively, Chinese resistance to the aggressor nevertheless made a definite contribution to the common victory over fascism and Japanese militarism.

Unlike other countries, the PRC has not yet published a fundamental work on the history of the Second World War. However, the interests of Chinese policy demand that these questions be worked out. Therefore it is no surprise that a special academic society for the study of the Second World War has been set up in the PRC. This society holds regular thematic conferences and is planning to bring out a large volume of collected essays on the history of the Second World War. In the years since 1980 members of the society have published seven books on this subject.

Judging by the publications which have appeared, including the scholarly works, Chinese historians have not yet reached a consensus on many important questions, and an agreement is being worked out through polemical exchanges. In the PRC attention is primarily focused on the role of the Chinese front in the Second World War, and other related questions including how the war began.

The themes of the Second World War history have been under close scrutiny by the Chinese academic public since 1978 when the June 5th issue of the newspaper *Guangming ribao* published an article by historians Wang Zhende and Hou Chengde entitled "On the Beginning of the Second World War".

The Chinese authors hold that studies of World War II usually have a Eurocentrist bias and they put forward their own thesis: "The Second World War began on July 7, 1937, with the invasion of China proper by Japanese imperialism". To support this thesis the authors offer the following arguments: 1) unlike other early hotbeds of war, the Chinese front remained in existence until the very end of World War II in 1945; 2) from the very beginning this front was an integral element of the world war and not just of China's war with Japan; 3) throughout the Second World War there was a close strategic connection between the Chinese front and other fronts. "In March 1939," say the authors of the newspaper article, "Stalin pointed out that the Second Imperialist World War had already begun and said: 'Japan's war with China is in its second year now' (*Problems of Leninism*, p. 659)." However, this reference is cited inaccurately. On March 10, 1939, in his report at the 18th Party Congress, Joseph Stalin said that "the new imperialist war has already entered its second year", and even called it "a second imperialist war", but he did not consider it a world war then. It is clearly stated in the report. "A characteristic feature of the new imperialist war is that it has not yet become a general, world war".⁴

The argument advanced by these historians that the Chinese front existed from July 7, 1937 until the end of the Second World War in 1945

⁴ *The 18th Congress of the CPSU(B)*, Shorthand record, Moscow, 1939, pp. 9, 10, 12 (in Russian).

is historically correct, but their assessment of it as a front in World War II is not justified because it is subjected to changes due to external factors, and this is not taken by Chinese historians into account. In the end the Chinese front did become a front in the Second World War, not the main front, of course, but one of the important ones. However, it did not acquire this significance when it first came into being. The thesis that from the outset the war was not just a war between China and Japan is both arguable and vulnerable. Here the question to be considered first of all is the role and place of the USSR in the course of the Japanese-Chinese war.

It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union rendered assistance in a wide range of forms to the people and government of China in that war. For a long time, practically until the summer of 1941, Soviet aid was the most substantial and actually the only foreign aid that China received in its struggle against the superior might of Japan's war machine.⁵ Soviet volunteer pilots took a direct part in military operations on the Japan-China front.⁶ At that time (1938) military conflicts flared up between the USSR and Japan on the Soviet border in the area of Lake Khasan and in 1939 Japanese militarism suffered a defeat on the Mongolian border along the Nalun-gol River. These military events helped lower the level of activity by Japanese land forces on the Chinese front.

The reference by Chinese historians to Stalin's 1939 pronouncement with respect to the Second World War, which ended in 1945, seems somewhat misapplied because in 1939 it was simply impossible to make a definitive judgement on the war as a whole. Here they are apparently pursuing the aim of using any argument to exaggerate the role of the Chinese front in the Second World War. The legitimate and understandable wish of the Chinese scholars to determine their country's place in world history, and in the history of the Second World War in particular, has in this case led them away from solid historical ground. A revision was begun of the generally recognised date that marks the beginning of the Second World War.

The aforementioned article in *Guangming ribao* aimed to refute the accepted date of September 1, 1939 as the beginning of the Second World War. The authors categorically reject and present arguments to call in question the following points: 1) prior to Hitler's invasion of Poland the chief powers—Britain, France and the US did not participate in the war and therefore it was not "global"; 2) it was the declaration of war by Britain and France on Germany that marked the "official beginning" of the Second World War; 3) up until Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, it was an "imperialist war".

In the opinion of Wang Zhende and Hou Chengde the present, generally accepted interpretation of the Second World War, "serves the interests of the two superpowers", and they support their argument by pointing out that in both the USSR and the US historians recognise September 1, 1939 as the beginning of the Second World War.

The bombastic criticism by the Chinese historians of the fact that Soviet and US historians recognise one date as that which marks the beginning of the Second World War, springs from openly political motives. Moreover, their argumentation is rather shaky. For example, among the chief powers, without which the war cannot, apparently, be called "world", they include the US, although the US entered the war not in 1939 but on December 7, 1941, and American scholars call it a world war even before the US became directly involved. In addition, the demand by the Chinese

⁵ See *The USSR's Leninist Policy Towards China*, Moscow, 1968, pp. 95-120 (in Russian).

⁶ See *In the Sky of China, 1937-1940. Reminiscences by Soviet Volunteer Pilots*, Moscow, 1960 (in Russian).

historians that the Second World War be viewed as a war of liberation from the very beginning simplifies the complex nature of the Second World War's first stage.

In his last work the Soviet Academician Ye. Zhukov wrote: "The Second World War began within the framework of the capitalist system. The war in its initial phase had an unjust imperialist character not only with regard to the aggressive fascist bloc, but also in the case of the Anglo-French coalition. But to view the Second World War in that phase as imperialist on both sides is to ignore the fact that from the very beginning the resistance of the popular masses in those countries subjected to fascist aggression was liberational in nature. The fact must be taken into account that the states belonging to the aggressive fascist bloc unleashed war with the aim of conquering the whole world and establishing the predatory 'new order,' thus posing the utmost danger. Therefore for the peoples of Poland, Yugoslavia and a number of other states that were victims of fascist aggression, the war was by its nature a just struggle for freedom and national independence from the very beginning."⁷

The article in *Guangming ribao* was directed against the two superpowers merely in form; in content it only criticised the concept of Soviet historians. In the same year, 1978, the Soviet press refuted the main points of that article.⁸

The arguments put forward in *Guangming ribao* on June 5, 1978 have not become generally accepted in China either. Noteworthy in this respect is the article "The Second World War" which appears in the Chinese encyclopedic dictionary *Cihai*, an official reference work in the PRC. The article retains the views that were passionately criticised by the Chinese historians in 1978 in the daily press. In particular, the dictionary says, "The world war, unprecedented in its scale, was unleashed by the fascist states of Germany, Italy and Japan... Japan, after seizing the northeastern part of our country in 1931, began an aggressive war against China in 1937... The aggressive actions of the fascist states met the resistance of the Chinese people and the peoples of other countries subjected to aggression and suppression, and aggravated contradictions among the imperialist powers. On September 1, 1939, the German army invaded Poland, on September 3 Britain and France declared war on Germany and the world war commenced".⁹

Cihai calls the seizure of northeastern China by Japan the fascist states' first aggressive act but not the beginning of the Second World War. What is more, it states that the war unleashed by Japan against China in 1937 was not a world war either; it was Japanese aggression against China. Finally, the beginning of the Second World War is directly linked with the aggravation of contradictions among imperialist powers. All of this is completely at odds with the views presented by Wang Zhende and Hou Chengde.

It is particularly odious that the date September 3, 1939 is given in the encyclopedia as the beginning of the Second World War. Although, it is only two days off the generally accepted date, this difference is of considerable significance because it has some bearing on the assessment of Germany's role in unleashing the war.

⁷ Ye. M. Zhukov, "The Origin of the Second World War". In *The Causes of the Second World War*, Moscow, 1982, p. 13.

⁸ See M. Podklyuchnikov, "Falsifiers", *Pravda*, July 8, 1978; M. Yakovlev, "Falsifiers from Peking", *Pravda*, July 16, 1978; V. Borisov, "A Futile Attempt: Peking Falsifies the History of the Second World War", *Izvestia*, July 19, 1978; P. Zhilin, "One More Venture into History: How Peking Has Falsified Generally Known Facts", *Pravda*, August 8, 1978; B. Sapozhnikov, "Peking Falsifiers of History", *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Aug. 4, 1978.

⁹ *Cihai*, Shanghai, 1980, pp. 18, 81.

In a formal way, Germany's attack on Poland was not the beginning of the world war but a local act of aggression. Military operations actually became worldwide in scope after the involvement of the European colonial powers—Britain and France—which Hitler did not attack on September 1, 1939 and even hoped to come to terms with them, as evidenced by the very fact of the "strange war" on the Western front in late 1939 and early 1940. Thus the official declaration of the Second World War occurred on September 3, but, as has been repeatedly and convincingly shown in historical literature, it is unacceptable to ignore the substance of the matter, i. e., the responsibility Nazi Germany bears for unleashing the Second World War. By attacking Poland, Hitler wanted war, foresaw that it could turn into a world war and consciously took that risk. Formalism must have no place in such matters, particularly in such a respectable encyclopedic dictionary as *Cihai*.

Chinese historiography traditionally looks for historical parallels, that can be useful to China's policies. These parallels are sought out not only in Chinese history, but in geographically distant regions as well. It can be recalled that Sun Yatsen, working for China's national reunification, was interested in Bismarck's reunification of Germany and his policy towards German social democracy at that time. Mao Zedong in Yanan during the war was greatly interested in the events in... Greece. He viewed the suppression of the Greek democratic national liberation movement by British troops... as a dangerous example of what could happen in China after the war with Japan ended.¹⁰ Such a "parallelism" has been extended in China in recent years to some events in the Second World War. This subject is used not only for academic but for political purposes either. For example, the message of the article by Cheng Renqiang entitled "The German-Polish War of 1939: an Example of Sudden Attack by Imperialism"¹¹ is that an aggressive imperialist state, seeking expansion and the solution of domestic problems at the expense of foreign policy, can, like Nazi Germany, perpetrate a sudden act of aggression against a neighbouring state. Is this not a hint that a similar threat is posed to the PRC?

Further use of the subject of the Second World War for present-day political needs is made in Bao Yicheng's article "A Discourse on the Causes of the Second World War. What Kind of Imperialism Is the Most Dangerous Source of War".¹²

The purpose of Bao Yicheng's article is to justify China's rapprochement with imperialist countries by arguments from "historical experience". The article is crammed with statistical material and appears to be an example of serious scholarly research, but its conclusions clearly serve the needs of present-day Chinese politics. The author tries to prove that there are two kinds of imperialism: "belligerent" and "nonbelligerent", thereby consciously attempting to revise Lenin's definition of imperialism. "The experience of the First and Second World Wars proves," writes Bao Yicheng, "that although all imperialist states are predatory by nature and any kind of imperialism dislikes peace, the most dangerous is the kind which is relatively weak in terms of its finances and economy, the kind that has saved little or has lost its savings".¹³ Later the Chinese historian elaborates, "The history of the Second World War shows that imperialism which has originated relatively recently is the most dangerous hot-

¹⁰ P. P. Vladimirov, *Special Region of China 1942-1945*, Moscow, 1973, p. 401 (in Russian).

¹¹ *Lishi yanjiu*, No. 2, 1978.

¹² *Ibid.*, No. 4, 1980.

¹³ *Ibid.*, No. 4, p. 171.

bed of war¹⁴... The war was rooted in the crisis of the Axis powers, not in the world economic crisis".¹⁵

The reasons for the Second World War are defined by the author quite precisely: "The struggle for Europe and world domination". And on this basis he formulates the conclusion required by Peking's present-day political course of rapprochement with imperialist countries. "It would clearly be wrong to say that all imperialist powers are always ready to launch a world war; in fact it is only those who are out to get Europe and world domination that pose a threat".¹⁶ Thus a historical criterion for dividing imperialist powers into "bad" and "good", was "discovered": the "bad" ones are always ready to start a world war, while "good" ones are not. In this way Bao Yicheng's article presents historical facts in accordance with the demands of pro-imperialist policy and gives it a kind of "substantiation", which radically differs from Lenin's teaching on the nature of imperialism.

Historical studies, like Bao Yicheng's article, have been used in the Chinese press to promote major political and propaganda actions, including openly anti-Soviet in nature. Such is the article which appeared in the September 1, 1979 issue of *Renmin ribao* on the 40th anniversary of the beginning of the Second World War. *Pravda* answered this article by saying, "Peking's propaganda has ascribed aggressive plans to a country that sacrificed 20 million lives to defeat fascism. An attempt has been made to present the Soviet Union as a virtual accomplice in unleashing this war, to put part of the blame for this world conflict on the USSR."¹⁷

It can be surmised that it is the political significance of this theme that brought about the creation of the Chinese society for the study of the Second World War in 1980.¹⁸ The society was set up after the Second Symposium on the History of the Second World War which took place in Kunming in June 1980. The main subject under discussion was "The Beginning and Place of the War of Resistance to Japan in the History of the World Anti-Fascist War".¹⁹ Discussion revealed several different points of view.

According to the first point of view, shared by the majority of participants in the symposium, the Second World War began in 1939. Those in favour of this date note the change in political situation in Europe after the Munich deal. In the majority opinion, the "subjective conditions" in Germany and Japan had grown ripe for unleashing a world war in 1939. The war resulted directly from the policy of appeasement conducted by the Western powers, and there are three possible reasons for this policy: 1) a form of struggle between Britain and France for world domination; 2) the anti-Soviet and anti-communist orientation of British and French policies; 3) sacrificing small countries for the selfish interests of Britain and France.

Supporters of this viewpoint hold that "the Chinese front appeared on September 18, 1931" and was always connected with the European theatre, while on July 7, 1937 war spread throughout China, but it was "a war limited to the Asian theatre" until the start of war in Europe, and not a world war at all.

All the participants in the symposium were unanimous in their opinion that, "China is one of the countries that were the first to enter the Second World War, fought in it the longest and suffered the greatest losses"²⁰

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

¹⁶ *Lishi yanjiu*, No. 4, p. 183.

¹⁷ "Peking's Double Standard", *Pravda*, Sept., 26, 1979.

¹⁸ *Shijie lishi*, 1981, No. 1, p. 14.

¹⁹ *Xinhua yuebao wenzhaiban*, No. 9, 1980, pp. 91-93.

²⁰ *Xinhua yuebao wenzhaiban*, 1980, No. 9, p. 92.

According to the second point of view, July 7, 1937 is not the beginning of war in the Chinese theatre but the beginning of the Second World War: the Chinese front, it is maintained, has always been part of the world anti-fascist front, while the connection between the Chinese and European theatres of military operations was mutual. Thus, the war in Europe inspired Japanese aggression, while the war in China postponed the beginning of war in the Pacific until December 1941. The Chinese front is said to have saved the USSR from a war on two fronts and gave it four years of peace in the Far East. While the beginning of the war in the Pacific made the Chinese front of primary strategic importance.

All of the participants in the Kunming symposium agreed that the Chinese people were the Allies' main instrument in Asia for defeating Japanese fascism. It was also pointed out that the Soviet-Japanese treaty on neutrality had an adverse effect on the Chinese theatre of military operations.

Those in favour of the second point of view have clearly taken a nationalist stand and are trying to exaggerate the role the Chinese front played in the Second World War, and in the Asian theatre in particular. According to Soviet historian B. G. Sapozhnikov the Chinese front was, in all probability, not of primary strategic importance for Japanese militarism, judging by the fact that it was closed down until offensive operations were resumed in 1944, an event which was facilitated by the Guomindang government's passive conduct of the war. In 1942-1943, Japanese militarism pursued its strategic objectives on the Chinese front through a "peaceful offensive" against the Guomindang government of Chiang Kaishek in Chongqing so as to induce Guomindang to peace and alliance with Japan through common actions against the Chinese communists.²¹

Neither is there enough substance in the assertion by PRC historians that the Chinese front postponed the Pacific war until December 1941. As a matter of fact, the existence of that front did not prevent the war in the Pacific. The concrete date it was begun was determined by the progress of Hitler's aggression in Europe and in particular, by the capitulation of France in 1940 and the time it took Japan to prepare a springboard in Indochina for the offensive in Southeast Asia. As early as July 1940 a contingent of Japanese troops landed in Haiphong.²² The treaty on mutual defence of December 9, 1941, put all of French Indochina under Japanese control.²³

It is also an extreme exaggeration to assert that the Chinese front "saved the USSR from a war on two fronts" and gave it four years of peace in the Far East. We must remind in this connection of the fact that the existing Chinese front did not prevent the Japanese from carrying out provocations in the area of Lake Khasan in 1938 and the Halhyn-gol River in 1939. It was the crushing defeat on the Halhyn-gol delivered by Soviet-Mongolian troops that secured the USSR five years of peace in the Far East. "For the majority of Japanese generals the lesson was so clear that war plans against the USSR immediately lost all feasibility. Soviet troops, fighting in new surroundings, far away from their bases, without any lines of communication, nevertheless utterly defeated the best Japanese units. This caused a change in the strategy of Japanese militarism", notes Soviet historian I. V. Mozheiko who has studied the history of Japanese aggression in the countries of Southeast Asia in detail.²⁴

²¹ B. G. Sapozhnikov, *China in the Flames of War (1931-1950)*, Moscow, 1977, p. 218.

²² I. V. Mozheiko, *Western Wind—Clear Weather Southeast Asia in the Second World War*, Moscow, 1984, p. 29.

²³ *Viet Nam: A Historical Sketch*, S. I., a. a., p. 236.

²⁴ I. V. Mozheiko, *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

The assertions by Chinese historians that the Soviet-Japanese treaty of neutrality had "an adverse effect" on the Chinese front also suffers from nationalist shortsightedness. The Chinese historians ignore such important facts as non-observance by Japan of the treaty of neutrality and preparations to openly violate it. They write nothing of the fact that Japan decided against declaring war on the USSR not because of the treaty of neutrality, but because of developments on the other fronts of the war, especially on the Soviet-German front, unfavourable as they were for the aggressive fascist bloc. Besides, in spite of the treaty of neutrality, the Soviet Union kept a major contingent of Soviet troops in the Far East, which were badly needed on the western front at that time. It seems that on this question Chinese historians have been influenced by Japanese bourgeois historiography.

The treaty of neutrality between the USSR and Japan served to foster a certain amount of distrust between the two main aggressors—Nazi Germany and militarist Japan. It also enabled the USSR to concentrate its great military efforts in the West, achieve victory there, and then, in August 1945, defeat the Kwantung army in northeastern China—the shock land force of Japanese militarism. In the final analysis, the above treaty served all the allied powers, including China, well. Regrets over the treaty were voiced first and foremost by the Guomindang men who dreamed of involving the USSR in the war against Japan so as to enjoy the benefits of the victories of others. In reality, as has been repeatedly noted by Soviet historians, "getting ready for the war in the Pacific, Japan decided in late 1938 to allocate not more than a fourth of its military budget to operations in China. The Japanese command also planned to speed up its preparations at the expense of intensive exploitation of the resources of Manchuria and the occupied regions of China. Beginning in the summer of 1939, the Japanese army ceased offensive operations in China."²⁵

By beating off Japanese aggression against the Mongolian People's Republic the USSR was able to increase its aid to China. "The biggest deliveries of Soviet weaponry, including tanks, aircraft, ammunition, and other supplies were made in 1939 and the first half of 1941."²⁶ Later Soviet aid to China was sharply cut back, not because of the Soviet-Japanese treaty of neutrality (April 1941) but because of Germany's perfidious attack on the USSR.

In August 1982, the society for the study of the Second World War held its 3rd annual conference in Peking to discuss "The Causes of France's Defeat in 1940."²⁷ The audience heard 9 reports and a number of speeches. The Chinese historians rejected in word the views of the French capitulationists Pétain, Weygand and Gamelin who asserted that "the roots of defeat are in self-indulgence" or that "sybaritism overpowered the spirit of sacrifice". Foreign views on the question were summed up at the conference as follows: "the French military and political leadership" were of the opinion that France was militarily inferior to Germany in 1940 and did not receive enough support (political or material) from its allies, Britain and the United States. The opinion of a British historian was that the greatest contribution to Hitler's success was made by the French General Staff because French military theory was backward as was its weaponry, while the military command was ineffective.

The Soviet point of view was interpreted at the conference as laying stress on political causes, above all on the class causes that resulted in the national treason by the French big bourgeoisie, and only subsequently were purely military causes mentioned.

²⁵ *The Contemporary History of China, 1917-1970*, Moscow, 1972, p. 186.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

²⁷ *Shijie lishi*, 1982, No. 6, pp. 74-77, 80.

The opinion of the French historians who spoke of "a complex combination of various factors" was singled out.

Most of the participants expressed a similar viewpoint: the defeat was brought about by both internal and external causes; it was the effect of different factors: political, military, economic, social, ideological and diplomatic.²⁸ Special attention was paid to France's military backwardness in 1940, noting not only its technical inadequacy but also its inept use of the available weapons, tanks in particular; the strategy of passive defence, the conservatism of military thought, poor control over troops, ineptitude in conducting modern combat, etc.

More insight was demonstrated by historian Ruan Yinan, who explained French military setbacks by political factors: the backwardness and reactionary nature of France's ruling classes, their degradation. Chen Zhengfei's conclusion was even more incisive: "From the Munich deal to the 'strange war', from the dissolution of the Communist Party to the persecution of progressive figures, to the aid to Finland an anti-Soviet movement was swelling which embodied France's reactionary policy".²⁹ Historian Li Hua made the following comment on anti-Sovietism which characterised the French ruling circles at the time: "Those were politically blind people who tried to direct disaster to the East by magic incantations."³⁰ Among the causes of France's defeat historian Zhou Xifeng mentioned the existence of a powerful pro-fascist and capitulationist grouping. According to Dai Chengjun, "The ideological fortitude of the broad popular masses, of soldiers and officers, and their will to win are the key to success in war, but in France in 1940 the people and the army were disgusted by war and feared it—therein lie the social and psychological causes of the French debacle".³¹

At the same time the conference in Peking heard opinions quite in keeping with the views of French capitulationists. For example, Dai Chengjun and Yu Qun asserted that pacifism in France "poisoned the army and people". Is this much different from accusations of self-indulgence and sybaritism which were rejected in word by the Chinese historians?

Criticism was also directed at the Communist Party of France and the Comintern for allegedly misinterpreting the nature of the war and regarding it as "an unjust, reactionary, imperialist war", having failed to perceive its complex nature and the just struggle of oppressed peoples against the aggressors. Echoing French reactionary authors, Dai Chengjun said, "The French Communist Party, carrying out the directives of the Comintern, called the war imperialistic and demanded its immediate cessation. This was a wrong position which led to ideological chaos in the minds of the people and Party members while undermining the will of the army and the people." These attacks on the French Communist Party and the Comintern reflect a hostile attitude towards the activities of the Comintern.³²

Outwardly the discussion at the conference aimed at bringing the position of Chinese historians and the interpretation of events in France itself closer together; in any case, a concordance of views was declared, while the views of Soviet historians on this subject were greatly simplified. Still interest in the subject, somewhat unusual for a conference in China, was chiefly aroused by historical analogies and political parallels that have taken root in Chinese life. France's defeat in 1940 was used to

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

²⁹ *Shijie lishi*, 1982, No. 6, p. 76.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

³¹ *Ibidem*.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 77. See also *Comintern and the East: The Struggle for Leninist Strategy and Tactics in the National Liberation Movement*, Moscow, 1969, p. 186 (in Russian).

show what a high price can be paid for rejecting the policy of "modernisation", this being not a historical but an extremely topical, political question for the PRC.

In 1982, an article by Ou Zhengwen entitled "The Beginning of the Second World War Should Be Seen in the Events of September 18", was published, first by a provincial journal³³ and then, having probably attracted some attention, in the central press.³⁴ Ou Zhengwen had gathered the following dates for the beginning of the Second World War from historians in various countries: 1) September 1 (or 3), 1939; 2) 1935 (the Italian invasion of Ethiopia); 3) July 7, 1937 (the Japanese invasion of China proper); 4) December 8, 1941 (the attack on Pearl Harbor); 5) September 18, 1931. He writes that discussion at the Chinese society for the study of the Second World War showed that the majority consider July 7, 1937 to mark the beginning of World War II. But Ou Zhengwen takes exception to this referring to the Japanese historian Akira Fujiwara who in his work *A History of Modern Japan (Nihon kindai shi)* states that the Japan-China war began on September 18, 1931. On the basis of this, Ou Zhengwen declares, "The war began with Japanese aggression and ended with Japanese capitulation".³⁵ He puts forward his own chronology of the war: September 18, 1931—the Second World War begins; September 1, 1939—expansion of the war; June 22, 1941—further expansion of the war; December 1941—only now does the war become truly global. He writes, "The events of September 18, 1931, marked the beginning of the Second World War, which one of the three fascist states, Japan, started by launching aggression against China. This was also the beginning of the Chinese people's armed resistance to Japanese aggression. In the world struggle against fascism the Chinese people were the first to start an armed struggle against the Japanese aggressors and that was an epoch-making event in the struggle of the peoples of the world against fascism, which started in 1922...

...After the events of September 18, 1931, the Chinese people, led by the Communist Party of China, conducted a protracted anti-Japanese guerrilla war in the northeastern part of the country. It became an integral part of the Chinese people's war of national liberation. The Party led the Chinese people in a national war against the aggressor, which began on September 18, 1931. Initially this war was waged in the northeast, but it never ended...

...The Chinese front was formed before any other and it was in existence the longest. The events of September 18 marked the beginning of Japan's armed aggression against China and meant the emergence of one of the Second World War's hotbeds—the Far Eastern".³⁶

Thus, Ou Zhengwen declares the appearance of the Far Eastern hotbed of the Second World War to be the beginning of the war itself. The emergence on September 18, 1931 of a hotbed of military conflict, which subsequently became part of the World War II general military actions is not disputed by anyone. But to mistake a hotbed of war for such a universal and broad phenomenon as a world war is only possible in case of a very formal approach to the events in question or if there is a wish to exaggerate their importance.

Ou Zhengwen is guilty on both counts. "The Sino-Japanese war exerted a great influence on the development and course of the Second World War. It was not a local war",³⁷ the Chinese historian asserts, although in the period from 1937 to 1939 the war remained local in scope and only later—

³³ *Hengshui shida xuebao*, 1982, No. 4.

³⁴ *Xinhua wenzhai*, 1982, No. 11.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

³⁶ *Xinhua wenzhai*, 1982, No. 11, pp. 78-79.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

finally and indisputably in December 1941—did it become one of the fronts of the Second World War.

Ou Zhengwen ends his discourse with the following words: "The Second World War ended with Japan's unconditional capitulation, so to date the beginning of the war from the moment of Japan's aggression corresponds not only to the historical facts but to the logic of history as well".³⁸ This demonstrates nothing but a formal approach to historical events.

Even though a great deal of attention was paid to Ou Zhengwen's article in the PRC, his opinion did not become predominant. In November 1983, a special scientific conference was held in Shanghai, entitled "On the Causes and Beginning of the Second World War", at which different opinions were once again voiced.³⁹ It is noteworthy that the conference heard a report by historian Yu Xintian about Soviet research into the subject.

At the conference it was said that the main cause of the war was the world economic crisis of capitalism (Zhang Ziping) and that the Second World War began as an imperialist war (Zhu Guisheng). They were contradicted by another participant, Xie Youshi, who still maintained that the main cause was the contradiction between fascism and peoples and insisted that "from the very beginning it was an anti-fascist war of liberation".⁴⁰

Some ideas expressed at the conference radically differed from those previously propounded by Chinese historians. Thus, the majority came to the conclusion that the difference between World War II and World War I is that the former grew out of local wars. Alongside this well-founded and serious approach, attempts were made again to exaggerate the importance of Chinese resistance and the Chinese front in the Second World War. "China's anti-Japanese war of resistance prevented Japan's movement either to the south or the north. The Munich of the Far East was frustrated by the Communist Party of China", asserted Wang Side. "The Chinese war of resistance postponed the beginning of war in the Pacific and prevented Japan from attacking the USSR".⁴¹ But the fact remains that Japan did unleash a war in the Pacific and the Japanese army occupied countries in Southeast Asia, while its attacks on the USSR as has already been pointed out took the form of military conflicts in 1938 and 1939.

Much more to the point were Wang Side's comments on the role of the Chinese front in the 1940s: "After the defeat and capitulation of France, the USSR needed all its forces to repulse the German threat, while the US set Europe as its first priority; the fulfilment of its strategic plans depended on China's ability to hold Japan. Stalin sent Chuikov as an adviser to Chiang Kaishek".⁴²

In effect, even after France's capitulation and until the beginning of nazi aggression against our country, the USSR continued to render assistance to China in terms of weapons, materials, and advisers. And Stalin really did set Chuikov the task of strategically holding Japan before Chuikov departed for China: "Your task, Comrade Chuikov, the task of all our people in China is to bind the hands of the Japanese aggressor. Only when the hands of the Japanese aggressor are bound, shall we be able to avoid a war on two fronts, if the German aggressors attack our country..."⁴³

³⁸ *Ibidem*.

³⁹ *Shijie lishi*, 1984, No. 1, pp. 82-84.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

⁴² *Ibidem*.

⁴³ V. I. Chuikov. *Mission in China. Notes by a Military Adviser*, Moscow, 1981, p. 58 (in Russian).

In his concluding remarks at the Peking conference historian Zhu Tingguang called on the participants "to use the results of Soviet and Western research selectively" and set the task of writing a work on the beginning of the Second World War from a "Chinese point of view".⁴⁴

The 1980s saw the publication of the first books on the Second World War by Chinese historians. Most are of a compilatory nature. However, one must keep in mind that their authors did not have access to documents from Chinese archives. Seven such works have been published and two of them are available to us at present. One is a book entitled *A History of the Second World War*, written by a large group of authors. It has already gone through two printings, one in 1982 and the other in 1983.⁴⁵ This book was reviewed in detail in the Soviet scholarly press, where criticism was leveled at the points the authors had borrowed from the bourgeois scholars, as well as at the tendency to overestimate the role of the Chinese front in the Second World War.⁴⁶ In scale the Chinese book cannot compare to the 12-volume Soviet *History of the Second World War* the last volume of which was published in 1982. Functionally the Chinese volume can be compared to historical essays that have repeatedly been published in the USSR.⁴⁷

In his preface to the book Liu Simu, a prominent Chinese historian, makes the following admission: "It is sad that in the past our historians did not do systematic and in-depth research either into the history of the Second World War, or even into the history of resistance to Japan, so that until now only booklets have been issued on the subject. As yet no special work written by Chinese authors on the history of the Second World War has been published".⁴⁸

Another work available to us is a historical essay written by Cai Zuming.⁴⁹ In both works the presentation of events begins with Japan's occupation of China's three northeastern provinces on September 18, 1931, but the beginning of the war is given as September 1, 1939—the day Germany attacked Poland. In the opinion of these Chinese authors, "the majority of the works on the history of the Second World War do not pay enough attention to the war of resistance waged by China against Japan".⁵⁰ This is probably true as, by their own admission, Chinese historians did not work on this question. Their argumentation that the Chinese was the main front in the Asian theatre of military operations is not convincing. As Yu. Shchebenkov has justly pointed out, "the armed struggle in China was in the main of a local nature. It is a fact that during the entire war Chinese troops did not carry out a single strategic operation".⁵¹ The Chinese authors' biased belittling of the role of the USSR and Soviet armed forces in the war also diminishes the scientific value of their work, as Yu. Shchebenkov noted in his review.

With all the differences of opinion and interpretation as regards the history of the Second World War, Chinese historians demonstrate a tendency to overestimate China's role in the war, which in a number of cases

⁴⁴ *Shijie lishi*, 1984, No. 1, p. 64.

⁴⁵ Zhu Guisheng, Wang Zhende et al., *A History of the Second World War*, Peking, 1982, 734 pp. (in Chinese).

⁴⁶ Yu. Shchebenkov, "For a Correct Presentation of the Events of the Second World War", *Military-Historical Journal*, 1983, No. 12, pp. 64-70 (in Russian).

⁴⁷ *The Second World War 1939-1945. Military-Historical Essay*, Moscow, 1958, 930 pp.; G. A. Deborin, *The Second World War. Military-Political Essay*, Moscow, 1958, 430 pp.; *The Second World War. A Short History*, Moscow, 1980, 530 pp.

⁴⁸ *Dierci shijie dazhan'shi*, Peking, 1983, p. 2.

⁴⁹ Cai Zuming, *Dierci shijie dazhan shi jianbian* (An Essay of the History of the Second World War), Peking, 1983, 200 pp. (in Chinese).

⁵⁰ *Dierci shijie dazhan shi*, p. 3.

⁵¹ Yu. Shchebenkov, *Op. cit.*, 1983, No. 12, p. 68; *A History of the Second World War 1939-1945*, Vol. 12, p. 427.

brings them closer to and sometimes even coincides with the Guomindang interpretation of the Second World War (for example, the idea of the decisive role of the Chinese front in Asia). The Chinese scholars also readily rely on works by Japanese historians. Some Chinese historians are also prone to emphasise the role played by the United States in the war because, according to them, only US involvement made the war a really global one.

Until quite recently, for over 20 years Chinese historiography practically kept silent about the role the USSR played in the defeat of fascism, and in the defeat of Japanese militarism in particular. The tendency to belittle the USSR's role is also seen in the special emphasis which is placed on the "adverse effect" the 1941 Japanese-Soviet non-aggression pact had on the Chinese theatre of military operations. In spite of historical truth, what is constantly underscored is not Soviet aid to China in the War of Resistance to Japan, which was real, but Chinese aid to the USSR of a political nature ("four years of peace in the Far East", saving the USSR from fighting on two fronts). The nationalistic tone which the treatment of this subject takes in Chinese historiography cannot be overlooked.

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VIETNAM CP LAUDED ON 55TH ANNIVERSARY

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[Article by A. S. Volodin: "A Staunch Detachment of the International Communist Movement (On the 55th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Vietnam)"]

On February 3, 1985 the fraternal Vietnamese people celebrated the 55th anniversary of the creation of its militant Marxist-Leninist vanguard—the Communist Party of Vietnam. This anniversary saw the CPV armed with historical experience; it has great accomplishments to its credit and is full of creative plans. It enjoys tremendous prestige among the Vietnamese working people. The merits of the CPV, a party of patriots and internationalists, a party of revolutionary action, are recognised throughout the world. The Communist Party of Vietnam has asserted itself as the political and ideological leader of the working class, and of the country's working people as a whole during a long and difficult struggle. Its road to victories was not an easy one, and is of much theoretical and practical interest.

Numerous armed uprisings began to occur throughout the territory of the country in the middle of the 19th century, when the French colonialists seized Vietnam. But these uprisings were crushed because the rebels had neither a unified leadership nor a clear-cut programme of action, and their methods of struggle were outdated. The Vietnamese national-liberation movement was in a state of crisis until the Vietnamese working class entered the political arena and assumed guidance of the revolution.

The Great October Socialist Revolution exerted a tremendous influence on the national-liberation struggle in Vietnam. It demonstrated that the Vietnamese proletariat could fulfil its historic mission only if it created an independent revolutionary party that would firmly and consistently adhere to Marxist-Leninist theory.

The creation of such a party was preceded by a period of preparation lasting many years during which the Vietnamese revolutionaries mastered the Marxist-Leninist world outlook. This was not an easy process as socialist traditions did not then exist in Vietnamese society. In addition, it was isolated from the main centres of the international revolutionary movement. But Marxist organisations began to appear in Vietnam in the 1920s. They established ties with the workers' movement, conducted anti-feudal and anti-imperialist propaganda. Ho Chi Minh, an outstanding revolutionary and the first Vietnamese communist, played an enormous role in the dissemination of Marxism-Leninism in Vietnam. He began

working to create a revolutionary Marxist organisation in the mid-1920s. In 1925 he formed the Society of Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth in which Communists constituted the guiding nucleus.¹ The years that followed the establishment of the Society witnessed the vigorous development of its organisational base and of the mass organisations guided by it: the worker, peasant and student leagues. The Society succeeded in establishing ties with the Comintern and the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, France and China.² Independent communist organisations were formed in 1929 in all three parts of the country.³ But there was an urgent need to unify the Communists in a single party as quickly as possible. The need for unity of action was noted also by the Comintern. Mindful of this, the Executive Committee of the Comintern sent a letter on October 27, 1929 to Vietnamese Communist organisations in which it said that "the absence of a single Communist party at a time when there is an upsurge in the movement of the worker and peasant masses is fraught with great danger for the future revolution in Indochina".⁴

On February 3, 1930 separate Marxist groups attended a party unity conference under Ho Chi Minh's chairmanship and formed the Communist Party of Vietnam.⁵ A plenary meeting of the Party's Central Committee held in October 1930 decided to rename it the Communist Party of Indochina (CPIC). On April 11, 1931 the Executive Committee of the Comintern recognised the Communist Party of Indochina as an independent organisation affiliated with the Comintern.

The forming of the Communist Party of Indochina was a historic turning point in the Vietnamese people's liberation struggle which heralded the assertion of the guiding role played by the working class in the revolution as well as the end of the national-liberation movement's ideological and organisational crisis. For the first time ever the leadership of this struggle was assumed by a political party reliably armed with scientific theory, which clearly realised the aims and tasks of the struggle, was closely connected with the broadest popular masses, possessed an arsenal of methods and means which would lead them to victory, while being in a militant alliance with the international revolutionary movement.

From the very first days of its existence the CPIC guided itself by the Leninist provision that "with the aid of the proletariat of the advanced countries, backward countries can go over to the Soviet system and, through certain stages of development, to communism, without having to pass through the capitalist stage", and clearly indicated that at the initial stage the Vietnamese⁶ revolution should overthrow the power of imperialists and feudal lords, win national independence, form a worker and peasant government, create a worker and peasant army and hand land over to those who till it. The task of the following stage was to advance to socialism bypassing the stage of capitalist development. The close alliance of the working class and the peasantry was declared the main motive force of the revolution.⁷

¹ See *A Militant Vanguard of the Vietnamese People History of the Communist Party of Vietnam*, Moscow, 1981, p. 23.

² See Nguyen Khanh Toan, *The Great October Revolution and Vietnam*, Moscow, 1979, p. 37.

³ During French colonial rule Vietnam was divided into three parts with different political regimes and systems of administration (Cochin china, Tonkin and Annam).

⁴ *Party Documents (1930-1945)*, Vol. 1, Hanoi, 1977, p. 10 (in Vietnamese).

⁵ See *Militant Vanguard of the Vietnamese People*, p. 28.

⁶ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 244.

⁷ See *History of the Communist Party of Vietnam (1930-1945)*, Vol. 1, Hanoi, 1978, pp. 39-41 (in Vietnamese).

The party's first General Secretary Tran Phu played an important role in drawing up the party's programme of action formulated in the form of political theses.

A mere fifteen years passed between the creation of the Party in 1930 and the victory of the August 1945 Revolution as a result of which the Vietnamese people under the leadership of the CPIC put an end to the almost 100 years of colonial domination and the millennium-long oppressive feudal monarchy. During this brief period the CPIC succeeded in staging three "rehearsals" of the revolution. Creatively applying Marxist-Leninist theory in practice it worked out and tested in the flames of revolutionary battles the strategy and tactics of the proletariat's class struggle.

The first "rehearsal" was the mighty revolutionary uprising of 1930-1931 during which the guiding role of the working class and the Communist Party of Indochina was asserted. During these years workers and peasants called for independence, freedom, pay raises, reduction of the work day, support for the Soviet Union and the national-liberation movements of the peoples of the world and opposition to imperialist war.

The class battles fought in Nghean and Hatinh provinces were especially fierce and the colonial feudal administration there was liquidated in the course of the uprising. The workers and peasants took the administration of all aspects of political and social life into their hands at the local level and performed the functions of popular power according to the Soviet model. The Soviets resolutely suppressed counterrevolutionary activity. Taxes introduced by the colonialists and feudal lords were abolished. Public land was divided among the peasants. All sorts of requisitions were eliminated, rent was reduced and a movement for the eradication of illiteracy was started.⁸

The French colonialists resorted to ruthless terror in order to suppress the revolutionary movement and destroy the Communist Party of Indochina. Tens of thousands of party members and patriots were arrested, thrown into prison, sentenced to hard labour or killed. Almost all the members of the CPIC Central Committee were arrested and many of them lost their lives. The first General Secretary of the CPIC Central Committee Tran Phu perished in September 1931. He was 27 at the time. The colonialists succeeded in smashing almost all of the CPIC cells. Beyond the terror campaign the colonialists tried to deceive and bribe the masses. It was then that various petty-bourgeois theories began to be circulated and Vietnamese Trotskyites and nationalists stepped up their activities.

But the CPIC soon succeeded in restoring its organisations and establishing firm ties with the masses. Revolutionaries organised political studies in prison, and the process of summing up the experience which had been gained during this period of revolutionary activity began. Intensive ideological struggle was conducted.

The CPIC Steering Committee Abroad was set up in 1934. It did much to unify party organisations, train leaders and create the necessary conditions for convening the party's first congress which was held in March 1935. It was attended by delegates representing party organisations in Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. The Congress outlined the top-priority tasks: to strengthen the Party, draw the broad popular masses to its side, and struggle against the preparations being made for imperialist war. It played an important role in preparing the party for a new upsurge in revolutionary activity.⁹

⁸ See *Thirty Years of Struggle by the Party and Working Class of Vietnam*, Hanoi, 1960, pp. 34-42.

⁹ See *The Militant Vanguard of the Vietnamese People*, p. 41.

In conditions of the certain easing of the political situation in Indochina in the wake of the creation of a Popular Front government in France the CPIC, relying on the decisions of the 7th Congress of the Comintern (July 1935), proclaimed that it was forming a Democratic Front. This front united all the democratic and progressive forces opposed to the French colonialists and local reactionaries. It came out in support of democratic freedoms and improving the life of the population, while opposing fascist aggression.

During the years which marked an upsurge in revolutionary activity (1936-1939) the party mastered the art of conducting political work with the urban and rural masses. The numerous publications put out by the Party were extensively used for this purpose. The propaganda of Marxism-Leninism, of the Party's main goals was also conducted through the trade union, youth, women's and other organisations that functioned under its guidance. As a result of pressure exerted by the popular movement many political prisoners were freed, among them Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong. Along with overt methods the Party also made extensive use of underground forms of struggle, thus enabling it to protect its nucleus from acts of repression.

The CPIC strove to establish contacts with petty-bourgeois political parties and with democratic elements among the bourgeois intelligentsia in order to organise joint actions. It sternly criticised manifestations of "leftist" deviation which took the form of sectarianism, narrow-mindedness and an inability to use legal and semi-legal forms of struggle. At the same time manifestations of rightist deviation such as intoxication with individual instances of success and disregard for need to strengthen the alliance of workers and peasants were also criticized. The CPIC Central Committee waged a persistent struggle against the Trotskyites exposing them as the accomplices of fascists.¹⁰

The upsurge in revolutionary activity from 1936 to 1939 enabled the CPIC to rouse millions of working people in town and countryside, strengthen the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, train a large number of party cadres and close party ranks. In those years the party did much to raise the level of education and political awareness among its members.

The Party's ties with the international communist movement had grown in strength. Comrade Le Hong Phong, who headed the CPIC delegation at the 7th Comintern Congress, was elected alternate member of the Comintern's Executive Committee. Comrade Ho Chi Minh, who was at the time enrolled in the International Leninist School in Moscow and was engaged in research, attended the Congress as a guest.

The Second World War broke out and with it came a time of great trial for the party. After France had been defeated Japan seized Indochina. The colonial authorities outlawed the CPIC and began to disband the legal and semi-legal organisations formed by the communists. Thousands of patriots, among them most of the party's leaders, were thrown behind bars and sentenced to hard labour. The opportunities open to the party for legal work were exhausted. The democratic freedoms won during the upsurge in revolutionary activity were eliminated.

But this drastic turn for the worse did not catch the Party off guard and it instructed its organisations to go underground in good time. When determining the party's tasks during this new stage the CPIC Central Committee noted that from now on the revolution's main task would be to overthrow the rule of imperialists and achieve the country's national liberation.

¹⁰ See *Brief History of the Vietnam Workers' Party*, Moscow, 1971, pp. 24-25.

The masses launched a determined struggle against the dual oppression of the Japanese occupiers and the French colonialists. In September 1940 there was uprising in Bacson. An uprising in Nam Ky began in November 1940, followed by uprisings in Te Rang and Doluong in 1941. These uprisings were suppressed but the intensity of the struggle was not reduced.

The Party decided to form the League of Struggle for the Independence of Vietnam uniting in its ranks all those fighting for the freedom of Vietnam regardless of which class they belonged to, their social status or creed. A decision was made to set up armed forces and step up activities to prepare the ground for an uprising with the aim of seizing power and extending it throughout the country. Liberation detachments were formed everywhere and the Liberation Army of Vietnam came into being in 1944.

The victories scored by the Soviet Union in the struggle against Nazi fascism facilitated the growth of the Vietnamese people's liberation movement. The CPIC set the task of preparing for an uprising against the Japanese invaders who eliminated the French colonial administration in March 1945 thus becoming Indochina's sole master.

The Soviet Union's rout of fascist Germany and its subsequent entry into the war against militaristic Japan, which by its nature was a mission of liberation in respect of the peoples of Asia, had a positive influence on the Vietnamese people's liberation struggle.

The decision to start a national armed uprising was made at a party conference held in Tan Trao on August 13-15, 1945. Several days later the National Congress of People's Representatives was convened. It gave its support to this decision, elected a National Liberation Committee, headed by Ho Chi Minh, and invested it with the powers of a provisional government. The Congress' decision stated that "the Soviet Union, having made a tremendous contribution to the cause of routing fascism in Europe, declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945... The Japanese regime in our country is crumbling". The Congress appealed to the people and revolutionary organisations to seize power, create the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and arm the people".¹¹

The uprising in Hanoi was victorious on August 19, in Hue on August 23, and in Saigon on August 25. The revolution spread throughout the country sweeping away the hated puppet feudal monarchy and its Japanese and French patrons. At a meeting attended by half a million people in Hanoi on September 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh, speaking on behalf of the Provisional Government, read out Declaration of Independence. He proclaimed the creation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the first state of workers and peasants in Southeast Asia. Vietnam acquired the statehood that had been wrested from it by the colonialists and won political independence. The Vietnamese people "became truly free and independent".¹²

Between September 1945 and December 1946 the Party guided the struggle to defend and strengthen the revolutionary regime and to restore the national economy. It mobilised the working people in order to repulse the aggression of the colonialists who hoped to restore the old order with the help of the local feudal and bourgeois upper crust. It was at this time that the struggle to increase production and to cope with the terrible famine that had spread throughout the country was begun. Land that once belonged to French colonialists and traitors was divided upon

¹¹ See *Let Us Smash the Fetters. Documents of the August 1945 Revolution in Vietnam*, Moscow, 1960, pp. 70-71.

¹² Ho Chi Minh, *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Moscow, 1959, p. 165.

a temporary basis, rent was cut by 25 per cent and a law on the 8-hour work day was adopted. General elections were held early in 1946. The National Assembly adopted the state's first Constitution. A literacy campaign was launched throughout the country.

These democratic reforms were carried out in terribly difficult times. North Vietnam was invaded by an army of 200,000 Chiang Kaishek men. With the help of the British imperialists the French colonialists seized Saigon on September 23, 1945 and launched combat operations throughout South Vietnam.

The CPIC and the DRV government made a tremendous effort to stave the foreign aggression off by political means. But the colonialists marched further and further along the road of military provocation and outright armed aggression. Therefore, the Central Committee of the Communist Party adopted a resolution entitled "On the War of Resistance by the Entire People" on December 22, 1946. The party urged the population to wage a "nationwide, comprehensive and protracted war of resistance" in order to uphold the gains of the August revolution.¹³

Thus began the Vietnamese people's lengthy war of resistance to the French colonialists (1946-1954). During the war the Vietnamese People's Army and the partisan detachments had the support of the whole people and dealt blows to the French expeditionary corps which was equipped with American made weapons. Along with armed resistance the Vietnamese patriots, headed by the Communist party, conducted vigorous political and diplomatic activity. The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union¹⁴ and other socialist countries in 1950 became an important factor facilitating the Vietnamese people's successful struggle and considerably strengthening the young republic's international status. The large-scale movement in France which called for an end to the "dirty war" also helped weaken the position of French colonialism in Indochina.

The 2nd Party's Congress held in February 1951 played a tremendous role in mobilising the masses to the struggle against the imperialist aggression. It worked out a programme of struggle against the colonialists stipulating that the task of the revolution was to bring the war of resistance to a victorious end, achieve independence, unite the nation, liquidate feudal and semi-feudal survivals, hand the land over to those who till it, develop the system of people's democracy and create the fundamentals of socialism while bypassing the stage of capitalist development. The Congress adopted a resolution legalising the party and renamed in the Vietnam Workers' Party. A decision was also made to organise separate revolutionary parties in Laos and Kampuchea that would be capable of meeting the specific demands of each country.¹⁵

The agrarian reform initiated by the WPV Central Committee (November 1953) was of prime importance in mobilising the overwhelming majority of the population—the peasants—to anti-imperialist struggle. Upon receiving land, millions of peasants joined the ranks of the resistance.

In the winter of 1953-1954 the armed forces of liberation launched a strategic offensive that ended in the victorious Battle of Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954. 112,000 enemy soldiers were killed or wounded.¹⁶ The rout of the French Expeditionary Corps by the Vietnamese People's

¹³ See *Brief History of the Vietnam Workers' Party*, p. 52.

¹⁴ See *Soviet Union-Vietnam. 30 Years of Relations. 1950-1980. Documents and Materials*, Moscow, 1982, p. 8.

¹⁵ See *Documents of the 2nd Party Congress*, Hanoi, 1965, pp. 39, 90, 95, 118 (in Vietnamese).

¹⁶ See *Militant Vanguard of the Vietnamese People*, p. 97.

Army at Dien Bien Phu paved the way for the DRV's success at the Geneva Conference on Indochina. The Geneva Accords were signed on July 20, 1954 which recognised the right of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea to "independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity".

The end of the war and the conclusion of the Geneva Accords in 1954 were an important victory for the VWP, the Vietnamese people, and all those who opposed imperialism. Given the new situation in the country the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the VWP Central Committee (July 1954) stressed the need to press for peace and strengthen it, to complete the country's unification, gain independence and implement democracy throughout the country.¹⁷

The agrarian reform was completed in the north of the country after the restoration of peace thus achieving the goal set by the party immediately after its formation. The task of restoring a national economy was in the main completed in the DRV by 1957. On the whole the volume of industrial and agricultural production reached the 1939 level. The state of people's democracy asserted itself and exercised the dictatorship of the proletariat. A three-year plan for transforming and developing the economy was successfully fulfilled between 1958 and 1960. North Vietnam made a step forward towards the socialist transformation of society and in 1959 new, socialist constitution was adopted.

The 3rd VWP Congress was held in September 1960. This marked the first time a congress of Vietnamese Communists had been held legally. In the years following the August revolution party membership had grown from 5,000 to almost 500,000. By 1960 party organisations had been set up throughout the country.¹⁸ The Congress worked out the party's general line at the new stage which faced it. The Congress noted that the general task of the Vietnamese revolution was to "strengthen the unity of the entire people, resolutely to struggle for the preservation of peace, accelerate socialist transformations in North Vietnam, activate the national people's democratic revolution in South Vietnam, unite the country on the basis of independence and democracy, create a peace-loving, united, independent, democratic and prosperous Vietnam..."¹⁹ The Congress endorsed the guidelines of the first five-year plan (1961-1965), discussed questions of party building, approved changes in Party Rules and elected the Party's guiding bodies. Ho Chi Minh was elected Chairman of the VWP Central Committee and Le Duan was elected First Secretary.

By 1965 the DRV had considerable achievements to its credit. The socialist sector had won key positions in production and distribution. More than a thousand state enterprises had been set up or rebuilt. Socialist industrialisation was begun. The foundations of heavy industry were laid and several new industries had been created. Illiteracy had been stamped out, a system of universal secondary education had been introduced and the training of engineers, technicians and skilled workers had been organised.

As for the southern part of the country, the patriotic forces there, headed by Communists, were conducting a vigorous struggle for liberation from the anti-popular Saigon regime that was being propped up by American bayonets and for the reunification of the country. The struggle for the homeland's reunification became the single national task of the Vietnamese revolution. Vietnam's revolutionary, democratic forces view-

¹⁷ See Ho Chi Minh, *Selected Works*, Hanoi, 1973, p. 191.

¹⁸ See *3rd Congress of the Workers' Party of Vietnam*, Moscow, 1961, p. 133.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

ed the reunification of the country as the sole basis on which further rapid national and social progress could be made.

Directed by Communists, the struggle for the country's unification was conducted in all spheres: military, political, ideological, economic and social. In the struggle for the country's freedom, independence and unity the Vietnamese people foiled American plans for waging a "special war" and then, beginning in 1964 and 1965, a "local" war against the South Vietnamese patriots and bombings of the DRV. In this struggle the Vietnamese people had the all-round and effective assistance of the CPSU and other fraternal Communist and Workers' parties, on its side as well as the active support of the national-liberation and peace movements.

An agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam was signed in Paris on January 27, 1973. It was the result of the flexible and consistent course taken by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG RSV), which was proclaimed by the patriotic forces in the south in 1969, and the unflagging support this course received from the USSR, other socialist countries, and progressive forces around the world. A decisive step was thereby made along the road to the total restoration of peace and the reunification of Vietnam.

In the north of the country the Vietnamese people began to heal the wounds war had inflicted. At the same time the VWP and the government of the DRV, in close cooperation with the PRG RSV, vigorously pressed for the fulfilment of the 1973 Paris Agreement. This was especially important since even though the United States had withdrawn its troops from South Vietnam it did not stop deliveries of arms and ammunition to the Saigon puppet regime and pushed it both to expand military operations against the liberated areas and actually to reject a political solution to the country's problems. In these conditions the liberation forces were compelled to fight back.

Saigon, the remaining bulwark of neocolonialism on Vietnamese soil, was liberated on April 30, 1975 as a result of a general offensive by the armed forces of liberation and a popular uprising. Speaking on the importance and sources of the people's victory in this protracted and bloody war the General Secretary of the Party Central Committee Le Duan said that, "our victory is a victory of the revolutionary path and methods of revolutionary action, of the correct and creative course of revolutionary war pursued by our Party, which holds high the banner of the national-democratic revolution and the banner of the socialist revolution, which merged the forces of national independence with the might of socialism, mobilised the forces of the entire people and, by combining them with international forces throughout the world today, created an integrated force to rout and defeat the US imperialists".²⁰

The victory of 1975 put an end forever to over a century of colonial domination on Vietnamese soil. It shattered the strategic plans of imperialism and hegemonism. As a result of this victory the necessary preconditions were created for the reunification of Vietnam as a state and the forming of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1976. A new epoch began in the life of the Vietnamese people, the epoch of building socialism throughout the country.

Basing their decisions on the situation which resulted from the Vietnamese people's victory, the 4th Party Congress (1976) defined the general course of the socialist revolution in Vietnam during its new stage: "Firmly to adhere to the dictatorship of the proletariat, to develop the working people's right to be the master and simultaneously to carry

²⁰ Le Duan, *Selected Articles and Speeches (1975-1981)*, Moscow, 1981.

out three revolutions in the sphere of production relations, in the sphere of science and technology and in the sphere of ideology and culture, the scientific and technological revolution being the most crucial of the three, to accelerate socialist industrialisation which is the key task during the entire period of transition to socialism; to create a regime of socialist collective economic management, large-scale socialist production, a new culture, to form a new, socialist man, to eliminate the exploitation of man by man, poverty and backwardness; steadily to raise vigilance, constantly to strengthen the country's defences, to preserve political security and public order; successfully to build a peaceful, independent and united socialist Vietnamese homeland; to make an active contribution to the struggle of the world's peoples for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism".²¹ The 4th Congress also decided to rename the party the Communist Party of Vietnam.

The 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (March 1982) made an important contribution to the further development of the strategy and tactics to be used in building socialism in the SRV. The Congress clearly defined the outlines of the Party's social and economic policy at the initial stage of socialist industrialisation. It noted that in the 1980s the party and people would concentrate their efforts on the accelerating the development of agriculture, this being viewed as the top-priority task today; on the comprehensive development of the production of basic goods as well as on the creation of a number of heavy industries without which the country's further industrial progress is inconceivable.

The Congress directed the party to carry out socialist reforms in the southern provinces, taking measures to strengthen the country's single economic complex, launching the social and economic integration of the North and the South whose development had proceeded in opposite directions over the course of several decades.

The Communist Party of Vietnam takes the specific conditions under which the country has to build the new society into consideration. Vietnam is building socialism while bypassing the stage of capitalist development. One of the problems with which it must cope is its underdeveloped productive forces. Thus, in 1975 the bulk of the national product was produced in agriculture primarily by small-commodity peasant households. The low initial level of the material base is also illustrated by the following fact: the per capita national income in 1975 was a mere \$135.²² Neither should one forget the devastating consequences of American aggression in Vietnam. The new society is being built in an unfavourable international situation, and it constantly faces armed provocations and threats by hegemonism and imperialism. This compels the SRV to divert considerable resources to maintain its own defences and those of its allies Laos and Kampuchea at the proper level. Attempts by the extreme imperialist circles, first and foremost in the United States, to subject the SRV to an economic blockade, to create a sort of a "cordon" around socialist Vietnam should also be taken into account.

In analysing the situation in the country at its 5th Congress the Communist Party of Vietnam frankly stated that beyond causes of an objective nature stable and confident economic development was retarded by subjective causes as well, including errors and miscalculations in managing and planning the economy, a shortage of experienced cadres and the inability of a number of functionaries to switch from wartime methods of administration to economic methods of management quickly enough.

Almost ten years have passed since the full liberation of Vietnam. Great successes have been achieved in healing the wounds inflicted by

²¹ *The 4th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam*, Moscow, 1977, p. 49.

²² See A. S. Voronin, *Vietnam Today*, Moscow, 1979, p. 11.

war and in creating the foundations of the new society during this period. War-ravaged agricultural and industrial enterprises have been rebuilt and the transportation network is being restored. Millions of people have received housing and jobs.

The accomplishments made in the main branch of the economy—agriculture—are especially impressive. Despite extremely unfavourable weather conditions some 18 million tons of food were produced in 1984. As a result, the population's food needs are now primarily satisfied by domestic production. Considerable changes are taking place in industry. The average annual increment of industrial output during the current five-year-plan period (1981-1985) equalled 11 per cent. There was a growth in the output of electricity, cement, machinery, chemical fertilizers, fabrics and paper.²³

The situation as it concerns capital building is improving. Greater resources are now being concentrated on decisive projects in key industries. The Hoabinh, Phalai and Trian hydroelectric and thermal power stations are now under construction. The extraction of Vietnamese oil has been started on the continental shelf in the south of the country. New moorages have been built in the sea ports of Haiphong, Hongai and Campha. Traffic has been resumed on the trans-Vietnamese railway linking Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.

Much is being done to strengthen the state and cooperative sectors of the economy, this being especially important in the case of southern Vietnam. In 1984 more than 50 per cent of the peasants owning approximately 50 per cent of all the land under cultivation formed production teams, mutual assistance labour groups or farm cooperatives.

Economic management is being perfected. A system of labour remuneration based on the end result of work done by a team or an individual is being introduced in agriculture. A policy of developing the independence and initiative of enterprises and local authorities is being pursued in industry; limits on using material incentives have been expanded; socialist cost-accounting is being strengthened; measures are being taken to remove disproportions in the economy; a policy of restricting and scaling down the activity of the free market, of ensuring social justice in the distribution of income among various segments of the population is being pursued.

The CPV has made a tremendous effort to arm its cadres and all members of the Party with the necessary knowledge in the field of management. Questions concerning management are regularly discussed at plenary meetings of the CPV Central Committee. They were also taken up at the Sixth and Seventh Plenary Meetings of the CPV CC in July 1984. The need to further strengthen the state sector of the economy and extend socialist reforms was stressed at the meeting.²⁴

The republic has made impressive achievements in the field of science and technology. 83 research organisations and 21 design institutes have been set up. 300,000 people have received a higher education while more than half a million received a specialised secondary education. There are more than 4,000 candidates and doctors of science in the country.²⁵

The organisational role of the CPV and the leadership it provides, the determined work of Party bodies, Party functionaries, and all Communists who mobilise the efforts of the working class, the cooperative-farm peasantry and the people's intelligentsia to the attainment of the tasks set

²³ See *World Marxist Review*, 1984, No. 10.

²⁴ See *Pravda*, July 19, 1984.

²⁵ See A. S. Yermolayev, "The Scientific and Technical Cooperation of the USSR and the SRV", *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 1, 1985.

by the 5th CPV Congress all this is clearly seen in the country's labour victories which in terms of their importance are on a par with the people's feat of arms.

The CPV's guiding role was formalised in Article 4 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which was adopted in December 1980. This recognises the great services of the party of the working class in solving the tasks of socialist revolution and the building of socialism. The Constitution stresses that the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat created in the SRV can fulfil its historic mission only if the working class and the entire people is led by a party that undeviatingly follows the Marxist-Leninist road.²⁶

Today the Party has more than 1.8 million Communists in its ranks. They work in more than 35,000 primary organisations. In fact, primary party organisations have been formed at virtually all industrial enterprises, work shops, educational establishments, and social and cultural institutions in the North of the country. The influence Party organisations exert on production and social life in the South of Vietnam is growing with every year as well. After the 5th Congress the Party carried out extensive measures designed to strengthen primary organisations as well as party leadership, at the district level, because success in the implementation of the Party's decisions depends to a large degree on their work.

The Party shows particular concern for improving the qualitative composition of its ranks. Special attention is being given to drawing the best representatives of the working class, the cooperative farm peasantry, soldiers from the Vietnamese People's Army and the socialist scientists, technicians and workers of culture into the Party. More than 84 per cent of the CPV's new members are from the Ho Chi Minh Young Communist League. About a half of the new members of the CPV have a secondary or specialised secondary education, while 6 per cent are graduates of institutions of higher learning.²⁷

Exacting demands are also made of the moral and political makeup of Communists. Absolute loyalty to the revolutionary cause, total support for the Party's line, a high level of political awareness, modesty, honesty, unselfishness, and an ability to place the interests of society and the collective above personal interests—these are criteria formulated in the CPV Rules.

Recently, the CPV gave its members the first membership cards ever to be issued in the Party's history. This campaign made the Party more united while facilitating the organisational strengthening of its ranks and the enhancement of ideological level of Communists. The professional competence, political and moral qualities of every Communist were subjected to a thorough analysis in the course of this campaign that was started in 1980. One characteristic of this campaign was that opinions on every Communist were expressed not only by members of his Party organisation but also by non-party representatives of the collective in which he worked. During the campaign the Party resolutely freed itself of those who had failed to pass the test of high responsibility imposed by membership in the Party. The Party's prestige among the working people and its ties with working people grew and were strengthened as a result of this campaign.

In the ideological field the CPV sees its main tasks in arming Communists with the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, cultivating in them will-power and the resolve to overcome all difficulties, and ensuring that

²⁶ See *Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam*, Moscow, 1982, p. 19.

²⁷ See *Pravda*, March 24, 1983.

they acquire the knowledge necessary to fulfil successfully the tasks of building socialism and defending the homeland. As was stressed at the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the CPV Central Committee (1983) which studied the party's pressing tasks in the field of organisational and ideological work, every Communist must not only have a thorough understanding of the Party's policies but also be a dedicated, active fighter for their realisation. The Plenary Meeting demanded that political and educational work in the Party be intensified, that criticism and self-criticism be promoted, that party discipline be observed and that the principles of democratic centralism be strictly adhered to.²⁸

A ramified system of party schools has been created to promote the ideological education of Communists. The classics of Marxism-Leninism are put out in large printings. The full collection of Lenin's works has been published in the SRV. The full collection of Ho Chi Minh's works is being prepared for the press, while collections of articles and speeches by Le Duan and other CPV leaders as well as by CPSU leaders are regularly published. A collection of works by Konstantin Chernenko, was published in Hanoi in November 1984.

Theoretical work in the party is being much more actively conducted. The quality of research in the field of social sciences has grown. Researchers are concentrating on the laws governing the period of transition to socialism, as well as on the CPV's economic strategy, party construction and economic development at the present stage.

The growth of the party's influence on all aspects of the country's life is also enhanced by the large amount of work being conducted by the CPV with public organisations through the Fatherland Front. In essence this work amounts to tapping the wells of the people's creativity and drawing the masses into the process of elaborating proposals, making decisions and implementing the party's policy.

Working on the basis of the Political Programme adopted in 1977 the Front has become an active assistant to the CPV in solving the tasks facing the country. Along with the CPV the Front now includes the Vietnam Federation of Trade Unions, the Ho Chi Minh Young Communist League, the Vietnam Union of Women and other public and professional organisations, as well as the Socialist and Democratic parties of Vietnam.

The Communist Party of Vietnam has never separated itself from the international communist movement of which it considers itself to be an integral part. By its selfless struggle in the interests of working people, to strengthen the unity of the international communist and workers' movement and the greater solidarity of the countries, belonging to the socialist community, on the immutable basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism the Communist Party of Vietnam has earned an impressive reputation among the Communists of the world, and among all those fighting against imperialism and for peace, democracy and socialism.

The CPV is developing multi-faceted cooperation with the CPSU and the Soviet Union. "Solidarity and multi-faceted cooperation with the Soviet Union", it was stated by the Fifth CPV Congress, "have been and remain the cornerstone of the foreign policy of our party and state." The spirited solidarity and comprehensiveness which characterise Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation are a guarantee that the Vietnamese people will successfully defend their homeland, build socialism, and strengthen socialism's status in the Indochinese peninsula.²⁹

²⁸ See *Vietnam News*, 1983, No. 8, p. 1 (in Russian).

²⁹ See 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam: Moscow, 1983, p. 96.

The Communist Party of Vietnam has every right to be proud of its achievements. At every stage of its history it has successfully played the role of the leader of the working masses, the inspirer and organiser of all their victories. It profoundly and precisely expressed the people's aspirations and skillfully translated the demands of the masses into the political language of revolutionary action. Its work has always been distinguished by its loyalty to the great teaching of Marxism-Leninism, and its ability to implement a revolutionary strategy based on principle despite every obstacle, placed in its path, while utilising flexible tactics and great diversity of form in the process. In the eyes of Soviet people and all friends of the fraternal Vietnamese people the CPV is a staunch detachment of the international communist movement, a striking and inspiring example of selfless service to the people's cause. "We," the message of greetings of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the CPV on the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the formation of the CPV, pointed out in part, "express firm confidence that the Vietnamese people, guided by the militant vanguard—the Communist Party, its Central Committee led by General Secretary Le Duan, will win fresh successes in building strong and prosperous socialist Vietnam, in the struggle for consolidating international positions of socialism, forces of peace and progress."³⁰

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USSR-JAPAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 60TH ANNIVERSARY MARKED

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[Article by N. N. Nikolayev and V. N. Arsenyev: "The 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the USSR and Japan"]

The year of 1985 marks 60 years since diplomatic relations were established between the Soviet Union and Japan. On February 26, 1925, the Convention on the Basic Principles of Relations Between the USSR and Japan went into effect, inaugurating the history of Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations. The Convention recorded the two countries' desire to live in peace and friendship and their commitment to develop relations on the basis of the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs and to refrain from direct or indirect hostility against each other.

Sixty years is a long period, during which Soviet-Japanese relations had both ups and downs and at times seriously worsened through no fault of the Soviet side. Nevertheless the experience accumulated during that period gives grounds to conclude that whenever normal relations were maintained between the two countries this fully accorded with the interests of the Soviet and the Japanese people and with the task of conserving peace and security in the Far East. The history of Soviet-Japanese relations also shows that for these relations to develop fruitfully it is imperative to follow consistently the policy of genuine goodneighbourliness and mutually advantageous cooperation.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan was of great international importance and was a major gain of the Soviet Union's Leninist foreign policy, a policy designed to promote relations of a new type—diverse peaceful cooperation between states with different social systems. The signing of the Soviet-Japanese Convention of 1925 and the subsequent establishment of diplomatic and consular relations consummated an important stage in Soviet efforts towards normalising relations with the leading capitalist countries.

The more far-sighted Japanese politicians of the 1920s realised that the Soviet state, which had already established relations with many capitalist countries, was stable and should not be ignored. Furthermore, Tokyo's ruling quarters believed that normal relations with the USSR could help them strengthen their international position and overcome the incipient isolation of Japan on the world scene, which became manifest particularly at the Washington conference of 1921-1922. As for the country's businessmen, they were aware of the direct advantages of broader trade and economic contacts with the USSR.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan opened prospects for the development of contacts between the two countries in the most diverse areas. Mutually advantageous trade burgeoned, initial cultural contacts were made, and so on.

But the Japanese reactionary and militarist forces stubbornly opposed goodneighbourly relations in a bid to unleash armed conflicts

against the USSR within the framework of their aggressive policy. The "anti-Comintern pact" concluded between Japan and Nazi Germany in 1936 and ensuing military alliance ("the tripartite pact") with Germany and fascist Italy were symptomatic of the Japanese ruling elite's dangerous aspirations connected with preparations for war against the Soviet Union. Manifestations of this aggressive policy were invariably rebuffed, as attested by the events at Lake Khasan (1938) and in the region of the Halhyn-gol River (1939).

It is noteworthy that in the complicated international situation of those years the Soviet government did its utmost to maintain a certain level for the development of relations with Japan and to use favourable prospects for it, which opened after the bilateral Convention had gone into effect. This was obstructed by the Japanese reactionaries who stepped up their expansionist policy and eventually plunged the Japanese people into the abyss of the Second World War, in which Japan suffered defeat.

In violation of the Neutrality Pact concluded between the USSR and Japan in 1941 the Japanese brass persisted in its provocative activities at Soviet borders, bent on availing itself of an opportunity to attack the USSR, depending on the course of military operations at the Soviet-German front. Japan concentrated the Kwantung army, the biggest grouping of its land forces, close to Soviet territory, regularly blocked Soviet navigation in the Pacific and supplied the Nazi military command with secret information about the USSR. In this connection the Soviet government denounced the Neutrality Pact with Japan in April 1945, having stressed that the document had been rendered void under the circumstances.

Seeking to put an end to the war, to lessen the number of victims and to restore universal peace as soon as possible, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan on August 9, 1945. The Soviet Army launched an offensive against the Kwantung army in Manchuria and dealt it a crushing blow. In August 1945, Japan announced its unconditional surrender.

The routing of Japanese militarism was part of the great victory and meant the end of the Second World War. The defeat of militarist Japan brought liberation to the peoples who had been enslaved by it, boosted the national liberation movement in Asia, speeded up the victory of the Chinese revolution and dealt a great blow to imperialism and its colonial system.

However, for a most dangerous seat of aggression to be eliminated forever in the Far East, it was necessary to consolidate the military-political victory over Japanese militarism by implementing extensive measures to demilitarise and democratise Japan. The USSR insisted on a set of measures that would uproot Japanese militarism and ensure the country's transformation into an independent, peace-loving state. The Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, envisaged that after the end of the war Japan would be granted complete national independence, form its own democratic institutions and develop a peaceful economy and national culture.

While striving hard to ensure Japan's peaceful, democratic development, the Soviet Union also wanted to restore normal diplomatic relations with Japan as soon as possible.

Despite its intentions, however, it took more than 11 years to normalise Soviet-Japanese relations. This was a period of virtually no contacts, commercial, cultural or other relations between the two countries. The reasons for that situation should be sought in the opposition mounted by certain elements in Japan and outside it, determined to preclude the normalisation of these relations and the easing of tensions in Asia. The

US attempts to "legalise" its military presence in that country by ensnaring it in a network of military bases also played a negative role in this.

In the mid-1950s, the movement for the normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union emerged as a formidable force. The country's progressive public actively supported the efforts of the Japanese government and above all Prime Minister I. Hatoyama, who realised the importance of good relations with their Far Eastern neighbour—the Soviet Union. As a result, despite the opposition of some influential opponents of the normalisation of relations, a sober-minded attitude to the USSR and the awareness of the need to take into account the interests of the two neighbouring nations, interests which objectively required that normal contacts between the USSR and Japan be established prevailed in the Japanese government.

As a result of the bilateral talks held in Moscow, the Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration was signed on October 19, 1956 which ended the state of war between the two countries and restored diplomatic and consular relations. The Soviet Union and Japan declared that in their relations they would be guided by the principles formalised in the UN Charter, and in particular, would settle their disputes by peaceful means. The Declaration also recorded the two sides' agreement to enter negotiations in the shortest possible period in order to conclude treaties or agreements to lay a firm foundation for Soviet-Japanese relations in the fields of trade, navigation and so on.

In the period that followed the two sides did a good deal to develop further Soviet-Japanese relations. They succeeded in laying a certain groundwork of treaties and agreements designed not only to regulate relations and contacts in individual areas but also to stimulate their further development. Among those documents were the 1957 Trade Treaty, agreements such as on fishing and direct air and sea communications, the Consular Convention and an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation.

The two countries have maintained fruitful and effective political contacts, including at a high level, since the Joint Declaration was signed. In October 1973, the Japanese Prime Minister came to the Soviet Union on an official visit. Beginning with 1966 the two countries' foreign ministers have been exchanging visits, during which a wide range of problems of bilateral relations as well as important international problems were discussed. The Soviet and the Japanese foreign ministers also began to hold regular meetings during the UN General Assembly sessions in New York.

Parliamentary contacts are also a good example of developing business ties, which facilitate the solution of political and other problems and promote mutual understanding between our nations. Official parliamentary delegations exchanged visits in 1964, 1970, 1975 and 1978. Reciprocal visits were made by the chairmen of the USSR Supreme Soviet Chambers and those of the Japanese Diet; the foreign relations commissions, too, exchanged delegations.

Beginning with 1979, there have been regular bilateral consultations on the level of deputy foreign ministers as well as other useful contacts between representatives of the two countries' foreign ministries.

Maintaining a political dialogue with Japan, the Soviet Union invariably demonstrates its constructive approach to developing relations with that country. The Soviet side always viewed and continues to view goodwill, realism and the taking into account of each other's interests and positions as a reliable basis for progress in mutual relations. Soviet-Japanese contacts have demonstrated that precisely such an approach has yielded tangible positive results in diverse fields.

For example, Soviet-Japanese trade and economic relations have been developing quite actively for a long period. From 1957 to 1983 bilateral trade grew almost 200-fold, reaching 3,004,000 million roubles in 1983. By the way, trade between the two countries is indeed mutually advantageous. Commodity flows between the USSR and Japan graphically illustrate the mutually complementary aspects of their economies. The Soviet Union's major export items are timber, textile raw materials, petroleum and petro-products, solid fuel and so on; beginning in the late 1970s this country expanded export of manufactures, including machines and equipment, to Japan. The Soviet Union imports from Japan primarily machines and equipment, including complete plant for enterprises of the chemical, oil-refining, textile and other industries as well as some other types of equipment.

Of paramount importance to the development of trade and economic ties between the two countries are the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation committees set up in 1965. The committees' efforts are all the more significant since prospects have opened for the two sides' interaction in developing the natural resources of Siberia and the Far East. Two General Agreements on timber were signed in 1968 and 1974, envisaging Japanese supplies of equipment, machines, materials and other commodities to the USSR to develop the timber resources of the Far East; a General Agreement on cooperation in building the port of Vostochny in the Wrangel Bay was signed in 1970; and a General Agreement on Soviet supplies of chips and pulp log lengths of deciduous trees to Japan upon receiving from it the corresponding equipment, machines and materials was signed in 1971. All these agreements have been implemented. Among the agreements signed and now being put into effect are a General Agreement on supplying Japan with coking coal from the Yuzhno-Yakutsk deposit upon receiving the necessary equipment, machines, materials and so on from Japan (signed in 1974), a General Agreement on cooperation in prospecting for and developing oil and gas deposits on the Sakhalin shelf (1975) and the third General Agreement on cooperation in developing Far Eastern timber resources (1981).

It would be a mistake to claim that Japan or the Soviet Union might be unilaterally interested in these projects. The undertakings are mutually advantageous and both nations equally stand to gain from their implementation. Representatives of Japanese business repeatedly have had a chance to see this, too.

It should be said that visits made by large delegations of Japan's leading businessmen to the USSR have greatly contributed to the development of Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation. For instance, in 1976 the Soviet Union was visited by a delegation of a leading Japanese business organisation — the Federation of Economic Organisations — headed by T. Doko, then chairman. In February 1983, another representative delegation of the Japanese business community headed by S. Naganu visited the Soviet Union. The meetings and talks held during those visits focussed on specific areas of prospective large-scale economic cooperation.

Fishing is traditionally a key area of Soviet-Japanese relations. As two major fishing powers, the USSR and Japan engage in large-scale fishing in the same areas of the World Ocean and coastal waters. Relations between them are regulated in this sphere by a number of agreements, including those signed quite recently, such as the Agreement between the Soviet and the Japanese government on mutual relations in the field of fishing along each other's coast (signed on December 7, 1984). The two sides maintain fairly close and active contacts in fishing

and hold consultations between the corresponding Soviet and Japanese ministers.

Taking into consideration the interests of the Japanese fishermen on the Island of Hokkaido and in the north of Honshu, the Soviet Union favourably responds every year to the Japanese request for the right to sea kale trade in some regions of Soviet territorial waters by the Island of Signalny and also to the extraction of some other seafood in Soviet maritime regions, including by organising joint expeditions with some Japanese companies.

Cultural exchanges and contacts in the field of science, sports, etc., have an active role to play in promoting mutual understanding between the Soviet and the Japanese people and expanding their knowledge of each other. Konstantin Chernenko said: "The Soviet people are familiar with the works of the creative genius of the Japanese people. And we know that the Japanese have profound interest in Russian and Soviet culture. After all interest in each other's culture and awareness of the intellectual heritage of every nation is a direct path to its heart and mind."

Indeed the postwar years saw many positive changes in what the Japanese know of the Soviet Union and the life of the Soviet people. Russian and Soviet literature, arts, theatre, ballet and so on are well understood and highly appreciated in Japan. Great interest is evoked by tours by Soviet ballet companies, first and foremost, the Bolshoi Ballet, the Kirov Opera and Ballet Company, the Kiev Company and others. Our circus companies and amateur performers tour Japan with invariable success. Another important aspect of cultural exchanges is the organisation of exhibitions of works of art from Soviet museum collections in Japanese picture galleries much to the delight of the Japanese public.

Japanese art and culture enjoy great esteem in the Soviet Union. The Soviet people are familiar with the works of celebrated Japanese writers Y. Kawabata, R. Akutagawa and many others, pieces of traditional Japanese *ukyo-e* engraving, Japanese national theatre companies and the art of *ikebana*. Perhaps, hardly any other country in the world publishes as many books about Japan and its culture and translations from Japanese classical and modern literature as the USSR does. After a rather prolonged interruption the practice of holding Soviet and Japanese film festivals through government organisations has been resumed.

The two countries maintain cultural contacts on the basis of an agreement reached by the Soviet and the Japanese government on concrete problems of cultural exchanges as well as through Japanese public and private organisations.

Contacts between Soviet and Japanese public organisations contribute greatly to the development of ties between the two nations. The Union of Soviet Friendship Societies and the Soviet-Japanese Friendship Society and, on the Japanese side, some influential organisations advocating friendship with the USSR all play an important role in this. Round-table conferences of representatives of the two countries' public have become a fruitful form of cooperation in establishing truly good-neighbourly relations between the USSR and Japan and in promoting an atmosphere of trust.

The Soviet and the Japanese people can rightfully be proud of achievements in the relations between the two countries in the postwar years. It seemed as though these positive experiences could not leave any

¹ *Prauda*, Aug. 25, 1984.

grounds to doubt the need to further develop mutual ties along the lines of goodneighbourliness, trust and mutual advantage.

But in the late 1970s and the early 1980s Soviet-Japanese relations cooled considerably; as it were, they stagnated in many fields and were even reversed in some areas.

Since the end of the war the USSR has not taken a single step to curtail links with Japan, restricting contacts or lowering the level of relations. Soviet state policy, designed to establish truly goodneighbourly relations between the two countries, is never subject to circumstantial changes and is based on a principled approach. This has been recorded in the resolutions of the CPSU Congresses and reiterated repeatedly in speeches made by Soviet leaders, the Soviet side developed its relations with Japan, working consistently and unswervingly to implement that policy.

The Japanese government adopted a different stand in the early 1980s. It unilaterally restricted political contacts with the Soviet Union, including contacts at the government level, introduced restrictions on signing new mutually advantageous contracts in the commerce and on granting new bank credits to the USSR, and adopted a policy of actually curtailing in other fields, among them in science and technology. These measures were taken under heavy pressure from the United States, which demanded that Japan should follow it in pursuing the policy of "stringent sanctions" against the Soviet Union.

It is absolutely clear that these measures ran counter to the interests of Japan itself, in particular those of its businessmen, who lost many profitable commissions from Soviet foreign trade organisations. As a result, instead of ranking second among the capitalist trade partners of the USSR, Japan ranked only fifth. There was a tendency to a slump in the turnover of goods; it dwindled by more than 18 per cent in 1983, as compared with 1982.

Simultaneously Japan stepped up its campaign of unlawful territorial claims against the USSR in a bid to make the further development of relations dependent on some "concessions" from the Soviet Union. Anti-USSR campaigns were mounted against the backdrop of an actively exploited myth of a "Soviet military threat" used by some Japanese quarters to justify steps taken to build up Japan's military potential. A dangerous shift was also made in Japanese policy in international affairs, first and foremost, in the context of Tokyo's close involvement in Washington's adventurist strategy. Taking concrete measures to strengthen its military alliance with the US, Tokyo did not conceal that it viewed the USSR as the main potential enemy. Naturally, that state of affairs considerably aggravated relations between the USSR and Japan because, as Nikolai Tikhonov, Member of the Politburo CC CPSU, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, said in an interview given to a *Yomiuri* correspondent, "the Japanese government, not without encouragement from the other side of the Pacific, deliberately pursued the policy, I would say, of dismantling the entire system of Soviet-Japanese relations..."² It goes without saying that such policy met with a rebuff from the Soviet side.

Many people in Japan, especially in the past few years, have become aware of the danger of following that policy. They understand that the country's geography, characteristics of the postwar development of its economy, other factors, and in a word, Japan's very national interests call for a stable policy in relations with all countries, including its close neighbour—the Soviet Union. In this connection Andrei Gromyko, Mem-

² *Pravda*, Jan 2, 1984.

ber of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Soviet Foreign Minister, in his address to Japanese readers published by *Asahi* on January 1, 1985, said that any positive shifts in the political mood of the Japanese leadership, especially if they are accompanied by practical deeds, "would be duly appraised by us and meet with the corresponding response, as the Soviet leadership has repeatedly stated".³ The Japanese side should look more realistically at the state of affairs and prevent earlier accomplishments in the development of mutual ties from being rendered void.

Today Japanese officials, including those occupying high ranks in the government, speak out ever more frequently in favour of better relations with the Soviet Union, stressing the importance of maintaining normal relations with the USSR. During meetings with Soviet officials which have become frequent of late representatives of the Japanese government speak about the desire to break the impasse in relations and make them more productive.

In September 1984, Andrei Gromyko met with Japanese foreign minister S. Abe in New York during the 29th UN General Assembly, and in November 1984, Nikolai Tikhonov, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU CC, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers had a talk with Japanese Prime Minister Y. Nakasone in Delhi. During these talks the Japanese officials assured their Soviet counterparts of their desire to improve relations with the USSR and develop cooperation with it. Soviet-Japanese exchanges of parliamentary delegations, which Tokyo had deliberately blocked previously, have now been resumed. In October-November 1984, a representative delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet headed by Dinmukhamed Kunayev, Member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU CC, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan visited Japan. A number of delegations of the Japanese most prominent politicians visited Moscow. The 4th Round Table conference of representatives of the Soviet and the Japanese public was held in October 1984 and discussed various aspects of bilateral relations. The 9th joint conference of the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation committees took place in Tokyo in December 1984; at this conference the two countries' delegations reported the successful implementation of some existing cooperation agreements and made preparations for further talks.

Needless to say, such positive changes can only be welcomed. The Soviet Union maintains a clearcut stand on the question of expanding the Soviet-Japanese dialogue and contacts. It advocates dialogue that would deepen mutual understanding and catalyse the development of bilateral contacts. The Soviet leaders declared in no uncertain terms that if Tokyo were to opt for peace and goodneighbourliness, the USSR would be a reliable partner in developing extensive mutual contacts in the political, economic and other fields.

The Soviet approach to Japan and the clear, constructive programme of developing Soviet-Japanese relations have been expounded in Konstantin Chernenko's address to the readers of the book of his speeches and articles published recently in Japan.

Speaking at an official ceremony for the presentation of Konstantin Chernenko's book to Japanese readers, M. Akagi, a leading Japanese politician, chairman of the Japanese-Soviet Friendship Society and member of the Diet, stressed that "the appearance of Konstantin Chernenko's book, which contains concrete proposals to improve Japanese-Soviet re-

³ *Pravda*, Jan. 2, 1985.

lations, inspires broad sections of the Japanese people advocating the establishment of friendship and goodneighbourliness between the two neighbouring countries. The establishment of truly friendly ties between our two countries ... is of vital importance for the cause of peace in Asia and throughout the world."⁴

The Soviet Union has approached Japan with a number of constructive and far-reaching political initiatives. The USSR is known to have proposed that a treaty on goodneighbourliness and cooperation be concluded between the two countries in areas ripe for a contractual foundation. This, in its turn, would be an important step towards greater mutual trust and a favourable atmosphere for further talks on a peace treaty. The Soviet leaders have also repeatedly proposed that confidence-building measures for the Far East should be worked out jointly with Japan and other interested states. The realisation of that initiative would, on the one hand, help stabilise the situation in the region and, on the other, improve the climate in Soviet-Japanese relations. Besides, the Soviet Union has suggested that Japan and the USSR should exchange opinions on concluding a bilateral agreement on guarantees designed to formalise, in a corresponding legal document, the Soviet pledge not to use nuclear weapons against Japan. The Japanese side could, in its turn, reiterate its pledge to observe strictly and consistently its non-nuclear status. Such an agreement coupled with other constructive steps would, beyond doubt, help eliminate mutual distrust, if there were any in bilateral relations, and would set an example that would open up new opportunities for easing tensions in the Far East.

Tremendous opportunities exist for the development of Soviet-Japanese trade and economic contacts. Bearing in mind the fact that the forthcoming five-year period and the subsequent years are to witness the development of rich regions adjacent to the Baikal-Amur Mainline, the Soviet Union is ready to consider specifically Japan's participation in realising our large-scale plans. It is only natural that the task of putting bilateral relations in this field on a firm and stable basis is especially relevant, as it would be in the interests of both countries and would facilitate the quest for new, promising patterns of business cooperation between them. That is why the Soviet side has recently repeated its proposal that an agreement on the principles of economic cooperation be signed between the Soviet and Japanese governments and its long-term programme be worked out.

There are also great opportunities for expanding Soviet-Japanese cultural exchanges. For example, the Soviet proposal to conclude an inter-governmental agreement on cultural cooperation that would stabilise such relations is still in effect. Other areas of cooperation also have much to offer in this respect but remain, so far, underexploited.

The task is to use the existing potential, to make active efforts to normalise Soviet-Japanese relations and to steer them towards genuine goodneighbourliness on a firm and stable basis. It is especially important to adopt a constructive and realistic approach to each other supported by a sound understanding of the vital interests of the two neighbouring states.

"Geography willed it," Konstantin Chernenko mentioned in his address to the Japanese readers of the collection of his speeches and articles, "that the USSR and Japan be close neighbours. Our coasts are washed by the same Pacific Ocean. But relations between our countries can hardly be called pacific."

"History cannot be re-written. The need to establish truly goodneighbourly, lively relations between the USSR and Japan is especially felt

⁴ *Pravda*, Sept. 5, 1984

in our nuclear age when all of us live in one interrelated and fragile world. This is necessary for the sake of the vital interests of the Soviet and the Japanese peoples, for the sake of peace in Asia and throughout the world."⁵

There is no denying, of course, that the Soviet and the Japanese sides may have different opinions and arrive at different conclusions. But if attention is concentrated on what can unite the two sides and on problems inviting effective interaction, positive results will soon be there. It is, first and foremost, a matter of our common concern for the destinies of peace in the Far East and of the need to pool efforts in the struggle against the threat of war and for the bright future of this and coming generations, and for the restoration and further development of detente.

"We are ready," Konstantin Chernenko emphasised, "to cooperate honestly and constructively with all those genuinely wishing to see world affairs progress towards stronger peace and security, detente and trust rather than towards new stages of the nuclear arms race."⁶ The Soviet Union uses the same approach to Japan, with which it wants to maintain goodneighbourly relations to the benefit of the two nations and for the sake of a stable peace in Asia and on our planet as a whole.

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5. PRAVDA, 25 August 1984.

6. Ibid., 6 December 1984.

JAPAN-CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONS ASSESSED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 85 pp 52-59

[Article by M. I. Krupyanko, candidate of economic sciences: "Japan's Economic Ties with China"]

Japan's economic policy towards China is determined, on the one hand, by the private interests of certain groups of its business community striving for expansion of trade relations with Chinese partners under conditions of chronic instability in the world capitalist market, and, on the other hand, by the general class interests of Japanese monopolistic capital trying to undermine the unity of the world socialist system and to completely sever the PRC from this system. The Japanese ruling circles' readiness to broaden economic links with China thus indicates a desire to gain a firm footing in the Chinese market and use trade and economic levers for influencing PRC policy. Already now, for example, for the sake of good relations with Tokyo, the Chinese leaders say that there is no militarisation in Japan and that it is time to discuss the idea of China's alliance with Japan, the US and Western Europe against the USSR. This concept, put forward by Deng Xiaoping during his visit to Washington early in 1979, determined Peking's practical actions on the world scene for several subsequent years.

The experience of trade and economic relations between Japan and China in the 1970s and the early 1980s has shown that attempts to integrate China in the economic system of the West can be carried out through trade in modern machinery, through the transfer of scientific know-how and technology, through credit cooperation and capital investment. Whereas in the 1970s ordinary trade was given preference, by the beginning of the 1980s ever greater significance began to be attached to credit cooperation, scientific and technological links and investments both in the mining and processing branches of Chinese industry. It stands to reason that such a course could be realised only under conditions of the "open door" policy actively pursued by the Chinese leadership; this implies an expansion of credit-financial and scientific-technological "assistance" from the West. As Zhao Ziyang pointed out during his visit to the US in January 1984: "China has opened its doors and will never shut them".¹

CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF JAPAN'S CREDIT POLICY

In all phases of the development of Japanese-Chinese economic relations credit policy has been the basis of Japan's economic strategy. The character and main directions of this policy were closely connected with the state of political relations between the two countries. Before bilateral relations had been normalised, the Japanese government banned to use state funds to finance trade between Japan and China. Whereas other Western powers, delivering finished industrial products to the Chinese market in the 1960s, widely practiced various forms of middle-term crediting, including the use of state funds, the Japanese government did not find it necessary to resort to credits by the state Export-Import Bank (EIB) in trade with China. Such a position arose, above all, from the complicated relationship in the Japan-US-Taiwan triangle.

Only in December 1972, for the first time since the normalisation of Japanese-Chinese relations, did Japan's government officially approve the

¹ Washington Post, Jan 13, 1984.

use of state credits for the export of complete sets of equipment. That marked the beginning of a qualitatively new phase of Japan's strategy with respect to China, with a wide use of the mechanism of credit in trade and economic ties between the two countries. Thus Japan sought to increase China's credit dependence and exploit it as an important tool for pressurising the Chinese government in questions of foreign and domestic policy. This course was also designed to strengthen the PRC's ties with the capitalist market of loan capital and to completely sever China from credit cooperation with the socialist countries, which successfully developed back in the 1950s. Finally, Japan's monopolistic circles counted on profiting from state assistance in their competition in the Chinese market with US and West European monopolies.

Japan's credit policy towards China often runs into problems due to China's inconsistency in borrowing funds from external sources. The point is that in the 1970s and the early 1980s China adopted a course of inviting massive financial assistance from abroad in accordance with the "open door" policy. At that time some top leaders in Peking believed that it was expedient to acquire large quantities of industrial equipment in the capitalist countries necessary for China's economic modernisation on borrowed money in order to speedily use it in production before the end of this century and then pay back creditors. In order to raise the interest of potential capitalist creditors in granting China huge credits and bolster confidence in it as a trade partner, Peking tried to pose as a strong power, capable of holding a substantial number of Soviet divisions in the Far East. Developed capitalist countries, and first of all Japan, then showed their readiness to grant credits to China to the tune of over \$30,000 million. However, later on the Chinese leaders had to admit that such a course could lead the country to financial dependence on capitalist countries since most Western credits are offered at high interest rates. Besides, Peking realised that in exchange for financial assistance the West expects major political concession from China. So, at present, China is determined to rely mainly on its internal resources, using foreign, including Japanese, credits only cautiously and as a subsidiary.

Mindful of China's zig-zags in its policy on loans and credits, Japan's strategy in bilateral economic relations is applied mainly in two ways: by varying conditions on granting credit and by restricting cooperation in the development of Chinese exports. The latest experience of Japanese-Chinese credit contacts shows that Tokyo, along with granting credits on relatively tough terms (the average repayment deadline not exceeding 7 years and an annual interest rate on all kinds of credit—6-8 per cent), also offers credit on favourable terms. Thus, during his visit to Peking in March 1984, the Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone announced, in particular, the granting to China of a favourable loan of 470,000 million yen (about \$2,000 million) at 3 per cent interest rate to be repaid within 30 years.²

The Japanese government's line of limiting cooperation in the development of the PRC's export basis is especially noteworthy since the difficulties of the Chinese economy, stemming from its growing foreign debt, are compounded by the country's limited export potential. The latter is linked with the increasing demand for fuel and raw materials by China's own economy as it modernises and with the slow expansion of production in the extraction industries. Besides, the present tendency for stabilisation and even reduction of prices on the world market for the main kinds of China's raw materials exports (oil, coal, non-ferrous ores) leads to a reduced volume of foreign currency revenues.

² In *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 5, 1984.

In Tokyo's assessment these main directions of credit-monetary policy with respect to China must directly and indirectly enhance the latter's dependence on the developed capitalist countries, Japan included. In this context the Japanese government also takes into consideration such an objective factor as the low effectiveness of foreign credits in the RPC economy. According to Wang Bingqian, the PRC Minister of Finance, by the beginning of the 1980s, of the \$10,200 million of credits granted to China, the latter had used only 2,200 million, i. e., about 20 per cent.³ The intensive use of foreign credits is bogged down by the overall problems of China's economy. As stressed by Zhao Ziyang at the Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress in May 1984, the Chinese economy is still characterised by low production efficiency, imbalance, and an "irrational" pricing system, as a result of which "the state bears a heavy burden of subsidies, while the centre experiences quite serious financial difficulties".⁴

Thus, the main distinction of Japan's credit policy vis-à-vis the PRC at present and in perspective is the Japanese ruling circles' aspiration to bind China fast to the Japanese market of loan capital and enhance the role of the "credit lever" in influencing the Chinese leadership.

POLICY IN TECHNICAL COOPERATION

Japan's technical cooperation with China is a very important element of its active economic strategy. At the present juncture it constitutes a link within the whole complex of economic measures vis-à-vis China, including credit-monetary cooperation, trade, and investments by Japanese capital in the development of a number of Chinese industries. Without wide-scale and diverse technical assistance from capitalist countries (while refusing to cooperate in this sphere with socialist countries) China can hardly count on the effective use of the purchased industrial plant and obtained foreign credits, i. e., on the successful implementation of the modernisation programme.

Almost throughout the 1970s, technical cooperation between the two countries proceeded on a non-governmental basis through unofficial, private channels. China's partners in Japan were private firms, separate enterprises, scientific establishments and organisations. But in the late 1970s, as the Chinese leadership was revising its policy in regard to scientific and technical exchanges with developed capitalist countries, Japan managed to bring into play powerful governmental financial and scientific organisations. In 1979, intergovernmental agreement was signed on scientific and technical cooperation between Japan and the PRC. It enabled the Japanese government, in addition to measures carried out under agreements with private firms, to use its scientific and technical arsenal to promote ties with China in the sphere of science and technology. Even wider prospects opened for Japan in this respect after China was officially granted the status of a "developing nation" in 1980. The inclusion of China in the group of developing countries made it possible to extend to it all those credit and technical privileges usually granted by Japan within the framework of "development aid" to other countries.

In its policy of technical cooperation with China, Japan seeks not so much to increase the rate and amount of profit, as is the case in its relations with the majority of developing countries, but rather to bind China economically even closer and to strengthen the positions of monopoly capital on the Chinese market.

³ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 13, 1980.

⁴ *Renmin ribao*, June 2, 1984.

The Japanese ruling circles, using China's bad need for foreign technology and know-how in their own interests, are expecting at the same time to reap maximum political advantages. Japanese specialists in China seek the widest possible contacts with local engineers, technicians and scientists. Attempts are being made to influence the working out of concrete research programmes and, on a wider scale, to modify the shaping of the country's economic policy. Tokyo also seeks to distinguish the huge technical assistance given China by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the 1950s from the aid Japan renders China today.

By its policy of technical cooperation with China Japan pursues ideological objectives as well. The point is that technical cooperation, as a rule, means something more than transfer of know-how and experience of the donor-country to the recipient. It also influences the outlook of a great number of technical specialists in the given recipient country. Japan's ruling circles find it important to penetrate the ideological sphere by transferring technological know-how and influence the minds of broad sections of Chinese technical intelligentsia. In this case Japan pursues an important objective of ideological expansion in China, since the transfer of technical know-how is accompanied not only by the transfer of elements of the productive forces but of elements of new relations of production as well. Japan seeks to introduce some elements of capitalist organisation of production to Chinese enterprises in order to increase China's scientific and technical dependence on the West. Cooperation with China today is supposed to create a more favourable climate for investment of Japanese capital as regards the economic, social and political aspects. The transfer of technical know-how thus serves as a kind of "lubricant" for a deeper penetration into the Chinese market over the long term. Japan's efforts are directed above all at creating a sufficient number of specialists trained at capitalist enterprises in a number of highly productive branches, as well as at creating capacious markets, and developing infrastructure. In the final count the attainment of these conditions is the aim of technical cooperation which is an objective necessity for China. Without it the process of modernisation would proceed very slowly and economic relations with industrially developed countries would be difficult.

Japan sees the low efficiency of programmes of technical cooperation with China and tries to expand, to a certain degree, the latter's possibilities of using new machinery and technology. This is a prerequisite for the continued growth of orders from the PRC. Japan also renders assistance to China in the mining industry, thus solving the task of "aiding development" through import. In fact, Japan grants to China financial aid and technical consultations in developing its natural resources and improving the mining industry with the aim to limit the growth of China's export potential.

Technical cooperation with the PRC also serves purely pragmatic aims. The Japanese are actively using every chance provided by the Chinese government to gather accurate information about China, its economic potential, foreign trade policy, etc. As is known, the Chinese authorities give the right to separate enterprises and agricultural units, educational and scientific institutions to establish technical links with private Japanese firms, organisations, scientific and educational establishments. These enterprises and institutions are allowed to buy, depending on the size of their own budgets and foreign currency funds, the necessary technology, equipment, licenses, patents, documentation, as well as to invite to China foreign specialists, lecturers, and to expand the so-called "fraternal relations" between separate collectives and private firms abroad.

Thus, it is apparent that Japan intends, through wider scientific and technical contacts with China, to strengthen its own commercial position in that country, to increase exports of finished goods, and to be able to influence the development of various branches of China's economy. Tokyo is banking on technical cooperation as an important tool of political pressure on China. Expanding the framework of technical exchanges, Japan is establishing closer contacts with Chinese specialists and scientists. It must be stressed that in its relations with China, Japan, on the whole, does not minimize the transfer of know-how, as is the case with other socialist countries. On the contrary, Japan maximizes the framework of technical cooperation with Peking.

JAPAN'S INVESTMENT-ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY IN CHINA: A PROMISING TREND

In the early 1980s, Japan's ruling circles watched with alarm the incipient decline in Japan-China trade relations, which threatened to be of a protracted nature. The press and special studies with increasing frequency expressed the views that Japanese-Chinese relations were undergoing a period of restructuring to be accompanied with a slump. Thus in May 1982, the weekly *Japan Economic Journal* noted that economic ties between Japan and China had entered a phase of protracted downward curve and were experiencing great difficulties in their development.⁵ At the same time it was pointed out that as distinct from the 1970s, when the main problems were engendered by political instability in China and its zig-zag policy vis-à-vis the West, in the 1980s the dynamics and character of Japanese-Chinese relations are mainly determined by economic factors. The latter include, in our opinion, primarily the fact that Japan's exports to China invariably exceeded its imports from that country (by over \$4,000 million in 1975-1980 alone). This hampered the steady growth of China's purchases of finished industrial products in the Japanese market and compelled China to periodically limit its imports from Japan in order to cut the trade imbalance. With this in mind, in the early 1980s, Japan substantially increased its purchases in China.

Japanese firms' business activities in China in the 1970s and the early 1980s were fraught with great economic risk which limited to a certain degree their number and the scope of their operations. At the beginning of the 1980s, the leading Japanese universal trade corporations, such as *Mitsui* and *Mitsubishi* (the main counterparts of the Chinese foreign trade organisations) were forced on this account to cut back the number of their subsidiaries in China.

Japan's ruling circles, realistically assessing the perspectives for Japan-China trade in the 1980s, have begun more actively to use new forms of economic exchange, such as mixed enterprises, wider cooperation in production, and the participation of Japanese capital in the development of China's natural resources. For Japan investment in the Chinese economy is a method to realise its own strategic plans with regard to the PRC, rather than a means to deeply involve in the international division of labour. This is not to say, however, that Japanese monopolies do not care about purely economic objectives.

Japan's monopolistic circles consider export of capital to China to be a means for boosting commodity exports, and above all the export of investment commodities. Export of capital to China can increase the export of complete sets of equipment, materials, technology, i. e., all those items which are part and parcel of active trade and economic relations

⁵ *Japan Economic Journal*, May 4, 1982.

between the two countries. It must be stressed that in contrast with many other countries that are rather cautious in inviting Japanese capital, the Chinese authorities do not put obstacles in the way of Japanese investors. Moreover, they bend over backward to please them.

Japanese entrepreneurs also pin certain hopes on the possibility of exporting their products, manufactured in China, to the not easily accessible markets of the US and Western Europe. The point is that already at the Second UNCTAD Conference in New Delhi in 1968 the developed capitalist countries, under the pressure of developing nations, agreed to allow them easier exports to their domestic markets. With the introduction of the system of preferential tariffs, the American and West European markets have become much more accessible for developing countries. Japanese entrepreneurs jumped at this opportunity and expanded the output of finished goods at mixed enterprises in developing countries so as to increase the export of formally non-Japanese products, which are, however, the end result of Japanese capital. At the beginning of the 1980s, Japanese investors just began to create mixed production in China and therefore could not count on selling competitive products on the US and West European markets in sufficient quantities. However, with the growing scale of Japan's investment-entrepreneurial activity in China the flow of such products can noticeably increase.

Japanese investors also show much interest in depositing capital in various kinds of combined Japanese-Chinese raw materials projects. An important stimulus here is the so-called "multiplication effect" of invested capital which results from the fact that Japanese companies have the possibility of simultaneous participation in different sides of the project: in construction, in building transport facilities, creating the industrial infrastructure, service facilities, etc. From experience in other countries, Japanese investors know that often investments in the mining industry ensure them a lot of business links, enabling them to build "bridges" to other industries in the recipient country. Taking into account China's great interest in inviting Japanese capital into the mining industry, part of the products of which is oriented to export, Japanese exporters of capital are expecting a stable market in this sphere of the Chinese economy too. A stimulus for the Japanese investors is provided by the upward tendency of the yen against the dollar, as a result of which it is more profitable for Japan, than for the US, to export capital to China in the form of industrial plant, materials, and payment for manpower. So it is important for Japanese investors to beat their rivals from other capitalist countries in gaining a firm foothold in the Chinese market.

Also of some importance for the Japanese investors is economising on wages paid at Chinese enterprises, which are still much lower than in other countries where Japanese capital is used.

At the same time Japanese investment in the PRC is supposed to achieve not only economic goals. Propaganda objectives are, perhaps, of even greater significance. Japan's ruling circles are actively trying to demonstrate to the wide Chinese public, including workers, technicians, and engineers, the advantages of working at enterprises where Japanese capital has been applied as compared with state-owned factories and plants. Japan is thus trying to change the mentality of Chinese workers, particularly young ones, with respect to working conditions at capitalist enterprises with their exploitation and system of payment. The Japanese investors are out to accustom Chinese workers to the idea that mixed enterprises and those included into the system of production cooperation with Japanese companies, can and must exist in China and that they are virtually the beacons of advanced experience and the scientific organisation of labour. It is these enterprises that must speed up the process of modernisation in China.

An important political aspect of Japanese investment in China can also be seen in the "service" rendered by Japan to the US in using the Chinese factor in Washington's global anti-Soviet strategy. Japanese capital in the PRC enables the Japanese government to view China as a kind of a "proving ground" in Asia for working out new and improving old methods of political and economic expansion in socialist countries. The fact that China is compelled to make concessions to Japan, in particular in providing more favourable terms for exporting capital, proves that economic policy is effective on this score.

In the late 1970s, in an interview with the journal *Keidanren geppo*, I. Inayama, President of the Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren), pointed out that "for Japan ordinary trade was the most desirable kind of economic ties with any country, including China. However, relations with the latter must take into account not only economic but also political aspects. Therefore, in order to promote political stability in the region and throughout the world, Japan must, aside from ordinary trade, provide economic aid to China by exporting capital there. Of course, Japan cannot develop China's economy instead of China, but Japan will always take into account to what extent its economic aid promotes peace and stability in Asia and all over the world".⁶

An analysis of Japan's economic policy towards China during the 1970s and the early 1980s shows that it is based above all on political, rather than commercial, considerations. Tokyo's official circles proceed from the view that the development of trade, credit cooperation, scientific and technical links, as well as the export of capital, all actively involve China in the orbit of Western economic and political influence, bind it to the capitalist market and inevitably foist political obligations on the Chinese government which are advantageous to the capitalist countries. At a press-conference held by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone after his talks with Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the CC CPC, in Tokyo in November 1983, it was directly stated that "the preservation and development of stable relations of peace and friendship between Japan and China on the eve of the 21st century, notwithstanding their different social systems, are of much importance not only for the two countries, but for peace and prosperity around the world. The year 1978 saw the signing of a treaty of peace and friendship which laid down the main principles of relations between our countries. The talks just held have confirmed our loyalty to these principles. We note with regret the relentless growth of tension in the international situation in recent years. We are particularly concerned over regional conflicts and the Soviet Union's build-up of its military potential. If these tendencies get stronger, they will inevitably pose a serious threat to peace. I find it significant that Japan and China, from their positions, will call the countries concerned to exert efforts in favour of peace and in the interests of promoting stability in Asia and all over the world. Striving to consolidate Japanese-Chinese relations of friendship and cooperation so that they can be handed down to our children and grandchildren in the 21st century, we find it desirable to set up a Japanese-Chinese friendship committee of the 21st century".⁷ Propaganda rhetoric aside, it can be noted that the Japanese Prime Minister unequivocally underscored the coincidence in the long term of both countries' policies towards the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

During Nakasone's visit to Peking in March 1984, further steps were taken to expand economic contacts between Japan and China. At that time, as has already been noted, the Japanese Premier announced the

⁶ *Keidanren geppo*, 1979, No. 6, pp. 41-42.

⁷ *Asahi*, Nov. 25, 1983.

granting to China of long-term loans to the tune of about \$2,000 million.⁸ In late October, it was made known in Peking that Japan's Export-Import Bank was granting China another loan of \$2,400 million to be used for the working of China's oilfields and coal deposits. The Chinese leadership's desire to use in the future too Japan's financial and technical "aid" is testimony of certain successes of the economic policy of the Japanese ruling circles.

In all probability the main trends of Tokyo's economic policy with respect to the PRC in the 1980s will be: firstly, attempts to increase China's dependence in the sphere of finances through more extensive crediting and varying conditions for granting credit.

Secondly, Japan will continue to exploit such a factor as the low efficiency of imported industrial plant, delivered on contract by Japanese companies and installed at Chinese enterprises where it is serviced by local workers and technicians. This, Tokyo hopes, will create a greater need for Japanese specialists at these enterprises at all stages of the production process. The best possibilities in this respect can be provided by enterprises maintaining cooperation ties with Japanese firms, as well as by mixed enterprises.

Thirdly, the Japanese side plans to hold under certain control the development of the PRC's exports, resorting with this aim in view to purposeful credits and deliveries of complex equipment. Granting China additional money, Japan will simultaneously give Chinese exporters the possibility to realise a part of their goods on Japan's domestic market, thus strengthening the trade and economic ties between China and Japan.

In the 1980s, economic relations between the two countries are marked by new trends and features which demand serious study. Their scientific analysis is necessary not only to provide practical activity with the objective and full picture of the economic policy of a capitalist country, in this case Japan, in relation to a socialist country, China, but also to help neutralise the possible undesirable consequences of this policy for the Soviet Union.

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8. IZVESTIYA, 28 March 1984.

ASEAN POLICIES SEEN HINDERING CREATION OF ASIAN PEACE ZONE

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 85 pp 60-72

[Article by A. P. Vasyugov and I. S. Galichev: "ASEAN's Approach to Creating a Zone of Peace in Southeast Asia: Illusions and Reality"]

Since the end of World War II the attention of the world public has been constantly focussed on Southeast Asia. There are few points on the globe where, due to US imperialism, the flames of war which poisoned the international political atmosphere have burst forth so often in recent years, or where dangerous hotbeds of tension have sprung up with such frequency. The triumph of the peoples of Indochina over US aggression eliminated a dangerous seat of war in Southeast Asia and gave all the countries in the region an opportunity fundamentally to restructure their relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence, and to channel the efforts of the peoples of those countries towards solving the urgent tasks of socio-economic development.

The defeat of imperialism and its puppets together with the victory won by the forces of peace and socialism in Indochina brought about serious changes in the alignment of forces in the region: the aggressive block SEATO was disbanded, US military bases in Thailand were eliminated, and diplomatic relations between the countries of Indochina and the members of ASEAN were established. All these changes made ASEAN¹ leaders reconsider how the Southeast Asian political situation might develop and considerably revise their policies with an eye to adapting them to the reality.

Under these conditions, the proposal on turning Southeast Asia into a region of peaceful cooperation and a zone of peace, stability and good-neighbourliness has been put on the political agenda by the very course of events. Are there any similarities between the positions of the Indochina states and the members of ASEAN on this issue? What prevents the states of Southeast Asia from making their desire to see the region peaceful and secure a reality?

The answers to these questions can be found not only in the specifics of the current political situation in Southeast Asia, but also in its history. The situation in the region also cannot be viewed without taking into account the links between events there and the deep-seated processes determining the current global situation.

TWO CONCEPTS, TWO "ZONES" — TWO APPROACHES

Different schemes for "neutralising" Southeast Asia and ensuring a "peaceful settlement" there were set forth prior to 1975. However, the necessary prerequisites for implementing such proposals came into existence only after the defeat of US imperialism in Southeast Asia and the elimination of pro-imperialist puppet regimes in Indochina.

¹ ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Initially it included Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. In January 1984, it was joined by Brunei when the latter gained its independence.

The plan for setting up a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality" (ZOPFAN) set forth by Malaysia in 1968, a year after ASEAN was formed, holds a special place among the various plans for the "pacification" of Southeast Asia. The "neutralisation" of Southeast Asia which embraces the ASEAN states, Indochinese countries and Burma, was the principal aim of the Malaysian proposal which subsequently became the key to Kuala Lumpur's foreign policy. The plan envisaged guarantees from the three great powers: the US, USSR and PRC.

In 1971, this plan or, to be more precise, its concept, was approved at a conference of ASEAN Foreign Ministers (The Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971). With an eye to implementing the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, ASEAN set up an ad hoc committee which elaborated the fundamental principles of the "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality". These principles were approved in April 1973 at a conference of ASEAN Foreign Ministers held in Thailand. The states within the "zone" were strictly to abide by the provisions of the UN Charter, the Bandung Conference, the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 on the creation of ASEAN, and the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971. The countries in the "zone" undertook to build relations with all countries, including those within the "zone" and those beyond it, on the basis of mutual respect for national specific features, independence, sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity. They also pledged to refrain both from being drawn into conflicts between the powers beyond the "zone", and from concluding agreements incompatible with the principles of the "zone". The creation of foreign military bases on the territory of states belonging to the "zone" was declared inadmissible. The use, storage, manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons or their components within the limits of the "zone" was also banned.

Was the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration a propaganda gesture on the part of ASEAN or did it express the sincere aspiration of those who were then the leaders of the Association? It is probably impossible to give a definite answer to this question. One can think it a pity that the principles of the Declaration remained only on paper. It should be pointed out that, in spite of ASEAN's adherence to the concept of a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality", an adherence which, until recently, was reiterated more than once, the members of ASEAN have never had a single approach to this problem and therefore they are not ready for business-like negotiations. Each ASEAN country has had its own opinion on how Southeast Asia could be turned into a "zone of peace" and on what prospects that will have. Within each country various political leaders have different understandings and interpretations of the problems of setting up such a "zone".

Malaysia has been the most consistent vehicle of the abovementioned interpretation of the "zone" although it has not always been sufficiently active in promoting it. In the main, Indonesia shares Malaysia's stand. Singapore is skeptical of the "zone of peace" concept. For a relatively long time now it has held that the "balance of superpower presence" constitutes the best method for preserving peace and avoiding conflicts in Southeast Asia. However, as soon as socialism began strengthening its positions in the region, particularly after the Pol Pot regime had been toppled, Singapore set about advocating the need for a broader US presence in Southeast Asia (and for a PRC presence to a somewhat lesser extent) to avert "the threat of spreading Soviet influence". Thailand is also in the right flank of ASEAN on this issue. The ruling elite of that country is banking on military cooperation with the US and closer relations with China to guarantee Thailand's security. The Philippines, too, is staking on the US to a considerable degree. US military bases are still situated on the territory of that country. During the Philippine-US

talks held in Honolulu in August 1980, Ferdinand Marcos stated that the transformation of Southeast Asia into a "zone of peace and neutrality" should be viewed as an event which would not be occurring in the near future. In general, Brunei supported the ZOPFAN idea although it has not explained its position in great detail.

As for the countries of Indochina, they demonstrate a different approach to the problems of strengthening peace and stability in the region.

Vietnam's peaceable proposals were set forth in an interview given to VIA by Nguyen Dui Trinh, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on July 5, 1976, three days after the proclamation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. These proposals represent a peace programme of sorts for Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese spokesman put forward four principles on the basis of which Vietnam was going to build relations with the other states in the region. They were founded on the Pancha shila principles, the ten principles of the Bandung Conference (1955), and the generally recognised standards of international law recorded in the UN Charter. Moreover, the ASEAN countries' stand was also taken into account.

In 1981, the Foreign Minister of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Ph. Sipaseuth, speaking on behalf of the three Indochinese states, presented the UN General Assembly with a policy-making statement on the principles underlying relations between the countries of Indochina and the ASEAN states. The principles included respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries in the region, non-aggression, non-interference, equality, mutual benefit; settlement of all controversial issues by peaceful means exclusively without the threat or use of force, the right to individual and collective defence in accordance with the UN Charter; development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation among all the states of Southeast Asia in economic, technical, scientific, cultural and other spheres; respect for the sovereignty the littoral countries of the region possess over their territorial waters, economic zone and shelf area. It was stressed that countries outside Southeast Asia should respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states in the region, which, in turn, should not give their territories to any country within or without Southeast Asia for use as a springboard for aggression and direct or indirect interference in the affairs of other countries.

Clearly, there are no fundamental differences between the principles set forth in the zone of peace proposals made by the two groups of states. It was precisely for this reason that the foreign ministers of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea meeting in the summer of 1983 expressed their readiness to use the proposal made by the ASEAN countries on setting up a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality as the basis for discussion between the countries of Indochina and ASEAN on turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability.

Thus, the matter came to hinge on the question, of whether ASEAN countries adhere to their own declarations and translate them into political reality.

"THE KAMPUCHEAN FACTOR"

The policy pursued by Pol Pot's "Democratic Kampuchea" was a factor which seriously complicated and destabilised the situation not only in Indochina, but in the whole region as well and caused tension in relations between the Southeast Asian states after the liberation of South Vietnam and reunification of that country, the victory of the people's democratic revolution in Laos and the overthrow of the Lon Nol regime in Kampuchea. It is common knowledge that the Pol Pot men had a pathological hatred of Vietnam, and before the fall of Saigon, staged incessant attacks and provocations on the border between the two count-

ries, which later turned into a real war. By the end of 1976, the situation on the border between "Democratic Kampuchea" and Laos had also deteriorated sharply. In addition, the Pnompenh authorities staged numerous provocations on the border with Thailand. The Pol Pot gangs attacked Thai villages in the area along the border, seized cattle, burnt crops, and murdered peaceful Thai peasants. Pol Pot's men were not only seeking to create a strip of "scorched land" in the border area, but they were also striving to "regain" the provinces of Eastern Thailand (Surin, Bariram, Sisaket) which had once belonged to the Cambodian Empire. Thus, Pol Pot's Kampuchea became a source of constant tension in the region and a threat to the security of its neighbours.

The Kampuchean problem acted as a brake on the natural development of relations between Vietnam and ASEAN countries long before the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime.

When contradictions between socialist Vietnam and Kampuchea had become aggravated, the position of the "Five" proved to be far from neutral. Well aware of who directed the policies of "Democratic Kampuchea", ASEAN thought that the conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam would provide the Association with room to manoeuvre and it tried to use the contradictions for its own purposes. The potential weakening of Vietnam as a result of the pressure brought to bear on it from the southwest and the north was quite to ASEAN's liking. The reactionary wing of the Association expressed cynical satisfaction over the existence of the "Kampuchean buffer" between the "Five" and Vietnam. A contradiction emerged between the words of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on promoting peace, stability and neutrality in the region and the deeds of ASEAN.

The long awaited overthrow of the Pol Pot regime, which was brought about by the patriotic forces of Kampuchea with the help of Vietnamese volunteers, not only put an end to a gloomy period in the history of the Vietnamese-Kampuchean relations, but eliminated a hotbed of tension and war in Southeast Asia, and became a prerequisite for establishing genuine peace, stability and goodneighbourliness in the region. From the very first days of its existence, the People's Republic of Kampuchea stated that it was ready to adhere to the principles of peaceful coexistence and goodneighbourliness in its relations with all its neighbours.

However, right after the overthrow of the Pol Pot clique and the formation of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, ASEAN states displayed a deeply hostile attitude towards the changes occurring in that country. The Association regarded the overthrow of the anti-popular regime in Pnompenh and the coming to power of the national-patriotic forces in Kampuchea as an "intensification of the communist menace" and began to consolidate ASEAN along anti-Vietnamese and anti-socialist lines.

ASEAN started bringing pressure to bear on Vietnam in a variety of ways in a bid to make it withdraw the contingents of Vietnamese volunteers from Kampuchea, an act which would inevitably lead to the restoration of the brutal Pol Pot regime. The ASEAN states refused to recognise the People's Republic of Kampuchea and declared their unconditional support for the non-existent "Democratic Kampuchea". Their relations with the SRV were frozen in all spheres. To increase the pressure on the SRV they enlisted the "American factor" (Thailand and the Philippines secured from the US a reiteration of its commitments under the Manila Treaty of 1954 which, as is well known, was the "embryo" of SEATO). Attempts were also made to use China as a counterweight to Vietnam. ASEAN states looked with satisfaction upon China's acts of aggression against Vietnam, which, according to the ASEAN states, were taken in response to the introduction of Vietnamese units to Kampuchea.

The withdrawal of those units has been made one of ASEAN's primary foreign policy goals. According to ASEAN strategists, the pull-out of the

Vietnamese contingents would create a "vacuum of force" in Kampuchea which would be filled by some "neutral" government "independent of Vietnam", which "naturally" would be favourably disposed towards the Association. In other words, this is nothing but an overt act of interference in the internal affairs of the PRK and an attempt to establish a government in sovereign Kampuchea, which would be to the liking of ASEAN's ruling circles.

Moreover, a blind eye is deliberately turned to the obvious fact that the restoration of the Pol Pot regime (no matter under which cover) is a threat to the security of the peoples in the whole region, including the ASEAN countries. It should be also borne in mind that the Pol Pot regime was responsible for immense human and material losses and actually created armed conflicts along all of Kampuchea's borders with its neighbours, including Thailand.

If one assumes that the ASEAN countries really want peace and security for the region, the tough policy they pursue in regard to the countries of Indochina is unproductive because, as a result of this policy, the ASEAN states are increasingly being drawn into the military orbit of the US which has been plotting to turn the Association into a military grouping opposed to socialism.

ASEAN'S MILITARISATION

After the PRK was formed, the militarisation of the ASEAN states which created the prerequisites for converting the Association into a political-military and later into military-political alliance (whether its members want it or not) has become an important part of ASEAN's activities.

During the past decade the intensification of military cooperation among the members of ASEAN was carried out along the following lines: information was exchanged on military actions and programmes in order to coordinate them;² the exchange of intelligence information was improved and new channels for transmitting data were set up; armaments were standardised; joint military operations were carried out against rebel and separatist movements in border areas (including the revival in 1981 of the ANZUK agreement on the defence of Malaysia and Singapore by Britain, Australia and New Zealand); the joint training of military personnel and regular joint military exercises were carried out involving all types of armed forces on a bilateral or multilateral basis with the participation of members of the organisation or with the armed forces of the US, Britain and Australia. After 1979 these efforts were intensified.

The question of turning ASEAN into a military bloc has not yet been removed from the agenda. The Thai military are most active in this respect. When visiting the US early in 1979 the Prime Minister of Thailand declared that the ASEAN states might hold consultations on the expediency of converting the Association into a military bloc. In 1980, Bangkok made an attempt to persuade its allies in ASEAN to hold negotiations on setting up a new regional "security system" which would replace SEATO in some respects.

The attempts the ASEAN military have made to obtain ultra modern weapons have caused grave concern among the public of the Southeast Asian countries. A question arises in Southeast Asia and beyond it: why is this being done? Do the members of ASEAN really need to have

² In 1981, a special group was formed at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta to study recommendations for the Association's military-political leadership which would plan the further strengthening and development of the national armed forces in the common interests of the organisation.

AWACS, purchased by Singapore, to "keep tabs" on territories which are more than 800 kilometres away from the borders of the ASEAN countries? Do they really need F-16 fighters capable of delivering nuclear warheads to targets situated some 1,000 kilometres away (such as Hanoi and Haiphong among other places)? It should be borne in mind that AWACS are flown by American crews and the information they obtain is processed by US intelligence officers. US military personnel are also needed to keep Thailand's F-16s repaired and ready for combat. This only warrants the conclusion that ASEAN's military buildup merely converts its members into an appendage of the US war machine.

The Pentagon has been nurturing far-reaching plans as far as South-east Asia is concerned. The question of stationing additional nuclear warheads, cruise missiles and chemical weapons there is "under study". It seems that the accelerated formation of ASEAN's military structure, the schemes for turning the Association into a military-political bloc and the inclusion of ASEAN states in the US strategy are at loggerheads with the national interests of those states, to say nothing of the fact that such steps diametrically oppose the aims of "peace and neutrality".

THE RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE AND THE ASEAN POSITION

ASEAN's tough stand which was reflected in the pressure it brought to bear on Vietnam and in its demand for the "immediate and unconditional" withdrawal of the Vietnamese volunteers from Kampuchea as a *sine qua non* for the resumption of dialogue between the two groups of countries failed to withstand the test of time. The Association had to agree to the resumption of contacts between the Foreign Ministry of Vietnam, on the one hand, and those of the ASEAN states, on the other. Although, as a result of this dialogue, tension in the region has somewhat subsided and a step has been made towards overcoming mutual alienation, mistrust and apprehensions, it nonetheless, failed thus far to bring about a radical improvement in the situation in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN countries still refuse to recognise the real state of things, i.e., the existence in the region of two groups of states belonging to different socio-economic systems. The changes in the stand taken by the members of ASEAN are either purely cosmetic (for example, harsh and insulting words concerning the action of Vietnam are no longer used) or represent an attempt to wrest an obviously unacceptable concession from the Indochinese countries "in return" for some invented concession from the ASEAN countries.

As far as the "Kampuchean settlement" is concerned, ASEAN's policy is still based on the demand that the Vietnamese volunteers be withdrawn from Kampuchea and that "free elections under the UN supervision" be held there. In this, however, the legitimate right of the Kampuchean people to self-determination is ignored. The Kampucheans made their choice during the elections when they gave their votes to the representatives of the popular government. Their attitude towards Pol Pot's thugs is quite clear: those butchers will never be allowed to return to Kampuchea.

The coordinated stand of the PRK and the SRV on the withdrawal of the Vietnamese military personnel is quite clear: the volunteers will be withdrawn when the external threat to Kampuchea's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity is removed. The threat being reduced, Kampuchea and Vietnam, on the basis of a mutual agreement, will carry out a partial withdrawal of the Vietnamese volunteers. Some troops have already been pulled out of Kampuchea in four stages (the most recent pullout occurred in late June 1984).

If ASEAN leaders really care about the withdrawal of the Vietnamese units which they call a "threat to Thailand" and an obstacle to the "im-

plementation of the right of the Khmer people to self-determination", they should have to eradicate the situation which brought the Vietnamese contingents into the People's Republic of Kampuchea, by putting an end to the border war against Kampuchea, and disarming the gangs of Khmer reactionaries which have their bases in Thailand, are armed by external powers and instructed by foreign specialists. Thus, when dealing with the question of the "withdrawal of Vietnamese troops" which, the Association has declared, will play a key role in normalising its relations with the countries of Indochina, ASEAN exploits the problem which has been created at least with its active participation and connivance.

The same can be said of the "Kampuchean refugees" problem. Kampuchea has repeatedly expressed its readiness to take back from Thailand thousands of people driven away by the Pol Pot men or those who left the country earlier because of the Pol Pot genocide. Bangkok would like to continue to exploit the "refugees" problem, the desired result of its policy, or even to "export" the complicated and explosive set of problems which it has created through its own policy, to its neighbour, Kampuchea. The implementation of the ASEAN proposal on the establishment of "liberated areas" in Kampuchea along its border with Thailand would actually be tantamount to the creation of the Palestine-type situation, when part of the Khmer people would live on the territory of their own country as "refugees".

The following should be said about the reasons behind ASEAN's tough stand on the "Kampuchean problem" and its persistent striving to bring this problem into the forefront of world politics. The process of the turning of the Association into a single regional economic organisation, to say nothing of the integration of the economies of the "Six", is far from complete. As a matter of fact, ASEAN emerged as an internationally recognised political organisation with a certain emphasis on military cooperation in 1979.³ Events in Kampuchea were used by the ruling circles in the ASEAN countries to consolidate the membership on an anti-communist and anti-Vietnamese basis. Moreover, by exploiting the "Kampuchean problem", the ASEAN countries facilitated their cooperation with the West, and enhanced, in a certain sense, ASEAN's prestige in the capitalist world as a unified organisation.

It is no secret that there is no unity within the Association with regard to the crucial issues in its relations with the countries of Indochina, as well as the role and place of third powers in the region. Meanwhile, the ruling elite in Thailand and the right-wing military circles in that country, seeking to present it as an outpost and bulwark of the "free world" against "Vietnamese expansion" in the region, actively utilise the ASEAN "solidarity". Political observers rightfully note that the Thai generals also make use of this invented external threat to buttress their role in the political life of the country.⁴

In striving to display a broader and well thought-of approach to relations with the countries of Indochina, Indonesia, the biggest country in the region, takes a stand which differs from that of other ASEAN countries. Indonesian politicians are apprehensive about the actions of Bangkok which is ready to use any enemies of the Indochinese peoples to pursue its anti-Vietnamese line, thereby becoming an instrument of a policy which is alien to regional interests.

³ Prior to 1979, the annual meetings of ASEAN ministers were reduced to unproductive discussions of ZOPFAN and "the five joint economic projects", not very successful attempts to find new commodities for the list of trade preferences, and political juggling in an attempt to avoid potentially explosive questions related to Eastern Timor, Sabah, and the activities of Muslim rebels in the Philippines and Thailand.

⁴ See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 10, 1984.

In recent years Indonesia has increasingly become the leader of ASEAN. The statesmen of that country who possess vast experience in dealing with representatives of different groups of states exhibit substantial realism, a sense of responsibility for peace in the region, and political far-sightedness. As compared with the other ASEAN countries, Indonesia is also marked by a somewhat greater degree of independence from the US and the latter's allies in Asia and Western Europe.

Indonesia and Thailand hold different views on the key question of how peace and security will be maintained in the region in the future and of who actually poses a threat to peace, stability and cooperation in Southeast Asia. In the opinion of Indonesian political leaders, this threat is posed by the PRC, which does not belong to the region, rather than by an imaginary Vietnamese "regional hegemonism". Malaysia holds a similar opinion. Hussein Onn, a former Prime Minister and Malaysia's most outstanding politician, has said recently that it is China which poses a threat to the countries of Southeast Asia.⁶

Unlike Thailand, Indonesia maintains that the introduction of the Vietnamese units to Kampuchea was not an act of "annexation" or "expansion" but was a matter of "national survival" and that "in fact, Vietnam is unable to attack the other Southeast Asian countries."⁶ According to political observers, the sober trends in the Indonesian leadership's approach to Southeast Asian problems developed in 1984. Early last year Beni Murdani, Commander-in-Chief of Indonesia's armed forces, made a trip to Vietnam. Upon his return home Murdani stated: "Judging from the impressions of my four-day visit and consultations with the Vietnamese leaders I came to the conclusion that Vietnam has common goals with ASEAN". "Bringing the Vietnamese troops into Kampuchea was motivated by considerations of national survival and the needs to secure the country... Vietnam has no territorial ambitions".⁷

Some ASEAN countries (Thailand first and foremost) met these words from Jakarta with alarm. Efforts were made to "unite" the ranks on the basis of anti-Vietnamese sentiments. As a result of conferences of ASEAN foreign ministers held in May and July, 1984, the "Six" reaffirmed their policy of supporting the "democratic coalition" headed by Sihanouk and demanded the withdrawal of Vietnamese units from Kampuchea.

Recent developments demonstrate however that there is a trend among sober-minded political leaders in ASEAN towards conducting constructive dialogue with the states of Indochina. Realising that the "ASEAN common line has not worked" and that efforts to continue bringing pressure to bear on Vietnam have only intensified rifts between the countries in the Association, i. e., adversely affected the unity of the group, Jakarta took the initiative to improving bilateral relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam late in 1982. Since that time it has succeeded in winning official support for its policy from other ASEAN countries.

Jakarta considered the Indochinese proposal that Pol Pot's men be removed from the "coalition" to be a key issue, a decisive step forward, and an important new component in the stand of the Indochinese countries opening up new vistas for bringing the concepts of the two groups closer together, reaching practical mutual understanding and even mutual activities. This is of great importance for the ASEAN countries which should also have no interest in seeing the Pol Pot regime restored. *Indonesia Times* wrote on April 24, 1984 that "the liquidation of the Polpotian gangs is a *sine qua non* for the Cambodian settlement". This political settlement as such deserves a most serious scrutiny.

⁶ See *New Straits Times*, May 30, 1984.

⁶ See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 29, 1984.

⁷ See *Indonesia Times*, March 14, 1984.

The awareness of the fact that the crisis situation in Southeast Asia act like a magnet on hegemonic and imperialistic powers, which pose as ASEAN "defenders" while in actual fact make use of conflicts in the region to fight for the "spheres of influence" and recarve those "spheres", was the chief reason why Indonesia modified its stand and realistically-minded political figures and groups in the ASEAN states began to speak out.

One important factor is worthy of note. Today the problem of "external influence" is widely discussed in the Association. It's indicative that ASEAN favours preservation of US military bases in the region, saying that this issue cannot be a subject for negotiation with the countries of Indochina. Some ASEAN states openly advocate the preservation and considerable expansion of China's presence, and a bigger role for the latter in solving the problems faced by the region. On the other hand it is said that the Soviet "presence" in Southeast Asia plays a destabilising role.

Some people in the ASEAN countries, as if guided by good intentions, uphold the idea of "removing the influence of the PRC and the USSR from the region". For example, the "Kuantana formula" set forth in the township of Kuantana at a Malaysia-Indonesia summit meeting declares the desire to "convince the PRC to relax its pressure on Vietnam thus removing the pretext for the Soviet presence in the region".

In this connection it would not be inappropriate to point out that the Soviet Union is the only great power which has never committed an act of aggression against the countries in the region. The USSR has supported resolutely and consistently the struggle waged by the peoples of that region for national independence and sovereignty. This is well known in Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. The role the USSR played in defeating Japanese militarism which brought so much suffering to the peoples of the region has not been forgotten in the ASEAN countries.

Many statesmen in ASEAN realise that the thesis on the danger of a "Soviet presence" and "the Soviet menace" has been made up. According to scholars of international affairs who represented the ASEAN states at a conference on the security problems faced by the countries of Asia and the Pacific, which was held in San Diego, California, in 1984, no "Soviet threat" is actually felt in the region. The Prime Minister of Malaysia and Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, Datuk Mahathir bin Mohamad, said that the "threat to the ASEAN countries is posed by China, not by the Soviet Union".⁸ The USSR has never sought to oust any power from the region. It has never made its assistance to the SRV dependent on the latter's relations with third countries. The policy pursued by the Soviet Union in that part of the world, as in the international arena at large, is aimed at creating an alliance with the forces of socialism, progress and national liberation, supporting the struggle of newly-free countries against imperialist and hegemonic policies of *diktat* and oppression. Clearly, the USSR wants Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea to have peaceful neighbours so that the resources so badly needed for national restoration and socialist construction will not be diverted by the confrontation with any external threat. The Soviet Union believes that this is equally in the interests of the socio-economic development of the ASEAN countries and of economic construction in China.

Let us note that it is not the USSR that has declared Southeast Asia to be within the sphere of its "vital interests", "historical zone of influence" and so on. The specific intentions of some powers to further militarise the ASEAN states, make them more dependent and lay the foundation for an ever greater strengthening of the positions held in

⁸ *Pasason*, July 13, 1984

the region by those powers can be clearly seen behind the conjectures about the "Soviet presence" in Southeast Asia, which are voiced by different sources. Thailand has already been used by Peking as a base of operations against the Indochinese peoples. Observers openly speak of the unofficial strategic alliance between Thailand and China.⁹

One cannot ignore the US military presence in the region. There have long been a number of big US air force and naval bases in Southeast Asia. While some people in the ASEAN countries may believe that these bases play a positive role in guaranteeing the "security" of the Association, the countries of Indochina hold their own opinion on the matter, regarding the bases as a direct threat to them. This point of view has broad support in the world. During his recent visit to Indonesia, India's Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao noted: "The security of ones cannot be based on the lack of security for the others."¹⁰

Opposition to the presence of US military bases in the region has invariably been an important element in the regional policies of the Indochinese countries, beginning with Nguyen Dui Trinh's four points (1976). In speaking out in support of an equitable dialogue between the countries of ASEAN and Indochina, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have every right to raise the question of equal security for the two groups of countries.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS THE BEHEST OF THE TIMES

An analysis of ASEAN's stand on regional detente and the creation of a zone of peace in Southeast Asia leads us to the conclusion that real opportunities exist for turning the region into a zone of peace and stability. As for the struggle to roll socialism back in Southeast Asia and reverse the historic processes there, it is doomed. The establishment of the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations between the two groups of states—Indochina and ASEAN—is the only alternative to kindling the fires of conflict in Southeast Asia.

Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have met ASEAN half way. Even a brief list of proposals made by the Indochinese states to the ASEAN countries includes the signing of bilateral or multilateral treaties of non-aggression between the three countries of Indochina, on the one hand, and Thailand, on the other (including the principle of the non-use of force and the renunciation of granting the signatories' territories to third countries to be used by the latter as a base for aggression against another country or countries); the proposal to discuss the prospects for setting up a zone of peace and stability in Southeast Asia (the ASEAN states rejected it); the proposal to create a demilitarised zone on the Thai-Kampuchean border or—if Thailand is not prepared to take that step—a "zone of security" on both sides of the Kampuchean-Thai border, as a result of which there would be no Vietnamese troops on the Kampuchean side and no Pol Pot gangs or armed detachments of the Khmer reactionaries in Thailand; the proposal to hold consultations on the situation in the South China Sea; Kampuchea's proposal to take back, on an organised and streamlined basis, the refugees now staying in Thailand. Clearly, it is the countries of Indochina that have displayed initiative in the quest for peace by looking for ways comprehensively to improve relations with ASEAN, by striving to relax tensions and create an atmosphere of trust, and improving relations on peripheral problems if the members of ASEAN are not prepared to work together with the Indochi-

⁹ *Asia Pacific Community*, No. 24, Spring 1984

¹⁰ *Hindustan Times*, June 5, 1984

nese countries to find a solution to the key issues in the region at this time.

How can the situation in that region be improved, and the current deadlock resulting from the unrealistic and unconstructive stand by the ASEAN states be overcome? How can the members of that organisation finally be put on the road leading to peace and cooperation in Southeast Asia?

It seems that the "Six" are becoming increasingly aware that there is little hope that a new "international conference on Kampuchea" overtly directed against the countries of Indochina will be successful. The world community displays less and less interest in this idea, and the international status of the PRK is gaining ground. However, under formal pretexts, ASEAN has rejected the proposal put forward by Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea that a regional conference be held,¹¹ although it is unable to present a realistic and reasonable alternative to this proposal.

Given this situation it would be more natural to continue the dialogue between the two groups of countries. It then would enable ASEAN and the Indochinese countries to specify the conceptual foundations of the approach taken by the two groups to the structure, parameters and mechanism of any future system for maintaining peace and stability in the region and subsequently to reduce the differences between the two conceptual foundations. At the same time it would eliminate distrust, prejudice and hostility, while working out some intermediate, temporary or palliative partial solutions to crucial issues. Also included among the possible subjects for discussion are confidence-building measures, the distribution of information on the situation in the states of the region to the public in these groups of countries, exchanges of people and ideas, scientific conferences, the specification of the stands taken by both sides concerning the division of the continental shelf and economic zones, and other international issues, the development of the resources of the Mekong River, mineral and other natural riches, etc.

There is nothing keeping the ASEAN and Indochina from settling the Southeast Asian problems according to the "Helsinki model", when two groups of states negotiate bilateral relations by means of dialogue (each group formulating a single stand for negotiations with the other side), elaborate a "code of behaviour" of sorts, and implement the principles of peaceful coexistence as applicable to the region in question. The countries of Indochina have long since declared and reaffirmed through their action their readiness for such a dialogue. However, these efforts have not evoked any response from ASEAN.

The Association is pursuing a tough and non-constructive policy on the form any dialogue should take with states of Indochina. While the countries of Indochina are ready for a dialogue of the states concerned in any combination, ASEAN, on the insistence of Thailand and Singapore, made it a *sine qua non* that representatives of the so-called coalition government, which includes Pol Pot men, be "full-fledged" participants at the talks.

At present the dialogue along the official lines is carried out in the form of relatively regular meetings of foreign ministers. It is Vietnam and Laos that have displayed the initiative in holding them. Another form of dialogue between the two groups is the "dialogue of communication", i. e., information is exchanged on the meetings of the Indochinese

¹¹ The Indochinese states propose to hold a conference (modelled after the Geneva conferences or the Paris Conference on Vietnam in 1973) in which all of the ten countries of Southeast Asia, the UN Secretary-General and spokesmen for the country coordinating the non-aligned movement and the great powers will participate. They are assumed to confirm the recognition of the decisions adopted by the conference and work out guarantees for their implementation.

foreign ministers and the conferences of ASEAN foreign ministers, which are held twice a year. Rather promising are the ties between formally non-governmental organisations. This form of a dialogue has developed of late.

Late in January 1984, a delegation from the Commission on Foreign Affairs of the lower chamber of the Thai parliament headed by a prominent political leader, former Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanand, paid a friendly visit to Hanoi. The delegation was received by the leaders of the SRV, and detailed talks were held on a wide range of questions concerning bilateral relations between the commissions of parliament and SRV ministries and departments. Upon the completion of the talks, Chomanand expressed "great satisfaction" with their results and said that the talks were held in a "warm and friendly atmosphere". The visit by the Thai delegation facilitated the trend towards dialogue and detente in the region.

Of great interest was the February 1984 International Scientific Seminar on Southeast Asia held in Hanoi under the auspices of the Hanoi Institute of International Relations and the Jakarta Centre for Strategic Research. The participants in the seminar were unanimous in their opinion that the differences between the stands taken by ASEAN and Indochina, far from being an obstacle to negotiations and discussions, make such a dialogue topical and necessary. The principles advanced at the Bandung Conference, the decisions made at the conference of nonaligned countries in New Delhi, the proposals presented by the Indochinese states, and the formula set forth by ASEAN on setting up a "zone of peace" in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971, were cited as the basis for solving the problems facing Southeast Asia.

In a report prepared for the seminar by Jusuf Wanandi, head of the Indonesian Centre for Strategic Research and a member of the GOLKAR¹² Commission on Foreign Affairs, it was stressed that there existed a real basis for constructive dialogue on a whole range of specific problems. Wanandi expressed the opinion that the countries in the region should not bring pressure to bear on one another, instead they should be strong and independent enough to settle conflicts themselves. As a result, there would no longer be any need to seek "protection" from the great powers. However, this would not keep the great powers from maintaining a "normal" presence in the region.

The Indonesian participants in the seminar outlined the following course for establishing a zone of peace in Southeast Asia: initial negotiations would be conducted between Vietnam, Laos and the ASEAN states; subsequently an international settlement would be made in which some states such as the USSR, China, and Japan would participate. At a certain stage some "Kampuchean factions" might take part in the negotiations in accordance with an agreement between both sides. Clearly, this programme coincides in the main with the proposals made by the Indochinese countries (regional consultations—regional conference—confirmation and guarantees by the great powers). The seminar papers testify to the fact that the Hanoi discussion was attended by people who, on the whole, held similar views.

There is no need to convince anyone that Soviet policy in this region of the world is totally honest and devoid of any ambiguity. Unlike other great powers, the Soviet Union is not responsible for the problems that have arisen in Southeast Asia. The US, on the other hand, is expanding its military-political presence there. Instead of promoting realistic and peaceful tendencies in the countries of the region, Washington is

¹² GOLKAR (Association of Functional Groups)—an organisation analogous to a ruling party or a bloc of ruling parties in Indonesia.

going out of its way to earn political capital by supporting those who want to prevent a political settlement from being reached in the region. US activities are aimed at raising military spending by the ASEAN states to record levels, providing them with new offensive weapons, pushing ASEAN to strengthen its military ties, standardising weaponry based on US military hardware and, finally, turning the "Six" into a military bloc associated with the US and its allies. Of course, the US has no intention of abandoning its military bases in Southeast Asia.

The USSR has emphasised more than once that it favours a lasting peace and the security of nations, including the Southeast Asia. Konstantin Chernenko said that the "Soviet Union supports the constructive programme developed by Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea which would help turn Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability, and start a dialogue between the countries of Indochina and the ASEAN states"¹³. The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that it would welcome any efforts the Southeast Asian countries might make towards creating a peaceful, stable and secure life in the region and that it is ready, if need be, to take part in discussions of this problem and in forging any possible guarantees of its solution, together with other great powers. The Soviet Union is in favour of initiating the discussion as soon as possible and of its touching upon the broadest range of issues of concern to the states in the region, possibly including the creation of a "nuclear-free zone" in Southeast Asia, an idea the ASEAN states themselves have proposed. The USSR favours an open and honest dialogue.

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LEGAL ASPECTS OF CHINA'S 'OPEN DOOR' POLICY DISCUSSED

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[Article by Ye. G. Pashchenko, candidate of historical sciences: "The Legal Aspects of China's 'Open-Door' Policy"]

The drafting and adoption of legislative acts regulating the inflow and use of various forms of foreign entrepreneur capital in China's economy has become an important trend in the law-making process which was resumed in the late 1970s, when China started implementing an "open-door" policy in foreign economic relations and expanding economic and technical exchanges with foreign countries. The long-term nature of the "open-door" policy¹ was reflected in the 1982 Chinese Constitution. Article 18 states that the PRC "allows foreign enterprises and other foreign economic organisations or individuals to invest" in keeping with China's laws "their capital in China and maintain various forms of economic cooperation with Chinese enterprises or other Chinese economic organisations". The same article stipulates that the "legitimate rights and interests" of foreign investors shall be safeguarded by Chinese legislation.

The "open-door" policy legislation is characterised by consistency and determination. As a rule, all pertinent acts become operative upon their publication. By the end of 1983, more than 50 relevant acts, regulations and decrees which had been adopted by central and local bodies of authority and administration beginning in the summer of 1979 were in force.

The Law on the Exploitation of Joint Enterprises Based on Chinese and Foreign Capital adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in July 1979, was the first step in elaborating "open-door" policy legislation.² The Law showed that at that time the Chinese government intended to bring foreign capital into the country primarily in the rather complex form of joint ventures, which enabled them to make comprehensive use of foreign investments, technology, know-how and management techniques. Simultaneously, this form of joint venture guaranteed that such enterprises would be run profitably and rationally as foreign partners would share in the profits and losses. Such ventures are lucrative for China because of their "feasibility", i. e., major capital investments can be avoided by using available material values and resources.

It also became clear at this time that the implementation of the "open-door" policy would be largely empirical. This was borne out by the fact that the Law on Joint Enterprises was very brief (comprising as few as 15 articles) and was worded in language unusual for such legal documents. It was, in fact, a programmatic document defining a general institutional framework for the ongoing process of enlisting foreign capital and setting forth the basic method of operation for such enterprises in China. True, Li Xiannian, the then Deputy Premier of the State Council

¹ Zhao Ziyang, Premier of the State Council, emphasised during his talks with the former US Secretary of the Treasury, Donald Regan, that the "open-door" policy will not only be a long-term policy, but "even more open" one (*Renmin ribao*, March 21, 1984).

² See *Renmin ribao*, July 9, 1979. In Soviet literature such enterprises are also called "mixed".

and now PRC's Chairman, acknowledged some time later that the new law was "far from being perfect" because China had no experience in setting up joint enterprises.³ But this view was largely rooted in the imperfection of China's legal system as such. To this day those branches of law—civil, administrative, economic, labour, and patent⁴—which must regulate, directly or otherwise, the use of foreign investments, have not been sufficiently elaborated.

As a fundamental act, the Law on Joint Enterprises contained rules defining the goals and principles involved in establishing such ventures, their general rights and organisational structure.

The Law established a permissive procedure for setting up enterprises involving foreign capital. A specially established Committee for Control over Foreign Investments became the organisation sanctioning this practice. (Following the reorganisation of the system of administrative bodies within the PRC State Council and, specifically, the establishment of a Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties and Foreign Trade, the 22nd Session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress, held in March 1983, adopted a resolution relegating the functions of the Committee for Control over Foreign Investments to the newly created Ministry.) Chinese and foreign companies, enterprises and other economic organisations as well as foreign citizens were allowed to take part in joint ventures. Joint enterprises were set up within the framework of China's judicial system and fell under Chinese jurisdiction (the Law stipulated that in carrying through their operations they had to "strictly adhere" to relevant Chinese laws and regulations). According to the Law, such enterprises take the form of joint-stock companies with limited responsibility. Yet this provision has been "suspended in the air" because China has no law or legal institution regulating the activities of such companies.

In accordance with the generally accepted principles of legislation concerning joint enterprises, their property comprised the partners' capital, equipment (there was a special provision which stated that foreign machinery and equipment should conform to the world standard), production facilities, industrial property rights, and know-how. The Chinese side was granted the right to consider the use of land plots as part of its investment. The pertinent legislation also stipulated that each partner should receive profits, sustain losses and run a risk proportionally to the share of its participation.

In contrast to other countries using foreign capital, whose legislation stipulates that the share of foreign participation should not, as a rule, exceed 50 per cent, according to Chinese Law the minimum share of foreign participation is 25 per cent, whereas the upper limit is not specified at all. It follows then that, theoretically, the Law permits enterprises funded entirely by foreign capital to be established, though such cases require special legislation. The absence of the upper limit for foreign participation also signifies that the Law was designed to attract the maximum volume of foreign investments. During his talks with the Japanese Minister of Justice, Yo. Furui, Deng Xiaoping offered the following explanation: "If the share of foreign capital is limited to 49 per cent, China will have to provide the remaining 51 per cent. Insofar as we do not have surplus funds, the limit has been waived."⁵ Generally speaking, it follows from the Law that joint ventures whose property is a combination of Chinese state property and foreign private property, have acquired a

³ See *Renmin ribao*, July 18, 1982.

⁴ The PRC's Patent Law adopted at the Fourth Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress in March 1984 takes effect on April 1, 1985.

⁵ *Economisuto*, No. 3, 1979, p. 6.

state-capitalist nature, though the current PRC Constitution does not provide for a state-capitalist sector in China's economy.

The Law defines a broad legal personality of joint enterprises, including the right to participate independently in the economic turnover. This means that such ventures are legal persons (although this term is not included in the text of the Law) under the aegis of China's judicial system. Their operation is governed by a basic provision according to which all production plans are to be reported to competent bodies and fulfilled by way of concluding economic agreements. To put it differently, the Law was intended to ensure that joint enterprises would operate within the framework of a centrally-planned system and under the control of the relevant Chinese administrative bodies.

In regards to the organisational structure of joint enterprises, the Law envisaged setting up boards of directors comprised of representatives of the two parties, their composition and membership being agreed upon by the parties in each specific case. To ensure that the Chinese side would maintain administrative control over the activities of joint enterprises the Law stipulated that irrespective of size of the foreign partner's share in an enterprise the board should be chaired by a citizen of the PRC.

One of the major objectives of the Law on Joint Enterprises was to provide terms sufficiently advantageous to attract foreign investors. To this end joint enterprises "at an advanced technological level" could be partially or completely freed of the obligation to pay income tax during the initial two or three years of successful operation, foreign partners' profits could be transferred abroad (after the necessary taxes were paid) without any restrictions, and in the event they reinvested their profits in China part of the taxes paid could be reimbursed. To ensure foreign-currency earnings, joint enterprises were encouraged to export their products. They were given the right to set up branches outside China, to have their own foreign-currency accounts in the Bank of China, and to purchase, if necessary, raw and manufactured materials abroad.

Yet many important problems involved in establishing and running joint-stock enterprises were bypassed by the Law. Specifically, the branches of the economy where the participation of foreign capital was to be allowed were not enumerated; neither were the methods to be employed in evaluating the emergent property of such enterprises specified; questions concerning the regulation of the rights of industrial ownership and the transfer of technology were left unaddressed; the mechanism regulating the relationship between joint enterprises and the planned economy and their liquidation procedure was only vaguely explained. The Law left unexplained which taxation brackets these enterprises were in, a crucial question for foreign investors. These deficiencies, it seems, did not stem from the carelessness of those who had drafted the Law. Indeed, many countries have developed a sufficiently comprehensive legislation concerning the use of foreign capital. Given this, the inadequate wording of the Law is explained by China's wish to back up its new course with legislation based on practical results, rather than by lack of experience. At the same time, this meant that at the initial stage of the "open-door" policy many issues, including some very important ones, involved in setting up and running joint-stock enterprises, would be settled by way of negotiation between the parties concerned and formalised in contracts for establishing such ventures. According to reports in the foreign press, a foreigner wishing to set up a joint enterprise in China, soon found that instead of law he should abide by during negotiations, the talks themselves provide a means for drafting the relevant law.⁶

⁶ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 30, 1980, p. 79.

Following the adoption of the Law on Joint Enterprises, it took one year to take further steps towards producing legislation for the policies which were aimed at drawing financial and economic assistance from the capitalist world. In July 1980, the PRC State Council adopted two acts: Regulations Governing the Registration of Joint Enterprises and Regulations Governing Labour at Joint Enterprises.⁷

The first statute transferred all matters pertaining to foreign investments to both the PRC's Chief Directorate of the Industrial and Trade Administration, and to local administrative bodies which handle industrial and trade matters on the level of provinces, central cities and autonomous regions. To ensure state control over enterprises with foreign financial backing, the statute gave a list of documents required for registration, which would provide basic data concerning the enterprises in question and the nature of their activities. Local administrative bodies were granted the right to register enterprises subject to subsequent approval by the Chief Directorate of the Industrial and Trade Administration.

The second statute, which also elaborated the provisions of the 1979 Law, granted the administration of joint enterprises a number of benefits which state-sector enterprises did not possess. These included the right to attract skilled labour to the joint enterprise by offering higher wages and adequate liberty in dealing with matters such as employment, dismissals and labour quotas. The statute implied that labour agreements concluded between the administration and the trade union set up at a particular enterprise, might to a large degree serve as a regulator for labour conditions in individual cases. At the same time the statute was aimed at making enterprises the centres for training skilled workers and administrative personnel.

Having thus taken the initial steps in elaborating "open-door" policy legislation, the Chinese leaders set about establishing a legal basis which would ensure real profits from the activities of foreign capital. The next series of legislative acts to be adopted was aimed at developing a tax system to be applied to joint enterprises. The first step in this direction was the Law on Taxing the Income of Joint Enterprises, which played a key role in the policy of "cooperation" with foreign capital and its passage was closely observed abroad. The law, adopted in September 1980 at the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress,⁸ showed that the Chinese leaders had remained loyal to their promise to create conditions favourable for foreign enterprise in China.

To bring the finances of joint ventures under the control of Chinese tax collecting bodies, the Law established an income tax rate equalling 30 per cent of the net profit received by a venture both in China and abroad. Together with the additional 10 per cent local tax, the general income tax level was 33 per cent irrespective of the overall profit. Foreign observers agreed that this level was lower than the normal level of taxes imposed on enterprises in developed capitalist countries.

The Law also provided for a three-year "tax credit" designed to attract foreign capital to the Chinese economy over a lengthy period. Enterprises set up to operate for ten and more years could be exempt from taxes during the first year of receiving profit, while during the second and third such years taxes could be reduced by half. Special tax allowances were provided for joint enterprises operating in China's economically backward regions or in low-profit branches of the economy, such as agriculture and forestry. To attract foreign capital the Law also provided for the reimbursement of 40 per cent of the taxes paid by foreign investors in the event they reinvested their income in China over a period of more

⁷ In *China's Foreign Economic Legislation*, Vol. 1, Beijing, 1982, pp. 13-26.

⁸ See *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 16, 1980.

than five years. In contrast to international practice, foreign partners were also granted the right to transfer their profits abroad at an extremely low tax rate. The Chinese press emphasised that this tax rate was sufficiently advantageous and promised new advantages in future.⁹

The Law did not apply, however, to joint ventures in the field of oil and gas production or the use of other natural resources.

The Law on Personal Income Tax adopted at the same session of the National People's Congress, has become a component of the newly developed tax system.¹⁰ From a formal juridical point of view, the Law applies to all Chinese citizens. If we consider, however, when it was adopted, the rates of taxation (annual incomes lower than 800 yuan were not taxed) and the provisions for taxing persons residing in China not less than one year and earning incomes in China or abroad, it becomes clear that it was not the incomes of ordinary working people which were the object of regulation by this Law, but rather those of foreign investors, the staff of joint enterprises, as well as those representatives of the bourgeoisie still existent in the country.

To finalise the elaboration of a relatively comprehensive tax system whose creation was a result of the "open-door" policy, the PRC State Council adopted two sets of regulations on the application of the above tax laws. In December 1980 these regulations interpreted a number of provisions and definitions used in the wording of the laws, specified the methods for calculating income tax and set forth the procedure for paying taxes. From that time on, Chinese legislation on the use of foreign investments was characterised by a specific feature: following the adoption of a law, by-laws were adopted on its basis to specify the sphere of its application and to regulate its administration.

Even before foreign capital began to flow into China in the form of mixed enterprises, use was also made of other forms of cooperation with foreign entrepreneur capital, which were less sophisticated than joint enterprises. This is the way China attracts the bulk of direct foreign investment to its economy today. Such forms include contracts concluded between Chinese enterprises and foreign firms allowing the latter to manufacture in China, on the basis of foreign production methods and technology, export-oriented manufactured goods or their components, semi-processed goods, etc. These forms of attracting foreign capital, know-how and technology are most frequently used in labour-intensive and technology-deficient branches of industry. The flexible forms of "cooperation" with foreign businessmen, such as goods-payback trade, joint or "cooperative" production and processing "on trust", are widespread because foreign partners regard them preferable for several reasons: there is no need to engage in complex and at times protracted negotiations where current legislation must be considered (as is the case when joint enterprises are set up); contracts are short-term; it is always possible to go out of business if the situation becomes unfavourable. Chinese participation involves, as a rule, providing manpower, production facilities and raw materials, whereas the foreign partner provides technology, know-how, parts and capital. The product is mainly exported to foreign markets. A joint enterprise as such is not set up; the partners divide their profits in accordance with the agreement they reached. Upon the termination of the contract foreign technology and know-how are transferred, for a fee, to the Chinese side. In other words, Chinese enterprises are being reconstructed in this way.

Despite the obvious need for general legislation on such forms of industrial and trade cooperation with foreign entrepreneurs, the Chinese

⁹ In *Beijing Review*, 1982, No. 17, p. 20.

¹⁰ See *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 16, 1980.

side had, as before, preferred to provide legal grounds for obtaining profits from such cooperation. In December 1981, the 4th Session of the Fifth National People's Congress adopted another law, i. e., on taxing foreign enterprise revenues.¹¹ The Law applied to foreign companies investing their capital in the Chinese economy on the basis of individual contracts similar to those mentioned above. The level of taxation stipulated by the law could not be regarded as extremely high. It varied between 20 and 40 per cent depending on the revenues received on a progressive scale from 250,000 to 1,000,000 yuan. At the same time, local authorities were granted the right to lower the level of the 10-per cent local surtax or to waive it in the event a particular enterprise was small-scale or low-profit. As regards further benefits, a number of measures were outlined similar to the "tax credit" established earlier by the Law on Joint-Enterprise Income Tax.

In 1982, China began implementing plans for a goal-oriented use of foreign investments to develop its energy and raw-material resources. In doing so, it was emphasised that oil was one of the principal energy resources and raw materials which was both needed by China and in constant demand on the world market. With this in view, the development and exploitation of oilfields on China's continental shelf has become a special area in the elaboration of "open-door" policy legislation.¹² In January 1982, the Standing Bureau of the State Council adopted Regulations Governing the Joint Development of Sea Oil Resources with Foreign Companies.¹³

Having reaffirmed that all oil resources on China's continental shelf are state property, the law allowed foreign companies to join China in developing the Chinese oilfields under the control of Chinese authorities. China's Ministry of Oil Industry became the body responsible for the elaboration and realisation of an oil resources development programme. All the drilling and pumping was entrusted to the Chinese General Company for the Development of Sea Oil Resources (established after this set of regulations took effect) which was given exclusive rights in this area. These regulations were also intended to enable the Chinese side to invest in the development of oilfields, whose lucrativeness has been proved. For this reason this set of regulations permitted foreign companies to drill for oil in an allocated sea region by their own means and at their own risk. Only after a commercially feasible oilfield or gas deposit has been found is it to be developed by the joint capital of the foreign partner and the Chinese General Company (or its subsidiary). This gives birth to a "cooperative" enterprise established on a contractual basis. When the contract expires, the Chinese side receives an oil producing enterprise; it takes over the property rights in relation to all the property produced or imported by the foreign partner. The cost of the foreign partner's property is reimbursed during the oil production process.

By inviting foreign capital into the national economy, China intends to achieve two basic objectives: that is to raise industry's technological level, and to obtain a source of foreign currency. Experience shows that the Chinese leaders intend to achieve this in two ways. Joint and large-scale capital-intensive enterprises of the "cooperative" type (established, in part, for oil production) will be given a predominant role in solving the first task (although these enterprises, too, are intended to provide budget revenues). The use of foreign capital in this rather complex form of enterprise implies the operation of such ventures over a considerable

¹¹ See *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 17, 1981.

¹² See *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 11, 1982.

¹³ China is now actively engaged in negotiations with a number of foreign companies which seek to assist in the development of coal deposits.

period and massive foreign investments. All this requires meticulously elaborated legislation on "cooperation" with foreign firms, and the establishment of legal institutions which thus far do not exist in China. But in dealing with these problems the Chinese government has preferred not to make haste, taking, as has been noted earlier, mostly empirical measures.

In order to satisfy the country's foreign currency needs as fully and as quickly as possible, China began establishing special enclaves on Chinese territory—special economic zones similar to free-trade or export zones—in 1980. They are a major component of the "open-door" policy.

The first and most comprehensive act defining the conditions which were to prevail in such zones thus far was the Regulations for Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province, adopted in August 1980 by the Guangdong Provincial People's Congress.¹⁴ Its analysis shows that in contrast to most countries having such zones, control over their everyday activities in China is exercised by provincial, rather than central bodies.

The regulations provided for the establishment of a supreme administrative body—the Committee for Administration of Special Economic Zones, with its main office in Shenzhen. On behalf of the People's Congress of Guangdong Province, the Committee "exercises unified administration over all special zones". It was granted the exclusive right to consider and approve projects which use foreign capital in various forms. The Committee's terms of reference include the development and implementation of special zone development programmes, the coordination of "working relations" between various organisations within such zones which were set up for the benefit of foreign companies, and the maintenance of law and order.

In order maximally to liberalise the terms under which foreign capital operates in China, for the first time since the declaration of the "open-door" policy the government allowed both joint enterprises and those fully financed by foreign capital, which are virtually private capitalist enterprises to be established in the special zones. The Regulations also granted special tax rebates: revenues were taxed at 15 per cent (lower than in Xiang Gang); enterprises in the special zones were allowed to import all necessary equipment, spare parts, raw materials, means of transportation, etc., duty-free.

The zones enjoy special status also because the output of their enterprises is to be exported. In order to sell these products on the domestic market the enterprise must not only obtain a special permit from the Committee for Administration of Special Economic Zones, but also to pay customs duties. In other words, the zones are not part of the planned economy. They play the role of "states within a state", which is augmented by the stipulation that "investors may administer their enterprises independently". Zhao Ziyang, Premier of the State Council, reaffirmed this when he said: "Government bodies [in these zones] shall in no way interfere in enterprise management and shall accord such enterprises complete freedom for the development of production."¹⁵ The Chinese press explained the meaning of this directive, noting that if the planned regulation of production in the zones becomes excessive, this will hamper the inflow of foreign capital. At the same time the press reported that there

¹⁴ See *Zhongguo jingji nianjian*, 1981, Peking, 1981, Section II, pp. 147-148. Although these regulations which codified an important government policy took effect following their approval at the 21st Session of the National People's Congress Standing Committee the same month they were not published in the central press and did not acquire the legal force of a national law in accordance with the 1978 PRC Constitution, then in force.

¹⁵ *Ta Kung Pao* (Weekly Supplement), Aug. 20th, 1981, No. 789, p. 1.

might be close ties between business activities in the zones and the markets of Xiang Gang and Aomen.¹⁶ In other words, in order to obtain foreign currency the Chinese authorities have made the special zones appendages of the capitalist economy. It is most significant that a huge poster proclaiming "Time Is Money" has been put up at the entry to Xiang Gang from Shenzhen.¹⁷

The power to regulate life in the special zones was transferred to local authorities; this is a characteristic feature of their status. Legal norms expanding or specifying the initial set of Regulations were drafted by standing committees of provincial people's congresses. In November 1981, four interim provisions were adopted concerning entry into and exit from special zones, the system of labour and wages, the registration of business activities, and land tenure (the latter applying to the Shenzhen zone exclusively). The right of the Guangdong administration to adopt such acts had its legal basis in the Resolution of the 21st Session of the National People's Congress Standing Committee of 26 November 1981, which empowered the people's congresses of Guangdong and Fujian Provinces and their standing committees to work out independently all regulations pertaining to any economic problems arising in the special economic zones under their jurisdiction.¹⁸

In keeping with these four interim provisions, the procedures governing travel between the zones, Xiang Gang (Hong Kong) and Aomen (Macao) were simplified, in contrast to enterprises outside the special economic zones, foreign enterprises in such zones were given greater latitude in defining the terms for hiring personnel and the form of wages; land in the special zones was rented and remained state property.¹⁹

The characteristic features of special economic zones enable us to conclude that they are now also regions where Peking conducts experiments aimed not only at earning foreign currency, but also at trying out ways of reforming the economic mechanism (including giving enterprises more independence) on a national scale in order to modernise China's economy. It seems, however, that the special economic zones are regarded by the Chinese leadership as a development which will later play an important role in implementing the Chinese political strategy of re-uniting the country. This pertains primarily to Xiang Gang (Hong Kong).

The empirical approach the Chinese authorities take to "open-door" policy legislation (which is demonstrated by the fact that relevant legal norms take effect stage by stage), has in recent years been acquiring an ever more pronounced pragmatic character.

In the spring of 1983, the Chinese press began publishing articles which laid the groundwork for the further liberalisation of the policy of utilising foreign capital and offered corresponding promises.²⁰

The Resolution of the 2nd Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress of September 2, 1983 concerning

¹⁶ In *Beijing Review*, 1981, No. 50, p. 15.

¹⁷ See *Renmin ribao*, May 6, 1983. Chinese economists define the essence of the special zones economy as state capitalism, when the socialist state holds key positions, yet allows some elements of capitalism, including private ownership and market regulation to exist (*Jingji yanjiu*, 1983, No. 2, p. 28).

¹⁸ In *China's Foreign Economic Legislation*, Vol. 1, pp. 207-244.

¹⁹ Less than a year after the four interim provisions had taken effect, new benefits were announced in the leading special economic zone of Shenzhen. These included a provision that in certain cases enterprises might be exempted from paying the single industrial-trade tax; taxes on revenues might be reduced by 15-20 per cent for the duration of three years for "relatively large enterprises"; land rent for such enterprises might be reduced by 20-40 per cent; moreover the new rent would be calculated on the basis of the minimal rent established earlier, i. e. 10 yuan for one square metre a year (*China Business Review*, 1982, No. 6, p. 4).

²⁰ See *Renmin ribao*, April 9, 1983, *Beijing Review*, 1983, No. 19, p. 7, *China Daily*, May 12, 1983.

changes in the Law on Joint Enterprise Income Tax was a practical step toward substantially extending the benefits accorded foreign entrepreneurs.²¹

In keeping with the Resolution, the "tax credit" for such enterprises was extended from three to five years. From now on, joint enterprises established to operate for ten or more years may be exempted from paying taxes on revenues during the first two years of profitable operation and pay half of it on the third, fourth and fifth years.

The Regulations on the Application of the 1979 Law on Joint Enterprises (the only legislative act whose content has not been disclosed in by-laws), adopted by China's State Council on September 20, 1983, was a milestone in the history of drafting legislation for the policy of utilizing foreign capital.²² Chinese officials considered this set of regulations to be a "new stage in the development of trade and the policy of investments in China."²³

Considering the great size of this document (118 articles grouped in 16 chapters) and the wide range of its provisions based, as a rule, on other stipulations empirically reached and reflected in specific contracts on joint enterprises concluded from 1979 on, this act may be regarded as a relatively comprehensive legal document which is to play the role of the Chinese investment code of sorts. At the same time the adoption of this document has amply shown that in the preceding period the "open-door" policy was largely in its probationary stage.

Developing the original 1979 Law, the regulations were primarily aimed at providing legislation for the interaction mechanism between joint enterprises and the system of planned economy, ensuring simultaneously sufficiently broad autonomy for their operations. Significantly, the regulations made further concessions to foreign capital by giving foreign investors additional privileges.

This set of regulations represented the first attempt to define the legal status of joint enterprises as legal persons. It further elaborated their status as companies with limited liability (provided for by earlier legislation) and established that enterprise partners' responsibility is limited by the volume of their investment, while the enterprise itself is responsible for its debts by all of its property.

The original law was further elaborated in another respect. The regulations allowed enterprises with foreign participation to be established in some of the leading branches of the Chinese economy, such as power engineering, chemistry, metallurgy, engineering, instrument manufacturing, sea-bed oil production, electronics (including the production of computers and means of communication), various branches of the light industry, tourism and services.

By regulating the mechanism of interaction between joint enterprises and the planned economy, this set of regulations did not merely reaffirm their economic independence. Mindful of the fears earlier expressed by foreign investors that it would be impossible to carry on business activities in China independently, the regulations also forbade planning and administrative bodies at all levels to give instructions to such enterprises concerning their production programmes. Pursuing the line of providing legal grounds for the privileged position of joint ventures vis-à-vis state enterprises, the new act made it binding upon departments responsible for these enterprises to ensure the fulfilment of their plans by giving them certain advantages in terms of material supplies. When defining chan-

²¹ See *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 3, 1983.

²² See *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gouyuan gongbao* (The Bulletin of the State Council of the PRC), 1983, No. 21, pp. 969-967.

²³ *China Daily*, Sept. 27, 1983.

nels through which joint enterprises would acquire raw and manufactured materials, they are given access to resources distributed in a planned manner. The privileged position of joint enterprises is also clearly seen in the fact that the new act obliged the people's governments of provinces, autonomous regions and central cities to help maintain the foreign currency balances of such enterprises at the expense of their reserves, if necessary. In case this is impossible to do, the matter is to be settled by its inclusion in the state plan.

Significantly, the privileges granted earlier to enterprises within the special economic zones are now being given to joint ventures outside such zones. For example the regulations allow the bulk of materials and equipment needed by enterprises for production to be imported duty-free. In addition, the single industrial and trade tax on the goods enterprises produce for export may be cancelled during the initial period of their operation in case difficulties arise.

Guided by the desire to obtain from joint enterprises products in short supply or those which have to be imported and taking into consideration foreign companies' aspiration to consolidate their position on China's domestic market, these regulations, for the first time ever, definitely give joint enterprises an opportunity to sell such products "chiefly" on the domestic market for hard currency. In other words, the former export orientation of such enterprises' production activities has been reconsidered. Joint enterprises are put on an equal footing with state enterprises as regards prices for raw and manufactured materials purchased in China and the maintenance costs of support services. Prices for products to be sold on the domestic market are fixed according to their quality.

At the same time, the regulations granted benefits to foreign personnel working at mixed ventures. After paying their personal income tax, they are now entitled to transfer all their remaining earnings abroad, and not half (as was the case before).

By acquiring an increasingly comprehensive legislation, the "open-door" policy is gaining momentum. Its forms, methods and scale are expanding in the context of eased control and coordinating effect on the part of central authorities.

Local governments are given ever increasing powers as regards the attraction of foreign capital. All Chinese provinces have been granted the right to approve investment projects valued at up to \$3 million. As regards Guangdong and Fujian, including the special economic zones, all projects irrespective of the scale of foreign investments involved may be authorised at a provincial level.²⁴

In April 1984, China made another important step in "opening its doors to the world". The authorities allowed so-called regions of economic and technical development to be set up in 14 ports, with foreign capital. These regions were accorded advantages similar to those in the special economic zones. The regions differ from the special zones in that emphasis there is made on the establishment of high-technology industrial enterprises and joint ventures backed by foreign capital, and on the modernisation of Chinese enterprises with foreign assistance. As a result, the 14 port-cities have been given broad powers to approve projects involving foreign participation. Tianjin and Shanghai can authorise projects valued at \$30 million; Dalian and Guangzhou, up to \$10 million; and the rest, up to \$5 million. Characteristically, these rights apply to projects which are outside the state planning system in terms of supplies and prices.²⁵

²⁴ In *China Business Review*, 1983, No. 5, p. 20

²⁵ In *Beijing Review*, 1984, No. 50, p. 16

In line with the general policy of expanding benefits for high-technology and large-investment enterprises, in November 1984 the PRC State Council adopted an interim provision according to which joint and foreign enterprises in the special economic zones and coastal cities are exempted from paying taxes (depending on their nature) during the initial two years of operation, while during the subsequent three years they may pay taxes totalling no more than 10 per cent of their profits.²⁶

Seeking to create an even more favourable "investment climate" for foreign capital, China, as a recipient country, has in recent years taken the path of assuming international legal obligations in relation to other countries. By the end of 1984, the Chinese government had signed seven agreements to promote and protect foreign investments (with Sweden, Romania, West Germany, France, Belgium, Finland, and Norway) and is negotiating similar agreements with Japan, the United States, Switzerland, Austria, Holland, and Italy.²⁷

The drafting of "open-door" policy legislation remains a central issue in China. According to reports in the Chinese press, work is underway to draft laws on enterprises fully financed by foreign investments, on contracts with foreign entrepreneurs, and a series of acts regulating the use of investments in the form of "cooperative" enterprises, goods-payback trade, etc.

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CHRONOLOGY, CURRENT STATUS OF KOREA UNIFICATION TALKS NOTED

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[Article by V. I. Andreyev, candidate of economic sciences, and V. I. Osipov, candidate of juridical sciences: "The Problem of a Settlement in Korea Today"]

The question of normalising the situation in the Korean peninsula is one of the problems in world politics that demands to be solved. The military and political situation in Korea is becoming one of the most explosive in the world at a time when international tension has been heightened through the fault of the most aggressive forces of imperialism headed by the United States. The situation in Korea during the postwar years can best be described as a dangerous balancing between a cold war and a very real armed conflict. It was in Korea that imperialism made its first attempt to change the alignment of forces which took shape as a result of the Second World War by force of arms when it attacked the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1950. It was there that imperialism suffered a jarring defeat, the result of the socialist countries' collective efforts and the Korean people's heroic struggle.

Korea's division into the North and the South is one of the unsolved questions left over from the Second World War. It is a result of the expansionist imperialist policy followed by the United States and the flouting by US of its allied commitments.

The Korean people is demonstrating a growing desire to bring about the peaceful unification of the country. But this is paralleled by mounting interference in its internal affairs on the part of imperialist states and by steadily increasing efforts to shore up the anti-popular regime in Seoul, thereby to perpetuate the "two Koreas" situation. Washington has included the Korean peninsula in the sphere of its "vital interests" and is increasing its military presence in South Korea. It is vigorously using the American troops stationed there to undermine peace and security and whip up tension in the Far East and Asia. The provocation organised by the US secret service, involving the use of a South Korean aircraft that intruded deep into the USSR's air space for espionage purposes, is an example of the Pentagon's aggressive designs in the Far East.

Ever more persistent attempts have been made in recent years to create a new military-political formation—a tripartite military alliance involving the United States, Japan and South Korea. President Reagan's visit to Tokyo and Seoul in November 1983 and his demonstration of the "diplomacy of strength" create an extremely dangerous seat of tension in the Korean peninsula and in the Far East as a whole. The thesis in Reagan's and Chun Doo Hwan's joint statement that "the security of the Republic of Korea [South Korea.—*Author*] is vital to the security of the United States"¹ reveals Washington's intention to draw other countries, first and foremost South Korea, into its militaristic plans for Asia and the Pacific.

The 6th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, held in October 1980, stressed that the confrontation in the Korean peninsula between considerable contingents of armed forces from the North and the South

¹ *Korea Herald*, Nov. 15, 1983.

and the presence of American troops in South Korea perpetuate the tense situation there. The Congress also noted that the elimination of the military confrontation between the two parts of Korea was the most important precondition for their peaceful unification.²

It should be recalled that today, when various parts of the world are becoming ever more closely bound together any local conflict could easily become global. For this reason the Korean problem transcends national boundaries and is an important issue in the struggle for peace throughout the world.

The international importance of the Korean question, however, is not restricted to its military aspect. It is, as always has been, a problem concerning the confrontation of two diametrically opposed socio-political systems and two distinct foreign policies. The only realistic way of solving it is to remove all interference by imperialism in the affairs of the Korean people and to achieve a peaceful democratic unification of Korea.

The movement for the unification of Korea is one of the primary concerns of the Workers' Party of Korea and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Throughout the years of its existence the DPRK has made more than 200 concrete proposals to the South Korean authorities on ways of achieving a peaceful, democratic solution of the Korean question.³

For a long time the DPRK's initiatives went unanswered. And it was only in the early 1970s that the first official contacts on Korean land between the North and the South were arranged—first between the national branches of the Red Cross Society to solve humanitarian issues and then at the governmental level.⁴ These contacts were primarily the result of the general shift towards détente internationally which came about through the tireless efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. They were also aided by the growing support given by the world public and by the world socialist community to the Korean people's just desire to live as one family.

The first meeting between representatives of the North and South Korean branches of the Red Cross was held on August 20, 1971 in Panmunjom, a small settlement near the demarcation line which divides the country along the 38th parallel. Exactly one month later, on September 20, preliminary talks on the agenda and procedural questions of the main talks were begun in the meeting hall of the Commission of Neutral States for Observance of the Armistice in Korea. Welcoming the commencement of contacts Kim Il Sung noted: "The entire people of North and South Korea... unanimously want these talks to become an important starting point in the drive to destroy the barrier between the North and the South, and attain the peaceful unification of our homeland".⁵

The preliminary talks lasted for almost a year and were conducted quite vigorously, there being a total of 38 sessions on the working level, including 25 plenary sessions and 13 held behind closed doors. It was only at the 20th session on June 16, 1972, when contacts between the two governments had already been initiated that the sides agreed on

² See Kim Il Sung, *Report of the WPK CC to the 6th Party Congress*, Pyongyang, 1980, pp. 81-82.

³ See *DPRK's Proposals on the Unification of the Country*, Pyongyang, 1982, p. 1.

⁴ In 1963 representatives of the Olympic Committees of the DPRK and South Korea met in Hong Kong and Lausanne to discuss forming a single Korean team to perform at the Tokyo Olympics.

⁵ *Rodong Shinmun*, Jan. 1, 1972.

the agenda for the main talks between the North and South Korean branches of the Red Cross. The agreement reached was based on a proposal made by the DPRK representatives. It included the following items:

- that searches for separated relatives be conducted and information on their whereabouts be provided;
- visits by relatives living in the North and South and the creation of the conditions necessary for their meetings;
- free correspondence between separated relatives;
- reunification of relatives who freely state desire;
- other humanitarian issues.⁶

Seven rounds of the main talks between Red Cross representatives were held and the first item of the agenda was discussed. But by the middle of 1973 the talks became deadlocked because South Korean side refused to solve matters constructively, from positions of genuine humanism.⁷

Talks on the governmental level between North and South Korea were opened without public announcement and held in Pyongyang from May 2 to 5 and in Seoul from May 29 to June 1, 1972.⁸ They resulted in the signing of a Joint Statement by North and South Korea, by plenipotentiary representatives of the two governments and were published simultaneously in Pyongyang and Seoul on July 4, 1972.

This document is important because in it the sides recorded their common approach to the problem of unifying the country, which has become known as the "three principles of the homeland's unification"; they also agreed to carry out a number of practical measures. In accordance with the Joint Statement the country's unification should be achieved, first, independently, without foreign interference, second, by peaceful means, and, third, on the basis of "national consolidation".⁹

When suggesting the principle of the country's independent peaceful unification without foreign interference the DPRK government had in mind the elimination of imperialist interference, of American imperialism first and foremost in the Korean people's affairs and the withdrawal of American troops from the territory of South Korea.¹⁰

The principle of "national consolidation" means that broad sections of the public both in the North and in the South should participate in the dialogue and, accordingly, that a democratisation of South Korean society, including freedom of political activity for all parties and public organisations in the South and the discontinuation by the Seoul authorities of their policy of anti-communism must occur. "How can national consolidation be achieved", Kim Il Sung queried, "if one does not cooperate with Communists and comes out against Communists?"¹¹ The DPRK government also includes in this principle the understanding that when conducting a dialogue and striving for unification the sides should not impose their socio-political systems on one another. It has stated its readiness to permit any South Korean political party to engage in political activity in the DPRK if the same right is granted to North Korea's

⁶ See *Modern History of Korea*, Pyongyang, 1979, pp. 622-623.

⁷ In July 1983 the South Korean Red Cross proposed that talks with the DPRK Red Cross be resumed on the question of separated relatives. In reply the Central Committee of the DPRK Red Cross published a statement on July 24 in which it condemned the South Korean Red Cross as a "political toy" in the hands of the Seoul authorities and offered it as a preliminary condition "to admit its crimes in connection with the torpedoing of the talks between national branches of the Red Cross in the 1970s and apologise to the nation for this." *Rodong Shinmoon*, July 25, 1983.

⁸ See *The DPRK's Proposals on the Unification of the Country*, p. 105.

⁹ See *Rodong Shinmoon*, July 4, 1972.

¹⁰ See Kim Il Sung, *On the Independent Peaceful Unification of the Homeland*, Pyongyang, 1980, p. 76.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 77-78.

political parties in the South. National consolidation also implies wide-ranging cooperation between the North and the South in all fields of politics, economy, culture and military matters.¹²

In their Joint Statement of July 4, 1972 the sides also agreed to "stop mutual slander and armed provocations against each other", to take vigorous measures to prevent sudden military clashes, to promote greater understanding and exchanges of every kind between the North and the South, to open a direct telephone line between Pyongyang and Seoul. In order to implement all the practical issues and to carry out the above-mentioned accords a decision was made to form in the future the Coordinating Committee of the North and the South. Its co-chairmen were also appointed for the DPRK—Kim Yong Chue, head of a department in the WPK Central Committee, and South Korea—Lee Hu Rak, Director of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency.¹³

At their third meeting, which was held in Seoul from November 30 to December 1, 1972 the co-chairmen reached a formal agreement on the establishment of the Coordinating Committee of the North and the South and the commencement of its activity. Included in the Committee's functions were the discussion, solution and supervision of the realisation of the following questions:

- attainment of the country's peaceful unification on the basis of agreed-upon principles;
- implementation of extensive exchanges between political parties, public organisations and individuals in the North and the South;
- implementation of economic, cultural and social exchanges; pooling of efforts in solving economic matters;
- easing of tension in relations between the North and the South, preventing military clashes and reducing the level of military confrontation;
- coordination of the foreign policy activities of the North and the South.

In accordance with the agreement five sub-committees were to have been formed under the Coordinating Committee: political, military, diplomatic, economic and cultural.¹⁴

There is no doubt that fulfilment of both the Red Cross and Coordinating Committee agreements would have presented genuine prospects for gradually easing tension in the Korean peninsula, for the development of mutual trust and this in the long run could have facilitated the eventual attainment of a peaceful unification of the country.

The DPRK realised, however, that these contacts were of a limited nature both in terms of the questions that were discussed and the number of persons who discussed them. They knew that they alone could not solve all the problems that had accumulated during the long years of the country's division and eliminate mistrust between the North and the South. That is why after the signing of the Joint Statement the DPRK government proposed that a joint conference of the political parties and public organisations of North and South Korea or a conference of representatives of the North and South Korean authorities, as well as a joint meeting of deputies of the Supreme People's Assembly of the

¹² See Kim Il Sung, *On the Independent Peaceful Unification of the Homeland*, pp. 123-124. Besides the Workers' Party of Korea, which is the guiding and organising force of the Korean people, there are two other parties in the DPRK, the Social-Democratic Party (prior to 1981—the Democratic Party) and the Chondogyo-Chonudohn Religious party. These two parties do not have legal organisations and fully support the WPK's activities.

¹³ *Rodong Shinmun*, July 4, 1972.

¹⁴ See *A Modern History of Korea*, pp. 617-618.

DPRK and the South Korean parliament be held.¹⁵ The DPRK carried out a number of practical measures in accordance with the agreement reached with South Korea. The country's mass media stopped presenting materials critical of the South Korean regime. Another real demonstration of the DPRK's sincere desire to ease military tension in the Korean peninsula was its absolute and relative reduction of spending on defence by more than a third in 1972—from 1,959.83 million won in 1971 to 1,256.06 million won, or from 31.1 per cent of total state budget expenditures to 17 per cent. Subsequently this spending did not exceed the 1972 level in terms of percentage of the total budget, though it did grow somewhat in terms of absolute figures.

After three meetings of the Coordinating Committee, held in Seoul and Pyongyang alternately, it became clear that on the instigation of the United States the South Korean side was trying to use the dialogue between the North and South to secure unilateral advantages by eroding the socialist system in the DPRK. At his first press conference on the day the Joint Statement of the North and South was published the Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency Lee Hu Rak, who signed it for the South Korean side, stated that "from today on, we are moving from confrontation without dialogue to a new era of confrontation with dialogue".¹⁶ As time passed this South Korean approach to contacts with the DPRK became even more obvious. "The South Korean side", note DPRK scholars, "paid only lip service to the 'full opening of doors' while in reality it proposed only limited measures in the fields of economics and culture, insisted on the creation of only two subcommittees under the Coordinating Committee, obstructed the adoption of measures to end military confrontation, the creation of the political, military and diplomatic subcommittees and the convocation of a political conference between the North and the South".¹⁷

By the middle of June 1973 the work of the Coordinating Committee was at an impasse. Contacts between the deputies co-chairmen of the Coordinating Committee were resumed again in December 1973 but they, too, were discontinued after the 10th meeting held on March 14, 1975 through the fault of the South Korean authorities.

The facts show that the Seoul authorities needed the dialogue with the DPRK and certain initiatives displayed in this direction not to make a genuine attempt at the negotiating table towards reaching a mutually acceptable decision on the country's future but only to divert the attention of the democratic Korean public and world public opinion from South Korea's further militarisation and the military build-up conducted within the framework of the "Nixon doctrine" with the aim of raising the level of confrontation with the DPRK and "rolling back communism" from the Korean peninsula. Seoul's attitude towards the dialogue with Pyongyang was noted by American researchers as well. South Korea feigned an interest in the issue of unification in order to win time to strengthen its position, wrote the American political scientist R. Clough.¹⁸

The intention of both the South Korean ruling circles and imperialism to perpetuate the country's division clearly manifested itself in the so-called special statement made by the then "president" of the Seoul regime Park Chung Hee on the morning of June 23, 1973 after first clearing it with the US Administration and the Japanese government. Park

¹⁵ See Kim Il Sung, *On the Independent Peaceful Unification of the Homeland*, pp. 11-12.

¹⁶ *Asian Survey*, November 1980, vol. XX, No. 11, p. 1113.

¹⁷ *Modern History of Korea*, p. 620.

¹⁸ R. Clough, *Deterrence and Defiance in Korea: The Role of U.S. Forces*, Washington, 1976, p. 25.

Chung Hee proposed that North and South Korea join the United Nations separately. This would legitimise and formalise the "two Koreas" situation, as Park himself admitted. For precisely this reason on the evening of the same day the DPRK government emphatically rejected the idea of having the two Korean states separately join the United Nations and offered new proposals on unification consisting of five points. These were:

- to end military confrontation and ease tension between the North and the South;

- to make multifaceted cooperation and exchanges between the North and the South a reality;

- to convene a Great National Assembly which would bring together representatives of all sections of the population as well as representatives of political parties and public organisations from the North and South;

- to form a confederation of the North and the South under a single state name;

- to join the United Nations under a single state name.¹⁹

In combination with the three principles contained in the Joint Statement of the North and the South these five-point proposals continue to serve as the basis of the DPRK government's consistent policy towards the country's peaceful democratic unification.

We have already investigated the content of the "three principles of unification". Now let us look into the "five point proposal".

As has been repeatedly stressed by the DPRK government bringing military confrontation to an end and easing tensions in the Korean peninsula is one of the key questions which must be addressed if the unification of the country is to be brought about. "The possession by both the North and the South of considerable armed forces and their military confrontation are serious factors threatening the existence of peace in our country. They are also a source of misunderstandings and mistrust," stressed Kim Il Sung.²⁰ There is no doubt that the elimination of this factor would facilitate the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust in Korea and thereby facilitate the implementation of other measures along the road to the country's unification. To this end the DPRK proposed that the South Korean government stop building up armaments and encouraging the arms race, withdraw all foreign, American troops, first and foremost, from the territory of South Korea (there are no foreign troops on the territory of the DPRK), reduce the armed forces of the North and the South to 100,000 men or less, limit arms, stop the importation of arms, and conclude a peace agreement between the interested parties, i. e., between the DPRK and the US, to replace the existing shaky armistice agreement.

It has been proposed that wide-ranging cooperation between the DPRK and South Korea be initiated in the fields of politics, military matters, diplomacy, economics and culture. Its purpose is to prevent the total economic, political and cultural enslavement of South Korea by the United States and other imperialist countries, to organise the joint exploitation of natural resources, to resume the traditional economic exchange between North and South Korea, to unify the language, and to facilitate the development of the national arts. Backing up its proposals with concrete initiatives the DPRK offered the South Korean authorities to form a single Korean team for participation in the 22nd Summer Olympic Games in Moscow. The Seoul regime not only rejected this

¹⁹ See Kim Il Sung, *On the Independent Peaceful Unification of the Homeland*, pp. 19-20.

²⁰ Kim Il Sung, *On the Independent Peaceful Unification of the Homeland*, pp. 20-21.

suggestion but toed the line laid down by its American masters and joined them in the so-called boycott of those Games.

Proceeding from their past experience in conducting dialogue with the South the DPRK believes that talks on the unification of Korea cannot be conducted solely by representatives of the authorities of both parts of Korea. It is quite clear that the South Korean authorities do not represent the interests of all the classes and political strata of that society. For this reason broad sections of the public in the South and the North should take part in these talks. For this reason it is proposed that a Great National Assembly be convened.

The purpose of forming a confederation of the North and the South is to create a unified Korean state. It would represent the first step towards the final unification of Korea, and continue as long as the different socio-political systems in the DPRK and South Korea exist.

The DPRK has proposed a concrete programme for Korea's peaceful, democratic unification. At the same time it never considered this proposal to be the only one possible and expressed its readiness to compromise and to cooperate in a business-like manner with the South Korean authorities in working out mutually acceptable ways of unifying the country²¹. These considerations also motivated other initiatives taken by the DPRK government in recent years to resume the dialogue with South Korea.

A statement of the Central Committee of the United Democratic Fatherland Front was adopted on January 23, 1979 at a joint meeting of the DPRK's political parties and public organisations, convened by the Central Committee of the United Democratic Fatherland Front on the suggestion of the Workers' Party of Korea. Addressed to various sections of South Korea's population, to Koreans living abroad, to South Korean political parties and public organisations, and to the South Korean authorities, this statement proposed that a number of measures be adopted "to accelerate the country's unification".²²

First, the North and the South should return to the ideals and principles of the Joint Statement of July 4, 1972. To this end it was suggested that the two sides officially confirm their adherence to these ideals and principles at an agreed-upon date. Second, mutual propaganda attacks should stop. Third, all actions hostile and threatening to the other side, involving the use of armed forces, should stop immediately and unconditionally. The build-up of armed forces, military operations, the construction of military installations and the holding of military exercises should stop in areas adjoining the military line of demarcation. Fourth, a national conference attended by representatives of all the political parties and public organisations in the North and the South, including the Chairman of the ruling Democratic Republican Party of South Korea, as well as representatives of compatriot organisations (in Japan, the USA, the FRG and other countries) should be convened to discuss questions of comprehensive cooperation and exchanges in politics, the economy, defence, culture, the free dom for the political parties of the North and South to engage in political activity throughout the entire territory of the Korean peninsula. With the aim of preparing for this conference and solving other questions of unification it was proposed that a preparatory committee of national unification be formed which would include not only representatives of the authorities but also of all political parties and public organisations in the DPRK and South Korea, as well as representatives of compatriot organisations.²³

²¹ See Kim Il Sung, *On the Independent Peaceful Unification of the Homeland*, p. 97.

²² *Rodong Shinmoon*, Jan. 24, 1979.

²³ See *Rodong Shinmoon*, Feb. 6, 1979.

The DPRK government repeatedly brought its proposals to the attention of the South Korean authorities and stressed that then, when the South Korean ruling circles were in a political crisis due to the murder of the compromised dictator Park Chung Hee it was more important than ever to join in a search for a rational way of peacefully reunifying the country. Although the Seoul authorities published a statement on January 26, 1979 positively assessing the proposal made by the Central Committee of the United Democratic Fatherland Front,²⁴ they did not do anything to put it into practice. The South Koreans simply did not send their delegates to the fourth meeting of representatives of the North and the South in Panmunjom, thus torpedoing a new round of contacts.

In January 1980 the DPRK came up with a new initiative intended to bring about a resumption of the dialogue between North and South. Vice-President of the DPRK, Chairman of the Committee on the Peaceful Unification of the Homeland Kim Il proposed to the leaders of the ruling and opposition parties in the South, while the Premier of the DPRK's Administrative Council Li Jong Ok proposed to the Prime Minister of South Korea that a consultative conference and multilateral talks be held between political and public organisations from both parts of Korea. They also voiced their interest in seeing a meeting of the prime ministers.

The South Korean Prime Minister gave his consent to this and nine working conferences between representatives of both sides were held in Panmunjom from February 6 to June 24, 1980 to thrash out the terms of the forthcoming meeting of premiers (location, who was to participate and the agenda). The North Korean side displayed a constructive attitude, a high sense of responsibility, and proposed that the meetings be held not in third countries but on Korean territory. The DPRK also asked that the scope of questions for discussion not be restricted to a narrow agenda, as Seoul insisted. Soon, however, these conferences were discontinued and the aims set before them were not attained. While conducting talks with the DPRK, the military authorities headed by Chun Doo Hwan, which replaced the brief period of civilian rule after the murder of Park Chung Hee, launched a campaign of terror against democratic leaders and the people that was without precedent even in South Korea. It used force to suppress an uprising in May 1980 by the residents of Kwangju who demanded the restoration of democracy in the country. Under these circumstances the DPRK was compelled to cease contacts with the South Korean regime.

As to Kim Il's message, neither party nor public leaders in South Korea had a chance to reply to the proposals contained in it because they were arrested by Chun Doo Hwan. These and other actions taken by Seoul's ruling circles were deliberate actions intended to worsen the atmosphere and complicate intra-Korean dialogue.

The 6th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, which was held in October 1980, gave a great deal of attention to the problem of a political settlement in the Korean peninsula. In furtherance of earlier proposals while taking the actual situation in and around the Korean peninsula into account the Congress once again proposed that a confederation of the DPRK and South Korea be created as a step on the road to normalising the situation in Korea and creating the preconditions necessary for a peaceful, democratic solution of the Korean problems without interference by imperialist forces.

The supreme forum of the Korean Communists proposed to the United States that talks be held on the question of replacing the 1953

²⁴ See *Rodong Shinmun*, Jan. 28, 1979.

Korean armistice agreement with a peace treaty, and this became an integral part of its programme for finding a political solution to the situation in the Korean peninsula. The first such proposal to the United States, the main participant in the aggression against the DPRK which occurred between 1950 and 1953, was contained in a message from the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK to the U.S. Congress in March 1974. Washington, however, has yet to send an answer.²⁵ The Congress also demanded that American troops be speedily withdrawn from South Korea, stressing that such a step on the part of the United States would be in keeping with the interests not only of the Korean people but also of the peoples of other countries, including the United States, and contribute to the cause of ensuring peace in the world.

The new initiatives of the Workers' Party of Korea, which were directed at bringing about peaceful, democratic unification of the country in the speediest manner possible received wide support from the Korean public. The conference attended by representatives of the Workers' Party of Korea, the Democratic Party, the Chondogyo-Chonuduhn Party, the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Homeland and other DPRK public organisations, held in Pyongyang on November 11, 1980, sent a letter to the population of South Korea and Koreans living abroad, urging them to facilitate the implementation of the proposals concerning the country's unification approved by the 6th WPK Congress.²⁶ It was noted in the letter that these proposals had the unanimous support of the Korean people and were positively assessed by the international public. The participants in the conference also proposed that a consultative conference to be attended by representatives of North and South Korean political parties, public organisations and also of Koreans living abroad be convened to solve questions concerning the implementation of the DPRK's proposals in practice. In November-December 1980 this letter was sent to 1,336 South Korean political and public figures and to 870 Koreans living in other countries.

In the 1980s the DPRK's main efforts towards resolving the situation in Korea are concentrated on the holding of a broad campaign inside the country and abroad to garner support for the idea of creating a confederation of the North and the South and isolating the present rulers of South Korea who have the blood of the Kwangu patriots on their hands. At the same time, the heightening of tensions in the world and in the Far East in particular during that period, which were the result of the aggressive intrigues of imperialist forces and the hurried creation of the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul militaristic alliance, necessitated certain adjustments in the WPK's policies on the Korean settlement. These adjustments did not alter the essence of this policy but only served to somewhat change the proposals on ways of achieving the tasks set by the previous Congress.

At their joint meeting on January 10, 1984 the Central People's Committee and the Standing Council of the Supreme People's Assembly studied the question "On New Measures for the Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Question" and proposed that talks be held between the DPRK, the USA and South Korea.²⁷

It is a well-known fact that the idea of holding tripartite talks (in which the U.S., South Korea and the DPRK would participate equally) on securing a lasting peace in Korea was initially expressed by Washington way back in 1979. When addressing the South Korean parliament during his visit to Seoul in November 1983 President Reagan sta-

²⁵ See *Modern History of Korea*, pp. 234-235.

²⁶ See *Reading Standard*, Nov. 12, 1980.

²⁷ See *Reading Standard*, Jan. 15, 1984.

ted that his country was ready to hold talks with the DPRK in which the South Korean authorities would also take part. The United States has also repeatedly made similar, confidential proposals to the DPRK.²⁰

In the DPRK it is rightly believed that such talks would present an opportunity for discussing ways of eliminating tension in the Korean peninsula. They would also create favourable preconditions for the peaceful unification of the country, and facilitate the search for a rational solution to the current situation which would be in keeping with the interests of the participating parties.

With these aims in view the DPRK proposes, first, to discuss at the tripartite talks the questions of concluding a Korean-American peace agreement in place of the 1953 armistice agreement, which would put a legal end to the Korean war, and the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. "The signing of a Korean-US peace agreement and the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea would be the chief pledge of a lasting peace in Korea and a precondition for carrying out unification independently and without outside interference", it was stressed in the communique on the joint meeting of the Central People's Committee and the Standing Council of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK.²¹

Another key question which the DPRK suggested be included on the agenda of the talks is the adoption by the North and South of a non-aggression declaration that would constitute the mutual commitment not to use force against each other, drastically to reduce the quantity of troops and armaments, and to eliminate the state of military confrontation in the Korean peninsula.

After reaching agreement on these two questions, it was noted at the joint meeting, it would be possible to solve the question of uniting Korea on the basis of the principles agreed upon in the July 4, 1972 Statement of the North and South by creating a confederate republic and convening a national conference for this purpose.

Displaying flexibility and good will in its approach to a settlement in Korea, the DPRK expressed its readiness to discuss other questions raised by the United States or South Korea at the tripartite talks.

The Central People's Committee and the Standing Council of the DPRK's Supreme National Assembly sent letters to the US Administration and Congress as well as to the Seoul authorities outlining the content of the new measures designed to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. In these documents the United States and South Korea are invited to take part in tripartite talks.

The supreme body of state power in the DPRK—the Supreme People's Assembly—held a regular session late in January 1984 and approved the DPRK's proposals when studying the resolution "On Creating Guarantees for Peace in Korea and Speeding up the Independent Peaceful Unification of the Homeland". The session adopted a resolution and an appeal to the parliaments and governments of all countries in the world.

In response to the DPRK's political initiative Washington changed its attitude to the idea of tripartite talks and, in an attempt to avoid discus-

²⁰ See *Rodong Shinmoon*, Jan. 25, 1984. A commentary in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* is quite typical in this respect. Noting that the DPRK's proposals were characterised by a spirit of compromise the magazine writes that by this initiative Pyongyang actually renounced a position that it had held for a lengthy period of time—to have no direct contacts with Chun Doo Hwan's government in Seoul. It also wrote that the DPRK's new proposals accord in principle with the idea Seoul earlier voiced of concluding a pact of non-aggression and implementing other confidence-building measures.

²¹ *Rodong Shinmoon*, Jan. 11, 1984.

sing the question of the withdrawal of American troops from the south of the Korean peninsula, came up with the proposal that a bilateral meeting between North and South Korea be held. Seoul took a similar stand.

In order to further the North Korean peace initiative the Premier of the DPRK's Administrative Council Kang Sung Sang sent a letter to the South Korean Premier Chin Ie Chong on March 7, 1984 expressing his failure to understand the position of the Seoul authorities which had rejected the idea of tripartite talks. Pyongyang. Kang Sung Sang's message notes, is ready for contacts with Seoul if the South Korean administration have appropriate prerogatives, i. e., obtains the right to command its own army (the joint forces of the United States and South Korea are commanded by an American general), secures the withdrawal of US troops from the south of the Korean peninsula, the right to replace the armistice agreement with a peace agreement, and displays its readiness to sign a North-South non-aggression declaration.³⁰ If these conditions are met the DPRK could enter into the intra-Korean dialogue and consider it a genuine road leading to the solution of the Korean problem.

As we have seen, the Workers' Party of Korea and the government of the DPRK, expressing the Korean people's will, are working to unite Korea. Those who really desire peace and do not want confrontation in the Korean peninsula are not short of initiatives and proposals which if implemented, could lead to a peaceful settlement in the Korean peninsula.

The question of finding a peaceful democratic solution to the Korean problem is an urgent item on the agenda of current present-day international affairs. The Korean people's struggle for normalisation of the situation in the peninsula is an integral part of the peoples' struggle to eliminate the threat of nuclear war, bring the arms race to a halt, and guarantee peace, security and social progress.

In this struggle the Soviet Union has always sided and continues to side with the DPRK. Solidarity with the Korean people's just struggle for the reunification of its homeland was reconfirmed by the Soviet Union during the visit of a Korean party and state delegation headed by the General Secretary of the WPK Central Committee and President of the DPRK Kim Il Sung to the USSR in May 1984. "The Soviet Union", Konstantin Chernenko stressed, "has consistently supported the reunification of Korea peacefully, on a democratic basis and after the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. Such is our firm, invariable position. We support the important initiatives taken by the DPRK which envisage the signing of a peace treaty in place of the armistice agreement, the adoption of a non-aggression declaration by the North and South, the mutual reduction of armed forces and the transformation of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. The implementation of these proposals would substantially improve the situation in Korea and create conditions favourable to a productive dialogue between the North and the South".³¹

³⁰ See *Rodong Shinmun*, March 8, 1984.

³¹ *Pravda*, May 24, 1984.

CAPITAL INVESTMENTS FOR MODERNIZING PRC'S AGRICULTURE STUDIED

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[Article by Z. A. Muromtseva, candidate of economic sciences: "Modernization of Agriculture in the PRC: The Question of Capital Investments"]

China's embarkment on the road of modern agriculture, which involves more than 800 million people, is a most complicated problem in many ways. The rural economic base remains extremely backward. It was noted at a national conference on work in rural areas in November 1983 that with the introduction of the family contract, which is described as a "large-scale and bold reform", "on the whole more and more questions are arising and they are becoming more and more complex".¹ A number of unsolved problems (elaborating political guidelines, improving the land-use regulations, abolishing the people's communes, establishing new forms of management in the countryside, and raising the economic efficiency of agriculture) are being joined by problems which may appear to be smaller in scale presently but which are really very important and concern the creation of an infrastructure in the countryside (irrigation facilities and the transport network first and foremost), the provision of agriculture with sources of energy, and the dissemination of science and technology, culture and education in the countryside.

The need to conduct land-improvement work on a large scale, to build roads, electric power stations and transmission lines, to sustain the fertility of land, which has become poor through intensive use at the necessary level, to break new land both to replace arable land lost to construction of all types (industrial, residential, etc.) and to provide land for the rapidly growing population—all this calls for large capital investments.

Neither can the accelerated development of agriculture on the basis of scientific and technological achievements be carried out without certain expenditures because the introduction of agrotechnical innovations requires the allocation of money for information, training, etc., that is for creating a component of the investment structure which is new to China.

As was noted in the *Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Some Questions of Agricultural Accelerated Development* (1979), the development of agriculture has followed a "tortuous path"; "state support for agriculture was insufficient, the reconstruction of agricultural technology was not set as the central task nor was it tackled properly".²

Let us study the structure of capital investment formation in agriculture and the main directions this investment has taken since the PRC was formed in greater detail. Money allocated by the state from its budget and agriculture's internal savings are the sources of capital investment in this branch.

According to official reports the money earmarked by the state for capital investment in agriculture is used to develop virgin land, plant forests, build large irrigation facilities, highways, telegraph network, large warehouses, etc.

¹ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 18, 1984.

² *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 6, 1979.

Cost-accounting units in the countryside (production teams were the overwhelming majority of them until recently) made capital investments from their own resources to build small and medium irrigation facilities, small hydropower stations, local roads, warehouses, and workshops to repair and produce farm implements.

When studying the question of capital investment in agriculture one should also take into account long-term agricultural credits, a part of which are spent on the needs of capital construction (during the First Five-Year-Plan period this accounted for more than 20 per cent of all credits).

Although state investments for capital construction comprise a much smaller share, than do capital investments coming from agriculture's internal savings, nevertheless they are the principal vehicle for introducing advanced forms of technical and technological development into the traditional structure of farming. So let us first consider the dynamics of state capital investment. Before the 1980s from 60 to 70 per cent of the state capital investments in agriculture were spent on irrigation projects. The raising of plant-growing and animal husbandry, on the other hand, got a much smaller share of the capital investment pie in the same period. Thus, 0.7 billion yuan (61.5 per cent) were invested in the construction of irrigation facilities in 1957 while 0.4 billion yuan (35.9 per cent) went to agriculture (excluding forestry, fisheries and meteorology). The corresponding figures for 1965 were 1.5 (60.7 per cent) and 0.7 (29.5 per cent), for 1975—2.6 (67 per cent) and 0.9 (22.3 per cent); for 1979—3.5 (72.7 per cent) and 0.6 (12.8 per cent); for 1982—1.8 (52 per cent) and 1.3 billion yuan (37.3 per cent).³

The number of big and medium agricultural projects reaching completion declined in the 1980s. Not a single project in agriculture or irrigation construction was completed in 1982, while only four were completed in 1981. In 1983, the situation somewhat changed: 2.1 billion yuan⁴ were channelled in the irrigation building, i. e., 59 per cent of the sum-total of the 3.5 billion yuan of the state capital investment.

In 1981 capital investment in agricultural modernisation (improvement of agrotechnology, establishment of research institutions, etc.) amounted to 584 million yuan, in 1982 to 876 million yuan and in 1983 to 685 million yuan, or 2.6, 3 and 1.9 per cent respectively of the total sums spent on modernising various branches of the economy.⁵ About one billion yuan were spent in 1983 on agricultural research and the development of farm technology.⁶ This represents a new and progressive trend but higher and stable rates of the growth of state capital investment increment are needed to sustain and develop it.

The introduction of fixed assets in irrigation construction was most adversely affected by the reduction of state capital investments in agriculture at the beginning of the 1980s. The newly introduced fixed assets in plant growing and animal husbandry reached the analogous indicator in irrigation construction, this being done by reducing the fixed assets in irrigation construction. Newly created fixed assets in irrigation construction in 1981-1982 amounted to less than 1.1 billion yuan on the average.⁷ This is much lower than their average level in 1975-1980 when almost 1.8 billion yuan of fixed assets were annually introduced in irrigation construction.

³ According to data presented in *Zhongguo nongye nianjian—1980*. Peking, 1981, p. 41, *Zhongguo tongji nianjian—1983*, Peking, 1983, p. 333.

⁴ *Zhongguo tongji nianjian—1984*, Peking, 1984, p. 314.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 361; *Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao—1984*, Peking, 1984, p. 71.

⁶ *Jingji ribao*, March 20, 1984.

⁷ *Zhongguo tongji nianjian—1983*, p. 346.

Early in the 1980s state capital investment in agriculture amounted to less than seven per cent of the total allotted by the PRC budget for capital investments (in 1953-1978 it exceeded 11 per cent on the average) while the figure of 6.1 per cent is planned for the sixth five-year-plan period.

Table 1

Dynamics of State capital investment in agriculture and the increase of irrigated areas by five-year-plan periods

Designation \ Years	1953—1957	1958—1965*	1966—1970	1971—1975	1976—1980	1981—1985 (plan)
I. Capital investment in the national economy — total (bn yuan)	58.8	162.8	97.6	176.4	234.2	230.0
Agriculture (bn yuan)	4.2	21.0	10.4	17.3	24.6	14.1
including:						
irrigation construction	2.5	13.6	6.9	11.9	15.3	5.2
II. Growth in irrigated areas (mln hectares)	7.4	5.7	2.9	7.3	1.6	1.3

* In the interval between 1958 and 1965 Chinese statistics singled out the second five-year plan period (1958—1962) that was wrecked by the big leap policy and the period of rectification from 1963 to 1965. Since the restoration and stabilisation of the country's national economy which was ruined by the big leap experiments, was, in effect, completed by 1965, it is expedient to combine these years.

The published statistics grouped by five-year-plan periods, show the dynamics of state capital investment in agriculture as a whole, including spending on irrigation construction.

The table shows that capital investment in irrigation construction during the First Five-Year-Plan period produced the best results. During that period the area of irrigated land increased by 7.4 mln hectares and had reached 27.3 mln hectares by 1957.⁸

In the years that followed, from 1958 through 1980, more than 73 billion yuan were invested in agriculture, including almost 48 billion yuan in irrigation construction (more than 65 per cent of the total investment in agriculture). The area under irrigation increased by 17.5 mln hectares during this period.

Due to population growth, the amount of irrigated land per rural inhabitant actually remained at the level of the late 1950s, that is 0.05 hectare.

By the early 1980s, 45 mln hectares were under irrigation in the PRC. That figure signifies almost a half of all the arable land in the country. According to data gathered by the PRC's statistical board electricity was used to irrigate more than 56 per cent of all irrigated land. But the figures for irrigation remained on paper for many localities; it was pointed out in the Chinese press that in a great number of places from a quarter to a half of the so-called irrigated lands did not get any water.⁹

In the period from 1980 to 1982, Chinese official statistics registered a decline in the area under irrigation. Whereas in 1979 this figure reached an all-time highest in the PRC level of 45 mln hectares—in 1980 it had dropped to 44.89 mln hectares, in 1981 to 44.57 mln hectares, and in 1982

⁸ *Zhongguo tongji zhishao*—1983, p. 33. As estimated in the collection *The Great Decade* (Peking, 1959, p. 115), the area of irrigated land in 1957 totalled 34.3 million hectares.

⁹ *Guangming ribao*, May 10, 1980.

to 44.17 mln hectares,¹⁰ i. e., during these three years the total area under irrigation shrunk by 830,000 hectares.

An important role in this decline was evidently played by reductions in state capital investment as well as poor maintenance of the irrigation networks when the family contract system was introduced.

At present the area that is truly guaranteed against droughts and floods does not exceed 20 mln hectares. 1983 witnessed a new increase in the area under irrigation to 44.64 mln hectares.¹¹

The volume of capital investment planned for the Sixth Five-Year-Plan period (1981-1985) is slightly over 57 per cent of the level of capital investments made in agriculture in 1976-1980. In the field of irrigation, state investments are giving a boost to projects in the basins of the Huanghe, Yangtze, Huaihe and Haihe rivers—projects which are intended to improve flood control. In the course of five years it will increase the total area under irrigation by 1.334 mln hectares. Forest planting and measures to combat wind erosion will be continued in the northwest of the country, and efforts to combat soil erosion will also be continued in parts of northern and northeastern China. Among other activities the state will also take part in creating zones where marketable grain can be grown in Heilongjiang, Jiangxi, Hunan and Anhui provinces. In 1983 the PRC State Council demanded that work to create zones for the production of marketable grain be accelerated, and noted that this work was not being carried out rapidly enough.

Prior to the early 1980s farm machinery accounted for 50 to 60 per cent and in some instances to 80 per cent of the fixed assets of people's communes and teams. Still, according to official data, 30 per cent of the communes did not have special groups in charge of utilising the existing agricultural machinery. As a result, the percentage of time that machinery stood idle went up, farm machinery was misused and cost-accounting units refused to employ machines. By mid-1979 the warehouses of the All-China Farm Machinery Company had unsold farm machinery worth seven billion yuan.¹²

The growth of state capital investment in agriculture in the 1960s-1970s had, on the whole, no substantial effect on the rise in both labour productivity and the knowledge and technical skills of the overwhelming mass of the peasantry. In agriculture the lag in the growth rates of labour productivity behind the growing availability of fixed production assets per worker resulted in higher production costs for farm produce and a drastic decline in the efficiency of capital spending.

Fixed assets in agriculture exceeded 100 billion yuan in 1982 (compared to 15.5 billion yuan in 1957). The annual growth rates for fixed assets in agriculture averaged 9.2 per cent,¹³ from 1957 to 1978, while labour productivity in agriculture during the same period went up by only one per cent while according to other (also official) Chinese statistics it had even dropped by four per cent.

Agriculture's own savings remain the main source of capital investments in the countryside. According to estimates, by the late 1970s, savings in the Chinese countryside amounted to 6-7 billion yuan annually.¹⁴ Attempts to increase savings quotas through the use of coercive budget-monetary methods did not bring about growth in the savings; on the con-

¹⁰ *Zhongguo tongji zhishuo—1983*, Peking, 1983, p. 33.

¹¹ *Zhongguo tongji zhishuo—1984*, p. 38.

¹² *Renmin ribao*, May 16, 1979.

¹³ *Zhongguo nungye nian jian—1980*, p. 339.

¹⁴ This estimate has been based on data presented in the magazine *Nungye jingji wenti* (1980, No 2, p. 33) according to which savings per one mu amounted to 4.16 yuan. According to data from other sources savings in rural China equaled 8-9 billion yuan.

rary it brought about stagnation. Savings in past labour, including implements and objects of labour, as well as in the labour capacity of workers which manifests itself in the level of skill possessed by the labour force, actually came about due to the quantitative increment of materialised labour, realised in machinery (mostly expensive tractors). Many cost-accounting units had to buy this machinery from the state not because they really needed it but because they needed to implement formally the slogan of "carrying out mechanisation before the year 1980". Of the 200 million h. p. of available farm machinery power capacity in 1981 effective use was made of only 20 per cent,¹⁵ the rest standing idle because of shortages of fuel, lubricants, spare parts, skilled operators, etc.

A situation took shape in the people's communes whereby peasants were no longer interested in their work. As a result of this lack of interest equipment on collective farms broke down much sooner than that belonging to individual households, and this situation became the rule.

In effect the peasants had neither the means nor the incentive to invest capital in the farms. The customary low material level of production and the stagnation of consumption standards in the Chinese countryside made the growth of the family the only incentive for saving and subsequently investing, especially when peasants were permitted to have kitchen gardens and engage in domestic farming. In the 25 years since people's communes were formed, capital investment sustaining the former per capita level of production have in practice been the only incentive for saving in agriculture.

When the family contract was introduced, new problems concerning saving and the policy of capital investment in agricultural production have appeared. On the one hand, incomes have risen substantially as has the desire to increase them with the intensification of manual labour which has resulted from the creation of tangible material incentives for peasants. It has been noted in the Chinese press that between 1977 and 1981 peasants' incomes grew by 48.5 per cent.¹⁶ On the other hand, as was stressed in the magazine *Hongqi*, the organ of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, a new problem has appeared—"how to adjust the ways of creating and using agriculture's internal savings to the new circumstances when scattered non-centralised peasant households have become the linchpin of the system".¹⁷

The distribution of production assignments among households resulted in a drastic reduction of the contributions made to the social funds of production teams. In the three years between 1979 and 1981 they dropped by almost a quarter (contributions to the savings funds in particular). Whereas in 1979 contributions to the savings funds of production teams amounted to 8.7 billion yuan, the figure for 1981 was only 4.8 billion yuan, a decline of more than 40 per cent.

It is held at present that the collective organisation in the form of a team under contract maintains relations with peasant households concerning production and marketing of produce and for this reason retains "certain functions characteristic of a centralised economy".¹⁸ Under the contract the peasant household is obliged to supply the state with a certain amount of farm produce while the collective, in turn, provides the peasant family with means of production, including tools, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, etc.

But according to the Chinese press the contract system has yet to be introduced in some areas of the country while in other it needs improve-

¹⁵ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1982, No. 3.

¹⁶ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 9, p. 21.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

ment. Besides, in a great number of places contracts have become unilateral debt pledges of peasants. In localities where peasant households are the only side honouring the contracts there are instances of administrative pressure on peasants, arbitrary changes in the terms of the contract by officials, with peasants being completely unable to protect their lawful interests. This brings about a decline in their labour activity. The breaking of contracts by the collective damages not only the peasants but, as the press has stressed, in the long run might damage the interests of the state. For this reason "under no circumstances should contracts be broken or changed by will of individual persons" and "contracts are not a one-sided promissory note signed by peasant households".¹⁹

It is easier for successful collective farms possessing sufficient financial and material resources to honour contracts. But at present there are no uniform quotas on contributions to be made by peasant households to collective funds, although these contributions are regarded as a key component in the collective economy. Many households either do not make any contributions to the team's collective fund at all, or make only token ones.

Under the family contract the household is assigned the entire volume of farm work. The households themselves are then responsible for the profits and losses. But the household operates on collective land, the collective is the sole owner and user of the land, and the irrigation facilities belong to the state.²⁰

Whereas prior to the early 1980s the money for modernisation in the countryside mostly took the form of gratis state investments and bank credits while machinery was distributed through centralised purchasing and marketing, under the system of the full family contract the peasants have taken in fact the greater part of capital investments upon themselves. They pay for the mechanised cultivation of land, for the repair of farm machinery, for fuel and lubricants, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, electricity, etc. The production team—the main cost-accounting unit in agriculture before the introduction of the contract system—has lost its ability to accumulate material and financial resources for capital construction. The team's own sources of financing remain only in those cases when the teams (committees of rural residents) have some enterprises or other.

Although money continues to be exempted for collective needs in many areas, this is being done on a drastically reduced scale. There are areas where taxes are not paid and the money designated for these purposes is shared among the members of the commune, so a part of the savings is concentrated not in the hands of the collective but at individual peasant households. Between 1979 and 1980 the volume of money available for collective savings dropped by 15.2 per cent, while between 1980 and 1981 it dropped by another 11.2 per cent.²¹

The sum-total spent by collective farms on capital investment in agricultural fixed assets amounted to 13.1 billion yuan in 1982 and to 11.1 billion yuan in 1983, or 10.9 per cent and 8.1 per cent respectively of the overall capital investment in the country's fixed assets.²²

According to selective surveys by the state statistical board, the share of incomes derived by peasants from their own households (in the total incomes received by peasants), has grown. In fact it grew from 33.7 per cent in 1978 to 48 per cent in 1981.²³ As a rule, no contributions to social funds (including the savings fund) are made from this part of a peasant's income. In the opinion of the Chinese press, this is one of the rea-

¹⁹ *Renmin ribao*, April 4, 1983.

²⁰ "Theses of the Chinese Conference on Work in Rural Areas", *Renmin ribao*, April 6, 1982.

²¹ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 9, p. 22.

²² *Zhongguo tongji zhazhiao*—1983, p. 57; *Zhongguo tongji zhazhiao*—1984, p. 63.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

sons for the decline in contributions to collective funds because almost a half of the money in the areas under investigation was not taken into account.

In most peasant families the savings are not so easily divided into personal consumption and accumulation because of the difficulties that exist objectively. The low standard of living of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese peasantry and lack of any progress during two decades explain the extremely poor housing conditions, lack of many household goods and even basic clothing. So the growth in the incomes of peasant families in recent years has enabled a part of the peasantry to eat their fill and buy clothes, others have been able to fix up their homes, buy durable goods (bicycles, watches, sewing machines, radiosets, etc.) and to start building new houses.

Statistics for 1979-1981 show that the larger incomes earned by peasants are primarily being spent for non-productive purposes such as food, consumer goods and the building of homes. Thus, the volume of the retail trade in consumer goods increased by 33.8 per cent between 1979 and 1980; and by another 15.7 per cent between 1980 and 1981.²⁴ In 1980-1981 1.1 billion square metres of individual housing was built in the countryside, while 1.3 billion square metres was built in 1982-1983. The volume of individual investment in housing construction in villages totalled 16.9 billion yuan in 1982 and then went up to 24.4 billion yuan in 1983²⁵, thus exceeding previous figures dating back several decades. At the same time the volume of collective spending on production by teams and communes increased by less than three per cent between 1979 and 1980, while in the period of 1980-1981 it dropped by two per cent.²⁶

The savings concentrated in agriculture and amounting to 70 billion yuan,²⁷ according to the Chinese press, were not spent on the purchase of modern machinery and equipment to expand production. Whereas the retail trade in agricultural means of production increased by 6.8 per cent between 1979 and 1980, there was hardly any growth at all in 1981.²⁸

According to the yearbook *Chinese Agriculture—1980* the long-term bank credits were used in the Chinese countryside for building industrial enterprises (with a 3.6 per cent monthly interest), agricultural enterprises (a 1.8 per cent monthly interest), capital construction in the teams (a 1.8 per cent monthly interest) and for mechanising agriculture (this type of credit was interest-free for a period of up to 15 years)²⁹.

In the 1950s and 1960s long-term and short-term loans were made cyclical (that is new loans were granted after the old ones were paid off) so that the state would not have to invest more and more money in the programme. From the "cultural revolution" until the mid-1970s agriculture did not get loans. The granting of credit for agriculture on a large scale was resumed in the late 1970s. In 1982 long-term state loans to agriculture reached about 3 billion yuan.

Since direct capital investment in agriculture is difficult to make at the present time China is pinning great hopes on loans from international organisations and individual countries. Since the late 1970s foreign credit began to be used for soil conservation, hydrotechnical construction, setting up livestock farms, research in agriculture, etc. Thus, in 1982 the PRC State Council approved a programme to reclaim 200,000 hectares of saline and alkaline soils on the North China plain. Of the 350 million yuan required for this project 120 million yuan were granted by the Inter-

²⁴ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 9, p. 23.

²⁵ *Zhongguo tongji zhazhuan—1983*, p. 57; *Op. cit.—1984*, p. 63.

²⁶ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 9, p. 23.

²⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 7, 1983.

²⁸ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 9, p. 23.

²⁹ *Zhongguo nongye nianjian—1980*, p. 335.

national Bank for Reconstruction and Development in the form of an interest-free loan. IBRD also gave China credit totalling \$74 million for agricultural research and \$60 million for the breaking of virgin soil in the North China plain. With the help of the IBRD the PRC is also planning to start production of grain harvesters and 130-160 h. p. heavy tractors.³⁰ Between 1977 and February 1984 91 agreements on aid and easy-term credit for agriculture were signed as were contracts worth \$606.8 million.³¹

But on the whole, using loans by the state to direct funds into Chinese agriculture with the objective of providing it with modern means of production and increasing a solvent demand for the latter is actually still in the formative stage.

China intends to make greater use of the population's savings accumulated in banks in various forms, together with the available social funds to carry out capital construction in agriculture.

Stimulation of the productive use of loans to create material preconditions for expanding the use of modern means of production should become the primary objective of the state's policy on loans.

In order to overcome the economic backwardness of rural China, the problem of internal savings must be solved as must the need to give them an appropriate productive form. But the introduction of modern machinery and technology to agriculture necessitates the development of modern branches of industry which would service agriculture and this largely depends on foreign imports. Today low-interest long-term loans, including government loans and loans from international financial organisations, play a significant role for the PRC but, in terms of their size, it is proportionately minute.

In the first part of the 1980s state capital investments and long-term credits used for capital construction accounted for roughly 21 per cent, while almost 79 per cent was provided by agriculture's internal capital investment. Total annual capital investment in agricultural enterprises owned by collectives or the state early in the 1980s, was below the average level of the late 1970s. In 1982 it amounted to 15.6 billion yuan.³² There were no substantial changes in 1983 and 1984.

If we view the savings of peasants from the standpoint of their designation we see that capital investment in land and education lag far behind investment in such items as housing construction, purchase of durable goods, current consumption, weddings and funerals.

Given the situation in China today, the collective cannot dictate to the peasant household the amount of cash savings it should spend on the expansion of production. The Chinese press urges peasants to find an optimal balance between accumulation and consumption.³³

As far as the prospects for agricultural development are concerned, the Chinese press points out, attention must be paid to ensuring factors of expanded reproduction in that area. Here it is important to encourage investment of earned savings for capital construction in agriculture (the levelling and clearing of land, the building of small irrigation facilities, soil conservation measures, etc.), as well as to help the formation and growth of peasant production associations. A part of the peasantry's personal savings should be given to these associations and spent primarily on the purchase of expensive means of production because the coefficient of use of the modern agricultural equipment purchased by peasant households on their own is very low in rural China.

³⁰ *China Business Review*, 1982, Nov-Dec., Vol. 9, No. 6, p. 21.

³¹ *China Daily*, February 23, 1984.

³² Estimates are based on the collection *Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao—1983*, Peking, 1983, pp. 57, 61.

³³ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 9, p. 23.

According to Chinese statistics, capital investment in the production of farm machinery, chemical fertilizer, herbicides and pesticides is not included in the sum allocated by the state budget for capital investment in agriculture. Still, recent statistics present a relatively complete idea of the way they are used.

The biggest capital investments were made in the production of chemical fertilizer and pesticides as well as in the production of farm equipment in the 1970s: about 1.7 billion yuan in 1970, over 3 billion yuan in 1975, more than 2.1 billion yuan in 1978 and over 1.6 billion yuan in 1979.³⁴ Most of this money was spent on the construction of chemical fertilizer plants purchased by China abroad. Capital investment in the production of farm machinery in the 1970s averaged 500 million yuan a year. There was a decline in state capital investment in the production of agricultural means of production early in the 1980s: in 1981-1983 capital investment in the production of farm machinery averaged 108 million yuan while in the production of chemical fertilizer, herbicides and pesticides it averaged slightly over 550 million yuan.³⁵

Agriculture's economic and technological backwardness impedes the development of the market of modern means of production. Peasants are using and will use primitive implements either of their own manufacture or purchased from other peasants and paid for by farm produce.

Without state assistance and guidance by the collective farm, most peasants will turn to traditional crafts and cottage industries not because of their conservatism or out of habit but rather because their output—the surplus product that they keep in particular—is too small and can only be used to purchase traditional implements. The latter will ultimately have a negative impact on agricultural productive forces as a whole.

Given a determined guidance by the state, the development of commodity-monetary relations that has recently emerged in rural China might gradually result in a market-oriented type of production and create the conditions necessary for peasant households to begin using more modern means of production.

This lends great urgency to the need for PRC industry to increase output and supply agriculture with means of production that are in particular demand. If the savings of peasants cannot be converted into means of expanded reproduction at a suitable time they will either be stashed away in a sock or spent on consumer goods and the like. So Chinese economists are only partially right in thinking that the money necessary for the modernisation of Chinese agriculture can be obtained from peasant households at the rate of 100 yuan per household, a plan which would yield 18 billion yuan a year.³⁶ Besides, this would primarily apply to developed agricultural areas.

The Chinese press is correct in contending that "agriculture must absolutely have financial assistance from the state and capital investment in agriculture can gradually increase with the improvement of the state's finances".³⁷ But at the present time capital investments used for production savings in the rural areas of China have shrunk in terms of both the state budget and the rural economy.

In recent years the gross agricultural product has grown not so much as a result of agrotechnological innovations but as a result of harder work by the peasants.

Considering the acute shortage of land in China the use of traditional agrotechnological methods to raise the fertility of the soil acquires special significance.

³⁴ *Zhongguo nanye nianjian*—1980, p. 335.

³⁵ *Zhongguo tongji nianjian*—1983, p. 331; *Op cit*—1984, pp. 312, 313.

³⁶ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 9, p. 22.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

Traditional agrotechnological methods are being revived through the introduction of the family contract because modern technological methods have not always taken the specific character of rural China into consideration, nor have they brought about the necessary growth in labour productivity.

The use of traditional agrotechnological methods by households working on the basis of a family contract prevented a drop of labour productivity and preserved the diversified nature of agricultural production.

More alarming is the fact that PRC state budget, having shed half of the burden of spending on capital construction in the countryside, is slow in disseminating information among the peasants and persuading them to concentrate production capital investments in capital construction according to a single plan of large-scale land-improvement projects (first and foremost irrigation and soil conservation projects). The state does not give enough help to collective farms which are trying to fulfil their contractual obligation to supply peasants with the necessary means of production. Peasant households might succumb to a petty ownership mentality which is not conducive to the growth of production capital investment in the interests of agricultural development as a whole.

Chinese economists are aware that control over economic processes in the countryside might be lost in the near future. But here they see the top-priority task, instead of giving the necessary assistance to the countryside in the field of education and the introduction of modern technological methods, in controlling the processes of consumption and growth of production savings.³⁸

It should be noted that propaganda of the need to control consumption processes and increase production investments did have an effect in 1983. That year the volume of retail consumer goods turnover went up by 11.6 per cent, as compared to 1982. This constituted a decline, however, when compared to the figures for 1980-1982. At the same time the volume of sales of agricultural means of production increased by 10.2 per cent in 1983 (the real increase is slightly smaller due to the fact that in 1981 there was a drop in sales of means of production to agriculture).

Under the plan for 1984 the funds the PRC state budget will allocate to agriculture (this item also includes state capital investment in agricultural production) will amount to 8.1 billion yuan, a decline of 6.5 per cent from 1983.

It was noted at the national conference on work in rural areas, which was held in November 1983, that PRC agriculture was making a historical transition from traditional natural farming to commodity production.³⁹ It appears that practical measures to increase effective state assistance to agriculture are needed to make this transition painless for the hundreds of millions of peasants who live in a natural or semi-natural economy.

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POLICY QUESTIONS, STATUS OF ANZUS, ANZUK BLOC MEMBERS VIEWED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 85 pp 105-111

[Article by E. S. Grebenshchikov, candidate of historical sciences: "ANZUS: The Labyrinths and Deadlocks of Bloc Policy"]

In the 1980s, US reactionaries advocating militant anti-communism turned the Pacific Basin, with its ramified network of military alliances, bases and strong points set up way back in the cold war period, into a testing ground for their dangerous militaristic (including nuclear) rehearsals. Notwithstanding this fact, Washington is bent on setting up new alliances and is taking measures to revive organisations which have fallen into decline and to integrate them within the framework of the comprehensive military-strategic system of imperialism in that region. During his visit to Japan in May 1984, US Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger pressed the point that it is not so important to step up individual military efforts of the Pentagon's allies in different blocs as it is to unite and coordinate them.

Australia which, together with the US and New Zealand, is party to the ANZUS alliance is called upon to guarantee American influence in the south and southwest Pacific and it largely does. Until quite recently the United States persistently worked—and with some success—to expand that alliance's sphere of activity assigning to it, alongside regional functions, global ones, which would in practice mean support for US intervention in various parts of the developing world. Recently, however, Washington has had to face growing centrifugal tendencies within ANZUS and stronger anti-bloc, anti-American and anti-nuclear sentiments. It was quite annoyed to see power in New Zealand pass to the Labour Party, which had promised to prevent US ships carrying nuclear weapons from entering local ports. That promise was perceived by the White House as an attempt to undermine the ANZUS pact and defy US bloc policy as a whole. The US ruling elite openly voiced fears that, once implemented, the decision of the New Zealand government might have wide repercussions and do considerable harm to Washington's strategic designs in the Pacific.

These developments triggered anew debates over the prospects for ANZUS. Let us consider the alliance and the role it plays in US bloc policy.

Set up in 1951 at the height of the "cold war", ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) can be regarded as a project commissioned by the US military. The text of the treaty is very similar to the provisions of the NATO pact and envisions constantly to "maintain and develop the individual and collective capability to repulse an armed attack", which naturally presupposes a constant build-up of its members' military might. In fact, the Preamble and Article 8 of the treaty characterised ANZUS as the first step towards "forming a more extensive security system in the Pacific". This provision was apparently formulated in view of the peripheral importance of the bloc in relation to American imperialism's global interests. At that time Washington viewed ANZUS as a means of giving "rear support" to US plans in different regions of

Asia. The Pentagon strategists would, of course, have preferred to form what the treaty called a "more extensive system" there and then. At present the plans are to accomplish this task within the framework of the projected Pacific community.

The supreme body of the alliance is the ANZUS Council, which holds annual sessions attended by the three foreign ministers or their assistants alternately in every member country. Its infrastructure also includes groups of military advisers and a Washington-based special body for permanent consultations. The ANZUS pact and complementary agreements allow US warships freely to enter the ports of the member-countries and be serviced there, US nuclear bombers may use Australian air fields as well as the Christ Church Air Base in New Zealand. Intelligence information is exchanged and Pentagon bases have been set up in Australia in accordance with the pact and agreements.

Encouraged by Washington, Australian military-political circles seek to spread ANZUS activities to vast regions of the world. For instance, the Indian Ocean has been included in the sphere of ANZUS operations (this is recorded in paragraph 26 of the communique passed by the 32nd ANZUS Council session in Washington on July 18-19, 1983). During a stopover in Hong Kong Australian Foreign Minister William Hayden, who was returning from the session, spoke of expanding the Australian military presence in the Indian Basin. According to Hayden this presence would most definitely not be limited to the zone contiguous to Australia. Apart from safeguarding its own interests in the region, the Australian government promised to give "the appropriate support to the interests of the West" (read, the US). From time to time Australian warships patrol the northwestern part of the Indian Ocean and participate in joint manoeuvres with US naval forces. According to the newspaper *Australian*, Canberra plans to form the so-called Indian Ocean Commission, which the newspaper describes (rather freely, I should add) as a "regional equivalent of ASEAN".

The Australian military supported by Washington also intend to move into vast areas of the Pacific, where several small independent states have recently come into being. The aforementioned document signed at the 1983 ANZUS session in Washington reads that the security of the island states in the Pacific is closely connected with the security of the ANZUS partners.

It would nevertheless be wrong to believe that ANZUS is an outdated product of the "cold war". It is an active bloc or, rather, was until quite recently. But precisely whose interests does it serve and what threat has it to meet? Many Australians and New Zealanders justifiably think that by meeting the commitments resulting from their membership in the bloc they are seriously jeopardised. They doubt very much whether they should rely on the wisdom and prudence of their senior partner. Support [by Australia.—*Auth.*] of the international order advocated by the US inevitably raises the question of Washington's ability to coordinate its national goals with the broader interests of the Western community. ...This is a new problem for those responsible for Australia's security policy...,¹ an authoritative Australian journal writes.

As only few believe that the country's security at the regional level is threatened in any way, certain elements persistently promote the thesis that a "global threat" is posed, naturally, by the Soviet Union and its navy, in particular. Let it be recalled, however, that ANZUS, just like other aggressive pacts, came into being long before there was any talk of "Soviet naval expansion".

¹ *Australian Outlook*, April 1983, p. 24.

The Australian ruling elite tried hard to motivate and somehow justify Australia's involvement in the bloc, just as their New Zealand counterparts had done. They offered their membership as a proof that they belonged to the "Western camp" and called the pact itself an unbreakable link in the global chain. Australian Foreign Minister Anthony Street stressed unambiguously in 1983 that three alliances had the greatest bearing on Australian national interests—ANZUS, NATO and the Japanese-US Security Treaty.²

It is in a way natural that Washington should entrust Japan and Australia with the task of pushing and advocating the concept of the "Pacific community"—a superbloc of sorts called upon to integrate an entire system of bilateral and multilateral alliances and groupings under the imperialist aegis. Japan is primarily responsible for the northeastern part of the Pacific, while Australia takes care of its southern and south-western part.

Nevertheless the efforts exerted by the advocates of pacts could not overpower persistent demands for withdrawal from ANZUS or for a revision of its provisions in keeping with changing circumstances.

The national conference of the New Zealand Labour Party held early in September 1984 demanded that the country withdraw from all military alliances with nuclear powers which, naturally, presupposes withdrawal from ANZUS. It should be added that prior to coming to power, Australian Labour leaders also repeatedly promised to define more strictly the operational framework of the ANZUS pact and to place the narrowest possible limits on it. At a press conference held in July 1983, Foreign Minister Hayden said that Australia should play a "regional role... and for this reason we should extricate ourselves from the confusion which has always baffled our military strategists and namely, from the idea that we have a role to play in global affairs." But, according to the newspaper *Age*, this widely publicised reassessment boiled down to the confirmation of the former declarations of solidarity with the White House policies. From Washington's standpoint the ANZUS pact should "discipline" the junior members, check deviations from their overseas patron's policies and stimulate them to constantly increase their military buildup.

Together with Australia, the US is urging New Zealand to keep pace with them. The *Australian* wrote that at the ANZUS Council session in July 1983, Washington and Canberra called upon New Zealand "to make greater efforts towards building up its military potential." The pressure put to bear on New Zealand sharply grew more intense after the early parliamentary elections which took place there on July 14, 1984. The latter, as is well known, showed indisputably that anti-bloc sentiments are quite strong.

On the whole nearly two-thirds of the New Zealand's voters advocated barring US ships carrying nuclear weapons as well as atomic-powered ships from the local ports. The movement to give New Zealand non-nuclear status has grown in scope. Demands are also voiced that the ANZUS pact should be revised and even that the country should leave the alliance altogether.

Elections in New Zealand took place two days before the regular, 33rd, session of ANZUS was convened, and their results overshadowed the session proceedings to a certain extent³. At any rate the US delegation headed by Secretary of State George Shultz succeeded in introducing

² *Australian Outlook*, April 1983, p. 18.

³ The official agenda of the session included questions pertaining to security in the Pacific Basin, arms control and international economic relations but made no mention of the question of access for US atomic-powered ships to New Zealand ports (*The Times*, July 16, 1984).

in the final document the provision that "landing and berthing rights at ANZUS airfields and harbours for allied aircraft and ships... are essential to the continued efficiency of the alliance". The American ruling elite undertook some counter-measures, combining poorly veiled threats with persuasion and admonition. The Labour Party was practically accused of planning to undermine peace and stability "in their region and throughout the world". The words that George Shultz pronounced upon his return to the United States were actually addressed to that party: "In the final analysis ANZUS is not merely an isolated bloc designed to protect one region of the globe; it is part of a wider system of relations which help to repulse a global threat".

Washington and Canberra, which immediately joined in its senior partner's efforts, apparently deem it natural that "solidarity among the allies" obliges the New Zealand Labourites easily to renounce their election promises. The United States openly hopes that the New Zealand's leaders will change their stand, just as the present-day Australian leaders abandoned, upon coming to power, some of the promises that Washington found undesirable. It seems, however, that one "concession" is to be made to Wellington: namely, it is to be given some time, say, until the next ANZUS session is convened, to "settle" the problem of US nuclear ships making calls at New Zealand's ports.

Washington is especially afraid lest the New Zealand example trigger anti-nuclear action and "neutrality" tendencies in other countries. Characteristically enough, the Lange government's anti-nuclear pronouncements have already evoked a sympathetic response at the regional conference of the Commonwealth heads of state held in Papua, New Guinea, in early August 1984. They were welcomed by the host country's Prime Minister, Michael Somare, General Secretary of the Commonwealth Sh. S. Rampal and many other politicians.

Australia, too, is witnessing a growing movement to dismantle US military bases and installations and to renounce bloc policy. Eighty-eight local administrative councils declared their territories non-nuclear zones. This notwithstanding, the Australian Prime Minister used his participation in the Commonwealth conference to make another attempt to persuade David Lange to back down.

While this campaign of political and psychological pressure upon New Zealand is being conducted, alternate plans are being worked out. Should ANZUS break up, steps are expected to be taken to create a bilateral Washington-Canberra pact in its place. *Indonesia Times* pointed out that ANZUS might be "transformed" into a socio-economic organisation (clearly, a type of camouflage). The newspaper believes that no matter what happens the White House will not allow its "Pacific defense system" to be broken.

Washington has never been loath to use its ANZUS partners as a Trojan horse of sorts to penetrate developing countries and subject them to Western influence. Opportunities to do this were presented by Australian and New Zealand membership in regional or other organisations such as SEATO and ASPAC (before the former was disbanded and the latter went into decline), the Colombo plan and, finally, the quinta-lateral ANZUK pact. Before the 1980s, the latter could be regarded as one of the half-forgotten military-political groupings.

But this organisation was given a new lease on life when US imperialism caused the international situation to worsen and when tensions grew in Southeast Asia. Let it be recalled that the organisation in question was formed by Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore in April 1971. This pact states that, should there be "an armed attack or threat of attack organised or supported from without" on Ma-

laysia or Singapore, the governments of the five countries would consult to determine retaliatory measures to be taken jointly or individually.

ANZUK has no permanent staff or secretariat. As is known, the last British contingents left Malaysia and Singapore in March 1976. Though the scale of Australia's and New Zealand's military presence in the given zone has diminished, it could hardly be described as "purely symbolic". The Australian presence there is not only of military but also of a pronouncedly political nature and can be exploited in "crisis situations" with the aim of deploying larger forces. This presence is a material embodiment of the doctrine of "advanced defence", which has justified Australia's complicity in interventionist actions launched by the US and Britain in the past.

In July 1980, on Australia's initiative the ANZUK member states passed a resolution calling for the resumption of the bloc's military exercises⁴. In August 1982, the five countries held large-scale naval manoeuvres code-named "Starfish-82" in the South China Sea. Similar exercises have been held subsequently as well. And command and staff exercises on joint planning and troop control are also carried out within the framework of ANZUK. According to press reports "NATO-type tactical concepts" are being mastered during them. In the future this can facilitate operations by NATO powers (say, Britain) with the aim of maintaining "law and order" in a region so remote from the European theatre of military operations. In other words, steps are being taken that can be interpreted as the gradual "Natoisation" (if not Americanisation) of ANZUK.

Before it came to power the Australian Labour Party promised to curtail Australian military presence on the Malacca Peninsula for the sake of "economising resources" and to recall the Australian squadron stationed at the Butterworth airfield in Malaysia. Later on the Hawke government amended its policies and informed Kuala Lumpur that the Australian Mirage fighters (whose number was to be reduced by 8) were to be permanently stationed at that base until late 1988. Additional Australian air power is to be engaged in manoeuvres within the framework of the ANZUK joint anti-aircraft defence system. After 1988, the latest, A-18 fighters, are expected to be deployed at Butterworth, although on a temporary, rotating basis and with the period of their stay there being not less than 16 weeks a year. An Australian guard company is also to remain in Malaysia as a land force. Australia's Defence Minister Gordon Scholes specially assured his ANZUK partners that his government regards the Australian presence at the Butterworth base "as an important contribution... to ensuring regional strategic security". An infantry battalion and several combat helicopters from New Zealand are stationed in Singapore on a permanent basis. The New Zealand Labour forum mentioned above passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of these forces within a year.

The well-informed Hong Kong weekly *Far Eastern Economic Review* pointed out that the quinta-lateral manoeuvres under the aegis of ANZUK promoted cooperation between the armed forces of Malaysia and Singapore, two members of ASEAN, which is a socio-economic organisation at least as far as its programme aims are concerned.⁵ The London based *Economist* also commented on that circumstance, saying that military contacts among the ASEAN countries are growing, while links between Malaysia and Singapore (in that sphere) remain the weakest throughout the whole chain... Singaporean units were trained in the jungles in Bru-

⁴ In *Asia Pacific Community*, Winter 1984, p. 41.

⁵ In *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 21, 1983, p. 42.

nei, Thailand and on Taiwan and it was only relatively recently that Singaporean officers were sent for a course at a military training centre not far from Johor Baharu, which is under ANZUK authority.⁶ Singapore is known to have no jungle and therefore an expedition corps (a mini-analogue of the US rapid deployment force) is apparently being built for operations in other Asian countries.

US official and academic circles nurture other plans as well for using ANZUK for purposes hostile to the true interests of Southeast Asian nations. For instance, American scholar H. Indorf working at the National University of Singapore is the author of the "5+1" formula, which envisages bringing Thailand into the quinta-lateral ANZUK pact. According to Indorf, the advantage of this formula is that it merely formalises the military ties which already exist between Thailand and the members of ANZUK (this refers above all to Australia).⁷ Indorf thinks that in the future it will be possible to include Brunei in ANZUK, as well. The US is not expected to be involved directly. Its ANZUS partners are to act as instruments of its influence.

It has also been suggested that Thailand and Brunei be included in the joint ANZUK anti-aircraft defence system.⁸ Bangkok is openly interested in expanding and stepping up the operations of the quinta-lateral pact.⁹ These facts provide grounds for concluding that there is some interaction between ANZUK and ASEAN or rather, that attempts are being made to utilise the mechanism of the former to weaken and militarise ASEAN.

It would be hard to deny that the US has a definite strategy to entangle the countries in the South Pacific in a cobweb of military and military-political pacts, to link various blocs and groupings, such as ANZUS, ANZUK and ASEAN, for the purpose of mutual backing, coordinating their activity with the tripartite alliance Washington—Tokyo—Seoul which is quickly taking shape.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is being subjected to greater pressure. For more than a decade now the Australian ruling elite has been trying to establish special relations with ASEAN. Acting through bilateral and multilateral channels, all the successive Australian cabinets deemed it their main task to push the grouping towards far-reaching militarisation. British scholar F. Frost writes that in the early period of the Association's existence, Canberra tended to view the organisation as a potential military alliance with which Australia could be associated.¹⁰ An Australian Foreign Minister stated way back in April 1969 that Canberra would perceive the assignment of a military function to ASEAN as a healthy phenomenon. The approach adopted by the US and Australia to the issue was identical: they not merely thought it desirable to change the Association and to revise its goals and tasks but worked to achieve this effect.

In 1974, Australia was the first capitalist country to establish official contacts with ASEAN. The step evoked no objections from Washington, as it fully accorded with the US aim of actively exploiting Australia to maintain "the alignment of forces" in the region in favour of the West and to shift the expenses entailed onto the ASEAN countries.

While ASEAN primarily received economic aid from Canberra and on a rather modest scale at that, Australian military contacts with the organisation were established exclusively through bilateral channels. The

⁶ *Economist*, Oct. 22, 1983, p. 52.

⁷ In *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 21, 1983, p. 42.

⁸ In *Asia Pacific Community*, Winter 1984, p. 41.

⁹ In *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 7, 1984, p. 28.

¹⁰ *Understanding ASEAN*, Ed. by A. Broinowski, L., 1982, p. 146.

following data shed light on these contacts. In the 1982/83 fiscal year, three-fourths of the 1,300 foreign citizens trained at Australian military schools came from the ASEAN countries. The curricula took the conditions and requirements of the Asian and Pacific countries into consideration and, in the opinion of experts, were not inordinately complicated. This state of affairs ensures that in building their armies those countries will be bound to Australia and promises the latter a flow of orders for arms and military technology. Graduates of Australian military colleges subsequently receive command posts in the armed forces of developing states, and the political benefits of the fact are obvious.

Needless to say, both Australia and New Zealand have been far from absolutely loyal to the US and the ANZUS pact in the past. The ruling circles had to take into consideration not only Washington's will but, to a certain extent, the mood of the public, especially during election campaigns.

In October 1983, Australia refused to co-author a resolution in support of the "coalition government" formed by the Khmer reactionaries who usurped Kampuchea's seat at the UN (Australia refuses to recognise the legitimacy of the Pol Pot clique's claims to power). Canberra insisted on the need to expand dialogue with Hanoi and to settle Southeast Asian problems through "patient diplomacy". In this connection Foreign Minister Hayden visited Vietnam in June 1983 and received his Vietnamese counterpart in Australia in March 1984.

Australian businessmen and politicians have repeatedly spoken out in favour of expanding mutually advantageous contacts with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Similar desires have been expressed in New Zealand searching for new markets for its products, which it finds ever more difficult to sell because of protectionist and other measures taken by its Western trading partners.

These trends and the desire for greater autonomy persist today, despite all barriers and obstacles which have been put in their way. It is becoming increasingly evident that the passion for pacts runs counter to the genuine interests of Australia and New Zealand.

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PLANNED SETUP OF 'PACIFIC COMMUNITY' SEEN THREAT TO PEACE

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[Article by N. A. Tripolskiy: "Plans To Set Up a 'Pacific Community'--A New Threat to Peace"]

When Ronald Reagan became US President he stated that the US should proclaim its final objectives without any hesitation and take concrete steps to achieve them. It is no secret today that these "final objectives" imply the establishment of US imperialism's undivided world domination. Richard Allen, former US Presidential Adviser on National Security Affairs, quite frankly admitted that Washington's objective is to restore US leadership in the world.¹

Washington has chosen as the principal means of attaining its objectives a policy of global confrontation with the world of socialism, with all the progressive forces of our day and age and with regimes which are not to its liking.

It was already with Jimmy Carter in the White House, that Washington launched the torpedoing of international detente and approximate parity in the sphere of armaments. In frustrating the policy of detente and international cooperation the US was particularly active in Western Europe both under Carter and during the first years of Ronald Reagan's presidency. Initially, Washington concentrated on buttressing "Atlantic solidarity" and proceeded to play a scenario named the "NATO double-track decision". This resulted in the breakdown of the Geneva talks, the stationing of Euromissiles, an unprecedented rise in the arms race, stupendous growth in international tension, and a greater threat of war. As is well known, at that time the US made no secret of the fact that it regarded Europe as the most probable theatre of a "local", "limited" thermonuclear war against the Soviet Union.

At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s events in the Far East and the Asian-Pacific region were, seemingly, of a secondary and local character. However, this did not in any way mean that Washington lost track of that area. Back during the Carter Administration, when, in 1979, US Secretary of Defence Harold Brown travelled to Japan and South Korea, an attempt was made to lay the groundwork for a new military-political alliance of the three countries. This bloc would have a clearly anti-socialist orientation, thus creating a US outpost in the Far East within the framework of Washington's policy of global confrontation. Brown's trip was the beginning of the United States' new approach to Japan, i. e., compelling the latter to embark on stepped up militarisation and converting it from a "patronised" country into a major ally and mainstay of the US in the Asian-Pacific region.

Of late, however, US activities in the Far East have assumed a qualitatively different scope. Accordingly, the dangerous international situation in that region changed dramatically. Today it attracts the attention of public at large in many countries outside the region. There is increasing evidence attesting to the fact that, in accordance with the designs of Washington and its close allies, the Far East and the Pacific Ocean are slated to become a major area of international tension.

¹ See *Department of State Bulletin*, July, 1982, p. 27.

In June 1984 the West German magazine *Aussenpolitik* noted, "One should bear in mind that US foreign policy has always been faced by a problem: should it concentrate, to a greater extent on the Atlantic or on the Pacific. The solution in no way depends on who has the majority: the Republicans or the Democrats". Further the magazine quoted Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lawrence Eagleburger, an influential official in the Reagan Administration, who said that in the coming years US foreign policy would shift the centre of its attention from trans-Atlantic ties with Europe to the Pacific region.

Indeed, the recent growth in US diplomatic, economic and military activity in the Far East cannot go unnoticed. It includes visits by the US President to Japan, South Korea and China; trips by top officials in the US Administration to the countries in that region and visits by important officials from that region to Washington; the naval *Globe-Shield-84* exercises which were unprecedented in scope and nature, and a series of similar military exercises in the Pacific; the rapid growth of ties in areas such as trade and economics between the US and the countries of Asian-Pacific region, as a result of which in 1983 the US trade turnover with those countries exceeded its trade with Western Europe by \$26 billion.² In analysing the reasons for the recent tangible shift of Washington's political activities towards Asia and the Pacific, the majority of observers in socialist and capitalist countries draw the well-founded conclusion that this stems chiefly from the aspiration held by Reagan and his team to raise the Eastern flank to the European level while creating a vast belt which would encircle the Soviet Union from the Baltic in the west to Kamchatka in the east. The magazine *New Times* wrote that this is actually "...the revival of imperialism's old strategic doctrine according to which a military threat to the Soviet Union should be created at once from the west and from the east. The lessons of the Second World War," the magazine stressed further, "when the Asian part of the Soviet Union became the principal base of the country's defence industry, did not escape the notice of the US strategy planners. That is why nuclear missiles are being poised against these areas."³

Indeed, it is no secret that in recent years the Soviet Union has been making considerable investments in its eastern areas with an eye to their accelerated development. Most of the modern gigantic industrial projects have been launched there, and the majority of them will be put into operation very soon. This will have a palpable effect on the development of the entire Soviet national economy. The rapid growth of industrial potential in Soviet Siberia will inevitably affect the commercial ties and economic cooperation between the USSR and the countries of Asia and the Pacific. The USA, which openly speaks of "strangling the USSR and other socialist countries economically", cannot reconcile itself with this prospect. Washington's objectives are to trigger a "war of nerves" in the Far East, to make the USSR divert its allocations from peaceful construction to defence, and to undermine economic and other ties between socialist countries and the states in this region. Apparently, however, the US has other compelling reasons for shifting the centre of its activities to Asia and the Pacific. Let us examine some of them.

One of such compelling reasons which is domestic in nature is the fact that during the postwar period US economic potential has moved steadily westwards to the Pacific coast. The traditional industrial zone in the northeastern states which in the 1940s produced 72 per cent of

² See *Pravda*, Sept. 25, 1984.

³ *New Times*, 1984, No. 25, p. 22.

the total industrial output now produces only a little over 40 per cent of the output. These structural changes have had a great impact on the domestic political situation in the US. The population is migrating to the southwestern portion of the country on a large scale. In view of the fact that the proportional distribution of seats in the House of Representatives depends on the size of the population in each State, the migration has resulted in the loss of a number of seats by the Middle West and Northeast and in a corresponding gain in the South and the West. The monopolies located on the Pacific coast—Silicon-Valley, Boeing, Lockheed, General Dynamics and many others, which specialise in military-industrial business—obtained much broader opportunities for determining US policy. They largely paved the way for Reagan's assault on the White House as the Candidate of the Republican Party which traditionally takes an expansionist line in the Pacific Ocean. Back in 1898 Senator Beveridge, a Republican said that the Pacific would be the ocean for future trade. The majority of future wars would be conflicts over trade. The power which will dominate the Pacific Ocean will be the power dominating the world. Immediately after winning the 1980 election Ronald Reagan and his entourage, who represented the Californian financial grouping and that part of the military-industrial complex which struck its roots on the western coast of the US, began placing greater emphasis on the fact that the Far East is as important to US vital interests as Western Europe.⁴ When the first presidential term drew to a close the Reagan team had to report to the monopolies supporting them in order to receive their mandate for a second term. This was, in part, one of the reasons why there was such an explosion of trips from Washington to Asian and Pacific countries.

As far as Western European affairs are concerned, Washington has apparently realised that, however paradoxical this may seem against the background of its recent "achievements" in Europe—the breakdown of the Geneva talks, the deployment of Euro-missiles and the demonstration of "Atlantic solidarity"—its potential for increasing tensions in Western Europe still further has now been exhausted. The powerful anti-war movement in Western Europe, reinforced by the discontent the people feel against their governments which, following Washington's instructions, are pursuing the policy of "rigid economies" (increases in military spending and restraints on the growth of economic ties with socialist countries) became an obstacle to US diplomacy. Such policies pursued by London, Bonn, Rome and Paris have played a part in aggravating the consequences of the economic crisis in the West, increasing unemployment and bringing about the further deterioration of the working people's standard of living. Today many right-wing Western European governments have had to beat a retreat and pay more attention to their voters' wishes. It is highly indicative that the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, one of the most ardent proponents of the Reagan policy of confrontation with the USSR, was forced to refuse the deployment of US Minutemen missiles in Britain, succumbing to the prevalent sentiment in the country.⁵ That the right-wing Cabinet of West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl criticises the Reagan line on the militarisation of outer space is another case in point. Unconcealed disappointment with the situation in Western Europe was voiced by Eagleburger who recently stepped down from his post when he said in an *Aussenpolitik* interview that Western Europe is so concerned with its domestic problems at present that it is becoming increasingly difficult to make the allies consider problems

⁴ See *US Foreign Policy for Asia: the 1980s and Beyond*, Ed. by R. Myers, Stanford (Cal.), 1982, p. 12.

⁵ *Pravda*, July 25, 1984.

which are outside the limits of European borders. While the difficulties in contacting European countries may be exacerbated still further, Eagleburger added, the Pacific Ocean states, Japan above all, are playing an ever more important part.

The rapid remilitarisation of Japan, directed by the Cabinet of Yasuhiro Nakasone, Washington's closest ally in increasing tension and extending the policy of confrontation with the socialist world, is of great importance to the orientation of US foreign policy. In 1981 Cyrus Vance, former US Secretary of State, assessed Washington's attitude to Japan and stated that of all America's allies and friends no one was as important to Washington as Japan is.

Yasuhiro Nakasone and his supporters from among the LDP leadership have recently been trying to influence public opinion, particularly in the Asian countries which still remember militaristic Japan at the time of World War II, by seeking to convince the people that Tokyo is "compelled" to increase military spending, that it is only succumbing to pressure from Washington, and that by joining the policy of confrontation it is being guided by the "ideals of solidarity and cohesion with the West" thus meeting the demands of its "senior partner". The situation, however, is not that simple. Future research will reveal the negative role which the present Japanese leadership has played and continues to play in torpedoing international detente, conniving to "strong-arm methods" in international politics used by US Administration and openly opposing attempts to attain mutually acceptable solutions which would limit the arms race. After the Nakasone government came to power in November 1982, it began demanding that Western European countries put an end to detente, begin a period of tough military confrontation with the USSR and introduce economic sanctions against the socialist countries. During his talks with US Secretary of State George Shultz, in late January 1983, S. Abe, Japan's Foreign Minister, stated, that Tokyo would go even farther than Western Europe in placing economic "sanctions" on trade with the USSR and "would use its economic might as an instrument against the Soviet Union".⁶ At the Williamsburg summit meeting of seven leading capitalist powers in May 1983 Yasuhiro Nakasone insisted on the unconditional deployment of US missiles in Europe and declared, "As a result, tension will probably increase. The USSR will discontinue negotiations and withdraw its representatives. But it may do whatever it likes."⁷ Later on the Western press wrote a great deal about the fact that it was precisely Japan's total support for US policy, as well as the pressure brought to bear on Western Europeans that was a key factor in the adoption of decisions at Williamsburg which were a prologue to the breakdown of the Geneva talks and to the deployment of missiles in Western Europe.

Having become the United States' most privileged ally whom Washington increasingly needs in order to keep the other Western allies in line and continue the policy of global confrontation, Tokyo is beginning to impose its will and outlook in regard to international issues on the Americans. It makes as much use as it can of economic levers and the fact that in the market competition the Americans are losing to Japanese capital, as a result of which there is a growing and chronic trade deficit in Japan's favour which reached a record of \$21.7 billion in 1983 and, according to experts, reached an even greater figure in 1984. Thus, the element of mutual dependence in the Japanese-US relations is becoming even stronger, thus enabling Tokyo to place orders to its former master with increasing frequency.

⁶ *Mainichi shinbun*, Feb. 1, 1983.

⁷ *Tokyo shinbun*, May 26, 1983.

Dmitri Petrov, a Soviet scholar, has pointed to the growing independence and, consequently, the responsibility Tokyo bears for the tense situation in the Far East today: "Japan has gone from providing moral and political support for the US policy of frustrating detente to direct complicity in US preparations for nuclear war. This is a new phenomenon in Japanese policy... The pressure Washington has exerted, although important, in no way removes responsibility from the Nakasone government for the part it has played in increasing tension in the Far East because Tokyo not only failed to counter that pressure but, on the contrary, declared on its own initiative its readiness to make a greater contribution to US nuclear strategy."⁸ In his first policy-making speech in December 1982 Nakasone said that Japan's basic principles in matters of defence were to take joint Japanese-US measures to guarantee security and to attain a high level of combat readiness in the armed forces.⁹ Two months later in Washington the Japanese Prime Minister stressed that the two sides have an unshakable bilateral alliance not only in economic, but also in the military sphere.¹⁰

Thus, Japan is acquiring ever greater opportunities to exert its influence on the shaping of US foreign policy and it is enlisting the military, economic and political potential of its "senior partner" to serve Tokyo's own interests which, as is well known, primarily concern Asia and the Pacific.

While examining just a few of the above-mentioned factors which bring about greater US activity in the Far East, one cannot help noticing their long-term nature. This leads us to the conclusion that the current burst of activity is not a passing phase but rather a new and important trend in Washington's aggressive aspirations for the years to come within the framework of its policy of global confrontation.

THE "PACIFIC COMMUNITY" — AN OFFSPRING OF THE JAPANESE-US ALLIANCE

As US attention to the Asian-Pacific region as a flank in the "global chain encircling the Soviet Union", designed by the Pentagon and the present US Administration, and as the possible main trend in the policy of confrontation and preparations for thermonuclear war grows, the White House is seeking ever more obviously to convert the whole of the Pacific Ocean into a zone of US influence, and to create gigantic arsenals of nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as springboards of aggression there. The United States regards the countries of that region solely as well-trained members of a colossal military-political bloc headed by Washington, which, on the latter's order, should arm themselves to the teeth, use their entire economic and military potential to confront and isolate the Soviet Union, "strangle" socialist countries in Asia and other areas which are geographically removed from the USSR, eradicate regimes in a number of developing countries which are not to Washington's liking, and completely to discontinue economic cooperation, cultural exchanges and other ties with socialist countries.

Of course, US leaders are nurturing far-reaching plans, if one considers that in the past decade the countries in that region showed fast rates of economic growth: Japan's share of the world product increased from 3 to 11 per cent, while the annual increment of the GNP in the 1970s was 11.3 per cent in Indonesia, 10.4 per cent in Thailand, 10.3 per cent in South Korea, 9.4 per cent in Hong Kong, 8.4 per cent in the Philippines and Singapore, and 7.9 per cent in Malaysia. The Pacific re-

⁸ D. V. Petrov, "Japan in US Nuclear Strategy", *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 3, 1984.

⁹ See *Asahi Evening News*, Dec. 4, 1982.

¹⁰ See *Japan Times*, Jan. 20-21, 1983.

gion holds a remarkable place in the world in terms of its natural resources: the countries in that region possess 56 per cent of the tapped world deposits of lead, 47 per cent of zinc, 41 per cent of nickel, 37 per cent of cobalt, 32 per cent of copper and rich reserves of uranium, tin, oil and rubber. It should also be borne in mind that the governments of most of the countries in that region took rather tolerant attitude to the domination of US and Japanese monopolies. As a result, national capital and the capital of transnational corporations merged and became intertwined in a number of these countries. Today the countries in this region have turned into a major market for US weapons. They are being increasingly drawn into the arms race, and many of them have old and new US military bases within their territory. Finally, with the exception of Japan, the working class and the working masses in the majority of these countries, unlike in Western Europe, have not yet reached the degree of organisation and political awareness which would enable them resolutely to stand up to Washington's plans which pose a great threat to the future of these countries.

However, a vast military-political bloc in the Pacific, which would be an analogue of NATO in Western Europe or an even more efficient and obedient tool in the hands of the Pentagon generals exists for the time being only in their imaginations: realistically, Washington banks on its chief allies in that part of the world—Japan and South Korea. A bloc consisting of these three countries is speedily being put together. Although it has not yet been formalised *de jure*, it operates *de facto* and even has an unofficial name—NEATO (The Northeast Asia Treaty Organisation). It was precisely the task of forming this bloc that brought Reagan to Tokyo and Seoul in late 1983. Of course, the Americans would like to see this "triangle" officially joined by a fourth member—Taiwan—but here they have to display a bit of caution so as not to cause too much damage to US-Chinese relations. Actually, Taiwan is regarded as a component of the new bloc, and after their talks with Reagan in Peking in April 1984 the Chinese leaders were compelled to say through Deng Xiaoping that Taiwan, together with Japan and South Korea, is the United States' "unsinkable aircraft carrier".

As for the other countries in the region, US diplomacy has launched a big campaign to resurrect associations of military-political nature which once existed in that region. During the Reagan Administration ANZUS (US, Australia, New Zealand) has become much more active in the southern Pacific. Washington has persistently been seeking ways to force ASEAN into becoming a military-political bloc. The revival of ANZUK whose members since 1971 have been Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore is regarded as a means of achieving that objective. In their capacity as members of ANZUK, Australia and New Zealand have military installations in Malaysia and Singapore. During the past three years ANZUK has been "revived", to Washington's efforts, and a whole range of joint naval and air exercises have taken place. *New Times* wrote recently that "the United States hopes to infiltrate ASEAN through the 'quintelateral agreement', on the shoulders of Australia and New Zealand".¹¹ Guided by the same considerations, Washington has stubbornly viewed Thailand and the Philippines as its allies in the Manila Treaty, which served as the basis for creating SEATO, although the latter collapsed back in 1977. In recent years the US has continued to grant generous military aid to ASEAN countries.

However, not everything works out the way Washington plans: it had barely managed to get ANZUS going again when Labour Party

¹¹ See *New Times*, 1984, No. 25, p. 19.

came to power first in Australia and then in New Zealand. The Labour Parties in those countries take a rather cautious attitude towards US military preparations in the Pacific. The New Zealand Labour government even stated that it would ban US ships with nuclear weapons on board from calling at the country's ports, and would work to turn the southern Pacific into a nuclear free zone. The White House has failed time and again to get the ASEAN countries, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia to agree to join the militaristic blocs, although some of them—Thailand and Singapore in particular—seem to be "ripe" to become Washington's allies.

In the final analysis, all this is a far cry from the monolithic and pliant bloc, NATO's Pacific Ocean counterpart, which Washington has been dreaming of. Given this situation the United States urgently needs to build some common platform under NEATO, ANZUS and ANZUK and to link all the countries involved by a single rigid mechanism which would be controlled by the US. Thus the idea of creating a "Pacific community" which could serve as a net binding together all the capitalist countries of the Asian and Pacific region emerged.

It was as early as in the 1960s that the drafts for setting up a "Pacific economic zone" and later a "Pacific community", modelled after the European Common Market, appeared in Japan. When at the end of the 1970s this idea began being discussed in Tokyo, Washington was at first highly suspicious because the more competitive and technologically better Japanese commodities were already elbowing US-made products out of the Pacific markets by that time. Moreover, they were flooding the US market itself. Given the US-Japanese trade war, the idea of a "Pacific community" was treated as a "Trojan Horse", Japanese style, whose aim was to give Japanese capital access to markets in the region and to ensure their control over those markets to the detriment of the competitors from the US and Western Europe.

Washington's attitude towards the idea of a "Pacific community" began changing radically as the US-Japanese military-political alliance grew stronger in the wake of Yasuhiro Nakasone's election. In a bid to make Japan quickly increase its military spending and also to force it to take on the job of convincing other countries in the region to bend to the will of the USA, Washington, first, came to realise that certain concessions must be made to the Japanese, primarily on issues relating to markets and free trade. Second, the US hoped that, within the framework of a US-Japanese military-political alliance and their "special" political ties it would be possible to introduce an element of political regulation (to be administered by the two governments) to relations between the two countries' monopolies and to use coordination, agreements and mutual concessions to change the relationship between the two countries' TNCs from one of competitive struggle to one of coordinated action. In other words, the monopoly capital of the two powers would pool their efforts to subordinate and establish first the economic and then the political diktat of Washington and Tokyo over the other countries in the region.

Thus, the main stake is placed on the fact that, during an economic crisis, the majority of the countries in the region find themselves heavily dependent both financially and economically on the USA, Japan and international financial centres controlled by Washington. They realise that they badly need fresh credits and loans and experience difficulties in obtaining financial resources due to the concentration of free capital in the USA where a higher interest rate is artificially maintained. They also understand that US and Japanese monopolies have struck firm roots in their economies and their national bourgeoisie has linked its interests

with US and Japanese capital. Due to this relationship, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand have had a negative balance of payments each year between 1970 and 1980.¹² Of late Australia has been increasingly turning into an agrarian and raw-material appendage of Japanese economy. As of 1983 Japan had purchased 87 per cent of copper ore extracted in Australia, 79 per cent of iron ore, 75 per cent of coal, as well as large quantities of aluminium, sugar, meat and so on. While vigorously working to capture the Australian market Japan managed to shift the balance of trade sharply in its favour. *Pravda* wrote that by making use of the existing situation, the Japanese not only determine the purchase prices for Australian goods and get a stronger foothold in the Australian market, but also impel that country to speak in favour of Japanese proposals concerning a "Pacific economic zone" and a "Pacific community" and to use its political influence in ASEAN countries to make those ideas popular there.¹³ The Prime Minister of Malaysia recently described Japan's policy vis-à-vis his country as a "classic example of economic colonialism". He noted that while Tokyo opposes protectionism at international forums, it defends the Japanese market by surrounding it with a high fence of protectionist measures, purchases only raw materials in ASEAN states and counteracts the import of local commodities.¹⁴ In 1983 ASEAN's overall foreign debt exceeded \$56 billion. Indonesia's balance-of-payments deficit in 1982 topped \$6 billion. It is thought that in order to resolve its economic difficulties Jakarta would need new foreign loans to the tune of \$16 billion over five years and it is counting on the US and Japan to receive them.¹⁵ The US and Japan are strengthening their positions in the economies of ASEAN states still more by boosting their investments there. In 1983 Japanese investments in that group of countries exceeded \$11 billion (over 20 per cent of all of Tokyo's investments abroad), whereas US investments there exceeded \$5 billion, as compared with \$370 million in 1966.

To streamline the entire system of debts and economic dependence in that region, to ensure that the economic dependence of those countries on the US and Japan will be transformed into political dependence, and to cut short attempts to counter an even deeper penetration by US and Japanese monopolies into the economies of the region's countries and their efforts to reduce their dependence on the US and Japan through the development of cooperation with socialist countries, Washington and Tokyo need a special mechanism, a forum of Asian-Pacific countries. It is the "Pacific community" that is to become the mechanism through which the USA and Japan will dictate the rules and conditions of economic and political relations to its participants both inside the "community" and outside it. The main advantage, however, is that they will be able to apply economic levers, channel the resources of those countries towards the struggle against socialist states, and use the territories of those countries to build military bases and station new nuclear missiles without hindrance. Should a crisis occur, the bases in those countries would serve as a magnet attracting inevitable retaliation, simultaneously drawing it away from US territory as Washington hopes.

This does not exhaust their far-reaching designs. Yasuhiro Nakasone and his entourage have set out to restore Japan's military might. Judging by the stubborn resistance which the Nakasone Cabinet is now putting up to the demands of the opposition to formalise the three non-nuclear principles, the conclusion that Tokyo is hatching plans concern-

¹² *Bulletin Mensuel de Statistique*, ONU, January, 1983.

¹³ *Pravda*, Nov. 22, 1983.

¹⁴ See *Financial Times*, Aug. 28, 1984.

¹⁵ See *International Affairs*, 1984, No. 6.

ing its own nuclear missiles cannot be discounted to all intents and purposes, Washington has nothing against such plans. On the contrary, the Reagan Administration is eager to have a new Japan—a powerful nuclear state—as its ally.

However, Tokyo and Washington are well aware of the reaction they can expect from the Pacific countries which once were the object of the Japanese "co-prosperity sphere". These countries already watch the fast rebirth of the Japanese militarism with apprehension. Hence, Japan and the US need to start getting the countries in the region used to the idea that Washington would run affairs in the Far East with the help of Japan which, in order better to discharge its "mission", should become a powerful military state possibly possessing nuclear weapons. The idea is to make the countries of the region accomplices of the warmongers in Washington and Tokyo, and a "Pacific community" would serve this purpose best.

Meanwhile, the "play" is just beginning, and its final content and genuine objectives are carefully concealed as are the true motives behind the pilgrimage made by US statesmen—Reagan, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Wolfowitz, Kirkpatrick and others—to the countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia. Statements are made about economic and commercial interests and about the fact that the centre of business activity is increasingly shifting towards the Pacific... But in proclaiming this to be the "Pacific era of the US foreign policy", Reagan and his advisors no longer deem it necessary to conceal the fact that their militaristic designs which threaten the future of mankind are centred on the Asian-Pacific region.

What does the "Pacific community" look like? When will it be proclaimed? Will it be an organisation based on a treaty with Rules, agencies and, perhaps, even with a supra-national parliament similar to the EEC's? Clearly, all this remains to be seen. It is not inconceivable, however, that there will be neither any treaties, nor any ceremonies marking the birth of a new special organisation. After all Washington and Tokyo do not need any treaties or protocols. What they care about is submission and pliancy on the part of the countries in this region; acceptance of the rules of the game and their strict observance by those countries. In expressing a similar idea, *Aussenpolitik* wrote "probably, the countries of the Pacific do not want to create an organisation limited by treaties at all". However, the scenario for "streamlining" relations between states in the region in conformity with the US plan is ready and a lively discussion is under way not only in lobbies, but also at important meetings such as the Conference of Foreign Ministers of ASEAN states held in Jakarta in July 1984.

What attitude do the Pacific countries themselves take towards the "community"? Do they realise what Washington and Tokyo have in store for them? As for countries like South Korea and Taiwan, they act in accordance with the proverb: "he who pays the piper calls the tune" (and the "piper" is paid by Japan which only one year ago granted Seoul credit to the tune of \$4 million).

As for ASEAN states, judging by the pronouncements made by some officials from those countries and reports in local press, the concept of a "Pacific community" has not aroused the least bit of enthusiasm there. For example, reporting on the discussion of that question at the Conference of ASEAN Foreign Ministers in which the US Secretary of State George Shultz participated, the *Jakarta Post* wrote that the issue aroused a great deal of discussions and very little unanimity... ASEAN does not want to have anything to do with a formal organisation, the paper went on, which would undermine its role in Southeast Asia. Prime Minister

of Malaysia Mahathir ibn Mohamad told Shultz that Southeast Asia is primarily alarmed by the threat posed not by the Soviet Union or Vietnam but by China, in view of the growth of military ties between Peking and Washington. Finally, Shultz himself, after visiting a number of ASEAN countries and taking part in the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Jakarta had to admit that ASEAN countries are afraid that the relations the United States maintains with the ASEAN countries' northern neighbours—China and Japan—may affect their interests.¹⁶

At the same time, if one casts a sober glance at the situation, it is evident that the arm twisting campaign launched by the Americans and the Japanese, aimed at dragging the countries in the region into the "Pacific community" and forcing them to join the policy of confrontation with the socialist countries, the gambling on the economic difficulties experienced by those countries, and the use of crude pressure bordering on blackmail cannot but have an effect on the behaviour of the states in the region. Step by step many of them succumb to the pressure brought to bear by Washington and Tokyo. Indonesia, the leading state of ASEAN, is a case in point. The massive brainwashing of Jakarta by the Americans by means of "carrot and stick" tactics has left its mark. "Of late Jakarta has actually stopped criticising Washington's militaristic preparations and its growing military presence in Southeast Asia, in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. It also refrains from condemning aggressive US actions in the Middle East and even in those cases where it holds views which differ from those of Washington, Jakarta adheres to a cautious line, and tries not to touch upon the US interests."¹⁷ If one regards the attitude taken by the ASEAN states towards the peaceful proposals made by the Indochinese countries as an indicator of the Association's readiness either to follow a constructive and independent course towards ensuring peace and stability in the region or to follow Washington's lead, it is clear that the gross distortion of the essence of the policies pursued by Hanoi and Phnompenh in a resolution on the so-called "Kampuchean problem" adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Jakarta attests to a new retreat by the ASEAN states under pressure from the USA and Japan.

PEACE FOR THE PACIFIC REGION SHOULD BE ENSURED

It is becoming increasingly evident that, under the cover of empty verbiage on the "need to develop and streamline the integration of ties in the Pacific countries" and "the Pacific community", the efforts US imperialism and Japan have made towards raising the level of confrontation and making it extremely sharp are shifting to that highly explosive area. The US has stationed an extremely large number of troops, second only to the West European grouping in size in that region, and continues to build up its military presence there. Japan's war machine is also increasing its capabilities, and Tokyo is thinking of revising the results of World War II and is dreaming of its own nuclear weapons.

Washington and Tokyo hope that the policy of confrontation, international tension and preparation for a new world war will not engender a powerful mass anti-war movement in Asian and Pacific countries, as has been the case in West European countries, and that their governments would display even less independence and more compliance than Washington's allies in NATO have. They also believe that, unlike in Europe, where the Soviet Union together with the other members of the

¹⁶ See *Pravda*, July 26, 1984.

¹⁷ V. Andreyev, "Difficulties and Contradictions in the Development of Indonesia", *International Affairs*, 1981, No. 5.

socialist community, their defensive and economic might has the threat of war created by Washington and its allies, in the Far East the USSR would be practically alone in defending itself.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries of Asia have been doing everything in their power to change the course of developments in the Far East, consolidate peace and stability in the region, and restore the atmosphere of confidence and cooperation. In that manner they hope to find ways of eliminating hotbeds of tension, and solving the Korean problem as well as the remaining conflict in Southeast Asia. It is common knowledge that with this aim in view the USSR has proposed holding negotiations in which all of the countries concerned would take part on confidence-building measures in the Far East; the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to discuss ways of extending confidence-building measures to all seas and oceans; the USSR wishes to restore the former level of cooperation and attain more cordiality in its relations with Japan. The countries of Indochina continue to pool efforts to find mutually acceptable ways of normalising the situation in Southeast Asia. The Mongolian People's Republic has been making important political initiatives directed at improving the international climate in Asia and elsewhere. In particular, these initiatives include a proposal to conclude a multilateral convention on the non-use of force in the region and the settlement of outstanding issues by peaceful means as well as a second proposal that the UN General Assembly discuss the right of peoples to peace.

Regrettably, the response these peaceable efforts have inspired in Washington, Tokyo and some capitals in the Asian and Pacific region prompts one to ask: have they forgotten the language of normal diplomatic intercourse? Do they now only recognise the language of crude military force?

Konstantin Chernenko said "Imperialists today continue to utilise the tactics of dissociating peoples and setting one country against another. Despite what one would think was the instructive example given by the disgraceful collapse of anti-communist alliances such as CENTO or SEATO, fresh attempts are being made to form military axes and triangles like the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul bloc. We are against such geopolitics, against various 'spheres of influence' and 'zones of interest', against exclusive military groupings everywhere and in the Pacific Ocean in particular. The latter belongs to all, it may and should become an ocean of peace and goodneighbourliness which would bring peoples together, rather than divide them."¹⁸

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CHINESE SOCIAL SCIENCE VIEWS ON SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION HIT

Moscow PROBLEMY DALNEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, Jan-Mar 85 (signed to press 21 Feb 85) pp 120-131

[Article by V. Ya. Zhuravlev: "Chinese Social Scientists on Some Questions of Socialist Construction"]

[Text] A lengthy book called "Conversations about Capitalism and Socialism" and prepared by a group of researchers from the Institute of World Economics and Politics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, headed by Qian Junrui, formerly the institute director and now an academy adviser, was published in China at the end of 1983.¹ The authors' stated aim was to "demonstrate, through theory and through history and the present day and in a comparatively systematic manner, the tremendous advantages of the socialist order in comparison to the capitalist one, to show that their disclosure requires considerable effort and to prove the inevitability of the replacement of capitalism with socialism and of the triumph of socialism--as a result of a lengthy, persistent and difficult struggle--throughout the world."² Furthermore, according to the foreword, the authors were striving for "a thorough discussion" of several unanswered questions about the theory of socialist construction.³

The appearance of this work and the interest of today's Chinese social scientists in a broad range of questions connected with the theory of socialism are far from coincidental. The 20 years during which "ultra-leftist" ideas prevailed in Chinese politics and economics, and the struggle within the Chinese leadership, which continued even after the expulsion of the "gang of four," led to the serious ideological confusion of much of the population and many CCP members and cadres. The need to surmount this "crisis of faith" has been one of the central elements of CCP ideological work since the beginning of the 1980's.

In the late 1970's, Chinese social scientists, stimulated by the appeals for the "liberation of consciousness," became actively involved in the efforts to clear away the theoretical "obstacles" set up by the "pseudo-Marxism which had set the Chinese people's teeth on edge,"⁴ and to reinterpret the natural stages and tendencies of socialist construction and the nature of the current stage of China's social development.

Although the general framework of the discussions of socialism was obviously mapped out by directives "from above" regarding the need to view present-day China as a state that had already gone through the period of transition and had entered the stage of actual socialist development,⁵ the discussions nevertheless included a number of bold statements, including some that were later criticized or were not developed any further. They included the appraisal of the system of "people's communes" as the institution of "utopian peasant socialism"⁶ and the acknowledgement of the scientific invalidity of the statement that "the final and integral theory of the period of socialism had allegedly been developed by Chairman Mao."⁷

In any case, these discussions aroused the Chinese people's interest in the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and in the study of the theory and practice of the social development of socialist states and promoted the compilation--after an interval of many years--of works on scientific communism⁸ and the analysis of the socialist economic order's advantages over the capitalist one.⁹

At the end of the 1970's, however, interpretations of theoretical aspects of socialism by Chinese social scientists were inevitably affected by--in addition to the understandable difficulty of rapidly surmounting their previous inertia and throwing off the load of mistaken ideas of the preceding 20 years--such factors as the Chinese leadership's decision to "restore the economy" within the country, to institute a "open door policy" in foreign economic relations, to stay on an unfriendly footing in relations with the USSR and several other socialist countries and to use the "Thought of Mao Zedong" (now viewed as the "quintessence of collective party wisdom") as the ideological foundation of the search for China's "own road" of socialist construction. The combined effects of these factors led to a situation in which the theoretical interpretation of the distinctive features of the socialist order and its superiority to capitalism was aimed not only at publicizing certain premises of the theory of scientific communism and purging them of ultra-leftist distortions, but also and primarily at substantiating the idea of the "multitude of socialist models" and of China's "right" to strive for the establishment of a "Sinized" socialist order.¹⁰ All of this has been portrayed as the "creative application" of the principles of Marxism-Leninism in accordance with domestic (Chinese--V. Zh.) conditions.

This "goal-oriented" approach was also the direct cause of such characteristic features of the majority of contemporary Chinese publications dealing with socialist issues as, first of all, the prevalence of false and biased appraisals of world socialism, of its status and aims and of the state of affairs in the world community of socialist states and in individual socialist countries and, secondly, claims to some kind of important contribution to the general theory of socialist construction.

It must be said that Chinese social scientists' explanations of the processes occurring in the socialist community, the activities of CEMA and the Warsaw Pact and the foreign policy line of the USSR and other socialist countries are still distinguished by the anti-Sovietism, old clichés and slanderous lies engendered by the "Cultural Revolution" and the theory of the "three

worlds." It is true that the term "world socialist system" has been used in Chinese scientific literature in recent years,¹¹ and some mention has been made of the need to study new issues arising in connection with the spread of socialism beyond the boundaries of a single country and the emergence of several socialist states,¹² but there have been no serious analyses or even discussions of the problems of socialism as a world system as yet.

As for the further development of the theory of socialism, the need for this is certainly not being questioned. It is indicative that the CPSU, which is now paying "considerable attention to the analysis of the distinctive features of the present period,"¹³ has asked Soviet social scientists for more thorough studies of vital aspects of the political economy of socialism¹⁴ and detailed analyses of the non-antagonistic conflicts inherent in mature socialism.

By the same token, the Chinese social scientists' statements that "the Marxist political economics of socialism cannot be regarded as a full and complete science today" and that "the Marxist theory of scientific socialism urgently requires new development today"¹⁵ do not represent anything extraordinary and are obviously not objectionable in themselves, just as the desire of Chinese scientists to take part in the elaboration of the theory of socialism is not objectionable. It is important, however, that this elaboration be based on the genuinely vast collective experience accumulated in socialist construction throughout the world, on its generalization¹⁶ and on a sober analysis of China's own errors and omissions. The prevailing approach in the Chinese social sciences today is a different one, however, based on the premise of the "absence" of any successful experience in socialist construction in the world. Statements about the absence of truly valuable international experience in the construction of a new society or, at best, about the impossibility of its extensive use in China due to its "lack of correspondence" to Chinese conditions are used, on the one hand, to substantiate China's need to "take its own road and build socialism in line with specifically Chinese conditions"¹⁸ and, on the other, to call certain aspects of the current theory and practice of social development in the PRC a contribution to the eradication of the multitude of "blank spaces" supposedly existing "in the Marxist theory of socialist construction."¹⁹ It might seem that the Chinese social scientists are extrapolating their own and, judging by their present discussions, not always clear understanding of several problems in socialist construction to the analytical thinking of other countries. This is probably true to some degree--after all, for many years China has essentially acquired experience in how not to build socialism; furthermore, even after 1978 Chinese scientists had relatively limited direct contact with the achievements of social scientists in the socialist countries. In this case, however, this is less a matter of unconscious errors than of the conscious denigration and even the deliberate political denial of the successes and meaningful experience of the USSR and other socialist states in socialist construction. It is not surprising that the "new" elements found along this path which has been cleared for China's own "creativity" are sometimes nothing other than forgotten (by some Chinese social scientists) old elements. For example, Wu Zhenkun gives the 12th CCP Congress the credit for the "scientific summarization of the basic features of socialism" and then presents, without the slightest hesitation, a slightly modified and abridged version of the list of the main natural laws governing

socialist revolution and socialist construction, a list recorded in the declaration of the 1957 conference of communist and workers parties.²⁰

In light of all this, "Conversations about Capitalism and Socialism" can be regarded as a work reflecting the basic trends in the analysis of theoretical problems of socialist construction by contemporary Chinese social scientists. This book is something like the final stage of the discussions of socialism in China during the 1978-1983 period. At the same time, it seems to map out the general outlines of the ideological platform on which the theory of "building socialism with a view to specifically Chinese conditions," announced at the 12th CCP Congress, is being based in China. The "Conversations" are also distinguished by unconcealed anti-Sovietism--in this context, it is probable that the only Chinese work of recent years comparable to this one is volume 2 of "The History of International Relations (1945-1980)," published by Wuhan University. Apparently, an important part was played by the personal views of the authors, particularly of editor-in-chief Qian Junrui. These views were reflected, in our opinion, not in the repetition of the lies about the "disintegration of the socialist camp" or the affirmation of the "validity" of the theory of "three worlds"²¹--all of these are fairly common themes in the Chinese social sciences today--but, for example, in the misrepresentation of the causes of the events of 1956 in Hungary, in the many slanderous attacks on Soviet foreign policy and especially in the deliberately vague and obscure descriptions of the nature of the present order in the USSR and its affiliation with the world socialist system.

It is indicative that although the authors stipulate that "over a third of the population has embarked on the road to socialism," they confine their data on the development of the USSR to information predating 1960 and assign the Soviet Union nothing less than the "responsibility for socialism's loss of prestige."

In general, it must be said that Chinese social scientists avoid clear and precise descriptions of the USSR as a socialist state. This is in sharp contrast to the ascertainment of the "existence of a socialist social order in China" by the Soviet side on the very highest level (KOMMUNIST, 1982, No 6, p 20; PRAVDA, 27 October 1984). Of course, appraisals of the current stage of social development in the Soviet Union in the PRC scientific press have undergone some changes in recent years. In particular, the authors of the "Conversations" did not dare to allege that the economic basis of the USSR is "state-monopolist capitalism," as was alleged in the 1974 textbook "The Fundamentals of Political Economy," in which the chapter on the Soviet Union was part of the section subtitled "Capitalism" (see "Zhengzhi jingji xue jichu zhishi" (Zibenzhu yi bufen), Shanghai, 1974, pp 182-203). Even now, however, Chinese social scientists generally confine themselves to isolated semi-acknowledgements and hints in narrowly specialized publications. For example, the editor's notes in the anthology of translated documents called "Soviet Economic Reform" (1979-1981) say that the book was published to further "the study and discussion of the theory and practice of various socialist models within the contemporary international communist movement."²² Speakers at a conference on theoretical problems of the USSR economy in July 1983 in Beijing said that "the Soviet Union's long-standing belief in the principle of public ownership must be acknowledged, and not denied."²³

Another characteristic feature of the "Conversations" is the persistent effort to "regenerate" the old belief in Mao Zedong's "great contribution" to the theory of Marxism-Leninism. Although these passages are interspersed rather than concentrated in one section of the book,²⁴ their abundance in general distinguishes the "Conversations" from other major works of recent years by Chinese social scientists.

Far from all of the interpretations and opinions stated in the "Conversations about Capitalism and Socialism" warrant criticism or argument. This applies above all to the insinuations about Soviet foreign policy. For that matter, the question of Mao Zedong's "contribution" to the theory of Marxism-Leninism was unconditionally refuted by life itself long ago.

As for the analysis and comparison of capitalism and socialism in the book, it must be said that the description of the capitalist structure and the comparison of this structure to socialism essentially conform to generally accepted patterns. For example, the comparison of the two types of social orders includes the valid statement that the new production relations display their superiority to the old ones only over a lengthy period of time, and that the direct comparison of current results in the development of productive forces is invalid and could lead to false conclusions.²⁵ At the same time, after ascertaining the inevitability of capitalism's departure from the historical arena and admitting that "the capitalist order has not acquired any new viable features in the postwar period," the authors put maximum emphasis on the slow process of capitalism's "extinction" ("a matter of centuries") and the "non-automatic" nature of this process and, in this context, warn against the kind of "excessive optimism" that was allegedly characteristic of I. V. Stalin.²⁶ This analytical premise is apparently supposed to serve as indirect justification for the PRC leadership's present efforts to establish broader and stronger relations with developed capitalist states.

The discussion of a broad range of aspects of the theory of socialism and the practice of its construction in the USSR and the PRC, which is the central part of the book, is particularly interesting and testifies to the heightened interest of Chinese social scientists in the particular aspects of the theory and history of socialist construction that are now being debated by social scientists in the USSR and other socialist countries. This interpretation includes many debatable comments as well as generally accepted opinions.

Although the authors of the "Conversations" examine socialism from the traditional vantage point--that is, as the initial stage of communism and as the first and lowest phase of the communist social structure--they stress that socialism is a society not free of the traditions and "birthmarks" of capitalism and explain their manifestations in detail.²⁷ The possibility of socialism's development on the basis of its own form of production relations is not questioned, although Chinese social scientists are inclined to subdivide the period of socialist construction into stages of partial (or imperfect) and complete socialism.

In general, the authors' description of the distinctive features of socialism's economic order (the establishment of public ownership of the means of

production, the satisfaction of the growing material and cultural needs of the people as the aim of national production and the effects of the law of distribution according to labor), political order and spiritual culture seems sound and conforms to the generally accepted framework. The authors' acknowledgement of the strong influence of various types of non-proletarian ideas in China and their apprehensive statements about the possible appearance of "even more channels for the spread of bourgeois ideas" under the conditions of extensive contacts with the West²⁸ seem justified and quite pertinent. At the same time, the attempts--displaying a total disregard for V. I. Lenin's statements about the role of cultural revolution in the construction of socialism²⁹--to portray "the strategic decision of the 12th CCP Congress on the construction of a highly developed spiritual culture" as "a great advance in the international communist movement, the enrichment and development of Marxism-Leninism,"³⁰ can only raise vehement objections.

The analysis of the causes of the "convoluted" path of socialist construction for the disclosure of, in the authors' words, "several common and natural problems,"³¹ is prominent in the section of the book dealing with socialism. These problems include, in particular, the underestimation of the complexity and difficulty of building socialism in the economy, which leads to the accelerated collectivization of the means of production in the belief that "the more collective, the better," to excessive haste in the development of production and excessive reliance on heavy industry; the departure from the principles of socialism in the political sphere (the cult of personality and the excessive concentration of power within the hands of a single individual). The objective causes of errors in socialist construction include the complexity of the process by which the objective laws governing the development of socialism are learned and mastered, the underdeveloped socioeconomic basis of the majority of countries where the revolution has triumphed and acts of sabotage by internal and external class enemies. Some statements (which have also been made by Soviet scientists) about the need for a correct understanding of the connections and differences between the essence and laws of socialism and the actual policy and behavior of specific countries also seem quite valid.

The authors make the noteworthy remark that socialism's advantages are displayed "not in some kind of guarantee against all types of errors, but in the possibility of overcoming and correcting errors," in the absence of the kind of insurmountable errors and crises that are present in the capitalist society.³²

We cannot agree, however, with many of the authors' statements about errors in socialist construction.

This applies above all to the authors' claims to a new way of investigating this subject matter. It is common knowledge that V. I. Lenin spoke of the "incredibly difficult" road to socialism,³³ the impossibility of faultless revolutionary action by the same laboring classes "that were oppressed, beaten and brutally gripped in the vise of poverty, ignorance and neglect for centuries"³⁴ and the need to analyze yesterday's errors to avoid "making errors today and tomorrow."³⁵

The CPSU frankly admits that the long historical road of the construction of a new society "also had its shortcomings and its interruptions, stemming from objective and subjective factors,"³⁶ and has made a constant effort to surmount them. The activities of communist and workers parties in the fraternal countries are distinguished by the same approach. For example, the Vietnam Communist Party is now analyzing errors in the management and organization of the SRV national economy and determining the exact ways and methods of eliminating them.³⁷ Besides this, in the view of the authors of the "Conversations," errors in socialist construction almost outnumber its positive results and are essentially turned into one of the basic "natural tendencies" in the more than 60 years of the practice of socialism. In this way, the authors of the book unwittingly take the same stand as bourgeois ideologists, who view real socialism as "an endless chain of errors, defeats and difficulties and say nothing about its achievements of worldwide historic importance."³⁸

In recent years some Chinese social scientists have mentioned the possibility of "the fuller disclosure of the advantages of socialism" by means of a departure "from the classic form of socialism predicted by K. Marx" in the sphere of production relations.³⁹ This point of view is also expressed in the "Conversations," in which the main reason for "dogmatic errors" in socialist construction in countries with an initial preponderance of small-scale peasant economic units is listed as nothing other than the tendency to act according to the conclusions drawn by K. Marx and F. Engels from their analysis of the situation in developed capitalist countries.⁴⁰ What can we say about this? We think that a good answer was once provided by famous Chinese economist Sun Yefang, who said the PRC's financial and economic failures were the result "not of the adoption of certain 'dogmas' from 'Das Kapital,' but of the violation of many of the fundamental principles clearly delineated so long ago in 'Das Kapital.'"⁴¹

Finally, the authors of the "Conversations" associate many shortcomings of economic construction in China directly with the "mechanical adoption of the Soviet experience"⁴² during the initial period after the establishment of the PRC. It is true that although V. I. Lenin stressed the need to adapt the main revolutionary principles to the specific conditions of different countries and objected to the exact duplication of the Russian revolution in other states,⁴³ what actually occurred, as Soviet social scientists have correctly pointed out, is that "the creative use of the Soviet experience in socialist construction was accompanied by the undiscerning acceptance of this experience and its duplication even in minor and trivial details."⁴⁴ In general, this stemmed from such objective causes as the absence of popular democracy in these countries during the initial stage of their development of their own experience in building a new society and the sincere belief of many leaders of these countries in the temporary and transitory nature of differences in ways of building this society in the USSR and other states. This is why it is quite understandable and even natural that these countries tried in the second half of the 1940's and the first half of the 1950's to secure, in K. Gotwald's words, "a closer approximation of the Soviet example, of the society which had already built socialism and had suffered greatly for our sake in its search for new ways of life and its realization and discovery of them."⁴⁵ It is probable that China was not an exception to this rule.

It is wrong, however, for a country to blame Soviet experience for its own miscalculations. In any case, Chinese social scientists are well aware of the fact that it was not the "mechanical duplication" of the Soviet experience but, rather, the refusal "to follow the general pattern of industrial construction on the pretext of making a break with 'obsolete clichés'"⁴⁶ that plunged the country into the chaos of the "Great Leap Forward." The logic of the authors of the "Conversations" leads them inevitably to the effective justification of the "Great Leap Forward" and other "experiments" of the same type, as they are "sanctified" by the aims of the struggle against the "blind duplication" of foreign experience and the search for "China's own suitable path." This is attested to, for example, by the article by Huang Daqiang on "The Theoretical Bases of the Construction of Specifically Chinese Socialism," in which Mao Zedong's statement of 18 June 1960 (!), that the development of the country since 1956 had supposedly "begun to reflect the objective economic laws of China,"⁴⁷ is quoted without the slightest hint of criticism. As a point of reference, one of the 5 years in this period, 1956, was the year of the so-called "small leap forward," and 3 years, 1958-1960, were taken up by the "Great Leap Forward," at which time, as Vice Chairman Yuan Baohua of the PRC State Economic Committee wrote in the Chinese economic almanac for 1981, "there was a tendency to disregard objective laws, to strive for excessively high indicators and to ignore quality and economic effectiveness."⁴⁸

Efforts to prove the existence of a "multitude of socialist models" are made throughout the book "Conversations about Capitalism and Socialism."

The existence of various "models" of socialist construction, the authors state, permits the enrichment and diversification of the collective experience in building a new society and the avoidance of some errors: "The existence of a variety of patterns and models allows for comparison, study and intersupplementation—that is, it eliminates some straying and thereby accelerates socialist construction."⁴⁹

The statement that the founders of Marxism did not provide a complete answer to the question of the means of making the transition to socialism under the conditions of underdeveloped productive forces,⁵⁰ as a result of which the need for "the further development of Marxist theory" arose,⁵¹ is used as the point of departure for the substantiation of the "multitude of socialist models." One of the most important areas of this development was, in the authors' opinion, the overall search for ways of "building socialism on a basis combining the general principles of Marxism with the specific conditions and circumstances of various countries."⁵²

Chinese studies of the issue of "models of socialism," and especially of "models of the socialist economy," began in the late 1970's under the obvious influence of works by some bourgeois authors and theorists of "market socialism," especially O. Sik and W. Brus.⁵³ An important part was played by Qian Junrui, who was apparently the first Chinese social scientist to use the term "model of socialist construction"⁵⁴ and to state the need for "genuine comparative studies of all different models of socialist construction."⁵⁵ The aim of this research was not the adoption of any specific theoretical model, but the "discovery of a socialist economic model corresponding to Chinese conditions."⁵⁶

Although there are different views on the principles governing the classification of "models," Chinese authors generally distinguish between the Soviet (of the "Stalin era"), Yugoslavian and Hungarian⁵⁷ "models of socialism," with an analysis of the differences in the economic machinery of these countries and sometimes even in their political systems, history of socialist reforms, etc. This approach is also reflected in the "Conversations," in which the appraisal of the Yugoslavian and Hungarian experience in socialist construction is positive in general.

The description of the "Soviet model" in the book essentially conforms to the clichéd Chinese interpretations of recent years of the "pros and cons" of socialist construction in the USSR. Although the authors acknowledge the great international significance of many aspects of the socialist reforms which were first instituted in the Soviet Union and which proved that socialism could triumph in one country, they also stress the "historically determined" "defects" in the patterns of socialist construction followed by the USSR, including the flaw of the "lopsided emphasis on the development of heavy industry" and the shortcomings of the "highly centralized system of planned management."⁵⁸ Some of the authors' statements about the construction of socialism in the USSR are obviously influenced by today's theories about China's own patterns of economic development. This applies, for example, to the statements that the Soviet Union "mechanically adopted Marxism's predictions about the socialist society," "did not take its own salient features into account" and made a premature departure "from the correct line of the new economic policy."⁵⁹

As mentioned above, the authors do not discuss the internal development of the USSR over the last 20 years. Here the authors are obviously going against the growing tendency of Chinese social scientists to conduct more objective and scrupulous studies of the Soviet Union's efforts to improve the economic structure and economic mechanism after the middle of the 1960's, efforts which are still being made today.⁶⁰

In general, however, the authors' approach to the issue of "models of socialism" is not a new one. Here we find such repeatedly employed methods as the tendency to equate the indisputable Marxist-Leninist theoretical premise of the possible uniqueness of the specific conditions of the establishment of a new society and forms of socialist social relations in different countries and the supposedly related theory of the "multitude of socialist models," and the far-fetched declaration that a choice must be made between the mechanical duplication of a single example by all countries or the elaboration of a "national model of socialism."

A clear and complete answer to tendentious statements of this kind can be found in "Leninism--The Inexhaustible Source of the Revolutionary Energy and Creativity of the Masses," the report presented by Yu. V. Andropov at the festivities commemorating the 112th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth in Moscow on 22 April 1982: "Life itself presupposes a variety of forms of socialism, but they have the same essential features. In this connection, I would like to say something about the currently fashionable topic of socialist 'models.' Some say that the difficulties encountered by some

socialist countries are the result of the alleged imposition of the Soviet 'model' on them. This is a strange idea. An unbiased look at reality is enough to demonstrate all of the absurdity of these allegations. Any socialist state displays unique national, historical, cultural and other features. The conversation becomes debatable when the talk about different types of models is based on a vague and unclear idea of the very essence of socialism and its fundamental differences from capitalism" (Yu. V. Andropov, "Izbrannyye rechi i statii" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1983, p 197).

Social scientists in the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries believe that "there is only one scientific model of socialism, common to all countries--this is the logical assumption, common to all Marxist-Leninists, about a socialist society based on a realization of the objective laws governing the transformation of capitalism into socialism and displaying the main structural features of a new society, revealing its main features and obligatory principles for all countries. The general model of socialism... provides the basic outlines for a specific program of action."⁶¹ This dictates, and certainly does not deny, the obligation of each country building socialism to take its own specific history into account in complete accordance with V. I. Lenin's belief that "this new society is an abstraction which can take physical form only through a number of diverse and imperfect attempts to build some kind of socialist state."⁶²

It must be said that some Chinese scientists are worried about the spread of bourgeois and other non-Marxist phrases, theories and appraisals in social research, including studies of the issue of the "models of socialism." For example, Huang Fanzhang stresses that some foreign studies of "models of the socialist economy" contain "revisionist views contradicting the basic principles of Marxism."⁶³ Jiang Xiueuo criticizes this tendency even more pointedly. In his words, works by bourgeois authors "embroider the truth about every facet of capitalism's economic order and denigrate socialism's economic order, slanderously calling it an irrational order and a violation of objective laws and human nature.... When economic models are analyzed (by bourgeois scientists), the model regulated most by government plans is called the inferior one. Some of our comrades have been influenced directly or indirectly by these theories...and also object to unified and centralized planned control and national economic management by the government and even regard it as a source of bureaucratism and authoritarianism. It is completely obvious that adherence to these ideas precludes the discovery of a mechanism of economic management meeting the requirements of socialist economic relations."⁶⁴

All of the talk about the "multitude of socialist models" generally reflects quite definite political goals rather than an attempt at the terminological enrichment of socialist theory.⁶⁵ One such goal is quite apparent in the "Conversations": the goal of substantiating the historical inevitability of the uniquely interpreted theory of "specifically Chinese socialist construction" and the validity and viability of this theory. Although the 12th CCP Congress (1982) is taken as the point of departure here, its "genetic relationship" to statements by Mao Zedong, particularly those he made in his 1956 work "The Ten Main Relationships," is acknowledged in China and even underscored. The Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee (1978) is

known as the start of the actual elaboration of "China's absolutely unique pattern of socialist construction."

The political aims of the theory,⁶⁶ its details and its exact meaning are still the subject of debates, during which extremely diverse points of view have been expressed.⁶⁷ The official "approval" of any of the theory's political aims could obviously have more far-reaching consequences. At present the most frequently encountered view (worded in different ways) is the one in which the "construction of socialism in line with specifically Chinese conditions" is portrayed as "not a 'particular' form, isolated from the basic premises of scientific socialism and the general principles of socialist construction, and not a 'common' form with no specifically Chinese features, but a combination of the general laws of socialist construction and the specific experiences of China."⁶⁸ The "itemized" description of the elements of "specifically Chinese socialism," however, sometimes underscores differences from other countries rather than similarities to them.

The economic portion of the theory of "specifically Chinese socialist construction" has probably been elaborated in the greatest detail to date. The list of its elements in the "Conversations" includes long-standing, traditional premises: the 10 points of future economic construction, listed in Zhao Ziyang's report at the Fourth Session of the Fifth NPC (1981); the establishment of a "specifically Chinese" system of economic management, including systems of production responsibility in agriculture and systems of economic responsibility in other spheres of the economy; the implementation of the principle that "economic planning is the main element, and market regulation is an auxiliary aid"; the authorization of some development of the private economic sector with a prevalence of various forms of public ownership, etc. The authors describe the advantages of the planned economy quite clearly and stress the inaccuracy of "the overexaggeration or even the unlimited expansion of the role of the market mechanism."⁶⁹ It is interesting that descriptions of the economic content of "specifically Chinese socialism" do not include--and this applies to descriptions in the "Conversations" and in other works--several of the characteristics of the national economy whose existence will be unavoidable for a long time--for example, the high percentage of small-scale production units, the concentration of the majority of the economically active population in rural areas, etc. It is probable that this is being done in China in an attempt to give the economic platform of "specifically Chinese socialism" more appealing features than those made possible by the country's actual circumstances and capabilities.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Ziben zhuyi yu shehui zhuyi zong heng tan" [Conversations about Capitalism and Socialism], Shijie zhishi chubanshe, Beijing, 1983, 634 pp (in Chinese). Explaining the name of the book (literally "Vertical and Horizontal Conversations"), the authors state that they were striving to first point up--"vertically, in accordance with the sequence of historical events"--the distinctive features of the origins and functioning of capitalism and socialism, and then to provide a "horizontal" comparison

of major aspects of socialism and capitalism (pp 18-19). Hereafter, the abbreviation "Conversations" will be used.

2. "Conversations," pp 2-3.
3. See the foreword in "Conversations," p 2.
4. Li Honglin, "What Did the 'Crisis of Faith' Prove?" RENMIN RIBAO, 11 November 1980.
5. For example, at a scientific conference on the natural laws governing the socialist society in November 1979 in Wuxi, speakers unequivocally said that China "is a socialist state, and this fact cannot and should not be disputed" (see GUANGMING RIBAO, 23 November 1979). The 1981 "Decision on Some Aspects of CCP History Since the Founding of the PRC" officially called the denial of the fact that China had become a socialist society a mistake (see RENMIN RIBAO, 1 July 1981).
6. Hu Fuming, "The Peculiarities of Socialism's Development in Our Country," SHEHUEI KEXIUE, Shanghai, 1980, No 3.
7. Wang Roshui, "Criteria of Truth and Theoretical Research," DUSHU, 1980, No 1, p 6.
8. "Scientific Socialism," Jinan, 1980; "The History of the Doctrine of Proletarian Dictatorship (1895-1952)," Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1981, and others.
9. Xiue Muqiao et al, "The Advantages of the Socialist Economic Order and the Experience of Our Country," Beijing, 1981; Jiang Xiue, "The Advantages of the Socialist Economic Order," Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1981; Dong Fureng (ed-in-chief), "The Socialist Economic Order and Its Advantages," Beijing, 1981.
10. Zhong Jisheng, "The 'Specifically Chinese' Form Expressing Socialist Content," GUANGMING RIBAO, 31 October 1983.
11. Yu Guanyuan, "Studies in the Social Sciences," Chengdu, 1981, p 89 (in Chinese); "History of International Relations (1945-1980)," vol 2, Wuhan, 1983, p 76 (in Chinese).
12. Su Shaozhi, "Attention Must Be Paid to Comparative Studies of the Socialist Order," JINGJIXIUE ZHOUBAO, 23 May 1983.
13. "Speech Presented by Comrade K. U. Chernenko at a Meeting with Voters on 2 March 1984," KOMMUNIST, 1984, No 4, p 9.
14. PRAVDA, 24 February 1984.
15. Yu Guanyuan, "Research in the Political Economy of Socialism," pt 2, Beijing, 1981, pp 379, 381 (in Chinese).

16. This is precisely the approach distinguishing CPSU theoretical activity. As Comrade K. U. Chernenko said, the new edition of the CPSU program which is now being prepared "will include new provisions reflecting the conclusions of contemporary Marxist-Leninist thinking and the experience of our party and fraternal parties" (KOMMUNIST, 1984, No 7, p 6).
17. For example, back in early 1980 Deng Xiaoping said that even 63 years after the triumph of the October Revolution the Soviet Union "cannot brag about its ability to build socialism," in the book "Deng Xiaoping wen xuan (1975-1982)," Beijing, 1983, p 215.
18. "XII Vsekitayskiy syezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Kitaya" [12th All-China CCP Congress], Beijing, 1982, pp 3-4 (in Russian).
19. JINGJIXUE ZHOUBAO, 23 May 1983.
20. Wu Zhenkun, "Studies of 'Specifically Chinese Socialist Construction,'" GUANGMING RIBAO, 25 September 1983.
21. It is indicative that Qian Junrui essentially tried to modify this theory by proposing that the world economy be divided into four regions--see SHIJIE JINGJI DAOBAO, 10 October 1983.
22. "Sulian jingji gaige 1979-1981," Harbin, 1982.
23. XINHUA WENZHAI, 1983, No 11, p 42.
24. "Conversations," pp 309-310, 397, 621.
25. Ibid., pp 432-434.
26. Ibid., pp 105, 179.
27. Ibid., pp 233-244.
28. Ibid., p 411.
29. See, for example, V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 41, p 337; vol 44, pp 168-169, 174.
30. "Conversations," p 279.
31. Ibid., p 346.
32. Ibid., p 366.
33. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 36, p 47.
34. Ibid., vol 37, pp 60-61.
35. Ibid., vol 34, p 257.

36. "Speech Presented by Comrade K. U. Chernenko at Reception Honoring Participants in the CEMA Economic Summit Conference of 14 June 1984," *KOMMUNIST*, 1984, No 9, p 18.
37. Duo Miao, "Improving Control," *PRAVDA*, 25 July 1984.
38. M. Mchedlov, "The Year of Marx and the Ideological Struggle," *KOMMUNIST*, 1984, No 10, p 51.
39. *JINGJIXIUE ZHOUBAO*, 5 March 1984.
40. "Conversations," p 370. The authors, however, stipulate that various negative developments were the result not of "errors" in the doctrine of scientific socialism worked out by K. Marx and F. Engels, but of "a dogmatic approach to its use" (*Ibid.*, p 371).
41. *JINGJI YANJIU*, 1981, No 10, p 16.
42. "Conversations," p 617.
43. V. I. Lenin, *Op. cit.*, vol 44, pp 14, 21.
44. "Problemy i puti sovershenstvovaniya mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy novogo tipa" [Problems and Ways of Improving International Relations of the New Type], Moscow, 1983, p 51.
45. Quoted in "Marksizm-leninizm o proletarskom internatsionalizme" [Marxist-Leninist View of Proletarian Internationalism], Moscow, 1969, p 399.
46. *SHEHUEI KEXIUE*, Shanghai, 1981, No 5, p 12.
47. *GUANGMING RIBAO*, 26 December 1983.
48. "Zhongguo jingji nianjian 1981," Beijing, 1981, pp III-42.
49. "Conversations," p 10.
50. Although this is formally correct, the authors of the "Conversations" are not entirely accurate in this assumption. As Soviet social scientists have correctly pointed out, "K. Marx and F. Engels...were the first to discuss the possibility of a transition to the new order in countries with pre-capitalist relations, and they outlined the international conditions making this transition possible." "Teoreticheskiye problemy perekhoda k sotsializmu stran s nerazvitoi ekonomikoy" [Theoretical Problems of the Transition to Socialism in Countries with an Underdeveloped Economy], Moscow, 1983, p 20. For example, when F. Engels mentioned the possibility that countries with a pre-capitalist level of development could "shorten the process of their progression toward a socialist society," he related this to material and spiritual support from the new order after it had triumphed in civilized countries (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 22, p 446). At the same time, F. Engels did not feel the need to

predict the specific levels and forms of the transition to socialism in backward countries, pointing up only the complexity and multiple stages of this transition (ibid., vol 35, p 298).

51. "Conversations," p 370.
52. Ibid., p 281.
53. W. Brus worked in Poland until the middle of the 1960's and then emigrated to England. Translations of O. Si's books "Plan and Market Under Socialism" (1982) and "The Third Way" (1982) and of W. Brus' "The Economics and Politics of Socialism" (1981) have been published in the PRC. An anthology of the lectures they presented when they were in China, "The Reform of the Socialist Economic System" (1982), has also been published.
54. SHIJIE JINGJI (WORLD ECONOMICS), Beijing, 1979, No 1, p 6.
55. Ibid., 1980, No 3, p 5.
56. JINGJI YANJIU, 1981, No 12, p 16.
57. It is noteworthy that our Hungarian comrades have repeatedly objected to the widespread attempts of Westerners to single out Hungary as some kind of separate "socialist model."
58. "Conversations," pp 282-294.
59. Ibid., pp 294, 349, 351.
60. For example, Shu Dong acknowledges the accumulation of considerable planning experience in the Soviet Union and believes that "the entire process of economic reform in the Soviet Union warrants...consideration and study"--JINGJI LILUN YU JINGJI GUANLI (ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT), Beijing, 1983, No 1, p 69.
61. A. P. Butenko, "Sotsializm kak obshchestvennyy stroy" [Socialism as a Social Order], Moscow, 1974, p 279.
62. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 36, pp 301-302.
63. JINGJIXIUE WENZHAI, Beijing, 1983, No 4, p 6.
64. ZHONGGUO JINGJI WENTI, 1982, No 3, p 25.
65. According to Soviet social scientist Kh. N. Momdzhyan, "the construction of 'socialist models' for the division of the single socialist society into various parts, differing radically from one another in their economic and sociopolitical structures, is aimed against the international unity of all segments of the world communist movement and the countries of the world socialist system"--KOMMUNIST, 1970, No 2, p 69.

66. In our opinion, this is essentially true of the Chinese discussions of the relationship, interconnection and interaction of the "general" (the socialist content and general tendencies in the construction of socialism) and "particular" (specifically Chinese conditions), and of the arguments about whether these specifically Chinese conditions should be reflected only in the "path" of socialist construction or primarily in the goal itself, in the final result.
67. For a summary of some aspects of the debates, see GUANGMING RIBAO, 5 September 1983, 26 December 1983; JINGJI YANJIU, 1984, No 5, pp 73-76.
68. GUANGMING RIBAO, 31 October 1983.
69. "Conversations," p 477.

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VIEWS OF U.S. POLITICAL SCIENTISTS ON U.S.-PRC TIES DISCUSSED

Moscow PROBLEMY DALNEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, Jan-Mar 85 (signed to press 21 Feb 85) pp 132-142

[Article by S. M. Olesin: "Sino-American Ties as Assessed by U.S. Political Scientists"]

[Text] The PRC's foreign policy course is the target of constant and unflagging attention by U.S. political scientists. The assessments of experts and the conclusions and specific recommendations of U.S. political scientists have a certain, though not always direct, effect on Washington's official line. On the other hand, these assessments are considerably affected by the White House's influence. Recently political science publications in the United States have carried a large number of different articles analyzing Beijing's practical line since the 12th CCP Congress and the effect of the congress on the nature of Sino-American relations and interpreting the content, certain results and prospects of R. Reagan's China policy at what amounts to the end of an intermediate stage—the 1984 presidential election.

Of course, the central—and most essential—question for U.S. observers is the question of the nature and depth of the changes introduced in Chinese foreign policy by the 12th CCP Congress. In order to answer it a certain amount of time was required so as to conduct an analysis of practical actions since September 1982. This analysis made it possible to draw a conclusion which, on the whole, encouraged U.S. experts: Despite certain "nuances" and "modifications" observed in the congress formulations, the general orientation of China's foreign policy strategy, Beijing's approach to key international problems and its assessment of political "enemies" and "allies" have remained essentially unchanged. This was the conclusion reached, for example, by C. Hamrin, staffer of the U.S. Department of State research service.¹

People in the West note that the PRC's striving to maintain the "strategic tie" with the United States and its desire to continue relying on the American partner in its international activity have remained unchanged since the 12th CCP Congress. D. Zagoria, an influential expert Sinologist in the United States, noted in this connection: "The Chinese, great masters of the art of practical politics, know very well that their long-range interests depend on containing Soviet power and that links with America are extremely necessary in order to achieve these goals.... China will not be able to pursue a policy

of 'equidistance' between the superpowers. On the main issues affecting the balance of forces, China will continue to lean toward the West."²

At the same time, American political and academic circles have not failed to notice some new aspects of China's foreign policy line, primarily certain "gestures" made by the PRC toward the Soviet Union in the early 1980's. Despite the limited nature of these "gestures"--the Chinese side undertook a certain expansion of trade and a slight revival of political, scientific and cultural contacts with the USSR--they proved sufficient to give rise to an entire wave of all kinds of speculations in the West about the possible consequences of a hypothetical Sino-Soviet detente for U.S. interests. A multiplicity of various press materials was devoted to this subject, including publications of an analytical nature.³ Perhaps the most interesting and most representative of them (especially with regard to the generalization of the viewpoints of interest to us) was the review "Future Sino-Soviet Relations and Their Implications for the United States," prepared by the U.S. Congressional Research Service.⁴ This review, as its author, R. Sutter, notes, is based on the opinions of a large group of authoritative American Sinologists, expressed (off the record) in the fall of 1982--in other words, immediately after the 12th CCP Congress. The review brings together and systematizes the experts' arguments, and consequently it can be viewed as one of the first reactions of U.S. political scientists to the 12th congress foreign policy program and to some new "symptoms" in Sino-Soviet relations.

R. Sutter singles out two dominant trends in U.S. assessments of the issue in question. The first one unites those political scientists who believe that any potential rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow will inevitably occur at the cost of a weakening of U.S. positions in the USSR-U.S.-PRC triangle. According to this approach, detente between China and the USSR, especially if it gains appreciable scope and affects the military sphere, will make possible a substantial reorientation of the USSR's military efforts from the Chinese flank toward Europe and other strategic directions, thus increasing the "deterrent" burden of the United States and its allies. In the opinion of the advocates of this viewpoint, such a development of Sino-Soviet relations would practically rule out any possibility of close military ties between Washington and Beijing, whose importance as an effective lever to exert pressure on Moscow is admitted by many people in the White House. Furthermore, so the group of experts claims, if there is a certain stabilization in Beijing's relations with Moscow, they could even lead to tactical cooperation between the two sides on many international questions, particularly on the problems of the Near East, Central America and southern Africa, North-South problems, and so on, which will naturally have negative consequences for the United States. Finally, although this forecast is the least probable one, according to the experts, a possible development of technical and economic cooperation between the USSR and China in the future will to a great extent reduce the latter's interest in economic aid from, and ties with, the West, which at present is one of the main incentives for Sino-American partnership.

On the whole, this group of experts, clearly reflecting the dominant viewpoint in the United States, considers it impossible for the United States to allow any normalization of Sino-Soviet relations and advocates that Beijing be firmly stabilized in the channel of an active anti-Soviet strategy.

The advocates of the other trend singled out by the author assess more "optimistically" the possible consequences of potential Sino-Soviet detente for the U.S. international position. Their optimism, of course, stems mainly from a belief in the extremely limited scope of such a detente. "At present," the review notes, "many observers conclude that current changes in Sino-Soviet relations will hardly lead to anything more than a limited growth in economic, technological and cultural exchanges and the establishment of a more normal diplomatic dialogue between the neighboring countries. These changes are not seen as leading to substantial negative consequences for American interests."⁵ The "optimistic" experts claim that such a limited detente in Sino-Soviet relations, provided China's "constructive" relations with the United States are maintained, will have a positive effect on American policy too. It is argued in particular that a Soviet Union displaying "less nervousness and anxiety" in connection with the China problem may become more "moderate" and "rational" in its relations with the United States. The advocates of this approach declare that this would supposedly "allow the Soviet Union to take a more moderate stance on arms control questions,"⁶ as if its stance on these questions has hitherto not been moderate and as if it were the Soviet Union, not the United States, that embarked on the deployment of new nuclear missiles in Europe, thereby hampering the process of reaching an agreement.

Furthermore, the advocates of the second approach consider that a reduction in the level of Sino-Soviet confrontation, particularly in the Asian region, around the Afghanistan and Cambodia problems, will be able to help the favorable solution of these problems and lead to the creation of a "stable, peaceful and flourishing" Asia, conforming, of course, to "the long-term foreign policy interests" of the United States. Nor should a stepping up of China's economic cooperation with the Soviet Union be feared. Furthermore, as these experts note, this could release substantial U.S. economic resources for use in other parts of the world. As for possible tactical cooperation between the USSR and the PRC on a number of international questions, the "optimistic" experts perceive possible positive consequences for the United States in that too--additional incentives in the quest for bilateral Soviet-American accords. Thus the representatives of the second viewpoint, as it were, "reassure" Washington, which is carefully following the development of Sino-Soviet relations and is interested in their consolidation in a very definite channel. They contend that, given the main proviso--the maintenance of the PRC's "constructive relations" with the United States--the latter would retain considerable opportunities for effective international maneuvering even in the event of the hypothetical Sino-Soviet detente.

It is perfectly obvious that the advocates of both viewpoints in American political science are ultimately concerned with the same thing--securing unilateral foreign policy advantages for the United States whatever the turn of events. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the present realities of U.S. policy, the approach toward the development of United States-PRC-USSR trilateral relations typical of the "optimistic" experts gives the impression of being purely academic constructs totally out of touch with reality. This approach not only fails to link up with the White House's practical China policy and to have the slightest noticeable effect on it, but actually sharply contradicts this policy.

It is well known that Washington sees the main value of strategic rapprochement with China--and this has been unambiguously apparent from the actions of all U.S. administrations since the Nixon Administration--as lying primarily in joint opposition [protivodeystviye] to the Soviet Union. While declaring verbally from time to time that the Sino-American partnership is not directed against third countries and that the United States would "welcome" the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, in practice Washington has always done and continues to do everything within its power to impede this normalization, to "harness" Beijing as closely as possible to itself politically, economically and militarily and to make the pro-Western and pro-American orientation of the PRC's foreign policy irreversible. This is precisely the goal, in addition to all others, that is pursued by the steps aimed at establishing U.S.-PRC military cooperation, the continuing easing of restrictions on sales of American "dual-purpose" and military technology to Beijing and the granting of preferential terms to the PRC in trade and economic cooperation. It becomes clear, particularly from the revelations of Z. Brzezinski, a former U.S. policymaker, that "the increase in the flow of modern technology to China was seen in the White House as an essential component of strategic cooperation, the desire for which grew in direct proportion to the deterioration of American-Soviet relations."⁷

It is indicative here that, while playing various versions of the "China card" and making virtually no secret of this fact, the United States is trying, so to speak, to shift the blame and to accuse the Soviet Union of similar maneuvers. Such an attempt is made, for example, by American Sovietologist D. Strode in his article "Arms Control and Sino-Soviet Relations" in ORBIS, a journal with rightwing conservative leanings.⁸ According to the author's interpretations, the Soviet Union has supposedly always seen as one of its essential goals in mutual relations with the United States the quest for accords aimed at damaging China and obstructing the growth of that country's political influence and military potential. The author distorts in this way, for example, the Soviet Union's true goals and actions during talks with the United States on West Berlin (1959-1960), during the Caribbean crisis (1962), in the conclusion of the USSR-U.S. treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear tests (1974) and in a whole range of other political situations.⁹ Lacking any facts or arguments to substantiate his position, the author limits himself merely to his own speculations in this connection.¹⁰

D. Strode implies that in the early 1980's the Soviet Union, precisely as a result of the acute exacerbation of American-Soviet relations, displayed "special interest" in the normalization of relations with the PRC and that its steps in this direction supposedly did not fit into the context of the previous Soviet line--which was tougher, in the author's opinion. The author elaborates the theory that the Soviet stance toward the PRC is "inconsistent" and based on short-term expediency and strives to show the supposedly "contradictory" nature of the CPSU's evaluations of this question.¹¹

This interpretation, however, has nothing in common with the real state of affairs. The Soviet Union has never regarded relations with China as a matter for political bartering and expedient maneuvering and has attached special significance to these relations throughout the history of the PRC's existence.

The USSR has always wanted to base bilateral ties with the PRC on the principles of good-neighborliness, peace and mutual advantage, without detriment to any third country. These principles underlie the USSR's numerous initiatives and proposals aimed at normalizing Soviet-Chinese relations, which have been repeatedly expressed from the most diverse political platforms, including the lofty platforms of CPSU congresses. Confirming the principled nature and consistency of this line, the 26th CPSU Congress emphasized: "The Soviet Union has not sought and is not seeking confrontation with the PRC. We are following the course determined by the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses and would like to establish relations with it on a good-neighborly basis. Our proposals aimed at normalization of relations with China remain in force, just as our feelings of respect and friendship for the Chinese people remain unchanged."¹²

It is well known that the initial period of President R. Reagan's term in the White House coincided with a period of slight cooling of Sino-American relations, caused mainly by the President's pro-Taiwan feelings and his conservatively anticommunist approach toward the PRC. For its part, Beijing resumed its "measured" criticism of the United States on a number of foreign policy issues and took a number of active political demarches in response to the infringement of PRC sovereignty by the White House. This situation in bilateral relations in the early 1980's lent a new boost and urgency to the debate within U.S. political science concerning the use of the "China card" in Washington's global strategy.

The advocates of the active use of the "China card" criticized President Reagan's "hard" line, held him mainly responsible for retarding the dynamics of the "strategic partnership" with the PRC and emphasized that his stance greatly multiplied the "danger" of Sino-Soviet rapprochement. This criticism was most energetically leveled by those political scientists and politicians who, from the very beginning, had advocated the most extreme and unconditional ways of using the "China card" in the United States' anti-Soviet line and had, furthermore, personally implemented that line under previous U.S. administrations. Z. Brzezinski, in particular, is one such figure.

In an article¹³ whose main purpose was to "advise" Japan on how best and most effectively to safeguard American interests in East Asia, Brzezinski emphasized once again China's important role and "services" in similar activities. Declaring that, in the military-strategic sphere, Beijing supposedly "costs" the Soviet Union 25 percent of its total military spending and that this is approximately as much as is "diverted" by the European NATO countries, the author confirmed once again that the well-known statements about China of the "Eastern" member of this aggressive group have a very specific meaning.¹⁴

Brzezinski spoke with obvious approval about the results of the operation of the "China factor" as a factor favoring the U.S. imperialist line in Asia. This was the vein in which Brzezinski assessed, for example, the Chinese aggression against Vietnam in spring 1979, which, as he put it, had a "sobering" effect on the Vietnamese and should, in his calculations, encourage the allies of China and the United States in Southeast Asia, especially Thailand. Beijing's "deterrent" stance toward the DPRK must also be perceived as highly

favorable for the United States, Z. Brzezinski declared.¹⁵ In other words, Brzezinski and the influential forces supporting him expressed gratitude to their Chinese partners for "parallel" actions which are aimed against the interests of Asian socialist countries and sometimes directly threaten their existence.

Of course, the prospect of losing a strategic ally that is so valuable in all respects greatly worried Z. Brzezinski. He emphasized that Sino-American relations could deteriorate seriously because of the "excessively rigid ideological prejudices of some politicians in the new U.S. administration." He leveled particularly sharp criticism at Reagan's stance on questions of arms deliveries to Taiwan, considering these deliveries to be absolutely unjustified. "I was deeply shocked," Brzezinski wrote, "by the domination--especially in the White House--of an unfailing commitment to supply Taiwan with more modern weapons, a commitment whose political sense I was unable to see either from the standpoint of the need to counteract some real threat or from the standpoint of gaining any political benefits for the United States at all."¹⁶

In other words, the pragmatic anticommunist Brzezinski accused the orthodox anticommunist Reagan of being incapable of showing a more flexible approach toward evaluating the United States' real foreign policy priorities and of being unwilling to realize that the PRC's foreign policy course, at least within the parameters that prevailed in the late 1970's, provides much more effective support for the United States than that which the "old friends"--the Taiwanese--are capable of giving.

The need to maintain Sino-American relations at the level that existed under previous U.S. administrations, primarily with reference to the strategic and anti-Soviet aspects, is persistently argued by many American political scientists. B. Garrett and B. Glaser, in particular, note that "the United States and China have no common objectives, but they play a great role in one another's strategic plans and consider it important to deter the Soviet Union from aggressiveness."¹⁷ Calling for greater mutual understanding between the PRC and the United States, these authors stress that the United States must demonstrate to the Chinese leaders its strict adherence to pledges already given, and particularly to the provisions of the August 1982 bilateral communique, while the Chinese leaders, in their turn, must take specific steps to demonstrate to Washington their willingness to develop strategic cooperation.¹⁸

In addition to that interpretation, one also finds in U.S. publications another interpretation of U.S. foreign policy priorities, a somewhat different treatment of the "stagnation phenomenon" in Chinese-American relations which occurred in the initial years of R. Reagan's presidency. It is characteristic chiefly of those authors who were more critical from the outset in their assessment of the significance of the "China card" in Washington's global strategy and stressed the need to prevent an overly pro-Chinese tilt by the United States to the detriment of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and other countries. These political scientists typically see the evident retardation of the dynamics of American-Chinese relations as a consequence of deeper, more fundamental causes of a bilateral nature and not just as the result of Reagan's conservatism and Chinese dissatisfaction. And to a greater

extent than Reagan's pragmatic critics they draw attention to the evolution of his approach to China throughout his presidency.

The interpretation of the present stage of Chinese-American relations is presented, in particular, by the political scientist and Sinologist J. Copper, who has published much in recent years.¹⁹ He stresses that on the American side certain preconditions for the retardation of bilateral relations emerged before President Reagan came to the White House. He says that the main one was the certain degree of disappointment in the United States at what he sees as the meager strategic and diplomatic fruits of the "China card." From the standpoint of military strategy, Copper claims, it is clear that Washington is not in a position to give Beijing military aid on the scale required for the modernization of the People's Liberation Army and capable of making China a serious counterweight to the Soviet Union. In the diplomatic sense, the author notes, the "China card" did not bring the United States any particular dividends either; in some case, for example, in the Korean peninsula and in Indochina, it had the opposite effect.²⁰ Stressing the fact that Reagan has by no means ignored the potential for maintaining good relations with China²¹ and has appreciably curbed his pro-Taiwan sympathies, Copper states that Chinese-American differences stem from problems which are more fundamental than Reagan's critics have said, and these problems show that "the United States needs more flexibility in foreign policy, but as a result of excessive commitments to China the United States is losing out in other parts of the world."²²

A similar view is expressed by the eminent U.S. political observer J. Kraft. In an article published on the eve of Reagan's visit to Beijing, he urged him "not to overestimate China," stressing that the enormous potential for U.S. ties with the countries of the Pacific, particularly Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, "will be lost if the United States takes on the thankless job of supporting the development and integrity of mainland China."²³ It must be stressed that the supporters of this viewpoint are by no means saying that the "China factor" should not be exploited in U.S. imperialist strategy. They are merely calling for greater "realism" and a balanced approach to the different spheres of U.S. global policy and want more moderate and, therefore, in their view, optimal forms of exploitation of the "China factor."

Analyzing the American political scientists' approaches toward U.S. China policy, it must be noted that whereas under former administrations the supporters of active contacts and "strategic partnership" with the PRC exerted a direct and dominant influence on the White House's practical decisions, now that their positions at the top have been somewhat constricted with the arrival of the Reagan team, they are obliged to maneuver, to seek additional "indirect" channels for influencing the White House and to use "non-American" arguments as well. In this connection, an article published in a very respectable U.S. political science publication, FOREIGN POLICY magazine, is symptomatic in our view.²⁴ It is notable for the fact that the author, who writes under a pseudonym, is, according to the magazine, a specialist in international affairs at a PRC research institution and is expressing a "rare" unofficial viewpoint. Items of this type are indeed rare, if not unique, for

leading U.S. political science organs, and for this reason the appearance of this article in FOREIGN POLICY is a most momentous occasion.

The article, which, in both its terminology and its style of argument, is couched in the classic spirit of Western political research, pays great attention to analyzing present domestic conditions for the formation of the PRC's foreign policy course. "Influential forces within China," the author writes, "are pressing for the serious discussion in Beijing of an independent foreign policy oriented neither toward Washington nor toward Moscow."²⁵ Depicting an internal political struggle within the Chinese leadership, the author singles out three leading political groups within it: the "reform group" headed by Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and Chen Yun, the "Maoists" headed by Hua Guofeng, and the "conservatives" represented by Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian. In 1978-1979, the author writes, Deng Xiaoping's group, with support from the conservatives, inflicted a serious defeat on the "Maoists" and attempted to implement a whole series of political and economic reforms. Nevertheless, in the author's opinion, these reforms proved to be unproductive and inconsistent in all but a few spheres, particularly agriculture and foreign trade.²⁶ As a result, finding itself under substantial pressure and criticism from the "conservatives," Deng Xiaoping's group was forced to maneuver and retreat, stressing the need for political stability.²⁷

The author's central thesis is that a process of "restoring" a "Soviet-style" political model is in progress in China as a result of the greater influence of "conservative" forces and that this fact is coming into serious conflict with the previous openly pro-Western foreign policy line. Explaining the changes that have taken place in Sino-American relations, the author, in addition to everything else, speaks of the greater harmony in China's ties with the USSR than in those with the United States and of Beijing's fears "in connection with the influence of Western ideas and values on the younger generation."²⁸

Of course, when he speaks of the restoration of a "Soviet-style" model, the author using this hackneyed (and, frankly speaking, absolutely inaccurate) propaganda term has in mind the influence of socialist principles and goals on the PRC's domestic political development--principles which are bound to run counter to certain aspects of the country's foreign policy course.

On the whole, an analysis of this article creates the impression that the author is deliberately frightening the American reader by depicting China's evolution in a "pro-Soviet" direction unfavorable for the West. Its purpose is to encourage the Western partners to adopt a more flexible and pliant course toward the PRC. It is noteworthy that the anonymous "PRC scientist" criticizes the Reagan line largely from the same standpoint as the aforementioned Z. Brzezinski, accusing the President of lacking sufficient "breadth of view," of playing the "Taiwan card" and even of denigrating the PRC's role as a strategic ally of the United States. The author also claims that this line by the United States has greatly stimulated Beijing's quest for dialogue with Moscow, and Reagan's tough stance on the Taiwan question has dealt a serious blow to the Deng Xiaoping grouping in China.²⁹ In this sense, the position of the "independent specialist" from the PRC is not all that independent. If

he does represent some political forces in China, it is perfectly obvious that these are forces with a very definite pro-Western orientation, and in any case the respectable American magazine would hardly have offered its pages for the expression of any other viewpoints existing in the PRC.

In conclusion, examining various options for the PRC's future foreign policy line, the author names the following as the "optimal" and most probable option: limited detente with the USSR, a slight "distancing" from the United States, but on the whole the maintenance of closer political and economic ties with the United States, "especially on Asian security problems." Such a strategy, he argues, would ensure for Beijing stable and secure conditions for a program for the country's domestic economic development relying mainly on Western aid and would be acceptable, from the domestic political standpoint, to the different factions in the Chinese leadership. In this way, after frightening the Western reader with Beijing's possible "evolution" in a "pro-Soviet" direction, the author ultimately reassures his American fellow-thinkers: China's fundamental foreign policy orientation toward the United States will remain unchanged.

The main sphere of disagreement in U.S. political debates, as already noted, has always concerned not the question of the use or non-use of the "Chinese factor" in U.S. global strategy and in relations with the USSR--on this score it is extremely rare to encounter an unreserved negative response--but rather the question of the optimum and most effective forms of such use. Of course, at every given stage in responding to this question U.S. experts have taken into account the "experience" already accumulated in relations with China, and also the corresponding evolution of their partner and a number of basic processes and tendencies in its domestic policy.

In addition to "strategic" aspects of relations and the development of military-political cooperation with the PRC, U.S. political experts are paying heightened attention to contacts in the economic, scientific and technological spheres. What is more, individual American experts believe that an emphasis on economic links with the PRC is the policy which guarantees most effectively and reliably long-term U.S. interests in bilateral relations. This is the opinion, for example, of well-known American Sinologist Professor C. Johnson.³⁰

In an article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, this political scientist stresses that the line of accelerating military cooperation, which the White House has traditionally pursued vis-a-vis the PRC, is unjustified and, what is more, potentially dangerous for U.S. interests. As for economic, scientific and technical forms of cooperation with the PRC, Johnson feels that, in view of contemporary internal processes in China, they are capable of leading to profound changes within Chinese society that will be much more favorable for the United States. "In my opinion," this political scientist points out, "...what is much more important than any hypothetical cooperation on security questions with the PRC is the continued training of thousands of Chinese students in Western universities, the strengthening of China's business links with the Pacific countries and the emphasis many Chinese put on the modernization of their country."³¹ The encouragement of such links with the PRC, Johnson is convinced, will help to strengthen the position of the "economic reformers"

in Chinese society, by whom the West very clearly means political forces interested in the pro-Western, pro-capitalist evolution of the country. In other words, the author sees the most desirable effect of U.S. economic links with Beijing as the erosion of the socialist system in the PRC and the gradual absorption of the country into the orbit of the world capitalist economy.

Many U.S. expert Sinologists voice agreement with Johnson's stance in the part where he talks of the great prospects and importance of economic levers of influence on China. However, D. Zagoria, unlike C. Johnson, by no means belittles the significance of military-political forms of cooperation with Beijing. "The common strategic interest in joint opposition to Soviet expansionism," he writes, is the "key factor in maintaining good long-term relations with the PRC." What is more, he puts this factor in first place.³² And indeed, most other U.S. publications, despite verbal camouflage and various reservations, continue to attach corresponding significance to "strategic aspects" of relations, particularly "Beijing's important ability to pin down 25 percent of the Soviet Armed Forces on the Soviet-Chinese border."³³

All the indications are that the viewpoint of Zagoria and the U.S. specialists who side with him is shared in official Washington to a greater degree than the position of their opponents and exerts influence on the practical Chinese policy of R. Reagan's administration. Its actions in recent years show that, by developing both economic and military-political cooperation with Beijing, Washington has not only overcome a certain retardation in the dynamics of bilateral relations, but in a number of aspects has gone further than previous administrations. For example, the Reagan Administration has increased still further the scale of economic exchange with the PRC, increasing the volume of bilateral trade to a sum in excess of 6 billion dollars (1984) and it has granted China the status of "non-allied friendly country," which has significantly expanded the latter's opportunities for access to "dual-purpose" and military technology, and extended to the PRC the operation of the U.S. state program for arms sales to foreign states, which envisages granting credits for the purchase of U.S. military technology.

The White House's fundamental interest in stabilizing and developing "special" relations with China and emphasizing the anti-Soviet thrust of these relations was very clearly demonstrated during President Reagan's visit to Beijing in spring 1984. During the meeting with Chinese leaders the U.S. President made the maximum use of all topics and theses--from the problems around Afghanistan and Cambodia, and the so-called question of the transfer of Soviet medium-range missiles to Asia, to the incident with the South Korean airliner--to make appeals for joint opposition to the USSR. During the visit an agreement was initialed between the PRC and United States on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and new impetus was given to the development of military links.³⁴

Therefore, Washington's present foreign policy line, determined by the interests of U.S. ruling circles, is still based on their class-related global priorities, including the need to maintain, as far as possible, anti-Soviet strategic cooperation with the PRC.

These are some of the prevailing tendencies in U.S. appraisals of the PRC's course and of the present and future of Chinese-American relations. The analysis of these appraisals shows that American Sinologists and political scientists who analyzed new facts and dynamics of Chinese-American relations at the start of the 1980's did not see a general reorientation of China's international priorities or any cardinal departures from foreign policy concepts, strategic aims and global allies which determined the main parameters of PRC foreign policy and China's place in the world balance of power in the preceding decade.

For this reason, American political scientists are still appealing for the maximum use of the "China card" in Washington's anti-Soviet line. Here it is typical that, in addition to appeals for the further development of military-political cooperation, other forms--economic ones--of "harnessing" the PRC to U.S. strategy are being proposed. These forms, in the opinion of American experts, greatly accord with the specific nature of the present stage of the PRC's internal development.

FOOTNOTES

1. C. Hamrin, "China Reassesses the Superpowers," *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*, 1983, vol 56, No 2, p 220.
2. D. Zagoria, "The Moscow-Beijing Detente," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, 1983, vol 61, No 4, pp 870, 873.
3. Ibid., pp 853-873; R. Sutter, "Future Sino-Soviet Relations and Their Implications," prepared for the U.S. Congressional Research Service, Wash., 1982; W. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Rapprochement," *PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM*, 1983, vol 32, No 2, pp 20-29.
4. "Future Sino-Soviet Relations and Their Implications."
5. Ibid., p 3. A. D. Barnett, authoritative U.S. expert on China, expresses a similar point of view, outside the review in question. Replying to a question about the prospects of Sino-Soviet relations, he frankly said that he could not foresee "any effective changes" in these relations (*U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT*, 7 May 1984).
6. "Future Sino-Soviet Relations and Their Implications," p 45.
7. K. Manning, "Reagan's Change Hit," *FOREIGN POLICY*, 1984, No 54, p 95.
8. D. Strode, "Arms Control and Sino-Soviet Relations," *ORBIS*, 1984, vol 28, No 1, pp 163-188.
9. Ibid., pp 164-167.
10. Sinologist C. Johnson remarked that "no matter how thorough or logical some analyses of Sino-Soviet relations might seem, foreign reports on this topic are based primarily on speculations" (*FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, 1984, vol 62,

No 3, p 736). In our opinion, this also applies to the article by D. Strode, with the sole reservation that it would be difficult to call his "analysis" either "thorough" or "logical."

11. Ibid., p 181.
12. "Materialy XXVI syezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1981, p 11.
13. Z. Brzezinski, "East Asia and Global Security: Implications for Japan," JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1983, vol 37, No 1, pp 5-12.
14. Ibid., p 8.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. B. Garrett and B. Glaser, "The Strategic Importance of Sino-Soviet Relations," USA TODAY, 1983, vol 112, No 2458, pp 15-16.
18. Ibid.
19. J. Copper, "Sino-American Relations: On Track or Off Track?" ASIA PACIFIC COMMUNITY, 1983, No 19.
20. Ibid., pp 16-17.
21. For example, the first foreign ambassador Reagan received after he took office was, as the author points out, the ambassador from the PRC.
22. J. Copper, Op. cit., p 18.
23. WASHINGTON POST, 24 April 1984.
24. E. Lee, "Beijing's Balancing Act," FOREIGN POLICY, 1983, No 51, pp 27-46.
25. Ibid., p 28.
26. The article was printed in FOREIGN POLICY in spring 1983. Of course, the author could not discuss subsequent stages of economic reform in the PRC, particularly the reforms approved by the Third Plenum of the 12th CCP Central Committee (October 1984).
27. Ibid., pp 29-30.
28. Ibid., p 33.
29. Ibid., pp 36-37.
30. C. Johnson, "East Asia: Another Year of Living Dangerously," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1984, vol 62, No 3, pp 721-745.

31. Ibid., pp 734-735.
32. D. Zagoria, "China's Quiet Revolution," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1984, vol 62, No 4, p 904.
33. K. Manning, Op. cit., p 87.
34. For more detail, see: V. I. Biryukov, "China in U.S. Strategic Plans," PROBLEMY DALNEGO VOSTOKA, 1984, No 3; V. I. Petukhov and G. I. Ragulin, "PRC-U.S. Military Ties," ibid., 1984, No 4.

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REFORM OF PRC APPARATUS SEEN AIDING STATE'S CONSOLIDATION

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 85 pp 142-154

[Article by K. A. Yegorov, candidate of juridical sciences: "The Reform of the PRC Machinery of State"]

The 12th Congress of the Communist Party of China held in 1982 set forth as the principal objective of the party policy the need to "modernise" the country, in particular, by speeding up its economic advance.¹ The meeting of this objective presupposes searching for rational forms of organisation of the state apparatus which would help create favourable political conditions for putting the charted policy line into effect and for ensuring the more effective functioning of the government bodies. Therefore, the congress's resolution on the summary report of the CC CPC linked the country's "modernisation" to a "reform of the state structure of the People's Republic of China."² This reform, as was stated in the report, stemmed from the need to perfect the management of state affairs and enhance the efficiency of the state apparatus.³

In the recent past, the absence of a firm constitutional and legal foundation affected the organisation and work of this apparatus: throughout the 30 years of the existence of the PRC, four Fundamental Laws replaced each other (the 1949 General Programme of the People's Political Consultative Council of China, and the Constitutions of the PRC of 1954, 1975 and 1978). In the process of repeated modification of the state apparatus, some institutions were abolished while others were set up, and those organisational principles that successfully regulated the work of state governing bodies in the 50s were also employed. The former organisational methods, however, were adapted to the fulfilment of new political tasks. As the nature of the tasks set by state power changed, the structural principles of its organisation changed accordingly.

For example, after the 3rd plenary meeting (11th convocation) of the Central Committee of the CPC in December 1978, a number of essential amendments were introduced in 1979 into the state structure defined by the 1978 Constitution, while in 1980, the question of the revision of that Constitution was brought up, along with the need for structural changes in the state apparatus. At the session of the National People's Congress which adopted the current Constitution of the PRC⁴ on December 4, 1982, it was stated that the previous Fundamental Law (1978) had ceased to be in harmony with "the actual state of affairs and the requirements of state machinery".⁵

The aim of the new constitutional provisions was not only to ensure the political stability indispensable for a rapid build-up of economic potential but also to consolidate the state control of Chinese society. Hence,

¹ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 9, 1982

² *Ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1982

³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 8, 1982

⁴ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 5, 1982

⁵ *Ibid.*, Dec. 6, 1982

the need for more meticulous organisation of the work of the entire state apparatus. And that could be achieved only through the adoption of certain legislative acts elaborating on constitutional provisions of a general nature. That was why, along with the Constitution of December 10, 1982, four major laws were passed and put into force in China: the Law on the Establishment of the National People's Congress⁶, the Law on the Establishment of the State Council⁷, the Law on the Establishment of the Local People's Congresses and the Local People's Governments⁸, and the Law on Elections to the NPC and LPCs at Various Levels.⁹

The first two laws were prepared on the basis of corresponding acts passed in 1954 with subsequent amendments taken into account, while the other two laws were based on 1979 legislation with amendments introduced on December 10, 1982. Still remaining in force is the Law on the Establishment of the People's Courts and the Law on the Establishment of the People's Procuratorates adopted in 1979 and modified to a certain extent in September 1983 in conformity with the current Constitution of the PRC¹⁰.

The Constitution and the six laws cited above and prepared on the basis and in elaboration of constitutional provisions, defined the rules of the formation, the composition, the jurisdiction and the forms of activity of the state power and executive bodies, the state court, and procurator's office. In short, they laid a constitutional and legal foundation for the present-day state apparatus of the PRC.

As distinct from its immediate predecessors—the 1975 and 1978 Constitutions—the Fundamental Law of 1982 was approved by a session of the NPC following a 4-month-long referendum of a draft project. Submitted for the consideration of the session, the draft project of the Constitution was discussed by groups of NPC deputies who subjected to scathing criticism the nihilistic attitude to law that had been wide spread earlier in the PRC, sometimes taking the extreme form of a complete negation of legal norms.¹¹ With the prestige of the Constitution and laws raised, hopes of achieving political stability in the country and of "successful modernisation" re-appeared.¹²

The above-mentioned circumstances influenced the nature of the legally sanctioned changes in the system of the state governing bodies, the introduction of which began in 1982. First of all, there appeared a more accurate legal definition of the NPC as the highest organ of state power in the system of state governing bodies. It was this definition that authors of the proposals sent to the state commission in charge of the preparation of a draft constitution had demanded to work out as was stated during the summing up of the results of the referendum.¹³

The Constitution legalised the status of the NPC as the highest organ of state power in a somewhat peculiar way. On the one hand, it endowed the NPC with full powers as the highest body of state authority in the country. With the adoption of the 1982 Fundamental Law, its exclusive powers were extended even further. Now the NPC can not only appoint the Premier of the State Council, endorse the entire membership of the State Council of the PRC, elect the Chairman of the Supreme People's Court, and the Procurator-General of the Supreme Peo-

⁶ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 15, 1982.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Dec. 16, 1982.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Sept. 3, 1983.

¹¹ *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 30, 1982.

¹² *Ibid.*, Dec. 6, 1982.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

ple's Procuratorate but also elect the Chairman of the newly-established Central Military Council, appoint the Chief Auditor and members of the newly-established Auditing Department of the PRC within the State Council, and annul inappropriate decisions of the NPC's Standing Committee. The NPC's exclusive right to elect the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the PRC granted by the 1954 Constitution was restored.

On the other hand, some of the major powers of the NPC in the period between its sessions held once a year, have been vested in the NPC's Standing Committee (SC). This is, first of all, the granting to the Committee of practically equal legislative powers with the ones exercised by the NPC and the expansion of its control functions. Under the 1954 Constitution, the SC could pass only decrees. In 1955, the second session of the First National People's Congress endowed it with the right to adopt acts of a particular character. The First session of the Second National People's Congress (1959) extended the legislative powers of the SC by granting it the right to amend existing laws and pass new acts. According to the 1982 Constitution, the SC, along with the NPC, "exercises the legislative power of the state" (Art. 58). Apart from the Constitution, which is approved (or amended) by decision of the session of the NPC, the SC is empowered to pass all other laws of the state. Falling into the same category is the power to examine and approve partial readjustments to the plans for national economic and social development and to the state budget that may be necessary in the course of their implementation, which makes it possible to make timely corrections in a plan or a budget, bringing them in line with the latest political directives. According to Chinese lawyers, a further extension of the legislative powers of the SC NPC was necessary in view of the new policy towards speedier economic development and the resulting need to intensify and introduce regularity in law-making procedures.¹⁴

The right to amend the Constitution is vested in the NPC alone, yet the right to supervise the enforcement of the Fundamental Law is granted by the Constitution to both the NPC and its SC which enjoys, besides, the exclusive right to interpret the Constitution. Chinese lawyers feel that these provisions play an essential role in ensuring the observance of legal norms, since they are bound to support the Constitution as the highest legal authority in the entire system of law.¹⁵

The supervisory functions of the SC NPC are ensured by the right of its members to address inquiries, during the Committee sessions, to the State Council, ministries and central offices, which in their turn must give appropriate answers to these inquiries. The three previous Chinese constitutions lacked that provision, and its introduction into the current Constitution, in view of Chinese lawyers, strengthens considerably the supervisory functions of the SC, since an inquiry has sufficient juridical force to oblige a certain body to produce an exhaustive answer.¹⁶ At the same time the establishment of more regular control by the state governing body (the SC NPC) over the work of the administrative apparatus can help improve and raise the efficiency of its work.

In view of the strengthened supervisory functions of the SC NPC, its members, as distinct from the previous time, can no longer hold simultaneously other posts in any of the executive, administrative, judicial or procuratorial organs of the state.

The SC NPC was also granted broader powers in appointing or removing from their posts ranking officials of the central administration.

¹⁴ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 20, 1983.

¹⁵ *Faxue zazhi*, 1983, No. 2, p. 31.

¹⁶ *Faxue zazhi*, 1983, No. 2, p. 32.

In the period between sessions, the SC, following a presentation by the Premier of the State Council, decides upon such matters as the appointment or removal of ministers, chairmen of state committees, the Chief Auditor, the head of the State Council's Secretariat and, upon presentation by the Chairman of the Central Military Council, of Council members. The previous constitutions of the PRC envisaged no such rights for the SC NPC. The new Fundamental Law, however, has incorporated the experience of the past few years. Besides, it is oriented toward a new personnel policy providing for a more operative transference of leading officials within the central state apparatus in accordance with the reform now underway.

It is thus can be concluded that the general sphere of competence of the country's permanent body of state power is expanding. Chinese jurists attribute this to the specific conditions of China, one of which being the lack of real opportunities for convening the NPC sessions (with membership totalling 3,000) more often than once a year because of the under-developed transport system, means of communication, etc. In the opinion of jurists, however, it is rather the numerical composition of the SC (about 200 deputies of the NPC) which allows it to be regarded as a permanent representative body of state authority that can promptly discuss major issues at its bimonthly plenary meetings.¹⁷

The day-to-day work of the SC is carried out by the Council of the Chairman of the SC, first set up after the adoption of the 1982 Constitution. The Council consists of the Chairman, his Deputies and the Executive Secretary of the SC. Among the Council's responsibilities are such matters as compiling replies to inquiries addressed to the SC NPC, organising various commissions, etc. While handling the everyday work of the SC, the Council of the Chairman of the SC should not, as Chinese jurists believe, act as a substitute for the SC but only as its working body.¹⁸ Besides, the SC can relegate the solution of many current issues to the working commissions it sets up.

Acting on behalf of the NPC in the period between its sessions, the SC supervises the work of permanent committees set up by the NPC (a Committee on Nationalities, a Committee on Legislation, a Committee on Finance and Economics, a Committee on Education, Science, Culture and Public Health, a Foreign Affairs Committee and an Overseas Chinese Committee). The SC also guides the work of all standing local governing bodies—the SCs of the People's Congresses.

Since the SC NPC has actually been turned into a body of power acting on behalf of the NPC, Chinese lawyers (Wang Xiangming, in particular) bring up the question of whether the SC can act as a substitute for the NPC. The negative reply to this question is usually backed up by a series of formal juridical arguments.

First, under the Constitution, the NPC elects all members of the SC and has the right to recall it; the SC is responsible to the NPC and reports on its work to the Congress (Art. 69 of the Constitution of the PRC). In the last few years, it has become a practice for the SC to submit to sessions of the NPC reports on the activities of the SC. Deputies to the NPC usually discuss them in working groups and make decisions, taking the results of these discussions into account. The NPC deputies have the right to address inquiries to the SC, which is legally bound to reply to them in a responsible manner.

Second, partial supplements and amendments made by the SC to statutes enacted by the NPC should not contravene the basic principles underlying these statutes (par. 3, Art. 67 of the Constitution of the PRC).

¹⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 20, 1983.

¹⁸ *Faxue zazhi*, 1983, No. 2, p. 32.

Third, the NPC has the right to alter or annul inappropriate decisions of the SC NPC (par. 11, Art. 62 of the Constitution of the PRC).

Fourth, the existing legal acts define in clear-cut and relatively exhaustive terms the status of the NPC deputies endowed with the right to address inquiries to the highest bodies of state authority, enjoy deputies' immunity and are exempt from legal responsibility for speeches or votes.

On the strength of these arguments, Chinese jurists Wang Xiangming and Li Buyun¹⁹ arrive at the conclusion that the status of the NPC as the highest body of state authority is firmly safeguarded. From a formally juridical standpoint, the NPC indeed enjoys the status of the highest organ of state power. But here, two factors should be taken into consideration: first of all, the previous political experience of China when the role of the NPC was underrated; and, second, the currently existing constitutional and legal prerequisites for turning the NPC into a fully empowered state governing body.

The reform of the state apparatus has spread to the collegiate institution of the head of state, which has been restructured on a new basis. Now some of the powers of the head of state are vested, along with the SC NPC, in the Chairman of the PRC. The abolition of this institution at the beginning of the "cultural revolution" was officially sealed by the 1975 and 1978 Constitutions. Chinese jurists explain its restoration under the 1982 Constitution by the need to coordinate the activities of the state's highest governing bodies and also by the necessity for a state with population amounting to a billion to be represented in international intercourse with other countries.²⁰

The 1982 Constitution took into account the experience of the existence of the PRC Chairman institution and changed its status, which was originally defined by the Fundamental Law of 1954. Under the new constitution, the Chairman no longer has the right to convene a Supreme state meeting to discuss important political issues, nor head the State Defence Committee, or be in command of the armed forces of the republic. Nor can he be elected for more than two terms of office in a row, that is for more than 10 years (this term was not specified in the 1954 Constitution). Assessing the present-day status of the Chairman, Chinese jurists believe that he is actually under the control of the NPC and his activities are restricted within the framework of laws and other legal acts passed by the NPC and its SC.²¹

The removal from the list of exceptional powers of the PRC Chairman of the right to command the state's armed forces is of particular importance. Under the 1982 Constitution, the newly formed Central Military Council (CMC) is placed in command of all the armed forces. The Council's Chairman is elected by the NPC and charged with personal responsibility for the work of the Council, on which he is to report to the NPC and its SC. Members of the Central Military Council are the same as in the Military Council of the CC CPC. The CMC is therefore a party and government body. This is why the provision of the Constitution limiting the term of office for leaders of other highest bodies of state power (Chairman of the PRC, the Premier of the State Council, the Chairman of the Supreme People's Court, the Procurator General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate) does not affect the CMC. This means that the term of office of the CMC Chairman is unlimited, an essential factor when one considers that the Council's Chairman controls the armed forces, which have traditionally played a major

¹⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 20, 1983. *Faxue zazhu*, 1983, N 1, pp 11-14.

²⁰ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 20, 1983.

²¹ *Ibidem*

part in China's political life. This role of the armed forces is recognized even now. Officially, the formation of the CMC is explained in China by the need to modernise the regular army, so that it "will be able to cope with the unstable present-day situation."²²

In the present conditions of China's rapid economic development, responsibility for the bulk of the tasks facing the state is laid on the administrative apparatus headed by the central government's executive body—the State Council of the PRC. It is this component of the state structure that is undergoing essential changes under the current reform.

The 1982 Constitution has set the seal on the introduction of a large-scale structural reform of the state apparatus from the State Council to the grass roots state governing bodies. That reform was originally planned by the fourth session of the Fifth National People's Congress (at the end of 1981) which drew attention to a series of shortcomings in the work of administrative bodies: the existence of a large number of structural units duplicating each other; inflated staffs of the state administration; and the general low effectiveness in the work of the state apparatus.²³

In orienting the country towards reform, the 1982 Constitution set the task of "steadily improving the quality and effectiveness of work" of all the state governing bodies. It saw as a prerequisite to the fulfilment of that task "simplifying the structure of the state apparatus and reducing its staffs" and introducing "a system of work responsibility" (Art 27).

In the course of structural reform, certain ministries and central agencies that existed in the 50s were restored within the system of the central organs of the state administration. New structural units of the State Council were set up to meet the aims of a new political course. For example, in September, 1983 an Auditing Department was established in keeping with the 1982 Constitution. It was placed at the head of a network of local auditing bodies and was expected to introduce a single, unified financial discipline throughout the country.²⁴ To streamline the development of Chinese economy, gravely undermined during the decade of the "cultural revolution", a State Committee on Economic Reform was set up with the Premier of the State Council at its head.

Yet, as official data indicate, quite a few problems concerning improvements in the work of state administrative organs still remain unresolved. The summary report delivered at the first session of the Sixth National People's Congress (June, 1983), admitted that there were "serious blemishes and problems" in the system of state administration.²⁵ Chinese jurists discuss in particular the possibility of restoring the system of bodies of state control that existed in the 50s with the former ministry of control at the head.²⁶

In an attempt to resolve existing problems, the range of powers enjoyed by the central government was slightly broadened under the 1982 Constitution and the Law on the Establishment of a State Council. The former Organic Law (1954) stipulated that the establishment of bodies immediately responsible to the State Council is to be endorsed by the SC NPC. Now the State Council is not obliged to seek the endorsement of the SC NPC. The new law provides that despite a certain extension of the powers of ministries and central agencies, all important administrative initiatives planned by them are liable to the endorsement of the State Council. The ministries and state committees issue orders, regulations

²² *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 20, 1983.

²³ *Guangming ribao*, Dec. 14, 1982.

²⁴ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 16, 1983.

²⁵ *Renmin ribao*, June 24, 1983.

²⁶ *Faxue zazhi*, 1983, No. 8, p. 8.

and rules on the basis not only of state laws but also of decisions and instructions of the government.

To strengthen centralised leadership in the state administration, a system of personal responsibility of the Premier of the State Council, the ministers and chairmen of the state committees (Art. 86 of the 1982 Constitution) was introduced, combined with the principle of collective leadership. This system provides that all issues of major importance are tackled by the State Council at its plenary meetings or at executive meetings of its permanent bureau, and all major affairs of sectoral management are decided upon at executive meetings of ministries and state committees (Art. 90 of the 1982 Constitution) while overall responsibility for the state of affairs lies with the Premier of the State Council, the ministers, and heads of relevant state executive bodies.

In the opinion of Chinese jurists, the introduction of such a "system of responsibility" was prompted by the need to bring the work of the administrative apparatus in line with the demands of economic development and the realisation of the reform of the state apparatus.²⁷

Advancing arguments in favour of this system, they declared that it would not allow leaders of certain administrative bodies to exceed their powers. These arguments were the following: first, decisions on major issues of state management are taken after being collectively discussed by competent officials, while the principle of one-man management is exercised on the basis of decisions of collegiate bodies. Second, the one-man management principle exercised by top administrative officials is now placed within the limits of laws enacted by the government. Under the Constitution, the State Council is the executive body of the highest organ of state power of the PRC (Art. 85 of the Constitution of the PRC). Heads of ministries and of other government bodies are subordinate and accountable to it and are juridically responsible for their administrative activities. Third, the demands placed upon all officials of the state administration by Article 27 of the Chinese Constitution extend to the Premier of the State Council and heads of other government bodies.

Under the law, the State Council not only sets the tasks, outlines the responsibilities of all the ministries, and central offices, and exercises an absolute authority over their activities, but also ensures centralised guidance over all local bodies of state administration, and divides the responsibilities between the central and local administrative bodies at the peripheral level.

The trend toward more centralised administrative guidance does not rule out the strategy toward a certain extension of rights of the local bodies of state administration in view of the decentralisation of economic policies on account of the uneven development of certain regions of the country and also of the establishment of special economic zones whose status is determined by specific rules. The policy of decentralisation has manifested itself in the granting of the right to enact statutes of local importance to organs of local administration in provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities under the Central government, major cities and provincial centres. Organs of provincial administration are empowered with the right to draw up local draft legislation on the basis of which the standing committees of the PCs at the provincial level work out local legislation. The SC NPC is notified of the adoption of local laws. Approval of the SC for this kind of legislation is not required.²⁸

²⁷ *Faxue zazhi*, 1983, No. 8, p. 6

²⁸ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 16, 1982

In keeping with the changes introduced into the Law on the Establishment of Local People's Congresses and People's Governments (1979) and with the adoption of the Constitution of the PRC (1982) the people's communes which sprang up during the Great Leap Forward policy at the end of the 50s lost their functions as bodies of state power and administration and remained merely economic units in the Chinese countryside. These changes were taking place in parallel with the restoration of small rural districts and national districts with corresponding grass roots organs of state power and administration.

The Law on the Establishment of the LPCs and the People's Governments (1982), while specifying the jurisdiction of the LPCs (at the district, national district and community levels), stipulates that the latter shall not set up standing committees, nor shall they make local plans for economic and social development and local budgets or appoint local functionaries. In all other matters, they perform, within the limits of their jurisdiction, the functions outlined by law for higher LPCs.

The Organic Law for the local bodies of state power and administration was augmented in 1982 by regulations on standing orders of assemblies. On the pattern of the NPC, the LPCs elect the Presidium of the session, and during the session sittings, set up commissions—among others a Mandatory commission which considers proposals and bills—and other commissions working under the guidance of the session's Presidium. The right to submit proposals and bills is vested by the session in its Presidium, the SC LPC and the People's Government at the corresponding level, and also in a group of LPC deputies consisting of no fewer than 3 people. Proposals and draft resolutions submitted for consideration of the LPC session are dispatched either to its Presidium or to a commission on proposals. So, a uniform pattern of activities is established for representative bodies of state power.

By analogy with the NPC, functionaries of various administrative units of people's governments at corresponding levels, chairmen of people's courts and chief procurators of the given administrative and territorial unit are allowed at LPC sessions.

Some provisions of the Organic Law (in the 1982 wording) regulate the status of the LPC deputies. During LPC sessions, they can address inquiries to people's governments at the corresponding level or to their administrative units and also to people's courts and people's procurator's offices which are obliged to reply to them in a responsible manner. Deputies of the LPCs form groups consisting of three or more members. Deriving from territorial and production principles in the election of LPC deputies, these groups are formed in both the voters' place of residence and work. In specifying functions of such groups, the law merely indicates that they help the people's governments at the corresponding level in their work.

The 1982 Constitution has reaffirmed the powers of standing committees of LPCs at various levels, first established in China on the decision of the second session of the Fifth National People's Congress (1979) as permanently acting organs of the LPCs. By analogy with the SC NPC, standing committees of the LPCs have the right to introduce partial amendments into plans for social and economic development and into budgets of corresponding administrative and territorial units, to make decision (in the period between sessions of the LPCs) on appointments and removals of deputy heads of local people's governments as well as heads of departments, bureaus, and sections of local organs of state administration. They also decide upon nominees for acting heads of local governments in the event the head of the

government cannot perform his duties. The law thereby assigns an important role to the standing committees of the LPCs in organising the state apparatus at a local level.

As is the case with the SC NPC, the LPC standing committee members—chairman, deputy chairman and others—have no right to hold posts in any organs of local government, the people's courts, or people's procurator's offices.

Chinese jurists attribute the formation of the standing committees of the LPCs to the desire "to promote in full measure active work and initiative" at corresponding local levels. This can be achieved only through the functioning of permanent organs of state power capable of ensuring, in the period between sessions convened once a year, the timely and competent solution of all major issues of state importance. The establishment of such organs is also attributed to the need to exercise permanent control of the bodies of state power over administrative organs with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of the local people's governments.²⁹

In his report "On the Work of the Government" delivered at the Second session of the Sixth National People's Congress (May 15, 1984) Premier of the State Council Zhao Ziyang spoke about the stepped up efforts to develop the state apparatus in China. He reported that by the middle of 1984, the restructuring had been completed in the main in the administrative-managerial apparatus at the provincial level, in representative administrative organs at the regional level, and also in people's governments of municipalities directly under the provincial government. According to the report, restructuring was underway at the same time in the organs of people's governments of districts, as was the work to separate organs of state power and administration from the economic management bodies at the grass roots rural district level, that is, to establish People's congresses and people's governments in the countryside which would assume the functions of the former People's Congresses and the Boards of People's Communes whose status was limited to that of the economic units of rural districts.³⁰

In all sections of the local state apparatus, including small rural and national districts reinstated in 1982, people's governments act as executive and administrative organs. In addition to the principles of the Organic Law of 1979, the 1982 Constitution introduced into all local people's governments a system of personal responsibility for all functionaries—governors of provinces, mayors of cities, chairmen of autonomous regions, heads of autonomous districts, regions, small rural districts, national districts and community elders.

A new feature authorized by the 1982 Constitution was the establishment within the people's governments at the district and higher levels of auditing organs as organs of "dual subordination" which are responsible both to the people's governments that set them up and to higher auditing organs. But within the sphere of their competence, they control financial activities independently.

The extension of the rights of local organs of state power spread onto the local administrative apparatus as well. In view of this, in 1982, corresponding changes were introduced into the Organic Law of 1979. For example, earlier, the appointment or removal of heads of the secretariat and of structural subdivisions of local governments made by decision of the standing committee at the given level was liable to endorsement by a higher level of the government. Today, no such endor-

²⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 27, 1983.

³⁰ *Renmin ribao*, June 2, 1984.

sement is required. The standing committee merely informs the people's government at a higher level of its decision.

People's governments at various levels have been granted the right to set up, "in accordance with work requirements," special functional subdivisions. This, however, must comply with the observance of the principle recorded in the Fundamental Law: to work towards reducing the state apparatus. The State Council's decisions on setting right the work of all the governing links in the administrative apparatus must also be abided by.

The reform of the state apparatus at the local level is based on the same principles which were used in restructuring the central organs of state administration. The "readjustment" in administrative organs at the provincial level (provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government) began in the second half of 1982 and was practically completed by March 1983. The "readjustment" of people's governments of regions (those occupying an intermediate position between provinces and districts where provincial governments form governments but where organs of state power are not established) and of the greater part of municipalities was over by the end of 1983.

In the report "On the Work of the Government" delivered at the Second session of the Sixth National People's Congress (May 15, 1984) Premier of State Council Zhao Ziyang pointed out that for the most part, the restructuring of the apparatus of people's governments at the provincial level had been completed, as had restructuring of regional administrative organs and the governments of municipalities under the central government. He declared that work was underway all over the country "in a certain order of priority" to restructure the apparatus of districts and set up anew the governments of small rural areas, in the course of which the low-level state power and administrative functions were to be separated from the people's communes.³¹

One of the immediate effects of the reform has been a decrease in the number of functionaries. The total number of governors and vice-governors of provinces, mayors and vice-mayors of cities, and chairmen of autonomous regions was cut by 34 per cent. Their average age was reduced by 7 years, and the number of those who have specialized higher education increased from 20 to 43 per cent.³² One may assume that during the restructuring of the local administrative apparatus, priority was given not to changing the structure of administrative organs but to replacing their staff with more competent workers capable of administering the decisions of the central government on their assigned territories.

This applies first and foremost to the functionaries of the administrative apparatus, almost half of whom have been replaced by new appointees during the two years of the reform. According to official statistics, the newly-appointed leading officials of administrative organs at the provincial level account today for 44 per cent of all high-ranking personnel in the provinces and for nearly half of the total number of functionaries in the regions and municipalities. About 70 per cent of them have specialized higher education.³³

Apart from improving the effectiveness of work and the competence of the administrative leadership, the reform pursues the aim of completing the division of the functions between party and administrative apparatuses. As official statistics indicate, leading officials of various party or-

³¹ *Renmin ribao*, June 2, 1984.

³² *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 24, 1984.

³³ *Ibidem*.

gans at the local level no longer hold administrative posts along with their party jobs.³⁴ This gives reason for some Chinese jurists to conclude that due to the reform, the administrative organs have acquired an "independent status."³⁵ But in view of the fact that the party and administrative bodies have been working together for a long time and that their functions are so intertwined that it would be very difficult to separate them, to speak of the "independent status" of the administrative apparatus on a countrywide scale would be premature.

It would also be difficult to speak now of a rapid rise in the level of competence of administrative functionaries or an increased ability to keep abreast of pressing demands of economic and cultural development in China. The "modernisation" of China will undoubtedly require a considerable increase in the educational level of cadre workers, whose number presently exceeds 20 million people. As official statistics reveal, of this number, only 2 million (that is less than 7 per cent) have higher education, and 700 thousand of them received their education during the "cultural revolution", when training was often in name only.

The acute shortage of well-trained administrative workers undoubtedly has had its effects on the state of the Chinese administrative apparatus. Apparently, this factor must be taken into account when dealing with questions pertaining to a reduction of the overall number of structural organs in people's governments at a local level. Usually, those bodies which can be staffed with well-trained personnel able to make them work more effectively are left intact.

Under the 1982 Constitution, the network of public representative organisations has been expanded to provide links between the population and the grass roots organs of state power. In addition to the urban citizens' committees that existed earlier, rural committees are being set up under the guidance of the people's government at the small rural district level. One of their prime functions is to help lower-level government organs perform their duties: to organise production, supervise local construction projects, improve consumer services, maintain law and order, provide health protection, solve disputes among citizens, etc. There is a rural committee elected by the local people with one representative per thousand residents in the countryside.³⁶ So, altogether there are about 800 thousand such committees in China today.

Apart from the above considered organs of state power and administration, courts and procuratorates constitute an important component of the state apparatus. While laying down their legal status, the 1982 Constitution and the Law on the Establishment of People's Courts (in the 1983 wording) say nothing about the fact that people's courts are the only organs that can administer justice in the country. Clearly, advantage was taken of that circumstance in the recent past to deliver judgements and pass verdicts ignoring court proceedings.

Though in contrast to the previous constitutions of 1975 and 1978, the Fundamental Law of 1982 has no provision allowing for the holding of mass meetings to "teach the masses a lesson", the joint decision of the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council as of April 13, 1982³⁷ on stepping up the campaign against economic and administrative malfeasances allows the use of such methods.

The 1982 Constitution states that the people's courts exercise their powers independently, and that in administering justice, they are subject only to the law. At the same time, the Constitution proclaims their re-

³⁴ *Ibidem*.

³⁵ *Faxue zazhi*, 1983, No. 8, p. 7.

³⁶ *Beijing Review*, 1984, No. 11, p. 9.

³⁷ *Renmin ribao*, April 14, 1982.

sponsibility to the organs of state power which created them, that is, to people's congresses and their standing committees. The decision on the amendments of the Law on the Establishment of People's Courts (1979) adopted by the SC NPC in 1983 pointed out that the interference of administrative bodies, public organisations or individuals³⁸ in the work of people's courts that had taken place earlier could no longer be allowed.

The Constitution and the Organic Law have officially sealed the principle of equality of citizens before law.

Some changes introduced in the Law on the Establishment of People's Courts take into account the specific conditions of China. Unlike the provisions of the 1979 Law, the current Law regards the participation of peoples' assessors in the first instance of court hearings as optional. In the explanation provided on this score at a SC NPC meeting, reference was made to the existence of "numerous difficulties in practical work," to the shortage of people's assessors versed in law and also to the need for "more flexibility in legal proceedings."³⁹

The juridical practices existing in China made it possible to pass quite a few functions of the judicial-administrative organs directly over to the courts. To raise the general level of legal proceedings, a provision was added to the Law obliging court judges to have a special legal education. Since the number of cases dealing with economic malpractice has increased sharply, the local people's courts along with higher courts were granted the right to set up special chambers for legal proceedings on economic matters.

Dubious as some of the above-mentioned aspects may seem, on the whole the streamlining of the law dealing with the courts may be regarded as a big step forward, especially if compared to the period when legal norms were completely ignored in China.

The same may be said about the people's procuratorates restored in China in 1978 after 12 years during which the functions of these organs were performed by public security organs. The 1982 Constitution proclaimed the principle of independence of the people's procuratorates, stipulating that any interference by administrative bodies, public organisations or individuals in their activities is against law (Art. 131). The Constitution at the same time reaffirms the earlier accepted principle of the 1978 Constitution about the responsibility of local people's procuratorates to local organs of state power—the LPCs and their standing committees.

It should be said however that when changes were being introduced in 1983 in the Law on the Establishment of People's Procuratorates (1979)⁴⁰ the dependence of procuratorates on organs of state power was weakening in some instances. For example, the procedure for the appointment of deputy procurators or members of the collegium of procuratorates of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities under the Central Government was simplified. The decision of the Procurator-General no longer needs to be endorsed, as the case was before, by the SC NPC. Similarly, the provision of the 1979 Law was annulled concerning the endorsement by standing committees of LPCs of appointment and removal of deputy chief procurators, members of the collegium of procuratorates of the autonomous regions, municipalities under the provincial government, small rural districts, cities and municipal areas made by chief Procurators of the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities under the central government.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Sept. 3, 1983.

³⁹ *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo renmin daibiao dahui chanyu wenshanhui gongbao*, 1983, No. 4, p. 13.

⁴⁰ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 3, 1983.

Of positive importance is the proclamation by the Fundamental Law of people's procuratorates as state organs exercising overall supervision. The promotion of this major constitutional function of the people's procuratorates may play an important role in ensuring the system of legality in China, the need for which was stressed at the 12th Congress of the Communist Party of China.

It was admitted at the same party congress, however, that "it would take much time and effort" to fulfil that task since the "cultural revolution" had undermined all that had been achieved earlier.⁴¹ It was also stated that "the 10-year period of disturbances" had had as one of its consequences the unwillingness of many government officials and citizens to put laws enacted by the state into force.⁴²

A similar point was stressed in the report on the work of the government delivered at the first session of the Sixth National People's Congress.⁴³ The reference was made to the low level of economic and cultural development in China and the conclusion was drawn that the promotion of the system of legality necessary to ensure the normal functioning of the state apparatus was "still a time-consuming and difficult task."⁴⁴

All these factors undoubtedly influence the condition of the present-day state apparatus in China. Not only reforms in its structure are needed, but also the introduction of large-scale measures aimed at raising the level of legal consciousness in state officials.

In the process of reforms, some important issues still remain unresolved. Chinese jurists point to one of them—the need to bring all the representative bodies of state power closer to the population.⁴⁵ The search is still going on for methods and forms (pertaining to China) that will allow the combination of the centralised system of state power with a certain measure of independence of the state apparatus and economic organisations at a local level.

Difficulties and shortcomings that still exist in certain aspects of life in Chinese society, cannot be overcome easily or in a short time. Nevertheless, the process leading to the consolidation of the state apparatus is gathering momentum.

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⁴¹ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 8, 1982.

⁴² *Ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1982.

⁴³ *Renmin ribao*, June 24, 1983.

⁴⁴ *Renmin ribao*, June 22, 1983.

⁴⁵ *Faxue yanjiu*, 1983, No. 2, p. 8.

30TH ANNIVERSARY OF USSR-PRC SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL AGREEMENT

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 85 pp 155-159

[Article by L. V. Filatov, candidate of economic sciences: "Cooperation in the Interests of Two Great Nations"]

Thirty years have elapsed since the signing of the Soviet-Chinese agreement on scientific and technical cooperation on October 12, 1954. This agreement was the first in the history of two countries to officially seal the relations in the field of science and technology that had already taken shape by that time, founded on the Leninist principles of internationalism. The historic inevitability of the world socialist system, the Soviet policy of international solidarity with the national liberation movement, and the very anti-imperialist spirit of the Chinese revolution which was of world-wide significance for the common struggle of all working people on the planet—all these created objective prerequisites for the bilateral relations which had begun even prior to the formation of the PRC.

Soviet scientific and technological assistance, as an important component of military and economic aid, was one of the decisive factors ensuring the victory of Chinese revolution and the successful building of the initial material and technical base of socialism in the PRC in the 1950s. Already in 1945-1949, in spite of the hardships of the post-war period, the Soviet Union rendered profound and very diverse scientific and technological assistance to the Chinese territories liberated by the Soviet Army from Japanese interventionists. Experts delegated by the Soviet government to the liberated areas took part in organising food supplies, restoring transport, communication and health care facilities and in setting up various programs to train Chinese personnel. In 1948 alone, over 320 Soviet engineers, technicians and skilled railroad workers were dispatched to China and more than 4,600 Chinese were trained as railroad workers.¹

The years that followed the PRC's formation (1949-1953) marked the beginning of regular ties between the Soviet and Chinese organisations and agencies, based on the principal clauses of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed on February 14, 1950 and on the cooperation principles worked out by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). At this stage the Soviet-Chinese inter-governmental agreements specified the procedure for Soviet specialists working in China, and for training Chinese citizens in the USSR. Other types of scientific and technological aid were stipulated in each specific case by independent contracts between corresponding Soviet and Chinese organisations.

In those years scientific and technological cooperation was largely unilateral and was aimed at maximally assisting the PRC in restoring the war-ravaged national economy and instituting economic transformations. Specifically, over 1,200 Soviet specialists in various fields were sent

¹ O. B. Borisov, B. T. Koloskov, *Soviet-Chinese Relations in 1945-1970*, Moscow, 1972, pp. 33-37 (in Russian).

to China to carry out restoration work, retool old enterprises and build new industrial projects; approximately 600 files of technical and design documents were handed over to the Chinese; the USSR in turn hosted approximately 200 Chinese citizens who received technical on-the-job training.

At that time the Soviet Union faithful to the foreign policy of proletarian solidarity, conducted its relations with China in strict observance of the major decisions as regards the general terms and principles of cooperation, adopted by the socialist states within the CMEA framework though the PRC was not a CMEA member. Accordingly, the USSR applied all benefits and privileges ensuing from these decisions to China. For example, in accordance with CMEA principles, the Soviet Union, even prior to the signing of the agreement on scientific and technical cooperation, handed over documentation, materials and scientific literature to China gratis; low tariffs were established for the dispatch of Soviet specialists and training of Chinese personnel in the USSR.

On October 12, 1954 the signing of a special inter-governmental agreement on scientific and technological cooperation hallmarked the establishment and legalisation of a new type of bilateral relations. These relations were officially based on the principles of equality and gratuitous mutual aid, which implemented Leninist ideas of internationalist relations under socialism.

On the whole, Soviet-Chinese cooperation was non-equivalent; it was in essence a major form of Soviet assistance to China on easiest terms.

As for scope, content, quantitatively and qualitatively, Soviet assistance to China in science and technology was unprecedented in the history of international relations. There were years when the PRC accounted for almost 50 per cent of all scientific and technological exchange of the USSR with the outside world. Upwards of 500 Soviet organisations, including 160 research and design institutes, partook in this cooperation. In the course of several years, no less than 30 per cent of all technical innovations and research projects used in Soviet economy, were transferred to China. This allround, constructive assistance spread to almost all fields in economy, science and technology and played a key role in nearly all major aspects in China's economic, scientific and technological potential, including the establishment of the PRC Academy of Sciences, over 100 academic and sectoral research institutes, and around 200 establishments of higher and specialised learning. The Soviet Union delivered all the necessary documents and gave technical assistance; it helped train skilled Chinese personnel for over 300 major industrial projects built in part by Soviet specialists, and for over 1,000 plants and factories constructed by China alone.

Suffice it to mention the following most remarkable activities in aid rendered to China: the participation of Soviet scholars and specialists in the drafting of five-year plans and the twelve-year plan for development of science and technology which included 616 problems; assistance in solving 122 scientific and technological problems of great importance (at the request of the Chinese side the number was increased to 163); assistance in the development of research in nuclear physics and in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as joint projects in the Joint Nuclear Research Institute; joint comprehensive exploration of natural resources and productive forces of China; elaboration of 134 research problems under the agreements between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the PRC Academy of Sciences, and also the execution of diverse studies, under inter-departmental agreements and protocols.

During 1949-1966, about 24,000 document files were handed over gratis to China through the Soviet-Chinese commission on scientific and technological cooperation. About 15,000 Soviet scientists and specialists

were delegated to China to render assistance in different areas of the economy, and almost 40,000 Chinese came to the USSR (on very easy terms for the PRC) for study and training at research institutes, educational establishments, enterprises and construction sites. In addition, under the auspices of a book exchange, the PRC received about 600,000 library units and was provided a series of other services by the Soviet Union. The aggregate cost of the whole complex of Soviet assistance (in minimum world market prices of that period) could equal over \$10,000 million, according to the official currency exchange rate of the 1960s.²

As for China, Soviet-Chinese cooperation opened up before it broad opportunities to use the Soviet Union's advanced experience and the latest achievements, and gradually overcome the legacy of economic, scientific and technological backwardness. Soviet aid, effective and constructive in nature, was directly reflected in China's various economic, scientific, and technological successes. In 1960, compared to PRC's gross output the output of enterprises designed and built with Soviet technical assistance was as follows: pig iron—30 per cent; steel—about 40 per cent; rolled metal—over 50 per cent; aluminium—25 per cent; heavy trucks—80 per cent; tractors—over 90 per cent; synthesised ammonia—30 per cent; electric power—25 per cent; production of steam and hydraulic turbines—55 per cent; production of electric generators—about 20 per cent; and heavy engineering production on the whole—more than 10 per cent. The aggregate cost of output produced by China on the basis of Soviet documents transferred in 1949-1966 alone (with knowhow and licences) could be evaluated in world prices at a minimum of \$250,000 million.³ At the same time certain achievements made by Chinese science and technology made it possible for the PRC to contribute significantly to the overall scientific and technological exchange among the socialist countries.

In the late 1950s research institutions of the PRC, created with Soviet assistance, were able not only to independently conduct scientific and design work but also to share their experience with foreign organisations. As China advanced along the road of scientific and technological progress, Soviet-Chinese cooperation provided most favourable opportunities for the future implementation of mutually beneficial exchanges between the two countries on an equal footing. Throughout several years the share of Chinese participation in the overall exchange constantly rose, growing 5- or 10-fold in individual areas.

Toward the end of the 1950s, however, a chauvinistic "special policy" pursued by Mao Zedong impeded the practical implementation of scientific and technological opportunities that had opened up in the PRC. The Chinese government made a U-turn in policy, implanting anti-Sovietism, adventurist economic experiments ensuing from the "great leap forward" and "cultural revolution" concepts. It carried out the militarisation of the country and the curtailment of economic, scientific and technological ties with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. As a result, the Second Five-Year Plan and the Twelve-Year Plan for scientific and technological development failed to be fulfilled. For all its achievements, especially as regards the military sphere, China had not met the planned objectives either in 1962 or in subsequent years.

Destructive effects of the "great leap forward" and the "cultural revolution" coupled with self-imposed isolation from international scientific and technological exchanges influenced practically all aspects of the

² See L. V. Filatov, *Economic Estimates of Soviet Scientific and Technological Assistance to China, 1949-1966*, Moscow, 1980, p. 121. Note: Estimated on the basis of current world prices, which are considerably higher than those of the 1950s-1960s, the total cost of Soviet aid to China could have been still much bigger.

³ See *Ibid.*, p. 70.

PRC's economic, scientific and technological potential, throwing the PRC 15-20 years back in several indices.

As a matter of fact, it was not before late 1977 that China began to pay more attention to problems of scientific and technological cooperation with other countries. This cooperation was viewed as a major force that could accelerate the development of social production and overcome the prolonged stagnation of Chinese economy, science and technology. Materials leaked to the press which contained admissions direct or indirect, of the decisive importance of the Soviet Union's assistance in creating a multitude of industrial enterprises, operative to this day, as well as research institutes and higher educational establishments. It was noted, among other things, that the industrial projects built by the USSR during the First-Five-Year-Plan period were instrumental in accelerating the PRC's economic growth and even now constitute the backbone of modern Chinese industry. The 12th CPC Congress and subsequent sessions of the National People's Congress also noted the significant contribution made by the USSR in creating industrial, scientific and technological potential which is still of primary importance for the PRC⁴.

In recent years, despite an obvious leaning to the West, the PRC has noticeably expanded the scope of cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Soviet-Chinese relations involved contacts between separate departments on questions of mutual interest, exchange of official and unofficial visits by scientists and specialists, as well as the participation of Soviet and Chinese representatives in different international conferences and symposia which took place in both the USSR and the PRC. Specifically, in 1982, the Soviet Union hosted a delegation of leading Chinese economists, while the PRC received a delegation of Soviet specialists in consumer and textile industries and several groups of scientists. Chinese scientists came to the USSR to take part in the 6th International Symposium on the genesis of ore deposits and the 11th Congress of the World Union for the study of quaternary period, while Soviet scientists attended the international symposium discussing continental seismology and earthquake forecasting, held in the PRC.⁵

In 1983, both sides exchanged representatives of iron, steel, and coal industries. The friendship societies of the two countries in turn received groups of prominent scientists and leading experts. There were also exchanges of students and lecturers from higher schools of learning. Specialists in the iron-and-steel industry from socialist and developing countries attended a seminar held at the "Zaporozhstal" plant during which Chinese engineers stayed in the Soviet Union for three months to study the latest achievements of Soviet metallurgy.⁶

In addition, Chinese medics took part in a series of talks with their Soviet colleagues during international seminars on acupuncture held in Sophia, Vienna and in Moscow on the way back to China. Soviet and Chinese scientists and experts had meetings at other scientific forums devoted to the pressing problems of modern science and technology, for example, at the international symposium on the problem of magneto-hydraulic energy generation, held in the Soviet Union.

In 1984, there was an exchange of delegations of executives from the USSR and the PRC State Committees for Science and Technology, and 70 students and interns from each side were also involved in the exchange.

The positive changes in the development of cooperation between the two countries, the Soviet large-scale assistance of the previous period

⁴ See Hongqi, 1979, No. 10, p. 44, *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 15, 1980, June 2, 1984.

⁵ See *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 11, 1982.

⁶ See *Ibid.*, Sept. 2, 1983, *Pravda Ukrainy*, Sept. 3, 1983.

(still of remarkable importance in China), the mutual interest in developing scientific and technological exchange—all these create an objective basis for expanding the scope of cooperation between Soviet and Chinese scientists in various fields of science and technology.

In December 1984, I. V. Arkhipov, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who came to China at the invitation of the PRC government, and Deputy Premier of the PRC State Council Yao Yilin, exchanged opinions on questions related to the further development of trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries.

The two sides discussed questions related to signing an agreement on economic and technological cooperation, on scientific and technological cooperation and on setting up a Soviet-Chinese Commission on economic, trade, scientific and technological cooperation. The sides have shown a mutual understanding of these issues.

On December, 28, 1984, the Soviet-Chinese documents were signed in Peking. These included: the agreement between the USSR and the PRC governments on economic and technical cooperation, the agreement between the two governments on scientific and technological cooperation, and the agreement on setting up the Soviet-Chinese commission on economic, trade, scientific and technological cooperation.

The documents were signed by the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers I. V. Arkhipov and by Deputy Premier of the PRC State Council Yao Yilin. These agreements are intended to promote the further development of mutually beneficial economic, trade, scientific and technological contacts between the two countries.

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NEW EDITION OF BOOK ON SOVIET WRITER'S IMPRESSIONS OF CHINA

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 85 pp 168-171

[Review by A. N. Snigirtsev of book "Iz kitayskikh bloknotov. O kulture, traditsiyakh, obychayakh Kitaya" [From the China Notebooks. Chinese Culture, Traditions and Customs] by O. Rakhmanin, 2d ed, suppl, Moscow, Nauka, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984, 120 pages, illustrated: "People's China: Meetings, Impressions, Thoughts"]

Nothing can substitute for direct contacts and personal meetings in becoming familiar with a country such as China and its culture. Neither a vast knowledge of characters, nor a wealth of factual material read or heard, is as valuable as personal experience and impressions. Besides a long stay in a country, the more rare opportunity of meeting interesting people is also very important. It is precisely these two features that distinguish the book by O. Rakhmanin entitled *From the China Notebooks* published by the Main Editorial Office of Oriental Literature of the Nauka Publishers in 1982. The second enlarged edition of the book appeared in 1984.

O. Rakhmanin was first delegated to work in China in 1946. As Counsellor for Culture at the Soviet Embassy in Peking in 1950s, Rakhmanin had a rare opportunity to meet many Chinese men of culture.

One of them was China's Minister of Culture Mao Dun (1896-1981), a prominent man of letters. Right up to "cultural revolution" he was Chairman of the Chinese Writers Union and in charge of the country's cultural affairs.

Rakhmanin describes in detail Mao Dun's contribution to familiarising Chinese readers with the works by Russian and Soviet writers. Mao Dun devoted many years of his life to this noble cause. In 1921 he edited a special issue of the *Xiaoshuo yuebao* magazine on the theme of Russian literature. This was the beginning of his systematic work in the field of Russian-Chinese literary ties (p. 12).

"On the eve of the 'cultural revolution', Mao Dun was discharged from the post of Minister of Culture. The Union of Writers was closed down. Many of Mao Dun's works were subjected to unfair criticism and at-

tempts were made to draw him into anti-Soviet activities. He was, however, permitted to write for the press, and was reinstated as Chairman of the revived Union of Writers only shortly before his death in 1981", writes the author (p. 19).

The hardships that befell him neither broke his spirit nor changed his convictions. Mao Dun worked to popularise Soviet literature in China after the decade of the "cultural revolution" (1966-1976) just as he had back in 1921. The first special issue of the literary magazine *Sulian Wenxue* (*Soviet Literature*), published in Peking in 1980, had as a foreword a poem by Mao Dun devoted to the event. An old friend of our country, Mao Dun spared neither time nor effort to revive literary ties between the two nations. He took pride in the fact that 2,683 works of classical Russian and Soviet authors had been translated and published in China from 1949 to 1956. His 1957 article in the Soviet periodical *Inostrannaya Literatura* (*Foreign Literature*) calculates the total number of such books as up to 67,630,000 copies.¹

Rakhmanin also met more than once with teacher Lao She (1899-1966), currently perhaps the most popular Chinese writer in the Soviet Union. His popularity is growing both in China and the rest of the world as well (p. 27). A discussion, which they had in 1957, jotted down in detail in Rakhmanin's notebook, is included in the book. In it Lao She expanded on his credo as a writer (pp. 25-26). He warned of the danger of substituting political slogans for creative writing, the danger of formalism: "Boldness and creative writing cannot be separated. Lack of originality in writing inevitably results in imitation, and imitation leads to decay in literature", said Lao She (p. 25). He deplored "unrefined critique, attacks on writers" which suppress rather than stimulate creative writing. "What is necessary in the field of culture is exchange, but you cannot impose reforms on others unilaterally and compulsorily" (p. 26).

"It was a great pleasure to visit the home of this interesting man," Rakhmanin writes, "to be hosted by his wife Hu Jieqing, a painter. Their apartment was a collection of unique books, souvenirs, flowers, and Lao She was a wonderful interlocuter. We talked for hours and hours, which enabled me to get to know this great writer and patriot well. During one of our last meetings, Lao She told me animatedly about his encounters with

¹ Mao Dun, "The Chinese Literature, Its Past, Present and Future", *Inostrannaya Literatura*, 1957, No. 9, p. 15.

Soviet colleagues at a Writers' Congress in Moscow. With intrinsic humour he commented on his attendance of numerous sittings during the Congress as follows: "Well, from a writer I turned into a conference-sitter" (p. 24).

Lao She perished on August 24, 1966, his body was found in a Peking pond. The Peking literary magazine *Wenyibao* recently published a story of his death as told by his widow.

Hu Jueqing is now preparing a 15-volume edition of Lao She's collected works for publication. The first volumes, already off the press, include his early works. Among them are some that have not yet run into second edition in China, such as his "The Wise Man Has Said..."² All who knew Lao She or were introduced to him would undoubtedly agree with Rakhmanin's opinion of him: "The powerful intellect and talent of this most charming man and artist will never be erased from my memory" (p. 28).

In China Rakhmanin also became acquainted with the outstanding poet and public figure Xiao San (1896-1983), who was in the 1950s an active member of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Society. Xiao San spent a great deal of time in the Soviet Union; some of his verses are even written in Russian; he attended the 1st Congress of the Soviet Writers' Union, at which he was addressed, as representative of Chinese revolutionary writers, by Maxim Gorky in a famous speech.

Xiao San had a good command of Russian. He translated "The True Story of A-Key" and "The Shanghai Impressions of 1933" from Chinese into Russian. From Russian into Chinese he translated such Russian and Soviet writers as Pushkin, Mayakovsky, Korneichuk, and Gusev. As a journalist and literary critic he wrote much for the Soviet periodicals in the 1930s. A good deal of credit goes to him for popularising Lu Xin's writings in the Soviet Union.

His personal contribution to Soviet-Chinese literary ties is so great that it constitutes an important chapter of its own in the history of these relations. While staying in the Soviet Union from 1932 to 1954, Xiao San published seven books of verse and some twenty articles on Chinese and Soviet litera-

ture. It is a pity that his activities have not yet been fully appreciated in his own country; unfortunately, he is better known as a poet in the USSR than in China, and his articles about Lu Xin have not been included in Chinese bibliographies such as the year-book devoted to Lu Xin's centenary.³

Rakhmanin's notebooks on China contain a detailed account of his meeting with writer Zhao Shuli (1905-1970) in 1955 on the shores of the Dongting Lake. Of farming stock, Zhao Shuli represented the new generation of Chinese men of letters. "I was born and grew up in the countryside," he told Rakhmanin, "and I did not need any 'special trips' to be continually among common people." Indeed, the language of his books and his characters are truly of popular origin. From a common peasant lad Zhao Shuli grew into a man of high literary culture. Like Lao She he died a tragic death, refusing to compromise with his good name and convictions (p. 30). Chinese writer Wang Xijian's story "The Death of Li Youcai" is based on Zhao Shuli's tale "Li Youcai's Songs" and Zhao Shuli's own life story. Wang Xijian takes the character from Zhao Shuli's tale, and makes him relive Zhao Shuli's life experiences. Huang Xiuyi in his *The Literary and Critical Biography of Zhao Shuli*,⁴ published in 1981, states that Zhao Shuli died in the prime of his literary career, full of energy and new ideas and plans.

Rakhmanin also knew the Chinese poet Ai Qing (born in 1910) personally, even before 1957. "Already at that time they had started persecuting him as an 'anti-Party right-wing element'... more than 20 years ago this great Chinese poet was silenced," writes Rakhmanin (pp. 32-33).

Times have changed. In 1983, Ai Qing's collected work *Returned Songs* was awarded a prize. The old poet's verses have impressed Chinese readers not only with their maturity, but also with their optimism. Critics call his songs "radiant". In the foreword to his collection of poems entitled *A Poet Should Speak the Truth*, Ai Qing says: "In the face of instantaneously changing reality a poet should speak the words of his soul. Verses must be written with one's heart under the control of one's conscience. What is called conscience is what is good for the people; it

² Lao She, "The Wise Man Has Said..." Translated from Chinese by V. Semanov. In the book *Oriental Anthology*, issue 7, *Autumn in the Mountains*, Moscow, 1979 (in Russian).

³ *Lu Xin yanjiu niankan*, Xian, 1979.

⁴ Huang Xiuyi *Zhao Shuli pingzhuan*, Xuzhou, 1981.

is the people's aspirations. The heart of the people will discern the true values."³

Al Qing had always travelled a good deal. In the 1950s he visited the Soviet Union and South America; in the 1970s—Western Europe. Upon seeing the Coliseum in Rome, the poet wrote:

In our contemporary world

There are still people who think and feel like slave-owners,

For them the human race is just an object of enslavement.

And the whole globe is just a coliseum...

A very accurate picture of Al Qing, according to Rakhmanin (p. 32), is given in N. Fedorenko's book *The Chinese Notes*, which is today a sort of requiem for many Chinese men of culture who fell victim to the "cultural revolution". Al Qing's comeback to Chinese poetry, his "radiant" verses and his voice of truth after a 20-year exile are a striking example of his vitality, of the unfading power of talent.

The second edition of Rakhmanin's book includes a section devoted to Zhou Libo (1908-1979), an outstanding novelist and translator, awarded USSR State Prizes twice: in 1951 and 1952. His literary career was influenced by Soviet literature, particularly by Mikhail Sholokhov whose works he translated into Chinese (*Virgin Land Uplifted*, 1946). Zhou Libo was victimised and deprived of the right to write for many years. "In the memory of all those who knew him," writes Rakhmanin, "Zhou Libo will remain a revolutionary and an internationalist, an example of how an honest writer should fulfil his duty" (p. 35).

Rakhmanin was also acquainted with the oldest Chinese experts in Russian language Cao Jinghua, born in 1897, and Ge Baoquan, born in 1913. Thanks to their common work in the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society, and along the lines of cultural relations, they had a lot of contacts and discussions that developed into a friendship lasting for many years.

Rakhmanin's chapter on China's drama theatre is especially valuable. To write about theatre one must see it. Rakhmanin, an avid theatre fan, was in a position to follow the development of China's theatrical art for many years. He was friendly with such famous playwrights as Tian Han, Cao Yu, Xia Yan, Chen Baichen, Chen Qitong, and Yang Hansheng. This chapter is important

not only as the remote past and the distant 1950s, but also the present. In the late 1970s Cao Yu and Chen Baichen put up their new historical plays, "Wang Zhaojun" and "The Song of the Strong Wind" which made them central once more in China's theatrical life.

The 1950s were characterised by active cultural cooperation between the Soviet Union and China and the Soviet Counsellor for Culture in Peking played an important role in these contacts. His was a busy life. Among his responsibilities were public relations, meetings, talks, arrangement of tours of artistic companies, and joint productions. Soviet plays were staged in Peking at that time and the theatres needed advice and practical assistance. Rakhmanin's book narrates in detail the staging in Peking of Tian Han's remarkable historic play "Guan Hanqing," the activities of Cao Yu as director of the Peking Art Theatre and the tragic death in 1968 of Sun Weishi, the talented directress of China's Youth Art Theatre (she had graduated from the Moscow State Institute of Theatrical Art).

Chinese theatre is many-faceted. The author discusses not only modern drama, called by the Chinese "spoken drama", but also the traditional Peking opera theatre, "jingju". Rakhmanin saw on stage and knew personally the famous Chinese actor Mei Lanfang, the reformer of the Peking opera. "I was lucky to talk many times with Mei Lanfang, to enjoy his unique art" (p. 63). The famous Soviet theatre director V. Komissarzhevsky once said of Mei Lanfang, and quite to the point, "he has become the history and the legend of Chinese theatre".⁴ Rakhmanin reproduces the notes of his talk with Mei Lanfang in 1955, and also his memories of the festive meeting in Peking on April 11, 1955, sponsored by the Chinese Ministry of Culture and China's artists' organisations, and dedicated to the 50th anniversary on the stage of two outstanding traditional Chinese theatre actors—Mei Lanfang and Zhou Xinfang.

Rakhmanin's book is the first to describe the activities of the House of Culture at the Peking Sino-Soviet Friendship Society in the 1950s. Its cultural and educational programme was at that time most varied, including films, photographic exhibits, concerts and lectures by figures such as Xiao San and Ge Baoquan.

"During my almost 15 years in China I travelled a lot. There are very few places in

³ V. Komissarzhevsky, "Mei Lanfang and his Book". In the book: *Mei Lanfang, 40 Years on the Stage*. M., 1963, p. 4.

⁴ *Guangming ribao*, May 26, 1983

the country I haven't been to. Of course, not everything has been committed to memory, but the jottings from my old notebooks help partially to call to mind some of the impressions of those years", writes Rakhmanin (pp. 75-76). The author shares his travelling impressions of the city of Luoyan, Sichuan province (1953), the sculptures of the Yungang caves, Jinan and Beidaihe. In the winter of 1952, the author visited Canton, Hangzhou, Nanking, Kunming, Nanchang and Shaoxing. He went to Hangzhou, Wuhan, and Wuxian, because there the memory still lives of the heroic Soviet flyer G. Kulishenko who had volunteered for China and was shot down by the Japanese on October 14, 1937. Rakhmanin also warmly recalls professors Hu Hua, Miao Chuhuan, and Sun Jingzhi, whose classes he attended at the People's University of China.

The last chapter of the book deals with the author's observations on national painting and Chinese applied arts—calligraphy, woodcuts, glazed ceramics for construction, stone carving and lacquer ware. There is also a section on Chinese folk holidays, and a description of the "beating of the devil" in the Peking temple of Yonghegong, so rarely mentioned in literature. Chinese tea drinking habits, the Chinese cuisine, and Peking restaurants are also discussed.

Cruel time has taken away many of those whom the author knew and met with in the 1950s. Some, such as Lao She, Zhao Shuli, and

Tian Han, met with tragic ends in the prime of their lives. Others such as Ai Qing, Xia Yan, and Yang Hansheng, endured the trials and ordeals of the dark decade of 1966-1976. Nonetheless, the book is remarkably optimistic. The author is confident of better Soviet-Chinese cultural relations in the future. He places faith in friends such as Ge Baoquan—"It was a pleasure to receive a kind letter in 1983 from Ge Baoquan. He sends greetings and a small parcel of the books by Soviet authors which are being published in China with his assistance" (p. 32), and Chen Baichen, "I still value the friendship which bound me to Chen Baichen, we used to spend long hours in discussing Chinese literature" (p. 43).

One cannot help but agree with Rakhmanin's concluding statement. "With almost 40 years of my life devoted to China I've been wanting to write about the political events in this country, which I've done more than once. I also wanted to tell about other aspects of the lives of these industrious and remarkable people, who, I am sure, will live in friendship and cooperation with their neighbours, including the Soviet Union, always a friend in need" (p. 119).

Rakhmanin's book will undoubtedly create and increase interest among Soviet readers concerning the people, culture, history and customs of China.

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BOOK STUDYING PAST, PRESENT HISTORY OF MALAYSIA REVIEWED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 85 pp 171-173

[Review by V. A. Vasilyev of book "Malayziya vchera i segodnya" [Malaysia Yesterday and Today] by B. T. Koloskov, Moscow. Mysl, 1984, 303 pages]

B. T. Koloskov (Dr. Sc. Hist.), is a case in point.

Koloskov has used a vast body of factual material to analyse Malaysia's current socio-economic and foreign policy problems. He attaches great importance to the political situation in the country both before and after independence was gained.

The book contains a thorough analysis of Malaysia's history and of the links between the country's past and present. Koloskov gives a detailed description of the specific role played by the ethnic Chinese bourgeoisie in Malaysia's economy and its links with the ruling elite. He pays a great deal of attention to the Malaysian people's national mentality as a social phenomenon and its significance at different stages of the country's history.

The value of a book on area studies depends, to a large extent, on how deep and comprehensive the analysis is and on the personality of the author, his knowledge and skill in explaining important matters which are of interest for a wide range of readers.

The monograph under review by a prominent Soviet scholar of international affairs,

The author examines the main trends in Malaysia's economic development, and reveals the objective and subjective factors which have defined the position and activities of the country's various social and political forces in their struggle for economic progress and the strengthening of Malaysia's status in the world capitalist economy and the capitalist system as a whole.

Malaysia's ruling circles, Koloskov points out, are trying to overcome economic backwardness by intensively going over to the capitalist mode of production. This process is accompanied by the exacerbation of class antagonisms as the proletariat grows in number and its class consciousness evolves. Moreover, it gives a new aspect to the problem of intercommunal relations. In this context it is of great significance whether the consolidation of the positions held by the Malay national bourgeoisie will lead to stronger opposition to the local Chinese bourgeoisie or whether both communes will act in concert against their common enemy, the Malay working class.

The monograph contains a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Malaysia's foreign economic ties and its dependence on the world market. This has enabled the author to estimate the country's actual degree of economic and political dependence with sufficient accuracy.

The author gives an interesting account of the original way of life of the Malays, their archaic mores and the distinct features of the country's feudal-bourgeois political superstructure. Koloskov pays a great deal of attention to the position of the Malay working class and its struggle, as well as to the changes that have taken place in the life of the peasantry and other social groups. He points out that the process of social evolution is considerably influenced by the peculiarities of Malaysia's national structure, in particular, by the existence of a large Chinese population.

A comprehensive study of the problems of social and economic development in Malaysia is necessary if one is to understand the complicated processes which are now taking place in Malaysia and other countries of Southeast Asia, whose people have a vital interest in seeing their countries develop along the road of peace, national independence and social progress.

In essence the monograph is a problem study of Malaysia's history from ancient times to the present. Koloskov is the first So-

viet scholar of the Orient to try to use the example of one developing country, in order to investigate processes characteristic for the whole region to which that country belongs. He analyses not only the features specific to one country but also the regularities common to all the Southeast Asian countries which were formerly colonies.

Malaysia is a member of ASEAN, an organisation uniting those developing countries in Southeast Asia, which have opted for capitalism. The status these countries possess on the world scene is determined by two major factors. First, their rulers are class allies of world capitalism, and second, as was pointed out at the June 1983 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, "the objective interests of these countries are opposed by the aggressive policy of domination and *diktat* pursued by the imperialist powers. To overcome economic backwardness, these countries need equitable cooperation combined with a stable peace".

ASEAN was formed in 1967 as a regional organisation intended to promote economic, social and cultural cooperation among its members. Koloskov emphasises that this is a factor which points to the existence of a trend towards integration among developing nations.

The sincere desire the members of ASEAN possess for genuine independence, both political and economic, and for rapid industrialisation, as well as their joint efforts in opposition to neocolonialism, exploitation by transnational monopolies and foreign capital are not to the liking of the forces of imperialism. In addition, the ruling elite in the ASEAN countries consider their primary task to be to defend the interests of the big national bourgeoisie, to suppress all kinds of opposition and to persecute progressive elements.

Despite repeated statements by ASEAN leaders that their alliance is not and will never be a military bloc, these countries are stockpiling more and more weapons and militaristic trends are growing in strength. The countries in question spend enormous sums on military exercises, new proving grounds and training camps, as well as weapons and other military hardware. In 1983, their military allocations grew by 15 per cent on average as against 1982 (\$ 1,700 million). It is only natural that the United States does its best to encourage those circles which seek to make ASEAN a military bloc. Washington insistently demands that the ASEAN coun-

thies take "greater responsibility" for defending the "interests of the free world".

The author stresses that these militaristic tendencies in the ASEAN countries could lead to negative consequences since they are at odds with the aims ASEAN set itself at the time of its creation, and contradict the national interests of the Association's members.

The author discusses Malaysia's foreign policy and its contacts with developed capitalist states in detail, and examines the role these contacts play and the impact they have on Malaysia's domestic situation. He also gives a thorough analysis of Malaysia's external ties and their dynamics, the problems associated with getting foreign aid and the class nature of this aid.

Koloskov exposes the methods imperialists employ to further their expansion and the economic plunder of Malaysia. In addition, he discusses the latest forms of neocolonialism which hamper attempts by that country and other Asian states to alter the inequitable nature of international economic relations.

Koloskov also reveals how imperialists torpedo the development of the newly free countries by introducing destabilising factors.

The Soviet Union, a consistent champion of peace and international detente, now as always displays a keen interest in finding ways to normalise the situation in Asia.

The author discusses the Soviet Union's peaceable foreign policy, the constructive efforts it has made to ensure peace and security in Southeast Asia, and the aid and support it has rendered to developing countries which strive for social progress and economic independence.

The monograph under review, with its in-depth analysis of the key problems of Malaysia's social and economic development, is a notable contribution to area studies conducted in this country. It will be of interest both to students of international affairs and readers who are interested in knowing more about the problems facing developing nations.

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TRANSLATION OF PRC CONSTITUTION, LEGAL ACTS ISSUED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 85 pp 173-175

[Review by E. Z. Imamov, candidate of juridical sciences, of book "Kitayskaya Narodnaya Respublika. Konstitutsiya i zakonodatelnyye akty" [People's Republic of China. Constitution and Legislative Acts], tr fr Chinese, Moscow, Progress, 1984, 470 pages: "Contemporary Legislation in China"]

Progress Publishers has brought out a book entitled *The People's Republic of China. Constitution and Legal Acts* (ed. by Professor L. M. Gudoshnikov). The collection incorporates the PRC Constitution, laws and other legal acts passed in China in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

As is well-known law-making in China during this period primarily focused on two aspects of legislation—economic legislation (including environmental protection) and legislation regulating the organisation and functioning of the state machinery, including law enforcement bodies. These acts reflect the basic trends in PRC legislation policy which is aimed, first, at raising the efficiency of the state structure, second, at formalising the

"four modernisations" policy and, third, at stepping up crime control in the country.

This direction of Chinese law-making activities has for the most part determined the compositional structure of the collection: it opens with the 1982 PRC Constitution which is followed by three sections containing legal acts pertaining to state bodies, economic and environmental legislation, criminal law and legislation on criminal procedure.

The fourth and concluding section deals with legal acts which are not included in the preceding sections but which are nonetheless important for understanding the distinctive features of China's legal system today.

Section I of the collection features laws on the organisation of national and local government, executive bodies and the procedure for election to them, regulations on people's courts and the prosecution office as well as provisional regulations on the bar and the notarial system. In addition, the section contains subjoining acts pertaining to the reform and restructuring of the State Council and its subunits. These acts, which graphically show the dynamics of China's legislation concerning the supreme bodies of power give a better understanding of the causes and conditions under which the final version of

the Statute on the PRC State Council was adopted.

As a whole the documents in the first section testify to the fact, that this sphere of PRC legislation has a sufficient and developed legal base. This is evidently explained by both the relative stability of the object of legal regulation and certain positive experience scored by Chinese law-makers in this sphere.

Section II (economic and environmental legislation) is comprised of legal acts pertaining to the most diverse spheres of law—civil law, labour law, fiscal law, land law, etc. The distribution of documents in this section suggests that they fall into three basic groups: the first group is comprised of laws which regulate the country's domestic economic affairs; the second group is comprised of laws controlling the activities of foreign companies in China; the third group is made up of environmental laws.

It should be pointed out, that the first group of legal acts reflects the complex processes which are currently underway in China's economy. Owing to the heterogeneous and dynamic nature of social relations Chinese legislators could not immediately codify all the spheres of law. They were obliged to confine themselves to adopting small-size documents regulating individual social relations within the framework of a group of social relations which form the subject of a certain branch of law.

However, individual economic acts passed by the PRC's supreme authorities are devoid of legal content. These regulations are neither state injunctions nor are they compulsory, rather they have the status of recommendations. Examples are the State Council's "Resolution on Introducing the Course Towards Readjustment of the National Economy at Commune and Production Team Enterprises" and "Provisional Regulations on Launching and Protecting Socialist Competition". It is not inconceivable, that these acts which reflect the earliest stage of legal development are viewed by Chinese legislators as models for shaping the bases and principles of a subsequent, and ultimately legal, means of controlling this group of social relations which take prospective changes and even their qualitatively new make-up into account.

Legal acts regulating the activities of foreign companies in China are well represented in the collection. Examples are a Statute on Taxing the Revenues of Mixed Enterprises Based on Chinese and Foreign Capital, Pro-

visional Regulation on Foreign Currency Control, and a Statute on Running Mixed Enterprises Based on Chinese and Foreign Capital.

These acts go into greater detail on relations between the state and foreign entrepreneurs and the activities of the latter's companies. Among the many reasons for this elaboration the first which should be mentioned is China's urge to be seen as a state governed by laws and a law-abiding partner in the eyes of foreign companies. In addition, the establishment of strict rules governing the operation of the "China-foreign company" economic mechanism meets the requirements of China itself first and foremost.

This section also incorporates four PRC laws on the environmental protection activities of the state. These legal acts manifest China's growing interest in the question of environmental protection. It is a well-known fact, that the spontaneous felling of woods and ploughing of virgin lands in China has seriously affected the country's ecological balance, obliging Chinese authorities to take emergency measures to restrain the baneful impact of human economic activities on nature.

It should be emphasized, that the above acts, unlike many other PRC laws, are more accurately formulated from the point of view of legal terminology and, most importantly, clearly specify the liability of individual entities and juridical persons for the violation of environmental regulations, and the measures to be taken including prosecution and punishment under criminal law.

Section III of the collection is focused on two major laws—the Criminal Code and the Code on Criminal Procedure as well as a series of criminal legislative acts.

The 1979 Criminal Code and the Code on Criminal Procedure have since been substantially revised and supplemented. Seeking quickly to eliminate the sharply aggravated crime rate in the country Chinese law-makers are taking steps to toughen punishments.

The innovations in PRC criminal legislation clearly indicate the prevalence of repressive tendencies in crime control. At the same time, the difficulties incurred by Chinese legal institutions in the application of the Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes' regulations compelled the country's law-makers to enact amendments to the Code, "weakening" certain major requirements of criminal procedural legislation.

The closing fourth section entitled "Other Legal Acts" is comprised of a series of China's legal documents: "Statute of the People's Republic of China on Citizenship", "Statute of the People's Republic of China on Protecting Culture Monuments", etc.

This section also includes two documents which are very important for gaining an understanding of China's legal system: the November 29, 1979 "Decision on the Validity of Laws and Decrees Passed Since the Formation of the PRC" and the 1957 "Resolution of the State Council on Labour Education" which was reissued on February 26, 1980.

It seems that Chinese law-makers put the laws and decrees of the 1950s back in force in order to fill the gaps which exist in many spheres of Chinese law today. An analysis of the regulations in the "Resolution on Labour Education" shows that they provide for the application of measures which are as severe as punishments for breaches of the criminal law and unspecified by criminal procedural legislation (Code on Criminal Procedure, Art. 2-3); they are also outside the bounds of legitimatised legal procedures.

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BOOK ON PACIFIC REGIONALISM REVIEWED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 85 pp 175-176

[Review by L. G. Kondrashov of book "Tikhookeanskii regionalizm: kontseptsii i realnost'" [Pacific Regionalism: Theory and Reality], ed by V. I. Ivanov and K. V. Malakhovskiy, Moscow, Nauka, 1983, 262 pages: "Pacific Region: New Economic and Political Developments"]

The emergence of the phenomenon of Pacific regionalism is inseparably linked with the post-war enhancement of the role of the Pacific zone nations in global politics and economy. At present, this region accounts for about 60 per cent of the world's total industrial output and accommodates major industrial centres which set the pace for scientific and technological progress. The aggregate territory of the Pacific basin countries comprises 52 per cent of the globe's dry land and by the third millennium it will be the home for more than 50 per cent of the world's population. The Pacific region accounts for 56.5 per cent of the capitalist world's extraction of coal, 35.8 per cent of iron ore, 50.2 per cent of copper ore, 54.3 per cent of lead, 70 per cent of tin and many other minerals. This provides the basis for the Pacific nations' powerful economic development. The monograph under review examines current processes at work in the Pacific region. The indubitable merit of the book lies in the fact that its authors have generalised and systematised an extensive available data and have critically assessed the works by foreign scholars.

The rapid development of productive forces has intensified various kinds of relations

between states. The authors correctly define the deepening international division of labour and economic internationalisation as processes underlying the regionalisation of trade flows, the export of capital and the scientific and technological exchange. International economic rapprochement is accompanied by the aggravation of economic differences and makes the coordination of their foreign economic activities imperative.

The authors pay special attention to problems related to the formation of the so-called Pacific Community and the possibility of the emergence of a regional integrated group. Although there are no "organisational, institutional or legal regulations", the authors point out (p. 19), the level of economic rapprochement between such countries as the US and Canada, Australia and New Zealand is sufficiently high. Big business's urge to profit from the objective process of economic internationalisation has given rise to various "solidarity ideas", and to the formal alignment of a group of countries, primarily the industrialised capitalist ones, in a Pacific regional framework. These tendencies are manifested in the Pacific Community idea which is heatedly debated abroad. The book studies in detail the emergence and subsequent evolution of the proposals to establish a regional set-up.

The progressive community is very anxious about the possibility that the integration processes which have begun in the Pacific might take the shape of a military bloc challenging the stability and security of this region's countries. This is why one of the monograph's sections analyses the military and political aspects of regional relations which "makes it possible to more comprehensively assess the possible ways of changing the international situation given growing

economic interdependence." (p. 57). The authors justly emphasise the dangerous rise in military expenditures in the majority of the region's states (for the region in general, it almost doubled between 1975 and 1980); the US urge to gain military superiority over the USSR, the growth of Japanese militarism and the rapid reinforcement of the South Korean military machine, all this adversely affecting the international situation.

The authors thoroughly examine attempts by individual states to utilise Pacific regionalism for achieving their own narrow interests. The industrialised states, such as the US, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand share the goal of strengthening their political positions in view of the situation changing in favour of the progressive forces, using the unifying tendencies to alleviate the interimperialist contradictions and to smooth out frictions which have emerged in relations with developing nations of the region, and also to solve such global problems as energy, food, etc., on terms advantageous and profitable for monopoly capital. This section's basic theses show the increasingly manifest reliance of Japanese imperialism on setting up, under its own control, a major economic and, potentially, political interstate grouping in the Western Pacific which would be a functional element of the country's economic mechanism and a tool for the consolidation of Japan's positions in interimperialist rivalry. The US, in turn, emphasises the maintenance and enhancement of its economic role in the Pacific and the possible build-up of its military and political presence there. The Canadian government seeks to diversify its trade and economic relations in order to speed up Canada's economic development. The change in Australian and New Zealand foreign trade in favour of the Pacific zone countries is accompanied by reductions in the share of trade with their traditional partner, Great Britain, even more so, since the implementation of the Pacific Community idea could strengthen their position in the South Pacific.

The idea of setting up a "Community" arouses the concern on the part of developing countries. Thus the ASEAN members are reluctant to fall under US military and political hegemony and Japanese economic sway. The "Community" idea failed to gain the overall support of the Pacific nations and manifested a variety of approaches as re-

gards its goals and objectives as well as the forms and ways of carrying out the idea. This has given rise to new contradictions in interstate relations which, in turn, will evidently impede the realisation of the project. In our opinion, these sections of the book, providing a sufficiently comprehensive panorama of regional interstate relations, are a substantial success for the authors' team.

The book under review justly emphasises the fact that regional economic processes, integration included, have a tangible impact on the development of the world economy, on the USSR's economic position, potential and prospects both in the regional framework and on a global scale. The adequate assessment of and due regard for these processes are essential for the elaboration of the scientifically substantiated measures to raise the efficiency of our foreign economic ties, and to improve the USSR's (primarily its Far Eastern regions) economic cooperation in the Pacific basin in order to accelerate the development of the Far Eastern economic region and the country as a whole. The authors approach opportunities for cooperation in the Pacific, with the USSR actively taking part in it, as a major factor for regional economic development.

In our opinion, the features of economic and political processes in the Pacific region require special consideration. The authors failed to adequately analyse the correlation between such "theoretical" theses as the "Atlantic solidarity" and "Pacific regionalism", despite the fact that the US and Canada are both Pacific and Atlantic states. China's role in the region and the development of its military and political relations with the US and Japan are insufficiently analysed.

Individual drawbacks, however, do not at all belittle the value and significance of the book in question, which is the first ever in this country to comprehensively assess new phenomena in the Pacific region's economy and politics. The book contains vast factual material which is sure to interest both Soviet and foreign scholars engaged in related studies and the reader at large. This issue is a good supplement to a large variety of articles and other materials which have lately appeared in this country and abroad.

BOOK EXAMINES MANCHURIA'S 18TH CENTURY EXPANSIONIST POLICIES

Moscow PROBLEMY DALNEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, Jan-Mar 85 (signed to press 21 Feb 85) pp 199-200

[Review by V. Ya. Basin, doctor of historical sciences, of book "Tsinskaya imperiya i narody Sayano-Altaya v XVIII v." [The Qing Empire and the Sayano-Altay Peoples in the 18th Century] by V. A. Moiseyev, Moscow, Nauka, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1983, 150 pages]

[Text] The Qing empire's policy on the countries and peoples of Central Asia from the 17th century to the 19th has long been a matter of great interest to Soviet researchers, who have written a number of valuable works on this topic.* Until recently, however, not all aspects of this policy had been studied in

* See V. Ya. Basin, "Rossiya i kazakhskiye khanstva v XVI-XVIII vv. (Kazakhstan v sisteme vneshney politiki rossiyskoy imperii)" [Russia and the Kazakh Khanates of the 16th-18th Centuries (Kazakhstan in the Russian Empire's Foreign Policy Network)], Alma-Ata, 1971; V. P. Gurevich, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya v Tsentralnoy Azii v XVII-pervoy polovine XIX v." [International Relations in Central Asia from the 17th to the Middle of the 19th Centuries], Moscow, 1979; L. I. Duman, "The Conquest of Jungaria and East Turkestan by the Qing Empire," in the book "Manchzhurskoye vladychestvo v Kitaye" [The Manchurian Empire in China], Moscow, 1966; I. S. Yermachenko, "Politika manchzhurskoy dinastii Tsin v Yuzhnoy i Severnoy Mongolii v XVII v." [The Policy of the Manchurian Qing Dynasty in Southern and Northern Mongolia in the 17th Century], Moscow, 1974; I. Ya. Zlatkin, "Istoriya Dzhungarskogo khanstva (1635-1758)" [The History of the Jungarian Khanate (1635-1758)], 2d ed, Moscow, 1983; "Kitay i sosedi v drevnosti i srednevekovye" [The Ancient and Medieval History of China and Its Neighbors], Moscow, 1970; "Kitay i sosedi v novoye i noveysheye vremya" [The Modern and Contemporary History of China and Its Neighbors], Moscow, 1982; V. S. Kuznetsov, "Tsinskaya imperiya na rubezhakh Tsentralnoy Azii (vtoraya polovina XVIII-pervaya polovina XIX v.)" [The Qing Empire on the Boundaries of Central Asia (Second Half of the 18th Century and First Half of the 19th)], Novosibirsk, 1983; V. S. Myasnikov, "Imperiya Tsin i russkoye gosudarstvo v XVII v." [The Qing Empire and the Russian State in the 17th Century], Moscow, 1980; Sh. B. Chimitdorzhiev, "Antimanchzhurskaya osvoboditelnaya borba mongolskogo naroda" [The Mongolian People's Anti-Manchurian Liberation Struggle], Ulan-Ude, 1974.

sufficient detail or depth. For example, the Qing invasion of the Sayano-Altay uplands has not been studied to any great extent. This is precisely the subject of the book we are reviewing by V. A. Moiseyev.

The book was written with the aid of a wealth of historical documents. This is the first time some of them have been made available to the academic community, and they include Russian archival documents and Chinese chronicles and works. The book begins with a solid introduction, containing a historical survey and explaining the aims and objectives of the research, the findings of previous studies and the main sources of information on the topic. After analyzing hundreds of Russian archival documents, the author compared them to Chinese reports to learn the true nature of the Qing empire's policy in the Sayano-Altay region and to reveal the importance of this region and its role in the general expansionist plans of the Qing dynasty in Central Asia.

The author describes the forms and methods of Qing policy in the region and defines the actual political status of the Sayano-Altay peoples prior to the Manchurian invasion and after the start of the Qing expansion in Tuva and the Mongolian Altay region; he describes the process by which the peoples of the Altay mountains became part of Russia, demonstrates the invalidity of China's claims to this territory and discusses the effects of Qing domination on the socioeconomic and cultural development of the peoples of this region. The author's thorough knowledge of his subject matter serves as the basis for a panorama of historical events in Uryankhay, Northern Mongolia and Jungaria in the 18th century.

The author discusses the causes of the Qing empire's invasion of northwestern Central Asia and the essence of the so-called "Uryankhay question" during the late 17th century and the first half of the 18th. In this connection, he discusses the Manchurian Qing dynasty's policy in Tuva and the settlement patterns, socioeconomic order and political status of the Turkic peoples of the Sayano-Altay region. In our opinion, the author arrives at an absolutely accurate and extremely important conclusion when he says that the sparse settlement patterns in the huge expanses of the Sayano-Altay uplands and beyond their boundaries and the absence of any kind of strong and stable government placed many of the peoples of the Altay and Tuva regions in the 17th century at the mercy of their stronger neighbors--the Jungarian Khanate and the princes of northern Mongolia, and later the Qing empire. The author displays a good understanding of the complex and abruptly changing political situation in Tuva just before it was invaded by the Manchurian conquerors and describes the process by which Russia's influence spread gradually throughout the upper Yenisey basin and was then blocked by the invasions of the Mongolian and Oyrat troops and later by the Manchurian invasion. Step by step, V. A. Moiseyev traces the advance of the Qings and their stooges--the Khalkhak feudal lords in southern Tuva--and explains the reasons for this advance. "After attaining their main goal of dominion in Central Asia," the author writes, "the Qings tried first to take Tibet, the basin island of Kukuror and the Sayano-Altay zone, and then, after encircling the Oyrat khanate from all sides, to deal with their main adversary" (p 31). The author analyzes various stages of the Qing court's "Uryankhay" policy and the distinctive features of Manchurian activity in this region.

The author speaks at length on the proceedings and results of the Russo-Chinese talks of 1726-1728, recorded in the famous Burin and Kyakhta treaties. The author stresses that the Russian government delegation headed by experienced diplomat S. L. Vladislavich-Raguzinskiy had to give up some territories to the Qings which had long been part of the Russian empire after a lengthy series of difficult negotiations with Qing authorities in an atmosphere of constant moral and physical pressure.

The author's analysis of the Qing empire's invasion of the Mongolian Altay and the defeat of the Turkic and Mongolian subjects of the Jungar khans is the first in Soviet literature and, as far as we know, in world literature. As the author shows, the Qing government decided to deal a crushing blow to the Oyrat khanate, which had already been weakened by fierce inter-feudal strife, at the beginning of the 1750's. In preparation for the general assault on Jungaria, Beijing "cleared out" all avenues of approach in an attempt to establish control over the alpine obstacle of the greatest military significance--the Mongolian Altay region--and to subjugate the local population. On the basis of evidence derived from Chinese sources, especially the "Imperially Confirmed Description of the Pacification of the Jungars" and "Chronicles of the Rule of the Great Qing Dynasty," the author describes the Qing assaults on the peoples of the Mongolian Altay in 1753 and 1754. In spite of fierce and stubborn resistance, the small and disunited Tuva tribes of the Mongolian Altay were defeated. In late 1755 and in 1756, after all of the different tribal hordes in Jungaria had been conquered by the Qing dynasty, Qing detachments attacked the nomad camps of the southern Altays, many of whom had been Russian subjects for more than a hundred years and had been paying taxes to the empire. The book contains an extremely interesting description of the unequal heroic struggle of the Altay and Tuva natives for their freedom and independence and the participation by the Turkic peoples of Tuva and Altay in the anti-Qing liberation rebellions in Jungaria and Khalkha under the leadership of Amursan and Tsengunjab. The author cites many facts to substantiate the aggressive nature of the Manchurian Qing dynasty's policy in the Sayano-Altay region, which brought the local population ruin and death.

The policy of Qing China and Russia in the Altay and Tuva regions in the second half of the 18th century is thoroughly analyzed in the book. It would seem that the question of the southern Altays' Russian affiliation had been researched sufficiently by Soviet historians, but V. A. Moiseyev describes the role of the Qing empire's invasion in this turning point in the history of the Altay natives and relates the proceedings of talks on citizenship rights and tells how the Qing government reacted to this issue. In connection with this, we must agree with the author that the Qing aggression only accelerated the process by which the Altay mountain peoples became part of Russia, a process with deeper causes, primarily the long-standing and constantly developing economic and political relations between the two groups of people. The author cites numerous examples of the Qings' repeated attempts to change the status quo and to force the Altay mountain people to acknowledge the Qing emperor as their ruler. The devastating attacks of Qing detachments, accompanied by the robbery and imprisonment of the local Turkic population, continued until the 1790's. The author speaks at length

about the consolidation of Russia's influence in the Altay region and about the efforts of the government and the local Siberian administration to defend their new citizens against Qing invasions. The last section of the book explains how the Uryankhay regions seized by the Manchurians were turned into something like a buffer zone and colonial periphery of the empire.

The structure of the work corresponds to the objectives of the research and is based on considerable documented information and clear explanations of the cause and effect relationships between events. Most of the author's conclusions are sound and valid. Some sections of the book might have been more complete, particularly the parts dealing with the "Uryankhay question." The author's conclusion that the Qing court planned to use Uryankhay as a bridgehead for further expansion into Kazakhstan and Siberia and a buffer zone of defense against outside invasions needs more detailed substantiation, just as the statement about the nominal and real vassals of the Qing dynasty.

The book would be easier to work with if it had an index of people and place names and some maps.

In spite of these omissions, V. A. Moiseyev's work is a valuable contribution to the study of Qing China's policy in Central Asia and of the past history of the Turkic peoples of Tuva and Altay.

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NAKHODKA SITE OF SEMINAR ON PEACE AND COOPERATION IN PACIFIC

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[Report by N. I. Lutsenko, candidate of historical sciences, on Seventh International Seminar of Young Researchers of Peace and Cooperation in the Pacific on "Pacific Forum of Trust" in Nakhodka on 7-11 August 1984]

[Text] The Seventh International Seminar of Young Researchers of Peace and Cooperation in the Pacific Basin, organized by the USSR Committee of Youth Organizations and the USSR Student Council in conjunction with the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Asian and African Countries, the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the USSR Academy of Sciences, represented by several of its research institutes and the Far Eastern Scientific Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was held in Nakhodka from 7 to 11 August 1984. The forum was attended by more than 100 representatives of youth and student organizations, academics, young public spokesmen and journalists from 29 countries.

As speakers noted, the economic situation in the Pacific in the 1980's has been distinguished by the accelerated growth of the majority of economies in this region. The expansion of commercial and economic relations is promoting the intensification of intergovernmental relations. At the same time, the exacerbation of many problems in economic development and of conflicts between states or between certain countries and transnational corporations are giving rise to an objective need for the long-term regional coordination of international economic relations.

Seminar speakers stressed that there had been significant changes in the international situation in general and the state of affairs in the Asian Pacific since the time of the sixth seminar in 1981. The threat to the peace and security of nations has become quite serious and there are stronger tendencies toward confrontation, military superiority and the restriction of the independence and sovereignty of nations. One of the main reasons for the increased tension in the world and the more serious threat of nuclear war is the escalation of the arms race, which entered a dangerous phase when new American medium-range missiles were deployed in some NATO countries.

All of these negative processes will have the most direct effect on the Pacific region. The recent active militarist preparations in this zone are distinguished by the intensive buildup of U.S. military presence, the provision of U.S. armed forces in the region with more modern equipment, the further enlargement of the network of bases and other military installations, which already number in the hundreds, the organization of large-scale projects for the development of the navy and air force, the enhancement of troop mobility and the development of the potential for rapid expansionist actions.

All of this has been accompanied by the further involvement of the United States' traditional allies and other states in the region in the U.S. military strategic preparations. There have been more distinct and more frequent appeals for a new military-political alliance made up of the United States, Japan and South Korea, as well as Australia, New Zealand and the ASEAN countries, which have recently been urged quite strongly to take a more active part in U.S. strategy.

In this connection, many seminar speakers stressed the need for the vigorous development of the peace movement in Southeast Asia and in the Asian Pacific in general, the need to strengthen the security and friendly relations of the continent's peoples and the need for the peaceful reunification of Korea without any outside interference. They spoke with alarm about the tendency toward Japan's militarization.

The situation in the Pacific now depends and will continue to depend largely on the overall political climate in this region. The safeguarding of international security, the deterrence of negative tendencies in regional relations, the resolution of conflicts and the limitation of naval activity and the arms race are urgently needed. It will be important to raise the level of mutual trust in international relations. Widely acknowledged confidence-building measures could initially include bilateral initiatives to serve as a basis for the development of multilateral cooperation.

In this connection, many speakers stressed that the year of the Seventh International Seminar of Young Researchers of Peace and Cooperation in the Pacific Basin will be full of many memorable dates commemorating important events in human history. The 40th anniversary of the end of World War II and the defeat of Hitlerist fascism and Japanese militarism will be celebrated in 1985. The common desire and determination of the people of the Pacific countries to keep the peace were displayed clearly for the first time in history during that period. The brutal experience gained at such a high cost and at the loss of millions of lives proved that peace could be defended only through joint effort and by means of an active and uncompromising struggle against war.

In the postwar period the principles of peaceful coexistence won widespread recognition throughout the world. In our day, the need to continue the policy of peace and detente has become even more apparent against the background of the increasing tension in the world. In 1985 it will be 10 years since the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed in Helsinki on 1 August 1975 by representatives of 33 European

countries and the United States and Canada. The years since then have reaffirmed the fact that only dialogue and cooperation, and not tension and confrontation, are the sole acceptable and normal forms of intergovernmental relations.

In October 1985 it will be 40 years since the United Nations was founded to maintain international peace and security and promote economic and social progress throughout the world.

The special scientific colloquiums attended by leading political scientists from the Pacific Asian countries have become an extremely interesting part of the work of the Pacific seminars in Nakhodka. The problem of the "Pacific community" was thoroughly discussed at the last international seminar, the sixth, in 1981. The last colloquium was held for the discussion of confidence-building measures in the Far East and in the Pacific basin. One seminar speaker, Filipino Professor V. Villacorta, stressed that this was the first time he had witnessed such a frank and friendly exchange of opinions by Soviet and American researchers. Academics from the United States, Japan and the Philippines were quite interested in a Soviet researcher's proposal regarding the collective consideration of the possibility of creating a new international structure in the region, a "Pacific forum of trust," with the aim of improving the overall political climate and lowering the level of mutual mistrust and military confrontation between the two sociopolitical systems in Asia and the Pacific. This proposal, as colloquium participants unanimously agreed, represents an important attempt at a positive approach to the resolution of the region's most difficult problems in an atmosphere of trust and cooperation. The director of the Center for Pacific Asian Studies at the University of Hawaii in Honolulu, Professor Steven Yuhelli (United States), noted the constructive nature of the idea of the "Pacific forum of trust." "This is an extremely interesting idea--the idea of establishing a new type of regional organization to improve the overall political atmosphere in the region," he said when he was interviewed by a TASS correspondent. This warrants special consideration today, at this time of a dangerous increase in international tension, now that confrontation, militarization and brinkmanship are the alternatives to this reasonable approach. The breach of trust in the region must be replaced with the united efforts of all states to solve mankind's global problems on the basis of mutual trust. The Soviet Union has always displayed its goodwill and consistency in these matters. The international seminars of young researchers of peace and cooperation in the Pacific basin in Nakhodka offer convincing proof of the invariability of this policy.

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